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ABSTRACT 
 
Russian entrepreneurs have long faced considerable difficulties. While much is 
known about what these difficulties are, less is known about how entrepreneurs 
respond to them, what it is like to be an entrepreneur under these circumstances and 
why they bother in the first place. In this thesis I address these questions by 
conducting a multi-sited ethnography within three small Siberian enterprises, 
observing the directors as they conduct their everyday business. I find that these 
entrepreneurs all resent their vulnerable position in the political economy but that 
they have developed a capacity to survive or thrive in spite of the obstacles and 
threats they encounter. This capacity, I argue, is less a consequence of their 
commercial acumen than their understanding of what can be achieved given their 
particular circumstances, their knowledge that business-state relations take an 
informal, personalised form, and their preparedness to resist predatory outsiders. This 
leads me to reconsider the meaning of entrepreneurship in the Russian context. 
Furthermore, my informants’ agency presents a challenge to the idea in predominant 
political economic theories that the Russian state dominates the private sector. I 
therefore reconceptualise business-state relations using Douglass C. North et al’s 
Limited Access Order theory in combination with my empirical materials. This 
provides a more accurate theory that accepts the pre-eminent role of the state in the 
political economy while accommodating the agency displayed by my informants.  
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OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
I begin with an overview of the thesis as a whole in the form of a brief description of 
each chapter. This offers the reader clarity from the start about my research 
objectives, methodological approach, key findings, concepts and conclusions. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1 I begin by describing business conditions in Russia during the Putin and 
Medvedev presidencies. Although businesses have received considerable rhetorical 
and policy support from the government throughout this period, they continue to face 
significant risks and challenges. This dichotomy can be explained by Russia’s 
‘institutional asymmetry’ (Williams and Vorley 2014: 841) in which informal 
institutions, comprised of cultural norms, values and codes of conduct, undermine the 
formal institutional rules and laws introduced to support business development. In 
this environment, officials may act according to their personal will, frequently against 
the interests of entrepreneurs or the law. In turn, entrepreneurs tend not to rely on the 
government, law or policy but help themselves or turn to trusted acquaintances for 
support. Moreover, institutions change as individuals adapt their behaviour to 
institutional constraints (North 1993), which means that Russia’s entrepreneurs must 
have some control over their circumstances in spite of their vulnerability. However, 
while much research has been published on how business is doing based on macro-
economic and attitudinal data, there has been little research on what entrepreneurs do 
under such difficult conditions, or more specifically, how entrepreneurs react to 
institutional asymmetry. Gathering this data requires observation of business in 
practice and this forms the primary goal of the research. 
 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
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In Chapter 2 I argue that an ethnographic study of entrepreneurship offers the most 
appropriate way to observe how entrepreneurs ‘get by’ in spite of institutional 
asymmetry. I set out a case study design based on a multi-sited ethnography of 
business practices, which I undertook over ten months between 2013 and 2014 within 
three independent Russian companies, each in a different Western Siberian city. I 
draw especially on ‘contextual holism’, a new research programme developed by Jan 
Kubik (2013; 2015a; 2015b), to study post-socialist societies ethnographically with 
particular attention to formal and informal institutions. Ethnography with contextual 
holism is therefore an original method for studying questions of Russian political 
economy. It allows me to explain my informants’ attitudes and behaviours, the 
political economic and institutional context in which they work, and their relations 
with the state, in order to determine what contemporary entrepreneurship is like. At 
this stage I also introduce North et al’s social orders theory, This theory, I will argue, 
enables me to account more accurately for Russia’s business-state relations as I 
observed them. Specifically, I conceive of Russia as a Limited Access Order, and this 
forms the basis of my theoretical contribution to Russian political economy. 
 
Chapters 3-5: Case studies 
 
In Chapters 3-5 I present my three case studies. Each study offers a distinctive 
narrative because my informants’ experiences in business vary considerably. 
However, my informants also share the view that the state and its representatives have 
a malign influence on Russian business and they are determined to avoid them. This 
means that they spend a significant amount of time not on business matters but trying 
to reduce their vulnerability to predatory outsiders and officials. I therefore argue that 
their entrepreneurship should not be judged according to conventional business 
measures, such as profitability, company size or longevity, but in terms of their ability 
to respond to an unpredictable state and secure their independence. To explain this I 
draw on Alexei Yurchak’s concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ (2002), 
which is based on Michel Foucault’s concept of governmental rationality – a concern 
with government as an activity or practice (Gordon 1991: 3). Furthermore, I go 
beyond Yurchak to show that my informants’ entrepreneurship is also a form of 
resistance to the state. In these ways entrepreneurship takes the form of a life project 
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or mission. These observations, which underline the considerable agency of my 
informants vis-à-vis the state, represent my major empirical findings and lay the 
foundation for my key conceptual contribution, which follows in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6: Reconceptualising entrepreneurship 
 
In Chapter 6 I consider my ethnographical material in theoretical context. I show that 
my informants’ agency, characterised by a determination not to be subordinate to the 
state, poses a challenge to the idea in predominant political economic theories that 
Russian businesses are subordinate to the state. Accordingly, a reconceptualisation is 
required that accommodates the agency of my informants together with the relative 
power of the state. To achieve this I draw on North et al’s theory of limited access 
order (LAO) (2007; 2013a; 2013b) which seeks to explain how developing states’ 
institutions shape their political economies (North et al 2013b: 1-2). LAOs are 
governed by a dominant coalition of elites who control the political economy and 
agree to limit violence against one another in order to ensure access to economic 
resources (North 2007: 3). This clearly applies to the Russian case. However, little is 
currently known about why these coalitions allow private firms to survive when there 
is no obvious incentive to do so (North 2007: 39). My empirical materials offer the 
chance to develop LAO theory and improve conceptual understanding of business-
state relations. I argue that the state has been partially privatised by officials (Yurchak 
2002: 312), which allows them to act entrepreneurially, freely raiding businesses. On 
the other hand, entrepreneurs also undermine formal obstacles and may wield 
resources that compel officials to work cooperatively and pragmatically with, rather 
than against, them. This means that business-state relations are highly personalised 
rather than based on the dominance of the state over the private sector. I therefore 
contend that the imperative is for all actors to limit violence in order to improve 
access to material resources and that the quality of personal relations in business-state 
relations is critical to entrepreneurs’ fortunes.  
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
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In the Conclusion I set out four key findings.  First, I underline that private business 
in Russia continues to be extremely challenging, although, unlike extant studies of 
entrepreneurship, I am able to give specific empirical detail about the characteristics 
of those difficulties, their effect on my informants and what they actually do about 
them based on first-hand observation. Second, in spite of the pressure they encounter, 
my informants all exhibit a capacity to act in their own interests, to a lesser or greater 
extent. This challenges predominant theories about the subordination of Russian 
business to the state. Third, I argue that LAO theory offers a better conceptualisation 
of the way the Russian political economy functions, allowing for both the 
overwhelming power of the state and the agency my informants exhibit. Finally, I 
find that that since entrepreneurs face apparently interminable difficulties and yet 
choose to carry on, it follows that entrepreneurship is not simply a commercial 
vocation, but one undertaken because of what it represents: an autonomous life in 
resistance to the state and political economic status quo. I complete the thesis by 
highlighting directions for further research. 
 
Appendix: Being in the field 
 
In the Appendix I provide a short description of the specific characteristics of my role 
as a participant observer within the businesses of my informants Oleg, Anna and 
Aleksandr. I describe the key aspects of the research process including Russian-
language acquisition, establishing myself in the field and my approach to data 
collection. I also discuss my observational and participatory role within each 
business, the differences between them and how I approached the particular practical 
and ethical challenges encountered in the process. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Structure of the chapter 
 
In this chapter I make the case for my research. I begin with a description of Russian 
business conditions throughout the Putin and Medvedev presidencies (since 2000) 
with reference to scholarly and other authoritative materials. In doing so the paradox 
that forms the background and impetus for this research becomes clear: entrepreneurs 
continue to face numerous obstacles despite long-term support from the government. 
This problem is effectively explained by Russia’s ‘institutional asymmetry’, a term 
coined by Nick Williams and Tim Vorley to describe the fact that informal 
institutions tend to take precedence over formal institutions in post-socialist political 
economies (2014: 843). Institutions, according to North, provide ‘the framework 
within which human activity takes place’ (1990: 4). Thus in the Russian case the 
government’s policies and laws in support of business are undermined by behaviour 
determined by informal codes of conduct. This leaves entrepreneurs vulnerable to 
predation, not least from state officials. However, according to North, when 
individuals meet institutional constraints they change their behaviour, which means, 
logically, that entrepreneurs will not accept their vulnerability to the state but seek to 
avoid it. As North puts it, ‘If institutions are the rules of the game, organisations and 
their entrepreneurs are the players’ (1993: 345). This means that Russia’s 
entrepreneurs have some agency, even if they are relatively weak compared to 
powerful state officials. Nevertheless, I conclude that although much research has 
been undertaken showing that business is difficult, there has been little on specifically 
how entrepreneurs are reacting to these difficulties, which would require observation 
of business in practice. Accordingly this becomes my primary research objective. 
 
1.2 An analysis of conditions for entrepreneurship in contemporary 
Russia 
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According to Richard Connolly, Russia’s GDP grew at an annual average rate of over 
5 per cent between 1999 and 2013. This growth, however, was less a consequence of 
the market-oriented reforms initiated in the previous decade than of high prices for 
the country’s most important exports: oil, gas and metals (Connolly 2015: 13). Indeed 
it is widely accepted that the Russian economy remains inherently reliant upon these 
exports. As I now show, the government has repeatedly declared its intent to reduce 
this dependence and improve conditions for business, thereby diversifying the 
economy. However conditions for entrepreneurs have remained challenging. 
Although the small and medium sized enterprise (SME) sector did develop during the 
first Putin presidency, it did so in spite of difficulties, not because government 
business policies were effective (Puffer et al 2009: 446). Ruta Aidis et al conclude 
that of the numerous decrees, resolutions and programmes for the development of 
small business set out in the post-communist years prior to the 2008-09 economic 
crisis, the ‘vast majority’ were not implemented (2008a: 3).  
 
Following that crisis, which underlined Russia's acute dependency on oil and gas 
prices, the government sought to reinvigorate its support for business. The 2007 law 
‘On Developing Small and Medium Scale Entrepreneurship’ (Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation 2016a: online), which set out the ‘basic goals 
and principles’ of state policy towards entrepreneurs, gained new relevance.1  In this 
chapter I define entrepreneurship, simply and logically, in line with that law, 
specifically: entrepreneurs have established micro (employing up to 15 people), small 
(employing up to 100 people) or medium (employing up to 250 people) sized non-
subsidiary, independent firms in Russia (Ministry of Economic Development of the 
Russian Federation 2016b: online). This definition is sufficient here for providing an 
understanding of Russian entrepreneurship in the formal sense. In Chapter 2, 
                                                
1 The basic goals of the Law are, to paraphrase: develop SMEs in order to create a 
competitive environment; foster favourable conditions for the development of SMEs; ensure 
SMEs’ competitiveness; assist SMEs in the promotion of their goods in Russia and abroad; 
increase the number of SMEs, and so on. Of additional interest are the ‘Normative-Legal’ 
regulations to assist the development of SMEs, which include: a special tax regime for SMEs; 
measures for safeguarding the rights and lawful interests of SMEs when state supervision is 
performed; measures for the provision of financial support to SMEs; and measures for the 
development of an infrastructure for supporting SMEs. In these ways the Law is 
uncontroversial and emphasises the assistance that the government will provide promoting 
SME development and ensuring a legally reliable environment. 
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however, I find this insufficient for my research, because Russian entrepreneurship is 
better understood not by how it is formally defined, but what it informally involves. 
As I will show, commercial objectives and activities represent only one dimension in 
Russian entrepreneurs’ everyday priorities. 
 
The 2007 law was only the first in a series of rapid actions taken by the government 
to respond to the financial crisis by creating policies for the development of the 
private sector. A presidential decree in May 2008, ‘On Urgent Measures for the 
Liquidation of Administrative Limitations Upon the Execution of Business Activity’, 
tasked the government with developing ‘a set of legislative projects aimed at further 
improvement of conditions for business activity in the country’ (Khaleeva et al 2009: 
8). President Dmitry Medvedev then appeared to seize the moment in his 2009 article 
‘Go Russia’, in which he stated that ‘twenty years of tumultuous change has not 
spared our country from its humiliating dependence on raw materials’ and called for 
an ‘intelligent economy’ based on knowledge, new technologies and innovative 
products (2009: online). A series of initiatives aimed at supporting entrepreneurship 
followed: a new regulatory impact assessment in 2010, the creation of the Agency for 
Strategic Initiatives in 2011, President Putin’s 100 Steps Programme in 2012, with the 
aim of improving the country’s position on the World Bank’s Doing Business rating 
from 120 to 20, and the installing of a presidential commissioner to protect the rights 
of entrepreneurs (Yakovlev 2015: 59). Moreover, federal budget support for SME and 
entrepreneurship programmes increased from 3.9 billion roubles in 2008 to 23 billion 
in 2014 (OECD 2015: 15-16). In 2015, Putin introduced a law freeing small 
businesses from regular inspections until the end of 2018 as a way to stimulate 
growth in the sector, which, he said, contributed to only 21 per cent of GDP in Russia 
compared to over 50 per cent in developed economies (The Moscow Times 2015). 
This figure is indeed lower than in comparable developing countries as well 
(European Investment Bank 2013: 8; also OECD 2015: 20). Taking these initiatives 
together at face value, entrepreneurs have certainly received significant and 
comprehensive rhetorical and policy support for their development. As a recent 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) report stated: 
‘Positive momentum is being built up by public policy on the road to a more 
entrepreneurial Russian Federation’ (2015: 15). However, as I now show, these 
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initiatives have not made a significant difference to the everyday conditions actually 
encountered by entrepreneurs. 
 
Despite these supposed advances, economic growth in the post-crisis years 
recommenced at a lower rate (OECD 2015: 26) and the development of small 
business showed a ‘declining tendency’ (Kreidenko and Mironova 2012: 352) rather 
than growth. A 2013 OECD report describes Russia’s business climate as a ‘persistent 
handicap’, and stated that ‘a range of indicators suggest that doing business in Russia 
is perceived as difficult and risky’ (2013: 10). In 2014 a further OECD report 
remarked on the fact that while the authorities seemed to have become ‘more 
energetic on fighting corruption and strengthening the legal protection of 
businesses… capital outflows and the low market valuation of Russian companies 
suggest that business is not yet fully convinced (2014: 2). The key ‘long term 
challenge’, that report found, was still to ‘reduce dependence on the volatile revenues 
from exhaustible natural resources, and strengthen sustainable, productivity-driven, 
regionally balanced and broad based growth’, which above all required structural 
improvement to the business climate, strengthening the rule of law and fighting 
corruption (OECD 2014: 4). Evidently, formal policies have not translated into 
substantive improvements in the business climate. Indeed, some of the targets set by 
the government do not require substantive change in order to be met. For example, 
Russia had improved its position on the international ‘Doing Business’ scale to reach 
No 51 by 2015 (World Bank 2016: 229), but this measure only reflects the way 
regulation applies to business on paper rather than compliance with it; it is also based 
only on the experiences of businesspeople in Moscow and it does not acknowledge 
the informal economy (World Bank 2016: 19-22). It therefore offers a partial view of 
the ‘actually existing’ experience of ‘doing business’ in Russia. 
 
When the Russian economy slowed in 2013, the weakness of the private sector was 
again revealed. In late 2014 Russia’s Public Chamber found that only 3.4 per cent of 
small and medium-sized businesses last more than three years (reported in The 
Moscow Times 2014: 5). As before, the government responded by declaring its 
support for the modernisation of the economy through support for business (Buckley 
and Weaver 2013), and again when economic crisis struck in 2014. The question 
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arises: what has prevented these policies from taking effect? One reason is that a 
number of essential requirements for everyday business remain challenging. 
According to the European Investment Bank, ‘tax legislation fluctuates wildly and tax 
administration is unduly difficult’, while access to finance is limited and costly for 
SMEs, particularly new businesses (European Investment Bank 2013: 14). Moreover, 
according to Radziwil and Vaziakova, ‘state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for 
about half of GDP and occupy a dominant position’ in sectors including banking, 
energy and transport. These SOEs have privileged access to finance which 
‘complicates market entry and suffocates competition, while preserving pockets of 
inefficiency’ (2015: 12; also Connolly 2015: 16-17). Thus, the potential for small 
business remains structurally limited. As Razomasova found in a survey of 
entrepreneurs in Novosibirsk (the capital of Siberia), the burden of finding collateral 
to secure a start-up loan for new entrepreneurs is too high, especially for young first-
timers without substantial assets, and that despite government promises, actual 
support for entrepreneurs was weak, insufficient and over-bureaucratised (2010: 131-
134). 
 
The most significant factor obstructing the development of entrepreneurship, 
however, is that while the state rhetorically supports the private sector, it 
simultaneously allows it to be undermined. The most significant and longstanding 
problem entrepreneurs face is malign pressure from government officials in spite of 
formal government support. This means that the government’s apparent good will 
towards business has rung increasingly hollow over time. As Aidis et al stated after 
the introduction of the 2007 law, government policy has been ‘declarative in nature’, 
while a ‘legacy of corruption and favouritism’ means that many businesses accept 
‘the lack of a level playing field as the norm’ (2008a: 8). Likewise, when President 
Medvedev called for ‘modernisation’ of the economy in 2009, Sergei Guriev, a 
respected economist, said that Russia had not modernised because the country’s elites 
profited from a rent distribution system and would prevent any modernisation that 
threatened it (quoted by The Economist 2009a: online). In 2011 a literature review by 
Arto Ojala and Hannakaisa Isomäki on entrepreneurship and small business between 
1991 to 2009 concluded that ‘the same factors fostering and hindering 
entrepreneurship and small business can be found in the studies regardless of the year 
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of publication… there have been few changes in Russia’s business environment since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union’ (2011: 16-17). This appears to remain the case 
today. In Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Index, which monitors 
perceptions of public sector corruption, Russia scored 29 (with 100 being ‘very clean’ 
and nil being ‘highly corrupt’), which places it in 119th position out of 168 countries 
included. Contrary to the government’s intentions, this score has not improved since 
2012, but worsened in 2014 and again in 2015 (2016: online). Similarly, according to 
the World Justice Project’s 2015 Rule of Law Index, Russia scored 0.47 (with 1 being 
‘strongest adherence to the rule of law’), placing it in 75th position out of 102 
countries included, which makes it by far the worst performer among the ‘high 
income’ countries listed (2016: online). To put this into everyday context, a plain-
speaking entrepreneur at the recent Moscow Economic Forum gained notoriety on the 
Runet (Russian-language internet) when he likened relations between the authorities 
and business to that of a butcher with a knife to the neck of a cow, asking ‘What do 
we have today, beef or milk?’ (Filipenok and Shtykina 2015; Gazeta.ru 2015; Schreck 
and Shakirov, 2015). 
 
According to Georgy Bovt, the distance between Russian law and its effective 
implementation is growing: the Duma decreasingly issues laws that are ‘fit for 
enforcement’ because they do not recognise the actual needs of the business sector 
and have no understanding of how they can be implemented. As a result, 
entrepreneurs cannot follow new laws but have to wait until authorities begin to 
interpret them (Bovt 2015: online). As Maria Lipman has put it, ‘Putin has advocated 
freedom of entrepreneurship in a tightly controlled political environment, where there 
is no rule of law or independent judiciary, and with a legislature that has been entirely 
stripped of its representative function’ (2014: online). This situation makes business 
vulnerable. In February 2016, for example, the Moscow city government destroyed 
100 single buildings in a single night – dubbed the ‘Night of the Long Scoops’ – after 
the mayor Sergei Sobyanin decided to ‘cleanse the city of street vendors’ (The 
Economist 2016b: online). According to The Economist, he said that ‘one cannot hide 
behind property papers’ and claimed that the owners had acquired their title deeds 
illegally. As the article concluded, ‘On paper, Russia’s business climate has improved 
recently. But when paper rights meet steel scoopers, the paper tends to tear’ (The 
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Economist 2016b: online). Indeed, the malign role of state officials in defrauding, 
raiding or simply destroying private enterprises is well known and a common theme 
in reportage on contemporary Russia (see for example Pomerantsev 2015: 93-123).2  
 
In this situation the judicial system offers entrepreneurs little protection. According to 
one Russian advocacy group for entrepreneurs’ rights, every third prisoner in Russia 
may be a businessperson (Biznes Solidarnost’ 2015: online), although this figure is 
unverified. Valerii Fedotov argues that as the economic situation in Russia has 
worsened since 2014, the number of acquittals in Russian courts has decreased by two 
thirds, while the average bribe paid to officials has doubled (according to the 
Attorney General’s office) to 208,000 roubles, or tripled (according to NGOs). He 
concludes that the government’s formal support for entrepreneurs is undermined by 
its own officials and ‘untouchable’ security forces (2015: online) who use their 
position to extract personal gains in the private sector. This is the key problem for 
entrepreneurs resulting from Russia’s institutional asymmetry. For Vladislav 
Inozemtsev this pattern is established by elites, who move freely between politics and 
business. The families of the ruling elite, he states, are ‘infiltrating government 
service’, and successful businesses are being steadily converted into ‘quasi-family 
enterprises’. This means that prize corporate assets and political positions are 
acquired and distributed patrimonially (2011: online), even though, according to an 
OECD report, civil servants are meant to vacate their roles every three to five years to 
prevent them becoming too attached to the entities they supervise (Radziwill and 
Vaziakova 2015: 7). Indeed, Russian officials have been obliged to declare their 
income since 2008, to close their foreign bank accounts since 2012 (and those of 
family members) and to repatriate financial assets to Russia or lose their positions 
since 2013 (Radziwill and Vaziakova 2015: 7). However, the existence of these laws 
is not a good indication of their effectiveness: some of Russia’s most influential 
officials hold property abroad (The Economist 2016a: online; Harding 2016: online). 
Even Boris Titov, Russia’s presidential commissioner for entrepreneurs’ rights, and 
head of the country’s business ombudsman, whose job is to support and protect 
                                                
2 It is indicative of this subject that although much is colloquially known in Russia about the 
connivance of the state and its officials in the persecution of business, relatively little 
scholarly observation of this has been undertaken. Thus most insight into the persecution of 
businesses and the corruption of officials comes from journalists rather than academics. 
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entrepreneurs (Biznes Ombudsmen 2016: online), owns a property in London (Private 
Eye 2016: online). Thus there is a strong correlation between (ill-gotten) wealth and 
political influence among Russia’s most senior figures. According to The Economist’s 
‘crony-capitalism index’, which measures the wealth of billionaires active in rent-
seeking sectors as a percentage of GDP, Russia scores worst of the world’s largest 
economies (The Economist 2014: online). Overall, the Russian elites’ preference for 
informal over formal institutions is clear and serves as a caution not to expect the 
substantial reform promised.3 
 
Maxim Trudolyubov’s conception of a ‘two-tier property regime’ in Russia serves to 
explain the connection between elite behaviour and the bureaucracy, which impedes 
the development of legitimate entrepreneurship. He points out that within this system 
powerful business owners are permitted to hold assets and money abroad in order to 
prevent them pressuring the government for property rights at home. Abroad they 
benefit from formal guarantees for their assets whereas inside Russia their rights are 
dependent upon their loyalty (2014: online; also Inozemtsev 2011). Trudolyubov 
considers that in Russia big business and politics are not separate but the same thing. 
Likewise, Inozemtsev argues that the bureaucracy writes laws not for the 
development of the country but ‘its own comfort’ (2016: online). As a result, 
independent entrepreneurs inside Russia are inherently vulnerable to the law while the 
country’s most powerful figures function outside it. In this context entrepreneurs tend 
to rely upon themselves rather than government initiatives. Indeed, although the 
government has placed much emphasis on establishing associations to support 
                                                
3 It is alleged, though commonly accepted, that Russia’s political elite have used their official 
status for personal gain. Aleksei Naval’nyi and his team offer the most high profile examples 
based on private investigations. They link Yurii Chaika, the country’s Prosecutor General, to 
organised crime, murder, expropriation of private property and fraud (Naval’nyi 2015a: 
online). They also allege that Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov (Naval’nyi 2015b: online), 
Defence Minister Shoigu (Alburov 2015: online), and Presidential Press Secretary Peskov 
(Navalnyi 2015c: online) have created financial schemes involving their family members for 
the acquisition of property in Russia and abroad far out of proportion with their public 
salaries. Indeed, the recent ‘Panama Papers’ (The International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists: online) appear to indict President Putin himself in this kind of patrimonial 
behaviour too. 
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entrepreneurs4, Courtney Bain has found that many have rejected them on the grounds 
that their leaders prefer to lobby the government than to provide the practical support 
and advice they require (2007: 212-213). Overall, without political, legal or practical 
support, entrepreneurs have long turned to their own personal networks (Bain 2007: 
213; also Aidis et al 2008a: 13; Puffer et al 2007; 9). As I explain in the case study 
chapters, self-reliance and rejection of the state are also important factors in the way 
my informants behave.  
 
Overall, as Andrei Yakovlev has suggested, the major impediments to the 
advancement of independent business in recent years have been both bureaucrats in 
‘the middle and lower tiers of the state machine’ focused on ‘receiving rent from 
informal control over flows of financial resources’ (2014: 11), and elites that ‘deny… 
the interests of business and, on the contrary, insist on toughening of regulations and 
on firmer control and supervision’ (Yakovlev 2014: 17). The latter group is made up 
of the law enforcement agencies, the siloviki, including the Investigative Committee, 
Office of the Prosecutor General, Federal Security Service, Federal Customs Service, 
Federal Tax Service and others, as well as top SOE managers such as Igor Sechin of 
Rosneft and Vladimir Yakunin of Russian Railways (Yakovlev 2014: 17). According 
to Yakovlev, the strength of this group has grown since the 2008-09 crisis as a result 
of the failure of anti-corruption measures, government pressure on entrepreneurs in 
response to the capital outflow and tax avoidance that followed the crisis, and because 
the political protests of 2011 and 2012 served to strengthen the position of the siloviki 
(Yakovlev 2014: 17). Yakovlev concludes that there are both simultaneous moves 
towards and away from business, with the effect that the difficult conditions facing 
businesses have not changed substantially over time (Yakovlev 2014: 17-18). In 
conclusion I find that entrepreneurs must work in a business climate in which they are 
the recipients of verbal support but remain prone to malicious interference from 
outsiders and officials. 
 
                                                
4 Russia’s most important and state-approved business associations are the Agency for 
Strategic Initiatives, OPORA Rossii, the Business Ombudsman for the Protection of the 
Rights of Entrepreneurs, and Delovaya Rossiya. 
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1.3 The role of institutions in the (un)development of business 
conditions 
 
How can the difference between Russia’s nominal support for business and the reality 
of doing business be explained conceptually? In his Nobel prize-winning work, North 
draws attention to the importance of formal and informal institutions in the process of 
economic development. He defines institutions as ‘the rules of a game in a society … 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (1990: 3). Formal 
institutions are ‘the rules human beings devise’ and informal institutions include 
‘conventions and codes of behaviour’ (North 1990: 4). According to North, ‘the 
major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable 
(but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction. But the stability of 
institutions in no way gainsays the fact that they are changing’ (North 1990: 6). North 
argues that the process of institutional change is ‘never completely discontinuous’, 
even in the context of revolution, but results from the ‘imbeddedness of informal 
constraints in societies’ (North 1990: 6). Thus formal institutions may change quickly 
in line with political or judicial decisions, but informal institutions ‘are much more 
impervious to deliberate policies’ (North 1990: 6). From this perspective, it is clear 
that Russia’s transformation during the post-communist period was never going to be 
a matter of policy alone. To understand the political economy that has emerged, and 
the place of entrepreneurs within it, analysis of both formal and informal institutions 
is required.  
 
Drawing on North, several scholars have taken this task on. Williams and Vorley 
argue that a country’s ‘entrepreneurial capacity’ is related to the institutional context 
in which it occurs (Williams and Vorley 2014: 840; also Estrin et al 2007: 4). Sheila 
Puffer et al argue that among post-communist countries, or most transition countries, 
there are 'formal institutional voids' (Puffer et al 2009: 441). In Russia these voids are 
such that laws are ineffective, the judiciary lacks independence from the executive 
and private property rights are 'frail’, enabling officials to pressurise businesses 
unconstrained (Puffer et al 2009: 447-448), and pushing entrepreneurs to depend on 
the ‘personalised trust’ they develop through their own networks (Puffer et al 2009: 
459; also McMillan and Woodruff 2002: 159). Ojala and Isomäki argue that the 
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institutional environment in Russia ‘creates barriers for business and 
entrepreneurship’, leaving them prone to reiderstvo (or corporate raiding) (2011: 16; 
also Hanson 2014). Aidis et al argue that ‘the weakness of formal institution 
enforcement… combined with the informal norms and values (negative attitudes 
towards entrepreneurship)... create an atmosphere that is relatively less conducive to 
the development of new entrepreneurial firms, even than in countries of comparable 
levels of development’ (2008b: 658). As Chadee and Roxas concluded, Russia’s 
‘formal institutional environment is yet to reach a stage of maturity that is capable of 
supporting an open, liberal and market-based economy free of corruption and crime‘ 
(2013: 33).  
 
The relative influence of informal over formal institutions in Russia has led to a 
particular mode of post-communist capitalism in which personal networks, rather than 
regulations, have a determinant effect in the political economy. Puffer et al argue that 
a form of ‘state-managed network capitalism’ has emerged in which three sectors – 
the market, the siloviki and the oligarchy – operate primarily according to ‘cognitive’ 
or informal norms rather than ‘rule-based’ regulations (Puffer et al 2007: 3-9). This 
system, they argue, is embedded in Russian culture, with officials playing an 
important role, and the state able to act arbitrarily, within each sector (Puffer et al 
2007: 3-4). Similarly, Aidis et al conclude that ‘as formal structures in Russia fail, 
they are complemented by informal networks’ that constitute ‘intangible assets’ 
enabling some entrepreneurs to overcome obstacles (2008a: 15-16). Ledeneva (2009) 
argues that personal networks (or blat) are integral to overcoming the travails 
associated with doing business in Russia, and they play a critical role at all levels of 
the political economy (also Castells and Kiselyova 1998; Haas 2012: 103-107). She 
argues that in Russia ‘informality is the pattern of governance, even if hidden behind 
the formal discourses. It is rarely acknowledged as such but is often referred to in a 
commonly used euphemism “sistema”’ (2009: 268; also 2013). Indeed, it is important 
to recognise the relevance and extent of informality in everyday life in Russia in 
general, not simply in business. As Morris and Polese state, reflecting North’s 
institutional analysis, informality is still ‘embedded in social life’ in much of post-
socialist Eurasia (2014: 8).  
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In his Nobel prize lecture, North stated that ‘if institutions are the rules of the game, 
organisations and their entrepreneurs are the players’, which means that a society’s 
organisations, including businesses, ‘reflect the opportunities provided by the 
institutional matrix' (1993, reprinted 1996: 345). Moreover, institutional change 
occurs when individuals and organisations ‘perceive that they could do better by 
restructuring political or economic exchanges’ (North 1996: 346), which means that 
entrepreneurs modify institutions as they respond to the institutional framework. 
Consequently it cannot be the case that Russian entrepreneurs have no control over 
their destiny, or that their vulnerability is structurally determined. However, in spite 
of North’s authoritative work on institutional change, and the apparent scholarly 
consensus about the importance of informality that gives Russian entrepreneurs 
agency, there has been relatively little research on what entrepreneurs are actually 
doing to survive and/or profit. Rather, the majority of studies have used survey data 
that cannot distinguish between what entrepreneurs report and what they actually do 
(Estrin et al 2007: 2). Indeed, taking the empirical literature on the difficulties of 
entrepreneurship in Russia as a whole, most studies are based on attitudinal data, as 
opposed to observation of actions. When I conducted a search for articles 
investigating business conditions in nine journals dedicated to Russian or regional 
political, social and economic issues written between 2010 and January 2016, and two 
dedicated to ethnography, I did not find a single study drawing on actual observation 
of business practice.5 Therefore I assert that a majority of recent empirical studies of 
business show how businesses are faring, but not what business is doing. I concur 
with Estrin et al who conclude that further work on the combination of weak 
institutions and corresponding network structures is required ‘to pin down more 
carefully the relationship between institutional development and levels of 
entrepreneurial activity’ (2007: 20). Ojala and Isomäki also assert the importance of 
studying ‘the interaction between entrepreneurs and institutions' because ‘institutions 
                                                
5 These journals were: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Economics of Transition, 
EKO – Vserossiisskii Ekonomicheskii Zhurnal, Europe-Asia Studies, Ethnography, Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, Post-Communist Economies, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of 
Post-Communism, Studies on Russian Economic Development, and Voprosi Ekonomiki. In an 
article exploring Russian business values Dufy did claim a methodology of ‘ethnography and 
pragmatic sociology’ (2015: 85), but this work drew on ‘in depth interviews’, which cannot 
account for the difference between reported attitudes and actual behaviours.  
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and the business environment in Russia seem to be the most important inhibitors for 
entrepreneurship and small business’ (2011: 17). Thus the primary objective of this 
study is to observe and examine the ‘actually existing’ behaviours of entrepreneurs in 
a business climate in which they are simultaneously supported and undermined, in 
order to develop an empirically satisfactory understanding of how they ‘get by’. 
 
Before continuing I wish to touch on the connection between institutional asymmetry 
and the capacity of the Russian state. It is clear that the vulnerability of entrepreneurs 
is not the result of a ‘strong’ state as such; as I have written, many Russian laws and 
regulations have been designed to support the development of SMEs but these have 
had limited impact. Rather, the vulnerability of entrepreneurs comes from the 
weakness of those formal institutions that creates a situation whereby state officials, 
acting informally on their own initiative but with the authority of the state, can 
manipulate and take advantage of businesses. This phenomenon will be clear in the 
empirical chapters that follow. Thus when I refer to the vulnerability of business in 
the face of a ‘strong’ state in this thesis, I am referring to the malign potential of 
officials acting informally against entrepreneurs. The strength of the state is therefore 
relative to the longstanding weakness of entrepreneurs, which I have described. As 
Vadim Volkov stated fifteen years ago:  
 
‘The source of risk and insecurity in Russian business is not criminal groups 
(the so-called mafiia), as it used to be in the past, but the arbitrary and commercially 
driven actions of poorly controlled segments of the state. Accordingly, the success of 
certain business groups depends on the availability of administrative and coercive 
resources of the state. This situation continues to produce incentives for enrichment 
by means of redistributing economic assets and accumulating rents rather than by the 
productive employment of these assets’ (2002: 3-4).  
 
With respect to contemporary Russia under Putin, Brian D. Taylor has drawn 
attention to the difference between state capacity and state quality. He defines state 
capacity, conventionally, ‘as the ability of a state to ensure the reliable 
implementation of its decisions by its own personnel’ (Taylor 2011: 6), while state 
quality refers to ‘whether the state and its officials serve the interests of the 
 18 
 
population in a fair manner that promotes the general welfare’ (Taylor 2011: 17).  As 
he states: 
 
‘In ideal-typical high-quality states, bureaucrats see themselves as “public 
servants,” bound by the rule of law and resistant to the temptations of corruption. 
The concept of state quality shifts the perspective from that of the rulers and their 
goals to the citizens and their needs, and from what states do to how they do it’ 
(Taylor 2011: 17).  
 
Bearing in mind these criteria, Taylor argues that there is a ‘major disagreement 
among specialists about whether or not Russia after Putin is a strong state’ (2011: 
290). However, according to his statistical analysis:  
 
‘Russian state capacity and state quality… is more akin to a state whose GNI 
per capita is less that $5,000 than its peers in the $12,000-$15,000 range, such as 
Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico. In terms of wealth, Russia is in the top third of 
countries in the world, whereas in state capacity and state quality, it is in the bottom 
third’ (Taylor 2011: 291-2).   
 
Taylor concludes that the Russian state is weak and, like my own assessment above, 
raises the ‘plausible argument’ that ‘Putin and his allies were not interested in 
rebuilding the Russian state at all, despite abundant rhetoric to the contrary… [but] 
were more interested in looting the state than building it’ (Taylor 2011: 310-311).  As 
this thesis will show, my informants also view the state as deficient, but they remain 
vulnerable to predatory officials who may act freely from a relative position of 
strength. Since this study seeks to understand entrepreneurs’ perspectives in the 
political economy, it is important to bear this relative strength in mind, even if from a 
structural position the state is weak. It follows that Russia’s institutional asymmetry 
and the weak state reinforce once another.  It also follows that under these conditions 
state quality and the specific conditions of institutional asymmetry will vary 
regionally according to administrative conditions.  This is a question I tackle with 
respect to case selection in the next chapter.   
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1.4 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I described conditions for entrepreneurs in contemporary Russia based 
on recent empirical literature. We have seen that while the government has given 
continual and considerable support to the advancement of entrepreneurship in 
declarations, policies and initiatives, in reality business conditions remain 
challenging. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, entrepreneurs face significant 
start-up costs, widespread corruption, unreliable property rights, a politicised 
judiciary and the possibility that officials or rivals may freely intervene in their 
affairs. Indeed, even though GDP has grown, living standards have risen and a sense 
of order has been restored during the Putin years (Connolly 2015: 13-14) several 
entrepreneurs I spoke with claimed that the 1990s were a ‘golden period’ for business 
compared to the present. I therefore find that entrepreneurs operate under conditions 
in which they are simultaneously supported and undermined by the government. In 
this chapter I have sought to explain this situation in terms of institutional theory. I 
drew on several scholars who concur that Russia’s formal institutions are insufficient 
to allow the development of entrepreneurship. Instead, a form of capitalism has 
appeared in which personal networks have an organising function. In this system 
elites, officials and ordinary entrepreneurs all participate, but the latter are weakest 
because they are vulnerable to the former. However, I also drew on North to show 
that despite their vulnerability, entrepreneurs have the capacity to challenge their 
institutional constraints, but little attention has been given to observing this 
empirically. As a result, in this thesis I will set out to determine with observation what 
entrepreneurs are specifically doing to cope in this institutional environment. In the 
next chapter I detail the methodology for this research. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Structure of the chapter 
 
In this chapter I make the case that ethnography offers a method that can determine 
specifically what entrepreneurs do to ‘get by’ under conditions of institutional 
asymmetry. Its particular value relative to more frequently used research methods is 
to reveal the differences between entrepreneurs’ attitudes and behaviour. To begin, I 
recall that ethnographers made a significant contribution to interpreting market 
adaptation during the post-communist period but that ethnographers have paid less 
attention to the specific predicament of business through the Putin years. I therefore 
argue that this research can kill two proverbial birds with one stone: it can provide the 
observational data required to understand what business is doing and in so doing 
reinvigorate appreciation of the importance of methodological pluralism in the study 
of post-socialist markets and political economy. Thereafter I set out my specific 
methodological approach, drawing on Kubik’s ‘conceptual holism’ and outlining a 
multi-sited ethnographic design. I introduce my three key informants and provide a 
brief overview of their experiences, relating them to the difficulties of business 
described in Chapter 1. Finally, I provide an introductory description of my key 
finding, which is that despite their differences my informants are primarily motivated 
to be in business to secure their independence; commercial goals come second. As a 
result of this determination, each of my informants has been able to resist, to a lesser 
or greater extent, external influences on their affairs and shape their own destiny, 
despite their respective difficulties. To conceptualise this I introduce Yurchak’s 
concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ (2002). This allows me to highlight in 
advance, prior to outlining the case studies (Chapters 3-5), that my ethnographic 
materials contribute not only to empirical understanding of what business is like 
under conditions of institutional asymmetry, but that they also have implications for 
predominant theories about the way business is conceptualised in the political 
economy.  Specifically, I introduce North et al’s Social Orders Theory and propose 
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that Russia is better conceived as a Limited Access Order according to the case study 
materials I will present in the following chapters. 
 
2.2 The case for an ethnographic study of contemporary Russian 
entrepreneurship 
 
Ethnography presents an effective and suitable approach for observing business under 
conditions of institutional asymmetry. To a large extent, the case has already been 
made, because observation was frequently used in the first post-Soviet decade to 
investigate how Russians were normatively and practically adapting to the 
introduction of market conditions (for example Bridger, Kay and Pinnick 1996; 
Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Humphrey 2002; Humphrey and Mandel 2002; Pine and 
Bridger 1998; Ries 2002). Anthropologists in particular were drawn to Russia by the 
prospect of studying a large, diverse and previously inaccessible country living 
through an unprecedented historical period and economic crisis (discussed by 
Tomlinson 2002: 12-15). These scholars sought to grasp how individuals came to 
reconcile the ‘social and philosophical legacies of socialism’ with new market 
pressures and possibilities (Patico 2009: 205). In this sense the research effort was 
concentrated upon what the ‘situation of post-Sovietness’ (Patico 2009: 206) meant 
for the attitudes and behaviours of individuals encountering the market, rather than 
focusing on ‘entrepreneurship’ as an emerging formal profession as such. However, 
the myriad ways that their informants perceived, adapted to, and coped with, the 
momentous changes that occurred during that period were by their nature 
‘entrepreneurial’ in the absence of state support (Bonnell and Gold 2002: xv). As 
such entrepreneurship was not simply a new vocation in business chosen by 
particularly enterprising people, but the various activities required for local survival 
in the face of material scarcity, economic uncertainty, violence, lawlessness, 
interference by officials and the other travails of the period. In this context everyday 
life was ‘defined by the notions of crisis and the drive for autonomy, and how these 
new social forms could be innovative (in terms of formulating ingenious solutions to 
post-socialist dilemmas) and socially reproductive (by enabling individuals to 
function amid these dilemmas instead of addressing them) at the same time’ 
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(Shevchenko 2009: 176). Overall the anthropological approach underlined the 
importance of self-help as a reaction to the all-pervasive disorder that was the salient 
feature of everyday life. As I make clear below, I find the ‘drive for autonomy’ 
remains a defining feature in the contemporary experiences of my informants, in spite 
of an improvement in macroeconomic conditions during the Putin period. 
 
In taking this approach, anthropologists in particular unveiled the dichotomy between 
policy and reality in the everyday context. Most significantly, this raised a challenge 
to the prevailing notion of economic ‘transition’ that framed the rhetorical priorities 
of the Yeltsin government’s reform agenda and the international advisers supporting 
them (see for example Freeland 2000: 58-66; Nellis 2002). As Olga Shevchenko put 
it, the transition had two problems: it was implemented top down without public 
discussion, which made it socially illegitimate; and it was too technical, in that ‘it 
failed to translate into a larger strategic vision of the transformation that could give 
meaning and coherence to a protracted process of social, economic and political 
change’ (2009: 24). The anthropological work therefore underlined the ‘institutional 
asymmetry’ that I have described in post-socialist Russia. 
 
Jeffrey Haas summarises the case for an ethnographic approach to Russia’s post-
socialist experience plainly. He argues that the demise of the Soviet Union meant 
more than the end of ‘a set of institutions’, but ‘a set of categories reified through 
those institutions’ (2012: 226). As a result, post-Soviet reform became more than an 
economic process, but an attempt to determine what the new Russia should be, in 
legal, social, normative terms (Haas 2012: 226). In this way, Haas contends that 
markets are ‘learned’ and ‘arise imperfectly through trial, error and contention’ 
(2005: 7). As a result, in his view ‘only with culture can we make sense of the 
unfolding of Russia’s post-Soviet economic change, when practices changed more 
slowly than policies’ to address ‘what actors were thinking (categories, 
understandings) and the process of “learning the market” (even imperfectly)’ (Haas 
2005: 4). The Russian economy has a ‘“Russian” flavour’, he contends, ‘because of 
the cultural dynamics of learning and resistance’, which must be examined with 
attention on culture, investigating ‘previous institutions and cultural legacies’ and 
considering ‘how actors coded and addressed shocks and experiences’ (Haas 2005: 
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7). Haas’s argument underlines the appropriateness of an ethnographic approach to 
the study of everyday experience under institutional constraints.  
 
However, despite the relevance of ethnography in the study of post-socialist 
experience, very few ethnographies of entrepreneurship have been undertaken during 
the Putin period. The exact cause of this diminished interest is not clear. It is plausible 
that when the economy started to recover the novelty of studying post-communism 
fell, but this is speculation. More likely, the climate for extended research worsened 
as the Russian government became more antagonistic towards foreign interest in its 
political and economic affairs, culminating in the 2012 Law on Foreign Agents, 
which threatens to politicise and increase the risks associated with fieldwork. In 
recent months the Russian authorities have increased their scrutiny of Western 
researchers travelling in the country (Schreck 2015: online).6 Most importantly 
however, as I have written, independent business remained an insignificant part of 
Russia’s political economy: SMEs operating competitively in sectors such as retail, 
transport and business services account for only one fifth of Russian GDP and 
employment today (Connolly 2015: 13).  That said, there is a dearth of data on what a 
significant proportion of SMEs are doing: micro-businesses, those employing up to 
15 people, represent by far the most common type of SME according to Goskomstat, 
the Federal State Statistical Service (Goskomstat 2010), but this group was omitted 
from that organisation’s most recent sectoral analysis of SME activity (Goskomstat 
2015). 
 
Overall there is currently insufficient empirical evidence about business practice even 
as the emergence of the market continues to present normative and practical 
dilemmas across Russian society. Nancy Ries has argued that any stability and growth 
associated with the Putin era is a tribute to the government’s effective public 
relations, which has free rein while independent media is suppressed (2009: 188), 
rather than a substantive advancement in quality of life.  Indeed she argues that dacha 
subsistence (fruit and vegetable gardening) remains important in Russian society 
because people still seek to hedge against the possibility that the economy will fall 
                                                
6 I discuss the possibility that I was followed during my fieldwork in the Appendix. 
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apart (Ries 2009: 188). Jeremy Morris has emphasised how poor working Russians 
valorise self-resourcing and provisioning in communities that remain normatively and 
materially reliant upon the informal economy (2012a; 2012b). In her study of how 
middle-class teachers negotiated the changes wrought by marketisation on their moral 
and material status, Jennifer Patico argued that individuals apply moral legitimacy 
and social validation to different activities in different contexts, such that their 
meaning is continually reassessed in the post-socialist context (2009: 218-219). In 
Serguei Oushakine’s study of how the remote Altai region was ‘searching for its way 
in a market economy’ without significant investment, he finds that the arrival of 
capital and commercial institutions was a ‘culturally alien, geographically and 
historically distant event’ that appeared as a ‘physical rupture in the established social 
fabric’ (2009: 77). In attempting to reconcile themselves to these changes, a ‘dizzying 
array’ of social groups and tendencies emerged.  In time these coalesced around an 
‘organising plot’ in which many people felt manipulated by external forces that linked 
money with lies and capital with corruption. This, he finds, led people to attempt to 
rekindle the past and reformulate a ‘lost sense of unifying collectivity’ or ‘true 
Russian path’. Above all, the sensibility Oushakine encountered was of despair 
(Oushakine 2009: 77-78). I therefore argue that if these studies can demonstrate the 
continuing complexity of Russians’ experience of post-socialism, it seems appropriate 
to examine the contemporary experience of entrepreneurs, particularly in light of their 
paradoxical status as both supported and undermined by the state. 
 
2.3 Research design: multi-sited ethnography in three Western 
Siberian regions with ‘contextual holism’ 
 
Having made a case for this research and for an ethnographic methodology, it is 
necessary to develop a specific approach that can draw attention to entrepreneurial 
behaviour in light of institutional asymmetry. I draw specifically on the recent work 
of Kubik to set out my ethnographic approach. Kubik argues that the best research in 
25 years of post-communist studies accords with four principles, which he has drawn 
together to create a research programme grounded in ethnography called ‘contextual 
holism’ (2015b: online). The first principle, relationism, demands that attention is 
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given to historical relations, dependencies and entanglements such that individuals are 
considered to be ‘embedded’ between agency and structure. This is a reminder not to 
focus on ‘the extremes’ of agency or structure, but to work with them both. The 
second, historicism, underlines that history matters, so legacies, path dependencies, 
critical junctures and so on must be taken seriously. The third, constructivism, 
recognises that the way informants see the world has an impact upon what they do. 
The fourth, formal-informal hybrids, demands that researchers acknowledge that in 
the post-communist area much activity takes place between official structures and 
informal networks (Kubik 2015b: online). Combining these principles, ‘contextual 
holism’ ‘privileges the local dimension of the post-communist transformations and 
attempts to generate analyses of the macro phenomena’ (Kubik 2013: 63).  
 
‘Contextual holism’ is also an attempt to reinvigorate Area Studies, which, according 
to Kubik, once provided interdisciplinary conversation between the humanities and 
social sciences about particular cultures, but has long been in crisis (Kubik 2015b: 
online). Today, he argues, ‘Area’ is better defined as ‘a situation’ determined by the 
factors categorised by contextual holism. Thus, in this study relationism refers to the 
informal networks that create and maintain the local situation for entrepreneurs, as 
well as the external networks between them and the centre; historicism refers to the 
legacies that define and legitimate the situation, and the critical junctures that changed 
it; constructivism refers to the common interpretations or sensibility shared by 
entrepreneurs; hybridity refers to the tendency in post-communist societies (and 
therefore among entrepreneurs) to rely on informal social capital and formal 
institutions (adapted from Kubik 2013: 60; 2015b: online).  
 
The other aspect of ‘contextual holism’ that suits my research objectives is its 
emphasis on ethnography. Kubik argues that ethnographers view agents as capable of 
‘fixing themselves’ and ‘adjusting their strategies in order to cope with the changing 
environment’ according to behaviours emerging from their ‘historically evolved 
social and cultural environments’ (2013: 66), which provide templates that can make 
their apparently contingent existence predictable. As he puts it: 
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‘many such templates are formed and reformed in institutions that are often 
informal-formal hybrids and as such are best investigated through case studies 
designed to generate richly textured knowledge. Ethnographic participant 
observation is particularly suited to this task… [which makes it] possible to observe 
and reconstruct actors’ strategic creativity and thus serve as a welcome corrective to 
approaches that treat postcommunist transformations as phenomena of the 
macroscale’ (2013: 66).   
 
In these respects contextual holism offers a methodological and analytical framework 
grounded in post-communist studies that is appropriate for the requirements of this 
research: it represents a shift in postcommunist studies towards focusing on the 
actions of individuals within structures rather than elites (Daniel 2015: 55). As Kubik 
puts it, ‘thoughtful scholars of post-communism have come to realize that the 
seemingly intractable duality of structure and agency cannot be sidestepped but must 
be unpacked and theorized – even if unperfectly [sic] – if we hope to improve our 
understanding of … regime change and transformations’. (Kubik 2015a: 355).  
 
Bearing Kubik’s approach in mind, I resist the conventional requirement to define my 
research subject – entrepreneurs – too tightly in advance of my fieldwork: a better 
definition will be provided through observation of their activities (see Chapter 6). Of 
course each of my informants is an entrepreneur in a formal sense: they each own a 
small business according to SME categories set out in Federal Law 209-FZ (see 
Chapter 1). One of them, Anna, may be defined as an ‘individual entrepreneur’, 
whereas the other two, Oleg and Aleksandr, own ‘micro-businesses’, meaning a 
business that employs up to 15 people. However, to reiterate, I find this categorisation 
useful only for giving an impression of their businesses in a formal sense. As the case 
studies reveal (Chapters 3-5), my informants’ are all inherently vulnerable and their 
activities between informal and formal institutions reveals that what an entrepreneur 
portrays their business to be, and what it actually is (or will be), are infrequently the 
same thing. This argument is supported by the fact that, as I have stated, there is 
currently insufficient empirical understanding of what contemporary entrepreneurship 
is in practice anyway. In a sense, the point of this study is to define what 
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‘entrepreneurship’ is according to what my informants are doing, so there is little 
point in being too definitive at this stage. 
 
That said, my informants do own ‘legitimate’ registered businesses which they 
established themselves, so for the sake of convention Victoria Bonnell and Thomas 
Gold’s definition, taken from their editorial chapter on business development in post-
communist Europe and Asia, is sufficiently broad to encompass the commercial 
activities I observed. According to them, entrepreneurs ‘organise and direct 
businesses, assuming risk for the sake of profit … carry out certain necessary tasks, 
including perception of economic opportunities, assembling the financial and material 
resources and inputs for innovation, recruiting personnel, and dealing with suppliers, 
purchasers, and the government’ (2002: xv). Nevertheless due to its contested status I 
maintain that ‘entrepreneurship’ in Russian is better defined according to inductive 
study. As I will show, my informants’ entrepreneurial activities were not limited to 
commercial, or ‘conventional’ business activities, but a range of formal and informal 
everyday actions aimed at securing their status as entrepreneurs.  Indeed I will show 
that my informants’ activities are revealed more accurately by examining what 
Yurchak has defined as their ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’.  This, as I will show, 
is to know ‘what an entrepreneurial act is, who can act entrepreneurially, and what or 
who can be acted upon in an entrepreneurial way’ in the context of a state which has 
been partly privatised by officials about whose power they can do very little (2002: 
310-313).  
 
The breadth I demand at this stage does not mean that the case study businesses 
cannot be categorised or that they have little in common. My informants’ businesses 
are located in one of three neighbouring oblasti, so they are united by their shared 
location in a single federal district, Western Siberia. The choice of these Siberian 
oblasti for the research requires careful justification, however. Russia is the world’s 
largest country, which endows it by definition with significant regional diversity 
accross a number of factors. Of chief relevance for this study is that, as Aleksey 
Baranov et al. state:  
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‘It is well known that the institutional environment in Russia is highly uneven 
across its vast territory, and Russian regions exhibit significant differences in 
investment attractiveness, business climate, and regional government effectiveness 
(2015: 155-6)… As a result, Russia-wide measures of institutional quality could be at 
best accurate on the average and remote from the actual conditions on the ground in 
a particular region. Therefore, there is a strong need to measure institutional 
performance regionally’ (Baranov et al 2015: 161). 
 
In spite of these differences, Russia’s regions also have significant factors in 
common, not least a shared historical legacy, national institutions, policies and laws 
(Baranov et al 2015: 156; Sharafutdinova and Kisunko 2014: 2). Moreover, the 
institutional asymmetry I have described is a factor across Russia, even if its 
particular characteristics and quality vary from region to region; this is a point that 
my case study materials will underline. For example, according to Baranov et al, 
between the first and and second half of the 2000s, ‘the groups of regions with the 
greatest danger of doing business (variously measured) have changed their 
compositions by more than 50%’ (Baranov et al 2015: 174). This suggests 
considerable institutional instability, and therefore state quality, facing private 
enterprise across the country. It is therefore not entirely useful to choose a region 
based on its relative institutional characteristics since those characteristics are in 
significant flux countrywide. Baranov et al argue that despite regional institutional 
differences, ‘one should still expect that regional indicators of economic, legal and 
political institutions broadly follow overall Russian trends – if for no other reason 
than because national indices are aggregates of regional ones (Baranov et al 2015: 
p175).   
 
Nevertheless, Zubarevich has pointed out that studies of Russia often tend to focus 
too much on geographic variations. Researchers often position their work in the 
context of the Volga, the Urals, Siberia and so on (2012: online). These regions are 
themselves very large so the significant variation within them is missed. Zubarevich 
argues that researchers should instead reexamine the country through the lens of four 
different ‘Russias’ (Zubarevich 2015: online) according to population and quality of 
life indicators rather than geographical boundaries. The first Russia is that of the post-
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industrial cities of 500,000 to 1 million people, which amounts to thirty per cent of 
the population (or forty per cent if it includes towns of over 250,000 people, although 
the differences between these towns increases greatly with this categorisation). The 
second Russia is that of the blue-collar workers, including industrial towns that retain 
‘a strong Soviet ethos and way of life’. These towns have populations between 25,000 
and 250,000 inhabitants, and together amount to 25% of the population. The third 
Russia is that of the rural and semi-urban populations who live ‘off the land’ and are 
‘indifferent to politics’. According to Zubarevich, these three Russias are defined 
‘using the centre-periphery model, which explains social variations by geographic 
factors, that is to say their position in a hierarchy of settlement from the most 
modernised large cities to the patriarchal rural periphery’ (Zubarevich 2015: online). 
This model does not work for the fourth Russia, however, which is constituted by the 
less developed republics of the northern Caucasus and Southern Siberia (the Tyva and 
Altai areas), home to less than 6 per cent of the population, and where there are towns 
but ‘none of them have any industry’ (Zubarevich 2015: online).   
 
Given the significant territorial and socio-economic differences I have described, 
drawing on Baranov et al and Zubarevich, the question of choosing a case remains. It 
appears that no oblast’ or city can be adequately representative of Russia. Every 
location offers characteristics that make it both distinctive and typical of the country: 
state capacity, quality and institutional conditions vary. For example, Roberto Stefan 
Foa and Anna Nemirovskaya have found that ‘frontier zones’ such as Siberia, as in 
other parts of the world, are characterized by a deficiency of state capacity and lower 
rule of law (Foa and Nemirovskaya 2016: 429). Nevertheless, since this is an 
ethnographic study, I do not seek to make general claims about Russia as a whole by 
inferring from a particular region. Rather, my objective is to examine institutional 
asymmetry from the perspective of the entrepreneur rather than their region, or with 
respect to state quality. This does not, however, detract from the utility of the 
approach.  As a recent World Bank report on Russia stated: 
 
‘Only small… in depth ethnographic studies are usually able to capture the 
variety of particular rules, norms and agreements that structure social relationships, 
including the interactions among state and business actors. Still, their significance in 
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state-business relations is critical. The prevailing informal rules and agreements 
explain not only how these relations actually function; their understanding is 
crucially important for designing realistic pro-growth policies’ (Sharafutdinova and 
Kisunko 2014: 4).   
 
In this way I argue that what my study may lose in ‘representativeness’ it gains with 
in-depth material describing business-state relations under conditions of institutional 
asymmetry from the viewpoint of my informants.  The findings offer an indication of 
how entrepreneurs can get by in Russia, even if they cannot be called representative 
of Russia as a whole. This leaves the question: why have I chosen Siberia? Most 
significantly, as Oushakine has argued, Siberia offers above all an unusual field site 
simply because it is away from Moscow and St. Petersburg (or Zubarevich’s ‘first 
Russia’) which are the most common locations for scholarly research (Oushakine 
2009: 7-8). This in itself offers something distinctive to the field of Russian studies.  
Some, like Hill and Gaddy, argue that Russia’s particular geography presents a 
unique challenge to the development of the market because the population is 
distributed in cities that are relatively small and distant from one another across its 
entire territory, which is a characteristic not shared by other market economies (2003: 
17-25). This challenge, they contend, is most pronounced in Siberia, where the cost of 
transportation, the establishment of trust between market actors and ‘the creation and 
functioning of shared institutions’ are all hindered by the region’s enormity (Hill and 
Gaddy 2003: 25). This represents a challenge to my choice. However, I argue that 
their analysis is correct only if one accepts that Russian capitalism is developing in a 
fashion that resembles the Western market. Yet it becomes clear in the course of this 
thesis, if it is not already, that while there are certainly geographical limits on the 
profitability of business in Siberia, Russia is not really becoming a Western-type 
market economy at present. Besides, the idea that Siberia is poorly endowed for the 
market economy is debatable. Inozemtsev argues that by late 2012 (as my fieldwork 
began) Siberia provided the materials to make the products that constitute up to 75 
per cent of Russia’s exports and, more fundamentally, a majority of the subsurface 
mineral extraction tax and export duties for oil and natural gas that make up over 50 
per cent of Russia’s federal revenues (Inozemtsev 2013: online). Thus Leonid Khotin 
has argued that Siberia is less a victim of geography than plundering by Moscow 
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(2014: 48) and this, I contend, makes Siberia an integral part of Russia’s 
contemporary political economy.   
 
More to the point, if Siberia does present some of the most challenging conditions for 
business, it seems appropriate to study them over the more ‘conventional’ conditions 
found elsewhere in western Russia. That is, Siberia presents unique factors that others 
do not. For example, as I will show, especially in Chapter 3, Siberia does present 
geographical limits on the market available to small businesses, however that this led 
my informants to trade in the social, rather than purely economic, interest. Even so, I 
have considered my case study choice with national, regional and institutional factors 
in mind. The three cities in which this research was undertaken are in neighbouring 
oblasti in Western Siberia, which offers a comparable element within a large federal 
district in the middle of the country. Despite the common idea that Siberia is 
exceptional, these cities actually have large populations sufficient to place them 
within Zubarevich’s ‘first Russia’. As a consequence, my informants operate their 
businesses in by far the largest settlements in their respective oblasti. This means they 
are subjected both to Siberia’s unique geographical challenges (see particularly 
Chapter 3) but that they also habitually interact and trade with populations from 
Zubarevich’s other ‘Russia’s’. 
 
What else makes my Siberian cases representative of Russian entrepreneurs’ 
experiences and comparable? First, my informants all came of age in the late 
communist period, which meant they were among the first generation of Russian 
entrepreneurs. Second, they did not inherit or assume the leadership of former state 
enterprises but established de novo businesses according to their own initiatives 
between 1989 and 2000 in their home cities. Third, although their businesses have 
changed over time, they have all managed to stay in business in spite of a variety of 
difficulties, which I will describe. The most fundamental characteristic uniting them, 
however, is the very different approaches they have each taken to negotiating the 
institutional environment that they encounter. It is this factor that, I argue, justifies 
my reluctance to define entrepreneurship too rigidly or become too preoccupied with 
the regional aspects of their experience: from the outset these entrepreneurs could not 
follow an established entrepreneurial formula but learnt how to do business by doing 
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it (see also Haas 2005: 10), with varied approaches and results. This, I will argue, is 
the most significant influence of Russia’s institutional asymmetry upon 
entrepreneurship. 
 
With their permission, I have changed (fictionalised) the names of my informants, as 
well as the names of their businesses, their cities and regions in order to protect their 
anonymity. Anonymity removes the possibility of being specific about the regional 
conditions and legacies in which they work, which is regretful. In a region on the 
scale of Siberia, and one that inherits the Soviet Union’s peculiar spatial industrial 
character, the distinct geographical, economic and social characteristics of these 
oblasti is significant. In this way the three cities I describe have distinct historical, 
socioeconomic, geographic and post-socialist experiences. Nevertheless the 
importance of anonymity will become clear in the course of describing my 
informants’ activities. Where possible, I have provided information that aims to bring 
great contextual detail to my description.  
 
The first case study describes the entrepreneurship of Oleg and his directors, Irina and 
Dmitrii. He established Sibtekhnika in 1991 in Priyatnyi, the administrative centre 
(regional capital) of Priyatnaya oblast’, which has become a successful group of 
companies (gruppa kompanii) offering design and fitting services to the retail sector, 
and industrial equipment and furniture to the commercial, education and construction 
sectors in several Siberian cities. Oleg’s entrepreneurial success derives from his 
desire for independence from the state and his ability to bring this about by working 
pragmatically with the full range of actors in Russian business, whether they are 
entrepreneurs, state officials or criminals. In spite of his success, however, he is an 
opponent of the political economic status quo and has established a private 
community centre to quietly advance values he supports and, in a small but 
determined way, undermine the state.  
 
My second case study describes the entrepreneurship of Anna, who established her 
company, the Centre for Small Business Growth (CSBG) in 2000 in Oblomov, the 
administrative centre of Oblomovskaya oblast’. Anna studied in Europe before 
securing financial support to establish CSBG with the objective of supporting the 
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development of entrepreneurship in Oblomov. However, despite her connections in 
the West, her knowledge of how Western business works and her commitment to 
Russia’s transformation into a market economy, these advantages have not translated 
into business success in Russia; her company has been in a state of crisis for over 
three years as a result of a poorly judged business deal and a series of malicious 
interventions by officials and former clients. Nevertheless, Anna has managed to 
survive in business even as the demise of CSBG appeared inevitable. Her survival 
results less from her business acumen than the necessity of working between the 
formal and shadow economies, and by assiduously invoking the state’s formal 
institutional support to entrepreneurs against her attackers. In this way, Anna works 
between Russia’s formal and informal institutions to create the conditions for her 
survival, which necessarily involves undermining the state. 
 
The third case study describes the entrepreneurship of Aleksandr and his son Yurii. 
Aleksandr established a construction company in 1991 in Normalnyi, the 
administrative centre of Normalnaya oblast’, which became one of the most 
successful businesses in the region over the course of the next decade, but which was 
then acquired by officials in a case of reiderstvo in the mid-2000s. This led to 
Aleksandr’s imprisonment for several months. Unusually, and with the significant 
financial resources he held at the time, Aleksandr fought successfully for his release. 
Since then he has re-established himself as an entrepreneur and started a new 
company, Promploshchad, which is a commercial site with light industrial units let to 
other small enterprises. With his experience of both the great potential of independent 
business and the predatory capacity of the state, Aleksandr’s entrepreneurial approach 
is characterised above all by a wariness of the state, whose representatives he seeks to 
avoid unless completely necessary. Although he is sufficiently well connected and 
experienced to succeed in expanding his business, his plans are nowadays tempered 
by the desire to combine a steady profit with a low profile.  
 
2.4 Preview of key finding: entrepreneurship for autonomy and to 
resist the state  
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Considering only these brief descriptions of my informants’ experiences together, a 
clear factor uniting them is that the arbitrary and malign potential of the state has had 
a determinant effect on the trajectories of their businesses and, therefore, their 
approach to relations with officialdom. Their survival or success has depended on 
their abilities to use their own resources to respond to a state that does more to 
undermine than support them. Although they are opposed to working this way, they 
have to do so because of Russia’s ‘institutional asymmetry’ and, accordingly, the 
precariousness of their situation. To therefore state the obvious, working between 
informal and formal institutions is not an indication of the ‘corruption’ of Russian 
entrepreneurs, but of the pragmatism that is a consequence of a political economy in 
which there are no alternatives. To be in business between formal and informal 
institutions is to operate in a precarious legal limbo that resembles the ‘suspended 
punishment’ common in the Soviet period and defined by Alena Ledeneva:  
 
[Freedom was] ‘predicated upon following the unwritten rules and a subtle 
understanding of what was possible and what was not, and to what extent one could 
pursue one’s interests… the availability of unwritten codes alongside the written 
ones, and the usual practice for authorities to switch to the written code only ‘where 
necessary’ created certain freedom and flexibility. On the other hand such leniency 
could be restricted at every moment. This arrangement is based on the idea of 
suspended punishment’ (1998: 77).  
 
These blurred lines between public and private affairs, and the constant risk of falling 
victim to predation, appear to be alive and well in contemporary Russia. 
Consequently, defining my informants’ businesses according to their profitability, 
number of employees or size is not a useful guide to either their experiences or, as I 
show, ambitions: their companies have grown and contracted as they faced conditions 
beyond their control, so their priorities are continuity and independence, whereas 
commercial growth is an aspiration.  
 
However, while institutional theorists may welcome the empirical evidence in these 
case studies, I do not find ‘informal activity’ alone a persuasive explanation for how 
my informants ‘get by’. For example ‘social capital’, the linkages between individuals 
that ‘give the collectivity cohesiveness and thereby facilitate the pursuit of collective 
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goals’ (Adler and Kwon 2002: 21), is often described as a substitute for formal 
institutions (for example Puffer and McCarthy 2007: 9), but it does not give my 
informants safe passage so I argue that it cannot be used with such certainty. The state 
can still do whatever it wants: to take a famous example, the jailing of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, an extremely influential man, and the renationalisation of his 
company Yukos, one of the largest in the country, demonstrates this very clearly (on 
this case see Sakwa 2014: 91). Oleg has excellent social capital and is the most 
‘successful’ of my three informants, but knows that he could suffer a similar fate at 
any time, just as Anna and Aleksandr also did. As such, further explanation is needed 
of whether he has simply been lucky and what has motivated him to carry on in spite 
of this risk. Likewise, Aleksandr has experienced first hand how a successful business 
can be consumed by the state but still decided to start again. Moreover Anna failed in 
legitimate business but retreated to the shadow economy in order to avoid giving it up 
altogether, even with the odds stacked against her. Hence a conceptualisation of 
entrepreneurship is required that accounts for how entrepreneurs work amid 
institutional asymmetry and why they become, and continue to be, entrepreneurs in 
such a risky environment.  
 
In order to achieve this in my case studies I draw on Yurchak’s concept of 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, which reconsiders what it means to be 
‘entrepreneurial’ in the Russian context. Yurchak bases entrepreneurial 
governmentality on the concept of governmentality conceived by Foucault, which 
meant the ‘art of government’, the ‘rationality of government’ (Foucault in Yurchak 
2002: 279), or the ‘way or system of thinking about the practice of government (who 
can govern; what governing is; what or who can be governed), capable of making 
some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to 
those upon whom it was practiced’ (Gordon in Yurchak 2002: 279). Taking this 
conceptual approach, Yurchak seeks to conceive of entrepreneurship as ‘a form of 
governmentality’ (Yurchak 2002: 279).  That is, Yurchak is concerned with the art or 
rationality of entrepreneurship in relation to the state and other features in society:  
 
‘In Foucauldian terms, then, to be an entrepreneur is to have entrepreneurial 
governmentality that makes it ‘thinkable and practicable’ to relate to different aspects 
of the world – people, relations, institutions, the state, laws – in terms of symbolic 
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commodities, risks, capital, profits, costs, needs, demands and so on. It is a way of 
knowing what an entrepreneurial act is, who can act entrepreneurially, and what or 
whom can be acted upon in an entrepreneurial way. The category of entrepreneurial 
governmentality will allow me to speak about entrepreneurship in a context in which 
there was no private market or business’ (Yurchak 2002: 279). 
 
Additionally, Yurchak argues that ‘no relationship between the individual and the 
state is marked only by official codes. The state’s insitutions, laws, and ideologies 
everywhere are related to a mixture of terms that allow individuals to ‘officialize’ or 
‘personalize’ them depending on the context’ (Yurchak 2002: 279). Yurchak argues, 
moreover, that the ‘mixture’ of personalised and officialised terms was most 
pronounced in the period of late socialism (Yurchak 2002: 279), which resulted in a 
hybrid state and had profound implications for the entrepreneurial patterns which 
have emerged in Russia today. In this respect Yurchak calls for analysis of 
entrepreneurship that focuses on both structural constraints upon agents, and how 
agents act in their relations with official structures. 
 
In Yurchak’s view the features of post-communist entrepreneurship have roots in the 
late 1970s when Soviet society began to view Soviet state ideology more 
pragmatically and less idealistically (2002: 282). As a consequence of this shift the 
public sphere was reorganised into a hybrid form in which social activity took place 
within ‘officialised-public’ and ‘personalised-public’ spheres (Yurchak 2002: 287). 
For Yurchak, conceiving of the Soviet state as a hybrid challenges the Western 
scholarly construction of state-society relations in which ‘dichotomies as public vs. 
private, legal vs. illegal and state vs. civil society’ delineate between two forms of 
behaviour. Instead, the two spheres of practice ‘coexist and overlap in the same space 
and context’ (Yurchak 2002: 287). This means that relations between the Soviet 
citizen and state took on a ‘dialogical or hybrid cultural dynamic’ in which official 
meanings were reconceived in personal terms. Citizens completed their official work 
in a way that ‘took advantage of the distinctions between the hybrid spheres’ 
(Yurchak 2002: 288), so that state plans were officially fulfilled but results were 
reinterpreted such that their ‘fulfilment’ acquired a meaning quite distinct from the 
original (Yurchak 2002: 288). To put this plainly, citizens began to consider that the 
state, including its laws, documents and representatives, should be obeyed only in the 
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officialised-public sphere (Yurchak 2002: 301) which allowed them to work in 
between the two spheres in their personal interests at other times.  
 
How did this change affect the emergence of post-communist business? Yurchak 
argues that during the post-communist period the officialised-public sphere, 
constituted by old communist ideologies, laws and institutions, entered a period of 
crisis that meant the personalised-public sphere, constituted by relations and 
practices, grew in everyday significance. This meant that as new businesses emerged 
entrepreneurs drew on the ‘understandings of that sphere’ (Yurchak 2002: 311). At 
the same time, Yurchak argues, the state’s personalised-public sphere ‘did not 
collapse but rather readapted to the new situation much better than was obvious at the 
time’ (Yurchak 2002: 311), meaning that it was state officials who were often able to 
act entrepreneurially within their role as circumstances changed, which ensured that 
they secured access to resources and power in the post-Soviet period. As Yurchak 
states:  
 
‘Because of the crisis of the officialised-public sphere, the process of 
constructing new institutions, laws, relations, and ideologies of the state became 
informed within personalised relations and understandings on all levels. The 
hybridity of the relations between the individual and the state became perhaps even 
more omnipresent than was ever the case during socialism’ (Yurchak 2002: 311). 
 
Consequently, most entrepreneurs still ‘turn to the hybrid model when they interpret 
the rationale behind the rules, laws and actions of the state and its representatives 
(Yurchak 2002: 311) while most state representatives ‘also expect their relations with 
businessmen to be based on the hybrid model’ (Yurchak 2002: 311). In this way 
entrepreneurs have continued to see the state ‘as being partly privatised by state 
officials’ (Yurchak 2002: 312) and are confident that all forms of power in the 
country have been redistributed already so their vulnerable position vis-à-vis the state 
is fixed and cannot be changed (Yurchak 2002: 313). As a result, they must ‘rely only 
on their own ingenuity for the success or even survival of their family or business’ 
(Yurchak 2002: 313), based on their ability to engage with the ‘relations, practices 
and meanings of personalised-public spheres’ (Yurchak 2002: 313). As I show, Oleg 
and Aleksandr share this perception while Anna now faces that reality even if she had 
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been unable to see it before her crisis. Under these circumstances it is a mistake to 
consider Russian entrepreneurship in flux or through the paradigm of modernisation 
as the state would imply. The overall point, however, is that both entrepreneurs and 
officials recognise that the political economy is highly unpredictable because its 
officials tend to act in unofficial ways.  
 
Entreprenurial governmentality de-emphasises the commercial element that is at the 
heart of conventional definitions of entrepreneurship and replaces it with an emphasis 
on knowledge, skills and ways of thinking that developed in the late socialist era 
(Yurchak 2005: 297). The specific objective of this entrepreneurialism, moreover, is 
to ensure one’s autonomy from the state or ‘suspended punishment’. Thus Yurchak 
finds that entrepreneurs: 
 
‘ … represent a group of active and creative agents who consciously try to 
stay relatively independent from the state and to insure themselves against its 
unpredictability. They engage in this entrepreneurial practice not simply to enrich 
themselves at any cost but to build a meaningful, independent, and ‘civilised’ reality 
for themselves, at least partly in spite of the state. It is among this group of people 
that a version of civil society may develop (Yurchak 2002: 313). 
 
In the case study chapters I find ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ a persuasive 
concept for explaining my informants’ attitudes and behaviours. I argue that their 
shared attitude to entrepreneurship is based on a drive for their own ‘civilised reality’. 
It can also serve to explain the various business outcomes of my informants without 
relying on social capital alone: Oleg’s relative ‘success’, for example, is explained by 
his constant dedication to asserting control in the local market, working and 
negotiating pragmatically with the full gamut of personalities he encounters in the 
course of commercial life and limiting the arbitrary potential of local officials. By 
contrast, Anna and Aleksandr’s recognition of the personalisation of the state has 
been reactive, responding to the respective crises in which they lost control of their 
businesses. Accordingly the case studies show that relations between officials and 
entrepreneurs are not necessarily antagonistic but based on mutual interests decided in 
the personalised-public sphere.  
 
 39 
 
‘Entrepreneurial governmentality’ can help to explain my informants’ agency 
effectively, but I find it does not provide a wholly adequate answer to why my 
informants become entrepreneurs in the first place. That is, it cannot clearly 
determine why entrepreneurs deem ‘civilised reality’ to be worth the risks they have 
to take trying to get there. I therefore move beyond Yurchak conceptually to argue 
that my informants’ entrepreneurship also displays a determined resistance to the 
state. Entrepreneurship, after all, is a chosen vocation that, in the Russian context, 
contains numerous difficulties and dangers. Although Yurchak does mention that 
entrepreneurs represent a potential bloc of opposition to the status quo (2002: 315) he 
does not explore it empirically. It has also been mentioned that the potential for 
opposition among entrepreneurs is one of the factors explaining the government’s 
rhetorical support for business (Kesby 2012: online), but little is known about this 
empirically. What is clear is that SMEs are not attracted to business associations that 
could represent their interests, in contrast to larger firms (Golikova 2009: 278), 
seeking instead, as I show, to solve their own problems autonomously. Thus, the 
specific ways in which entrepreneurs oppose the state are poorly understood. In my 
case studies, however, it is clear that my informants seek not only autonomy but, to 
various extents, work to change the material conditions of the political economy as 
they encounter it. This evokes North’s point (Chapter 1) that entrepreneurs seek to 
change their institutional constraints when they encounter them. Thus I find 
entrepreneurship is undertaken not only for the type of independent life it represents, 
but also because of the possibility it gives to surreptitiously undermine and challenge 
the status quo that my informants reject. 
 
2.5 Implications of the empirical research: a challenge to 
predominant theories about the structure of the Russian political 
economy 
 
To reiterate, the purpose of this research is to describe and explain what doing 
business in Russia is actually like in a political economy in which the state ‘supports 
and undermines’ entrepreneurs, at a time when there is a shortage of recent studies 
based on observation of entrepreneurship. However, ethnography is an inductive 
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methodology ‘generative of its own analytical categories’ (Morris 2012b: 219). Thus 
in the course of fieldwork it became clear that my informants’ everyday activities and 
relations with officials could not easily be reconciled with prevailing theory about the 
structure of Russia’s political economy. I find that the role and influence of business 
is underrepresented in these theories, which assume the dominance of the state with a 
negligible role for other actors. Leon Aron, for example, conceives of the ‘Putin 
doctrine’, in which the state has reclaimed control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the 
economy, primarily the oil and natural gas industries (2013a: online) to become again 
‘the only sovereign political and economic actor in Russia, with the private sector, 
civil society, and its institutions mere objects’ (Aron 2013b: online). In Aron’s 
account, the Putin doctrine was created based on an assessment that the country 
needed to achieve economic growth of 4 to 6 per cent a year in order to keep up with 
developed countries, which meant that primary resources would ‘be central to the 
country’s economic development, security and modernization’ for at least the first 
half of the 21st century (Aron 2013b: online). At the same time, by controlling the 
‘rents’ generated from hydrocarbon exports, the government can ensure the loyalty of 
the low-income and elite segments of the country that present, apparently, the greatest 
challenge to the stability of the state. As a result, the institutions required to develop 
business have never been a priority for the government.  
 
Aron’s account of a ‘petro-gas state’ (Aron 2013b: online) is but one of multiple 
conceptualisations of the political economy in which the state has a leading, 
arbitrarily dominant position and the private sector is powerless and vulnerable to 
interference. Other examples include Ian Bremmer’s ‘state capitalism’ (2009: 41), 
Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes’ ‘rent management system’ (RMS) (2015), Neil 
Robinson’s ‘political’ or ‘state’ capitalism (2013a: 3-4) and ‘patrimonial capitalism’ 
(2013b: 137), Peter Rutland’s ‘petrostate’ (2015: 67) and Pekka Sutela’s ‘dual 
economy’ (1999: 10; 2012: 64).  I term these theories ‘hybrid’ in the sense that the 
two sectors have essential roles in the economy but an ontological delineation is made 
in which the state sector is strong and the private sector weak. Thus the relationship 
between the two sectors in these theories is considered, to borrow Connolly’s phrase, 
‘generally one-way’ (2009: 186). It is true that not all analyses focus on two sectors 
alone. In Sheila Puffer and Daniel McCarthy's conception of state-managed network 
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capitalism, for example, the division goes three ways – between market, siloviki and 
oligarchic sectors – but the role of the state is still central (2007: 8). Therefore I do 
not claim that these theories are indistinguishable from one another, but that they do 
share the conception that independent businesses are dependent variables, reliant on 
the support of the state for the amelioration of business conditions and without the 
capacity to exert change on their everyday circumstances. In other words, 
entrepreneurs are perceived to lack agency. To an extent, this claim is unfair, because 
some of these theories do not really consider the role of independent business in any 
significant way at all, however this absence only serves my general argument further, 
which is that the role of business in the political economy requires further empirical 
and theoretical attention.  
 
A short glance at my case studies offers sufficient evidence to substantiate this point. 
Oleg is unambiguously negative about business conditions but has created a 
successful business. Moreover, he has developed amiable, pragmatic relations with 
local state-affiliated elites. More complicated still, Oleg has used his own resources to 
build and staff a local community centre that directly (if surreptitiously) challenges 
the prevailing political system. Hybrid theories cannot adequately account for why his 
business has thrived (or indeed any successful business), for his cordial relations with 
local elites, or for his ability to get away with challenging the state. Anna, in stark 
contrast, is unambiguously hopeful about the prospects for the westernisation of 
Russian business conditions but has faced a major business crisis in which she must 
continually defend herself against adversaries and officials who wish to see her fail. 
Hybrid theories cannot account for her optimism, the survival of her business or her 
determination to fight the state. Moreover, Aleksandr was a victim of the predatory 
state and spent time in prison but managed to survive and rebuild a new business. 
Again, hybrid theories cannot account for the nuances of his survival or his re-
emergence as a businessman. Therefore the basis of my empirical critique is that 
hybrid theories can shed light on the relative power relations between the state and 
private sectors, but they do not reveal the actual relations between them. Their 
ontological delineation between a leading state and subordinate private sector 
misrepresents the way in which the two sectors are integrated, objectifying the 
business sphere as a dependent variable.  
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Thus my case studies will show that although these entrepreneurs are relatively weak 
compared to the state as they encounter it, and there are significant differences in their 
relative experiences, they each wield considerably more influence than predominant 
theories would suggest. Several factors bear this out. For one, it will be clear that 
although my informants share a disdain for a political economic system in which they 
are vulnerable, they also share a determination to build their businesses regardless. 
Moreover this motivation is not subdued by their negative experiences of the state but 
enhanced by them: they are unwilling to give up their status as entrepreneurs easily. 
The case studies will show, for example, that Anna refused to give up what seemed to 
be a hopeless set of circumstances, while Aleksandr returned to entrepreneurship in 
spite of losing his successful business. This makes their entrepreneurship more than a 
commercial decision: it is a normative choice to work in private business in spite of 
the risks. Second, their motivation to endure in business is supported by their 
knowledge of how to do so between the formal and informal spheres whether, as in 
Anna’s case, they are enduring a crisis or, as in Oleg’s case, overseeing a profitable 
company. Thus it seems businesses can survive and thrive in spite of their 
vulnerability. Third, it is clear that ‘entrepreneurs’ are not the only people involved in 
‘business’. For example, Oleg’s case demonstrates the continuing importance of the 
mafiya in the Russian commercial scene and the personal role of regional elites and 
their families over commerce and economic development in their territories. Anna’s 
case shows how local officials became personally involved in the destruction of her 
business on behalf of their personal acquaintances in the private sector. Aleksandr’s 
case illustrates the manner in which senior local officials devoted considerable 
personal attention and resources to the illicit acquisition of his company’s assets. It is 
therefore not particularly meaningful to delineate between ‘the state’ and ‘private 
business’, as predominant theories do, since the distinction breaks down in the real 
economy. Fourth, I find that entrepreneurs are not necessarily subordinate to officials 
or elites all the time. I will show, for example, that when Oleg conducted a business 
deal with members of his region’s elite, he was in a stronger relative position than 
them even though they held vastly more power. In fact this business deal shows that 
relations between the private sector (represented by Oleg) and the state sector 
(represented by the elites) can be civil, productive and based on mutual interests. To 
put this another way, I show that while Anna and Aleksandr’s antagonistic relations 
with officialdom may be more common, Oleg’s relations with regional elites proves 
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that the private sector is not necessarily at the mercy of the state. Fifth and most 
interestingly, I find that each of my informants is able to resist and undermine the 
state and its representatives in their own way. Indeed, the case studies show that 
resistance appears to be an important part of my informants’ entrepreneurship: it is 
the consequence of, and reaction to, the risky and informal context in which they are 
obliged to work. Overall I will show that hybridity interpreted according to 
predominant theories does not represent business in the way I observed it in the field. 
My informants wield a kind of agency that allows them to endure and resist 
oppression in ‘suspended punishment’ so as to survive or even thrive. A better 
account of this agency, which is a response to institutional asymmetry, is required.   
 
In order to account for the actual relationship between the state and private sector as I 
observed it, I will argue that a theoretical framework is required that puts institutions 
at the centre of analysis, and draw on North et al’s social orders theory to achieve 
this. This theory has been developed to explain the underlying logic of two patterns of 
social organization or ‘orders’, and how societies can move from one type of order to 
another (North et al 2009: 1). Specifically, social orders are: 
 
‘characterised by the way societies craft institutions that support the existence 
of specific forms of human organization, the way societies limit or open access to 
those organizations, and through the incentives created by the pattern of 
organization. These characteristics of social orders are also intimately related to how 
societies limit and control violence. Because social orders engender different patterns 
of behaviour, individuals in different social orders form different beliefs about how 
the people around them behave’ (North et al 2009: 1-2). 
 
Based on this definition North et al have developed a spectrum of three social order 
types. The first, the ‘foraging order’, is one of ‘small social groups’ resembling of 
hunter-gatherer societies’ (North et al 2009: 2). The second order, which emerged in 
the first social revolution, is the ‘limited access order’ or ‘natural state’ (North et al 
2009: 2). In LAOs: 
 
‘Personal relationships, who one is and who one knows, form the basis for 
social organization and constitute the area for individual interaction, particularly 
 44 
 
personal relationships among powerful individuals. Natural states limit the ability of 
individuals to form organizations’ (North et al 2009: 2). 
 
The third type, open access orders (OAOs), emerged with the second social 
revolution or rise of modernity. According to North et al, in OAOs: 
 
‘Personal relations still matter, but impersonal categories of individuals, often 
called citizens, interact over wide areas of social behaviour with no need to be 
cognizant of the individual identity of their partners. Identity, which in natural states 
is inherently personal, becomes defined as a set of impersonal characteristics… Both 
social orders [LAO and OAO] have public and private organizations, but natural 
states limit access to those organizations whereas open access societies do not’ 
(North et al 2009: 2). 
 
According to North et al, today all low and middle-income countries are LAOs 
despite wide differences in their per capita incomes and quality of institutions (North 
et al 2013b: 10). To differentiate them, they distinguish between fragile, basic and 
mature LAOs, which are ‘differentiated by the structure of their organisations’ (North 
et al 2013b: 11) although the chief characteristic of all LAOs is that leaders limit 
access to opportunities for organisation (North et al 2013b: 4). That is, a ‘dominant 
coalition’ forms that manipulates the political economy to create rents which 
incentivises powerful groups to limit violence (North et al 2009: 3; 2013b: 3). The 
dominant coalition includes a number of elite specialists in political, economic, 
religious and military activities who hold privileged access to vital functions like 
production, justice, trade, education and so on (North et al 2009: 18-20). Because 
their positions depend upon ‘the limited entry enforced by the continued existence of 
the regime’, they are incentivised to help support and maintain it, or face violence, 
disorder and loss of rents (North et al 2009: 19-20). A critical result of this 
arrangement is that the dominant coalition is able to control how organisations 
develop, who develops them and how rents are distributed. This induces discipline 
among elites because they rely on the support of the coalition, which receives rents 
from the organisation of productive resources under its auspices (North et al 2013b: 
20). This mutual interest between elites creates what North et al describe as a ‘double 
balance’, meaning that peace is dependent upon the satisfactory balance of interests 
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created by the ‘rent-creation process’ (North et al 2013b: 20). Jong-Sung puts this 
most simply: ‘sustaining fundamental changes in either the economic or political 
system cannot occur without fundamental changes in the other’ (Jong-Sung 2013: 
313-314). In practice this means that an LAO has to mature on its own terms: ‘When 
the institutional forms of an OAO are transplanted to an LAO, the logic of the LAO 
bends them to the purpose of rent creation to sustain the existing dominant coalition’ 
(Jong-Sung 2013: 314). The dichotomy between Russia’s western-style policies for 
the development of the business sector, and their ineffectiveness in practice, may be 
seen as an exemplar of this. 
 
Due to the fact that peace depends on the balance created by the ‘rent-creation 
process’, violence is always a possibility in an LAO so different groups maintain their 
strength as a check on one other’s power. As a consequence, the dominant coalition 
cannot last forever, while external shocks such as changes in relative prices or 
technology can also induce a shock (North et al 2009: 21-21). For an LAO to mature, 
three processes are required. First, rent-generating activities are arranged such that 
more of the organisations with the capacity for violence are incentivized to reduce 
actual violence. Second, the rule of law is expanded over a greater number of 
activities but in a way that is consistent with the incentives that prevent organizations 
from using violence. Third, the government becomes more reliable in securing 
support for organisations and enforcing agreements among them (North 2013b: 15-
16). Thereafter, it is possible for LAOs to ‘transition’ to OAOs if institutional 
arrangements are settled which enable impersonal exchange among elites, and when 
members of the dominant coalition find it in their interest to expand impersonal 
exchange, incrementally increasing access. Under these conditions, ‘the system 
changes from the logic of limited access rent creation to open access entry’ (North et 
al 2013b: 17).  Nevertheless, as North et al make clear, ‘the dynamism of social order 
is a dynamic of change, not a dynamic of progress’ and the natural state is the 
historical norm (North et al 2009: 12-13).  
 
To date, LAO theory has been applied convincingly to a number of empirical cases 
(see North et al 2013b), including Russia (Connolly 2009: 199; North et al 2007: 9). 
Indeed, limited access is characterised by the following factors and Russia is a clear 
fit: 
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1. Slow-growing economies vulnerable to shocks. 
2. Polities without generalized consent of the governed. 
3. Relatively small numbers of organizations. 
4. Smaller and more centralized governments. 
5. A predominance of social relationships organized along personal lines, 
including privileges, social hierarchies, laws that are enforced unequally, 
insecure property rights, and a perverse sense that not all individuals were 
created or are equal (North et al. 2009: 12). 
 
For my purpose of moving beyond hybrid theory, LAO theory therefore offers three 
significant advantages. First, it was not conceived to account for the Russian case 
alone so presents the prospect of situating Russia’s characteristics in comparative 
studies. Second, it can accommodate the most important and indisputable aspect of 
hybrid theories, which is the overwhelming power of Russia’s state and its ruling 
elites to interfere arbitrarily in the political economy: North et al argue that many 
LAOs have ‘dualistic economies’ (North et al 2007: 39-40) in which the governing 
‘dominant coalition’ manipulates the economy to create rents that ensure powerful 
actors refrain from violence and prevent outsiders from establishing rival 
organisations (North et al 2013: 4). Third, unlike hybrid theories, LAO theory does 
not consider the private sector to be a dependent variable, although business is 
typically difficult, especially for new start-ups (North et al 2007: 9). In fact, North et 
al specifically call attention to the need to determine the role of the private sector and 
the reasons why ruling elites sustain and respect private organisations (North et al 
2007: 44). Moreover, although North et al and Connolly have both described Russia 
as an LAO by examining its structural political economic features, no empirical work 
has yet been completed describing the specific characteristics of Russia’s private 
sector in this context: it is a theoretical framework still under development (Connolly 
2013: 4). Altogether, therefore, my case study material presents an opportunity to 
move beyond hybrid theories within a recognised theoretical framework. 
 
North’s emphasis on studying institutions provides direction for achieving this task. 
Tracing the ways my informants adapt ‘their activities and strategies’ to the 
‘opportunities and limitations in the formal and informal institutions’ (Aidis 2015: 78-
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79) is required. This, in any case, is the original purpose of my research. Therefore, 
my case study material has both empirical and theoretical relevance: it first offers 
evidence on how my informants practically overcome the difficulties they encounter in 
business, and second serves to reveal more detail about the specific characteristics of 
business-state relations, or to put it specifically, how entrepreneurs deal with state 
representatives in Russia’s LAO. As I will show, the personalisation of the state is 
again the key factor in these relations. The emphasis is on individuals as state 
representatives or entrepreneurs to personally make the best of their situation, which 
means that relations are not necessarily antagonistic, despite the power of the former 
over the latter. The motivation of these agents is a function of limited access and 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’: individuals act according to their perception of 
what is possible to limit violence and uphold their independence, and secure access to 
resources. 
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I argued that ethnography offers an effective methodology for 
observing entrepreneurship under conditions of institutional asymmetry, which is 
necessary to show how entrepreneurs actually deal with the difficulties they face. 
Scholarly attention on the ‘actually existing’ political economy in Russia has also 
receded, so this study represents a chance to reinvigorate ethnographic study of 
business. I then outlined a multi-sited ethnographic approach away from Russia’s two 
major cities, which draws specifically on the framework of ‘contextual holism’, and 
which emphasises that agency and perception is situated in place, meaning that 
particular history, culture and institutional contexts create the framework for action. 
As Linch puts it, ‘contextual holism’ ‘confronts the challenge of achieving the 
analytical clarity to generalize… without sacrificing contextual details vital to 
explanation (Linch 2013: 12). This makes it appropriate for my work, which is 
necessarily focused on both agency and structure in the form of business-state 
relations. I then introduced my three key informants, whose experiences in business 
are varied but who, as becomes clearer in the following case studies, all use their 
businesses as a means to achieve independence and resistance as much as commercial 
gain. Moreover, they have each been able to achieve this in part, despite the 
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challenges facing them. As I stated, this represents the most significant observation of 
my ethnographic research, and one that could not have been made using a study 
gathering attitudinal data. Finally, I highlighted that this finding also raises a 
significant question for predominant theories of Russian political economy, namely 
that my informants display considerable agency (which I defined using Yurchak’s 
concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’) but these theories assume that the state 
dominates business. I argued that North’s LAO theory offers a more appropriate 
theoretical framework to describe Russia’s political economy, accommodating both 
the arbitrary potential of Russia’s ruling elites and officials, and the specific factors 
governing business state relations that I observed. LAO theory is still under 
development, to the extent that little is known about how private organisations 
survive within them, and it has not been applied specifically to the Russian case. 
Therefore my empirical material can contribute to its further development in these 
respects. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, LAO theory can account for the 
negative attitudes held by my informants towards the political economic structure in 
which they are inherently vulnerable and for my observation that relations with the 
state tend to be pragmatic, as opposed to governed by the power of the state. My 
informants seek to minimise their involvement with the state as much as possible, and 
broker personal deals or find mutual interests when they must according to their local 
and personal situations. Their ability to achieve this accounts for their varied 
experiences far more than their structural vulnerability to the state as such. These 
empirical and theoretical findings, I will conclude, are possible only with an 
ethnographic methodology. 
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CHAPTER 3: OLEG 
 
3.1 Structure of the chapter 
 
In this chapter I present my first case study, which is based on participant observation 
within Sibtekhnika, a business established by Oleg in 1991 in the city I call Priyatnyi.  
Oleg has built Sibtekhnika into a successful group of companies offering design and 
fitting services to the retail sector, and industrial equipment to the commercial, 
education and construction sectors. As such, I concentrate on the features of his 
entrepreneurship that have enabled him to achieve this success in spite of the 
difficulties I described in Chapter 1. The case study contains four sections. In the first 
I concentrate on Oleg’s specific attitudes to business conditions and describe how this 
determines his everyday business practices. In his view Russia is ruled by an 
‘imperialistic’ government that centralises power, leaving regions dependent upon the 
Kremlin but rewarding the most loyal with funds earned chiefly from strategic 
industries and the extortion of private businesses. According to him, this system is 
well established and entrepreneurs must work within it as found, accepting that the 
government does not support business development but rather the interests of the 
political elite. In response Oleg has developed an entrepreneurial approach based on 
strict pragmatism. His everyday effort is focused on maintaining the market 
advantage he has established by working in collaboration with his competitors to 
maintain their joint dominance of the regional market. I describe this arrangement by 
drawing on the concept of limited access to argue that Oleg has built a ‘minor 
coalition’ that functions according to the same logic as a ‘dominant coalition’ in an 
LAO. That is, the minor coalition enables Oleg and his partners to work according to 
informal behaviourial norms to deter would-be extorters. 
 
In the following section I turn to the specific entrepreneurial activities of Oleg and his 
directors. I find that despite Sibtekhnika’s prominent position in the local market, they 
work continually to minimise the uncertainty they perceive in the business sphere, 
asserting control wherever possible over their business relations and contractual 
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affairs through regular practical activities, and striving everyday to work diligently to 
a high level of quality. At the same time, I also find that the emphasis on asserting 
control is partially for display, signaling their entrepreneurial ability and competence 
in defiance of the difficulty posed to clients and staff. I therefore argue that 
pragmatism, together with rhetorical and actual control and competence, are the most 
important aspects in the entrepreneurial behaviour of Sibtekhnika’s directors. 
 
In the next section I provide greater insight into the place of Sibtekhnika in the wider 
political economy by describing its transactions with three different types of client, 
which offers greater understanding of the specific role played by private businesses in 
Russia. I first consider its work with a small rural company in the interior of the 
oblast’, which provides an insight into the conditions for business in remote Siberia, 
away from the regional capital. I find that in the small regional communities there are 
limits to the extent to which Sibtekhnika can supply goods profitably, on account of 
the distances involved and low demand, but despite this the company makes a 
significant effort to supply them. Next I consider Sibtekhnika’s dealings with two 
state-affiliated companies. The first, Promstroi, is a large business constructing a 
pipeline though the territory; the second is a family-run enterprise that profits from its 
political affiliations to dominate commercial opportunities in a rural town. I show that 
although these clients derive their profits from the ‘imperialist’ political economy 
Oleg bemoans, they also offer highly profitable business opportunities to Sibtekhnika, 
which, according to Oleg’s pragmatic approach, he cannot ignore. Conversely, I also 
show that these clients require access to resources that only private businesses such as 
Sibtekhnika can supply, which suggests that the private sector has a vital role in the 
economy despite the dominance of the state. Moreover, I find that despite the clear 
differences between these businesses and Sibtekhnika, the success of the latter 
appears to replicate the business model of the former. That is, Sibtekhnika derives 
profit from its shared domination of local trade in the city just as the state-affiliated 
companies derive rent from political domination over assets or territories. This, I 
argue, is most effectively conceptualised using the limited access order framework. 
 
Finally, I seek to explain how Oleg reconciles his distaste for Russia’s political 
economic model with his pragmatic approach of dealing with business conditions as 
he finds them. After all, this approach has enabled him to become a successful 
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businessman. However, Oleg’s pragmatism is not an implicit endorsement of the 
status quo. In fact, he has also established the Cooperative, a social entrepreneurial 
initiative, to counter what he considers to be propagandistic and uninspiring state 
education and to encourage independent thinking instead.  His intention is to broaden 
the horizons of local youth by offering high quality, low-cost extracurricular 
activities. Since, in his view, nobody takes responsibility for the betterment of 
society, he wants the Cooperative to support the identification and development of 
youngsters who might become free-thinking entrepreneurs, potentially within 
Sibtekhnika. Thus, below the surface of Oleg’s tough pragmatism he is also 
concerned to challenge and change political and economic conditions surreptitiously, 
both for society and for the longevity of his business. 
 
In concluding I aim to account for the difference between Oleg’s successful business 
practices, which are characterised by caution, competence and control in an uncertain 
business environment – as well as a willingness to work with the full range of 
legitimate and illegitimate actors in the Russian market – with his desire to bring 
about an improvement in the local political economy through the Cooperative. I find 
this is first based on his belief that only by taking personal responsibility for his 
affairs, rather than relying on the government to improve political, economic and 
social conditions, will he be able to achieve anything. More importantly, however, I 
argue that Oleg displays ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’: by defining Oleg’s 
entrepreneurial approach in this way, I can account for his activities that work with 
the grain of the political economy, and his simultaneous resistance to it. I return to 
this in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
3.2 Oleg’s theory of business 
 
Prior to establishing Sibtekhnika, Oleg worked as an academic in the local university, 
which made him a keen student of social theory. This formative early career was 
instrumental in shaping his view of the Russian political economy and how 
entrepreneurs can ‘get by’. That said, nowadays Oleg is semi-retired and the majority 
of the company’s day-to-day business is conducted by his two directors. However, as 
I will show, Sibtekhnika continues to operate as a model of his thinking within the 
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Sibtekhnika group of companies. Dmitrii, his son, directs Ofistekh, which sells retail 
and office equipment and technologies. Irina, his long-time protégé and a former 
prosecution service official, directs three businesses: the first, Magazinstroi, provides 
design services for retail companies, such as shops, supermarkets, restaurants and 
beauty salons, then the materials and equipment needed to fit them out. The second, 
Dyetskiisad Apparat, sells playground apparatus and educational hardware such as 
blackboards and furniture to children’s nurseries, as well as the white goods and other 
equipment needed for their kitchens and utility rooms. Thirdly, Irina recently joined a 
production association (proizvodstvennoe ob’edinenie) called Uchebresheniya, which 
manufactures educational hardware, equipment and technology, to become its sole 
regional representative. Each of these businesses is on the Sibtekhnika site, and to all 
intents and purposes they are the same company; the different brands simply allow for 
a clear division of labour between the directors. Oleg himself has a roaming role in 
which he moves in and out of the office to talk things over and check up as the mood 
takes him. However, he dedicates most of his time to the development of the 
Cooperative, which is housed in an adjacent building.  
 
Priyatnyi itself is the regional capital of Priyatnaya oblast’, a region comparable in 
size to Poland or Italy, and therefore subject to particular social-geographic factors 
that affect the way in which business is undertaken.  Approximately 30 per cent of the 
region’s population work in the oil and gas sectors alone while just over half the 
population live in Priyatyni itself. Outside the capital, the population is widely 
dispersed. The next largest settlement, Lesnoigorodok, is not far and contains a 
further 10 per cent of the population, but is a closed city (Zakrytoe Administrativno-
Territorial’noe Obrazovanie (ZATO) or ‘closed administrative-territorial formation’), 
meaning that special permission is required for outsiders to enter and business 
opportunities are therefore limited. Throughout the remainder of the oblast’, the 
remaining population is distributed in far smaller regional towns and villages. The 
interior is also inhospitable all year round, whether due to the cold for over half the 
year, or the sticky heat and swarms of insects encountered the rest of the time. The 
paved or concreted roads are dilapidated and limited mostly to the south, while 
northern settlements are accessible only by boat along the river that bisects the oblast’ 
when weather permits, or by aeroplane. 
 
 53 
 
3.2.1 Oleg’s notion of imperialism and the importance of social capital 
 
The importance of Siberia’s natural resources to the regional economy and the state’s 
emphasis on controlling their exploitation is at the centre of Oleg’s notion of 
‘imperialism’. To him, Russia’s regions have been shorn of their economic potential 
by an imperialistic central government, and Priyatnaya oblast’ is representative. Like 
Khotin, he therefore argues that Siberia need not retreat from Russia, but should be 
granted greater economic freedom, stronger banking and financial services, the 
improvement of the protection of property rights, the enhancement of state regulation 
and the reduction of corruption (2014: 48). A particularly negative consequence of the 
state’s involvement in regional economies, in his opinion, is that employment in state 
organisations is considered to be more attractive than in private enterprises. Most 
people see that the state still favours quasi-private national champions such as 
Gazprom, Russian Railways, and organisations within the military-industrial 
complex, whereas entrepreneurship is prone to multiple obstacles and suspicion. 
‘Many rely on the state and do not want to fight it’, he says, and he uses his own 
family to make the point: ‘My wife works in a local university, so receives her money 
from the state. My second son works in Lesnoigorodok. Even my sister who runs a 
business in the Far East supports the state because it wants good relations with China, 
where her suppliers are, and her region receives a lot of money from Moscow.’ He 
concludes: ‘The businessmen you have met who say they are against the system are 
not representative. People like me are only 1 per cent of the population.’ Thus Oleg 
considers his negative attitude to state primacy in the economy to be the exception 
rather than the rule. 
 
In Oleg’s view private enterprise is unimportant to the state, which does not 
effectively regulate business or uphold the law, so entrepreneurs have to work in 
specific ways to regulate the business sphere themselves. Consequently, as he puts it, 
entrepreneurs must learn to ‘get by’ drawing on their own network of personal 
acquaintances: 
 
‘I work with my own resources, the contacts I have available. Maybe there are 
better people in the market but for me it is hard to have transactions with them, it is 
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hard to negotiate with them. Even if better specialists are available, I will work with 
the people I have. And that’s it! I rely on my own social network, because it is more 
effective. We deal with bonding capital. In our country, it has been this way for a 
century. We work with our circle, where our connections are free.’ 
 
In this way Oleg has, rather unusually, drawn on social theory to emphasise the 
importance of ‘bonded social capital’ and has used this as a basis upon which to 
develop his business. Paul Adler and Seok-Woo Kwon define bonded social capital as 
‘the linkages among individuals or groups within [a] collectivity and, specifically, in 
those features that give the collectivity cohesiveness and thereby facilitate the pursuit 
of collective goals’ (2002: 21).  Thus drawing on bonded social capital is a rational 
response to the vulnerability of private business. Deepa Narayan states that ‘when 
societies are characterised by social groups with abundant cross-cutting ties and 
poorly functioning governments… the informal networks become substitutes for the 
failed state and form the basis for coping strategies (1999: 17; see also Woolcock, 
2001, 16). As I wrote in Chapter 2, the importance of social capital has been central in 
research on post-socialist Russia, ranging from studies of survival of the poor (for 
example Burawoy et al, 2000: 60; Round and Williams, 2010: 188; Rose, 1994: 47; 
Williams et al 2013: 68) to how Russia is governed, which Ledeneva has described in 
terms of ‘sistema’ (2013). It is therefore no surprise that social capital should be 
integral to Oleg’s successful entrepreneurship too.  Indeed, as two Russian specialists 
have written, ‘A specific feature of post-Soviet, perestroika and post-perestroika 
economy was a dramatic increase in the economic role of kinship and family and 
friendship ties, the active use of these bonds for private solutions to economic 
problems’ (Pokrovsky and Nikolaeva 2014: 478). Ledeneva most famously described 
this phenomenon in her work on blat. Drawing on Richard Rose, she states that ‘kin 
and social networks in Russia function in a pre- or anti-modern way to enforce loyalty 
and compliance with the informal ways of getting things done’ (2009: 278). As Heiko 
Schrader argued over a decade ago, post-socialist countries had made a transition to a 
market economy, but they had not become market societies of which people ‘felt’ 
part. This requires not only institutions but ‘institutional trust, system trust, and 
society-inherent social capital, so that people can choose between the market (faceless 
transactions) and networks (more personal relations) according to the criterion of 
transaction costs’ (2004: 401). Oleg’s reliance on personal networks and lack of trust 
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in Russia’s institutions or system of economic governance reiterates Schrader’s 
analysis today. To him, drawing on his social capital is the logical response to 
institutional asymmetry. 
 
3.2.2 Self-protection and open communication 
 
What is the specific utility of Oleg’s social capital in practical terms? As it turns out, 
Oleg is not merely concerned to work with his allies in order to meet his clients’ 
demands, as one might expect a conventional business to do in the absence of state 
support. Rather, his priority is to ensure that he is known personally to his 
competitors and suppliers and that their joint interests are acknowledged. His 
objective, accordingly, is not to reduce regulation and outdo his competitors, but to 
work with competitors to self-regulate their joint dominance over supply to the 
market. Therefore a key aspect in his entrepreneurial survival and success is that he 
can communicate with them about their mutual interests. ‘It’s similar to the mafiya’7, 
Oleg explains, by which he means that he and his partners strive to achieve a degree 
of exclusivity over the supply of goods in his market. Although this approach 
resembles a protection racket because it prevents outsiders from entering their market, 
violence is, unlike the mafiya, a rare rather than defining feature. Sibtekhnika may 
buy in protection occasionally (as I describe below), but it is cooperation rather than 
coercion that is the basis of their security in the market’.8 Plainly violence no longer 
overshadows everyday economic transactions or governance in Russia (Gans-Morse 
2012), but it remains an option in the Sibtekhnika’s modus operandi. 
 
The way in which Oleg’s social capital works has profound implications for 
understanding how Russian entrepreneurs can survive or even become successful. 
This arrangement, in which he works with competitors to secure mutual advantage 
over supply in their market, represents a system for injecting some control into, and 
reducing some risk in, the unregulated but notionally free market in Priyatnyi. I argue 
                                                
7 Oleg used the term ‘mafiya’ to refer to men working notionally in business but who in fact 
have criminal intent and methods. Therefore extortion, violence, protection rackets and 
criminal codes of behaviour are taken here as read. 
8 Varese first noted that Russian firms made up for the absence of secure property rights by 
‘internalising’ or buying protection from an outsider (1994: 251). 
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that this is an effective reaction to working in the context of limited access order. 
According to North et al, in an LAO members of the dominant coalition ‘agree to 
respect each other’s privileges, including property rights and access to resources and 
activities. By limiting access to these privileges to members of the dominant 
coalition, elites create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among 
themselves’ (North et al 2009: 18). Connolly was the first to describe Russia as an 
LAO (2015: 20) and his model examines the structure of the political economy itself, 
in which ‘competition is suppressed to ensure that rent flows are managed to suit the 
interests of the political elite’ (Connolly 2015: 12). This is undoubtedly the case, but 
the ‘actually existing’ economy is not included in his analysis. I find that Oleg’s 
arrangement appears to constitute a ‘minor coalition’ in the real economy, operating 
according to the same essential logic of the dominant coalition that Connolly 
identified: the minor coalition replicates locally the dominant coalition that has 
structural predominance in the country as a whole. Thus although Oleg’s minor 
coalition is vulnerable because it does not have political authority, it still serves the 
requirement to create order and security among his competitors, prevent the entry of 
outsiders and stabilise access to profits (as opposed to rents). This is a novel empirical 
observation not made in the extant literature on Russian business. 
 
A question arises over how the minor coalition divides its interests in the market. 
However, since there is enough business to go around, the most pressing question is 
how the minor coalition protects its market from outsiders. Oleg was non-committal 
when I asked him, saying that ‘together we would try to price them out’. I replied by 
asking what would happen if this was insufficient. ‘We would watch closely and see’, 
he rebuffed. This response has to suffice, because I did not observe such a situation 
during my fieldwork. Nevertheless, it is important to consider what Oleg and his 
partners could do if push came to shove. Unlike in the 1990s when Oleg had a 
‘krysha’ or ‘roof’, like many businesses (for example Humphrey 2002; Ries 2002; 
Varese 1994) he no longer has such protection, so another form of security is 
required. Dmitrii offered some indication during a conversation about how business 
debts can be recovered. He stated that Sibtekhnika could not allow other businessmen 
to take advantage of them, and said that when his girlfriend, a graphic designer, was 
not paid for several months by a client, his reputation alone ensured she got her 
money. Pushing the discussion further, I ask what would happen if a client had not 
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paid a large debt. He replies that people come down from a town in the north, and 
indicates where the knife would go in my gut. ‘It’s normal’, he said, sincerely. This 
example shows that developing a business with one’s own network and without the 
state as arbiter creates corporate cliques and rivalries that have to be underpinned by 
meaningful deterrence in order to be effective. The potential for violence would 
provide this. As North et al put it in their definition of an LAO, ‘the threat of violence 
becomes part of the arrangement that controls the actual use of violence’ (2009: 20). 
Oleg’s minor coalition provides this just as the Russian elites’ dominant coalition 
serves the same function. 
 
Even so, throughout my fieldwork, negotiation was the primary means through which 
deals were struck. For example, during my fieldwork Irina received a visit from a 
man who had recently introduced her to someone who became a new client. He had 
returned to intimidate her into a cut of the profit from the business with that client 
and, since his demand was based on intimidation, it could not be overlooked.  Oleg 
lamented that the man was a ‘most simple person’, but both he and Irina agreed that a 
peaceful solution would have to be found. Violence was not justified; the man had 
helped their business in a small way after all. They agreed to draw up some 
paperwork up acknowledging his introduction to the client and setting a fee, then to 
feed the cost through the business. Afterwards, Oleg said, this sort of demand for 
otkat (a kickback) occasionally happens (byvaet), while Irina expressed her 
conviction that ‘corruption is everywhere’. Otkat is an important feature in the 
construction industry in particular, she said, ‘because officials ask “where’s mine”?’ 
and require payment before projects can begin. However, there is a difference 
between corruption (korruptsiya) and otkat. Simon Kordonskii has shown that 
corruption tends to lack specificity, whereas otkat refers to a widely accepted 
practice: ‘I have never heard the people themselves, without irony, defined as corrupt. 
Rather, you can hear “he, she, they steal, they take everything”’ (2012: online). This 
explains Irina’s unspecific remark that corruption is ubiquitous. Otkat, on the other 
hand, is the specific consequence of the redistribution of assets upwards through the 
hierarchy that is a central aspect in Russia’s post-socialist capitalism. Once assets 
have been allocated, entitlement to a cut is granted according to social perceptions 
(based on intuition and experience) of rank (Kordonskii 2012: online). Therefore if 
officialdom is involved in a project, as it frequently is in Sibteknika’s work, otkat is a 
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given. Nevertheless otkat is the norm in private sector deals too, as Irina’s experience 
in this case shows. As a result, states Kordonskii, the rhetorical fight against 
corruption is nonsense because it is a fight against the system itself. He notes that 
corruption itself only becomes formally illegitimate when one is perceived to have 
overstepped their entitled cut (2012: online). Thus, while otkat is common, 
entitlement is based on perception. The man who demanded a payment from Irina 
took advantage of this situation aggressively: he knew he was entitled to a cut but also 
knew he was low in the hierarchy and would have to go and get it rather than expect it 
to be given. This type of risk, in which any financial transaction can be perceived as 
worthy of personal reward, is precisely what Oleg has to be ready to deter; he must 
have a limit at which he is unprepared to be extorted, otherwise business would 
become unviable. This explains most persuasively the need for a minor coalition: 
instances such as this are infrequent as a result. By working cooperatively through the 
minor coalition he has established behavioural expectations among suppliers and 
partners. On this occasion, however, Oleg and Irina decided to cut their losses. 
 
The necessity for both open communication and self-protection was illustrated on 
another occasion when we travelled to meet Vladimir, a man Oleg described as 
‘construction mafiya’, in his office above a derelict yard. Vladimir owed Oleg two 
million roubles but, apparently, did not have it. All the same, Oleg wanted to remind 
him about his debt and did so by proposing a joint enterprise. Vladimir’s appearance 
was caricature: over six feet tall, huge in every dimension, with several gold teeth, a 
shaved head and grey goatee. He swore several times each sentence in a gruff voice 
between draws on his cigarettes. His government contracts had dried up lately 
because staff there had changed and his future in construction looked bleak. He had 
remortgaged the yard but he needed more income to settle his debts. Oleg suggested 
to him that they jointly build a café on the university campus, where he had contacts. 
Oleg knew that Vladimir wanted to build himself a country house (kottedzh), but if he 
did and his creditors bankrupted him, Oleg would only receive a small part of his 
dues. Vladimir said he would think about the suggestion. Over lunch Oleg described 
Vladimir as dangerous, something I had naturally grasped, but also that he had been a 
great Soviet soldier, honoured for his service in Afghanistan. For Oleg this was 
important: just because Vladimir turned to crime in the 1990s did not mean he was 
not a reliable, or a potential business partner. Therefore it is clear that Oleg is above 
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all pragmatic about his contacts and takes the view that it is important to work and 
negotiate with them all. 
 
3.2.3 Summary of Oleg’s theory of business 
 
In this section I have shown that Oleg and his staff perceive uncertainty and danger in 
the business sphere and have responded by developing a system that enables them to 
be prepared for aggression or the unexpected, to deter would-be extorters and which 
offers mutual assistance to partners. I have described this as a minor coalition that 
works in the same way as Russia’s dominant coalition, which is to say according to 
the logic of limited access order, with its emphasis on cooperation to reduce the 
potential for violence. At the same time, it is also clear that when a threat arises they 
can usually cut their losses or, more probably, cut a deal, even with unlikely figures, 
since mutual interests can often be found. Negotiation and deal-making is therefore 
more critical to Sibtekhnika’s continued success than anything nefarious. Indeed, in 
this chapter Oleg and Irina are presented working with a large number of diverse 
characters with the key point being that they are in regular dialogue with these 
contacts and stay in a position to influence them. Thus, under conditions of 
institutional asymmetry, the importance of acknowledging others’ interests grows, 
and this reinforces the importance of maintaining social capital. Accordingly Oleg’s 
social capital is extensive and includes the full range of actors involved in Russian 
business over the post-Soviet period, including criminals. Business conditions may 
have ‘stabilised’ since the 1990s, but business still involves such actors. This is at the 
core of the ‘bonded social capital’ Oleg described: the necessity of getting by with, 
and making the most of one’s contacts pragmatically, creating stable business 
conditions collectively through negotiation. Although moments of unpredictability or 
hostility in their business relations occasionally arise, this reinforces in Oleg and his 
directors a determination to bring about order and stability into everyday business. 
Thus Oleg’s theory of business reinforces itself, with stability and order as the main 
priorities for action.  
 
3.3 Oleg’s entrepreneurship in practice 
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In spite of the relatively secure position Oleg has established for Sibtekhnika in the 
local market, the directors work constantly to minimise the risk they face from 
arbitrary interference in order to get on with the proper business of selling their wares. 
It is not in Sibtekhnika’s interest to rely on their participation in the minor coalition to 
guarantee a steady stream of customers, as is the way with the dominant coalition. As 
I have said, the minor coalition operates in the real economy, which is to say with 
hard budget constraints, and must meet the needs of the market in order to exist at all. 
In a discernible sense, therefore, Sibtekhnika’s success must be viewed not as the 
result of privilege within a protection racket, but of years of sustained effort to 
comprehend and create order in ever changing and uncertain business conditions with 
limited (bonded) social resources and without access to state support. In Priyatnyi 
new business has to be won, contracts have to be fulfilled, and legal compliance is 
obligatory, as far as is achievable. These conditions became harder still during my 
fieldwork when the value of the rouble began to fall. I now examine how Oleg and his 
directors actually do their work with clients and suppliers, their determination to 
assert control over their affairs, and their focus on ensuring that they are taken 
seriously as reliable, competent and diligent businesspeople. 
 
3.3.1 Asserting control  
 
Irina’s resolve for control over business affairs and attention to detail is revealed in 
the following examples. While I was in the field Magazinstroi was contracted by an 
entrepreneur from Lesnoigorodok to design and fit out his new grocery store.9 The 
layout was quickly agreed and the refrigeration and wall units were supplied. In 
addition, Irina had sub-contracted Fyodor, a carpenter, to make a set of wooden units 
to occupy various places on the shop floor: a wooden frame imitating a market stall to 
hold special offers, and several tall stands for baked goods. After a couple of weeks 
                                                
9 Since all deliveries and visitors are subjected to checks before entering Lesnoigorodok, and 
all residents have specific permission to live there, my entry was out of the question. 
However, Irina had acquired a pass based on old relationships in the city, which meant she 
could consult with clients there rather than rely on their approaches, therefore providing 
greater access not only to a larger regional market, but one in which competition is severely 
limited. 
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we visited Fyodor to check his progress and all appeared to be on track. He called 
Irina a few days later to say he had finished the first bread stand and it was ready for 
inspection. He brought it to the Sibtekhnika showroom. Irina was not impressed: some 
of the edges were finished poorly and the joints made from different woods. The 
shelves were also at forty-five degrees so needed rims to keep the bread from sliding 
off, and the current rims were insufficient. In exasperation Irina told Fyodor, ‘If I was 
the client I would say “what is that”?’ By chance the client had come in to talk about 
the design of the beverage section. Irina showed him the bread stand and he liked it, 
but would have preferred the edges rounded off. Irina drew his attention closer, 
explaining how the quality was not right. He was an easy-going man and seemed 
unconcerned, leaving Irina to take care of the details. Thus in this sense the client was 
happy with the product but Irina, the seller, was not and would not give it away in its 
current form. This is related to Irina’s determination to assert control and her sense of 
responsibility to get it right. 
 
A few days afterwards, Fyodor returned to go over some contractual details. He 
wanted Irina to pay him more for the adjustments she had demanded. He shot me a 
knowing glance when Irina was not looking, seeking my approval for his claim. He 
seemed uncommitted to the details of the contract and had underestimated Irina as a 
deal-maker. I had also ascertained from our previous meetings that he looked down 
on women. Irina, who dressed smartly and expected the same of her staff, checked her 
hair in her office mirror, and this seemed to fortify Fyodor’s impression that she 
lacked seriousness. At an earlier meeting he had taken me aside and described Irina’s 
female office managers as ‘prostitutes’ when they left the room. While Fyodor 
pretended to study the paperwork in front of him, however, Irina in turn cast me a 
look indicating his uselessness. Before the meeting she had told me that she could 
barely understand his Caucasian dialect. Thus both Irina and Fyodor had both seen in 
me an opportunity to affirm their own rightness regarding the other: Fyodor sought 
my approval that Irina was beneath him; Irina sought it in othering Fyodor as a dim-
witted oriental workman without the skills for business. I remained neutral, however, 
knowing Fyodor was in for a shock. He left sheepishly a few moments later after Irina 
repeated to him slowly, clearly, with a raised voice, what was expected of him 
according to their contract. A few days later, Fyodor turned up with the finished bread 
stands. Irina inspected them and declared “Look! The result of shouting!” They 
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certainly looked better. Fyodor was given another order for two more stands, the 
reward for belatedly getting it right. As he left Irina glanced at me with a ‘Do you see 
what I have to deal with?’ look of exasperation.  
 
In this example it is obvious that Irina feels determined to assert or display control 
over her business. Although there is no real need for her to show that she is right in 
these instances – because it was obvious that she was – she still does so. This 
behaviour is borne of her perception that the client should see that she is in control of 
his affairs and taking care of his interests in a market in which one has to be self-
reliant and where people such as Fyodor will take advantage if they can. The fact that 
the client was relaxed is testimony to her effectiveness, while she can be sure that he 
believes she is reliable and trustworthy, and may recommend her to his 
acquaintances. The assertion of control, therefore, emerges from the fact that trust has 
to be tangibly earned rather than believed; this is the difference between relying on 
informal rather than formal institutions. 
 
Indeed, Irina often said only half-jokingly that her effectiveness as a businesswoman 
was down to shouting at workmen. This was borne out on visits to the construction 
sites (ob’’ekti) of the kindergartens Dyetskiisad Apparat was furnishing with 
industrial sinks, refrigerators, washing machines, play apparatus and other 
miscellaneous equipment. On my first trip I asked her en route about the purpose of 
our visit. ‘To shout at people and everything will be OK’, she replied, and showed her 
fists. On the sites, Irina would embark on a familiar checking routine: catching the 
personnel responsible for the parts of the building that would receive her equipment; 
inspecting their work against the blueprints; identifying inevitable errors and faults; 
and making continual demands for improvement and corrections. She invariably 
discovered that workmen needed to coordinate their work more carefully with her so 
that the equipment could be delivered and fitted, and demanded their contact details 
so that they could be in touch. Her unlikely appearance on a construction site, clear 
experience in her field, and quick competence comparing the architectural plans to the 
reality of the construction site was highly effective at ensuring she got the attention of 
the constructors. Often she started directing work on the spot: on one occasion her 
equipment had been delivered but was not properly assembled or fitted, and was in 
the wrong locations. She gathered the men responsible and explained that it was not 
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her task to sort out these problems but she needed to see that the work was done 
properly. One of the men said that this was his first kindergarten, as if to excuse 
himself from the fact that supply pipes were fitted in the wrong places. With a wry 
smile Irina closed the door behind the two of them so that he could not escape as she 
listed what needed to be done. Then, like a traffic officer, she directed the 
rearrangement of the industrial fridges and basins by six men between various rooms, 
waving the goods to and fro and pointing out where electricity and water supplies 
ought to be. Her view is that only by her own personal, active, communicative 
intervention would things turn out right. Her assumption was to expect the worst and 
to be physically present to ensure people did what they had promised. In this way 
Irina’s big fear is to be associated with shoddy work since, as is now clear, 
Sibtekhnika’s business is largely built on personal relations so her personal integrity is 
constantly at stake. 
 
Afterwards, I ask why the plans were not followed accurately. ‘It’s Russia’ she 
responded bluntly. ‘I wish it were better, but it is a fact.’ At the time I felt this answer 
was unconsidered, but on reflection believe it satisfactorily explains her determination 
to assert her will on what she considers the predictably disappointing standards of her 
business partners and suppliers. Moreover, this fatalism is widely held: it is common 
knowledge that even the best intentions will inevitably fall short of the original 
tasking or finished article. Indeed, even the long-time mayor of Moscow Yurii 
Luzhkov devoted a humorous book to the subject, and made particular reference to 
construction projects. He stated that although it is common to complete 95 per cent of 
a building, the last 5 per cent is almost never achieved: ‘It is as though some 
diabolical force prevents us from doing a thing more properly and putting the 
finishing touches…. It may only be 5 per cent, but we’ll leave something undone. But 
you see, as a rule, it is just this last 5 per cent that means quality!’ (2005: 38). Irina 
would concur with this view and responded by trying to maintain control, which 
required asserting her will over those responsible. On the construction site this was 
not a bad-tempered process; the workers accepted the changes that needed to be made 
when Irina showed them. However, they could have completed the job better 
themselves the first time. That they did not justifies and explains Irina’s approach. 
Moreover, Irina’s negative outlook was reinforced repeatedly in daily life when she 
encountered problems, such as a theft from her car or when the man arrived at her 
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office demanding otkat. Such events reinforced a commitment in her not to let her 
guard down, which made her emphasis on control both a necessity and performance. 
 
3.3.2 Conveying control 
 
Oleg places considerable emphasis on overseeing the company’s business effectively. 
When he and I discussed his plans for the day ahead he often replied simply with the 
verb ‘to control’ (kontrolirovat’). He also recruits Sibtekhnika’s staff with this ability 
in mind too, and in this respect Irina’s determinedness to convey control over her 
business affairs and give the impression of competence makes sense. Before working 
for Sibtekhnika Irina was a lawyer in the prosecution service and during my 
observation she frequently referred to that experience in meetings with clients or in 
sales pitches so that customers and suppliers knew they were dealing with a 
professional and serious-minded businesswoman. She also deployed her legal 
knowledge to placate administrators and creditors when they asked tricky questions 
about the business. Indeed, she gave the impression that such tasks were 
straightforward. When her bank manager wanted to meet to talk about why she 
managed three businesses instead of one, Irina became exasperated at the prospect of 
the meeting, and claimed she would have to explain ‘very slowly’ how the 
Sibtekhnika group of companies works.  
 
Indeed Irina often stylised her emotions for effect. For example, when an aggressive 
client called about a problem with a deal she responded with aggression of her own: ‘I 
already answered! If you want to go down that route, fine! Write a letter, bring it 
here!’ then crashed down the phone and nonchalantly ate a piece of cake, to the 
appreciation and awe of her managers. Here she exhibited considerable charisma, but 
it was also clear that she would not tolerate aggression and returned it if negotiation 
was not possible. This attitude is born of a conviction that weakness has no place in 
business. Since formal institutions offer insufficient protection she has to act in her 
own defence, which she can do with some confidence: she has both legal training and 
the support of the minor coalition. Here her control of the situation is both rhetorical 
and substantial. At the same time, she is adept at considering cost and profit on the 
go, and decides margins quickly with a calculator on the table and the telephone 
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against her ear. She is a master of deal-making on the telephone, and baldly discusses 
even her suppliers’ margins with them, pushing for discounts on the basis of past 
loyalty and potential future purchases. To her, all costs and prices are negotiable, 
deals are cut quickly and amiably, and she is careful not to be outdone. She conveys 
control with legal nous, business sense and self-confidence, which makes her an 
inspiring figure to her colleagues: she is able to uphold the legitimacy of the business 
in formal and informal terms, countering occasional doubts or threats. 
 
Sibtekhnika is managed hierarchically, like most Russian organisations (Kets de Vries 
2001: 617-8), with even basic decisions made by the directors. New employees are 
hired from the directors’ own social networks, which ensures their reliability, 
trustworthiness and obedience. For example, Marina, one of Irina’s managers, knows 
Oleg through his connections with a local university where she had been a good 
student. Svetlana, another manager, is studying there part-time, and was also 
recommended by a contact. Tanya, the third manager, is the former girlfriend of 
Irina’s son, Misha. Misha himself is employed in the business to learn the trade 
before going to the local technical university to study architecture, a skill he will 
bring back upon graduation. Dmitrii’s girlfriend, a graphic designer, works as a 
contractor, providing regular support to the company’s retail designs and branding for 
clients. Indeed Sibtekhnika’s entire team had been assembled according to this 
method. Yet despite this careful vetting the directors maintain firm control, which in 
turn means that even capable and experienced staff defer their decisions upwards, 
seek their guidance on routine matters, or pass them calls from clients to resolve, 
despite their undoubted ability to deal with such issues themselves. As a result I often 
saw clients walk past the managers towards the directors’ offices and wait outside 
until they were ready to speak to them about matters of product choice, rather than 
ask if the managers could help them. This, again, is the result of a system of work that 
privileges strict control. 
 
In spite of this micromanagerial approach the directors are adept at coaxing results 
from the staff to maintain a sufficient level of quality, although this is frequently 
achieved by either walking them through the job step by step or by taking over 
themselves, although this also served to reiterate their position in control, even if it 
was time-consuming. For example, when Svetlana entered Irina’s office with a 
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spreadsheet she had devised for a client that even Sibteknhika’s accountant could not 
decipher, Irina told her to start again. ‘We are trying to achieve a standard’, she 
explained, and drew columns onto some scrap paper to indicate which figures went 
where. She settled on a fee by calling the client to agree, and told Svetlana to make 
the spreadsheet reach that total. Or when Anastasiya, one of Irina’s senior managers, 
complained that she found dealing with the representative from Promstroi difficult, 
and re-enacted a fruitless and sarcastic telephone call, Irina called them immediately 
to resolve the issue: such a key client must be looked after carefully. Even 
Anastasiya, who studied medicine, likes the atmosphere in Sibtekhnika, describing it 
as ‘a good collective’, but still deferred any significant responsibilities to Irina. Thus 
the weight of responsibility for Irina’s businesses falls on her personally. She makes 
the process of business appear controlled and simple because she is the only member 
of her staff that consistently makes decisions. Even as she complains about it and 
recruits careful, intelligent staff, this is how she likes to keep it. 
 
3.3.3 Summary of Oleg’s entrepreneurship in practice 
 
In this section I have shown how old-fashioned business acumen is as necessary in 
Sibtekhnika as in any company. However, the ability to assert and display control in 
internal and external business relations, to show the seriousness and credibility of the 
business, is also critical. This serves as a signal to suppliers, clients and contractors 
alike, and is a key factor in negotiations with business associates, such as clients or 
even mafiya figures, as well as within the business itself. This display is central to 
Oleg and Irina’s strategy for maintaining the profitability and pre-eminence, 
reputation and autonomy of Sibtekhnika in the city’s real economy. Its importance is 
based on their perception that the business sphere is beset with uncertainties, which I 
have described: that Russian workers are consistently inadequate; that partners will let 
you down if you allow them to; that even with the best staff available, one has to take 
personal responsibility for daily tasks and that fate will strike if you let your guard 
down.  
 
I argue that these actions are a response to the difficulties of business I have outlined. 
That is, Oleg clearly equates the assertion of his will in market relations with his 
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longevity in business. This has meant adopting a pragmatic approach to doing 
business and to choosing business partners: his longstanding relationships with 
mafiya figures reveals his appreciation that Russian business can survive only by 
accepting conditions as they are encountered over time, not as he wishes them to be. 
Similarly, Dmitrii’s description of the necessity of occasional force is a reminder that 
gaining a business presence in Russia has depended not only on avoiding the 
interference of others, but on asserting oneself. That Irina uses her legal training to 
protect the interests of the business and promote her credibility reiterates the 
importance of understanding the way in which the existence of the law (if not the law 
itself), may be utilised in business. In this case, familiarity with the law is a fact to be 
vocalised as a deterrent for the purpose of conveying and asserting control. Overall, 
Sibtekhnika appears as an apparent exemplar of business competence in Priyatnyi. I 
find, particularly, that Kubik’s conceptual holism, which emphasises the social 
construction of informants’ perceptions, is particularly relevant to my interpretation 
of this point.  
 
3.4 Oleg’s entrepreneurship outside the city 
 
In this section I describe how Oleg and Irina do business with different types of 
organisations engaged in the commercial scene in Priyatnaya oblast’, with particular 
attention upon a business deal with state-affiliated political elites in a rural 
community. My purpose is to provide an empirical example of how private business 
functions in the ‘actually existing’ political economy of Siberia’s interior. As I have 
stated, Priyatnyi is considerably the largest settlement in Priyatnaya oblast’, with a 
large, diversified economy compared to the region’s other towns and villages, which 
are far smaller and isolated. Thus in Priyatnyi SMEs are more common and operate 
under hard budget constraints, so Sibtekhnika functions as an ordinary retail business 
in the city, selling equipment and services to clients from the shop floor; and as a 
contractor, winning contracts from public and private tenders on the open market. 
However, Sibtekhnika also has business interests away from Priyatnyi in the rural 
interior where, as I show, market conditions are different. In the interior, Sibtekhnika 
has three types of client. First, there are small regional organisations and companies 
that buy occasional goods and services, such as kindergartens or retail stores in the 
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provincial towns. Second, there are a few large state-affiliated resource extraction 
companies such as Promstroi, headquartered in Moscow but with a huge regional 
infrastructure in the interior. These companies also have occasional needs for 
equipment that Sibtekhnika, as a regional supplier, can provide most easily. Finally, 
there are state-affiliated elites who have pre-eminent positions in their local 
communities and who, by virtue of their local power, have acquired a dominant stake 
in their local economies, thus requiring occasional supplies from Priyatnyi as the 
regional centre. As I now describe, Sibtekhnika’s trade with these enterprises provides 
an insight into how Russian business works and the role of entrepreneurship in the 
wider political economy. 
 
3.4.1 Business with small regional companies 
 
I begin by considering the first type of client, the small regional enterprise. 
Sibtekhnika receives occasional demand for goods from these businesses, but must 
make a decision about the profitability of supplying them, since transportation costs 
can be high for small orders. Obviously, there is a geographical limit beyond which 
costs outweigh profits. As Irina pointed out, she regularly asks herself whether 
particular regional sales are profitable, and said that in a regional town she would 
normally expect a margin of 30 per cent on her sales. This, she said, is the ‘market 
price’ (po rynku). Some competitors, she said, might try to undercut that price by up 
to 20 per cent, but such businesses are one-man bands with limited logistical 
capabilities and no after-sales service. In contrast, Irina told me, she maintains that 
margin to account for the cost of future repairs in advance. For example, I once 
accompanied Sasha, Sibtekhnika’s technician, to repair a washing machine Irina had 
sold to a kindergarten in the regional town of Slobodskoi. Our job was to change the 
machine’s heating element, a task that took only a few minutes, while the return 
journey itself took all day. Clearly, the cost of our time and travel outweighed the 
price of the heating element. Even so, Oleg and Irina do their best to accommodate 
such clients. Irina was hardheaded about the geographical profit line, but she also had 
sympathy for the isolated communities that require goods from outside. In such a 
sparsely populated oblast’, Irina also wanted to uphold Sibtekhnika’s reputation 
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which, I have emphasised, is particularly important in the Russian market, where 
personal relations are critical to success. 
 
3.4.2 Business with state-affiliated companies 
 
Supplying state-affiliated companies such as Promstroi, in contrast, offers a far more 
lucrative opportunity. Promstroi is a notionally private corporation but is in fact the 
contemporary incarnation of two former Soviet ministries: the Ministry of the 
Construction of the Oil and Gas Industry and the Ministry of Installation and Special 
Construction Works (Promstroi Group 2015: 3). As a result, it is a company with 
continuing strategic importance. Among other projects in Priyatnaya oblast’, 
Promstroi Group is building a gas pipeline which, according to Oleg, requires a 
pumping station every 70 kilometers, each of which requires a staff of seven to ten 
people, who in turn require a kitchen and other conveniences. During my fieldwork 
Sibteknika was commissioned to supply equipment for the cafeteria and living 
quarters at one of these pumping stations. Naturally, this contract was given a high 
priority. As I mentioned in Section 2, when Anastasiya had trouble communicating 
with one of their representatives, Irina immediately called them back and promised to 
visit the site in order and go over the paperwork later that week. Irina was keen to 
make a good impression, because more pumping stations could mean supplying more 
equipment. 
  
The journey to the pumping station took six hours. A large digital clock on the 
outside of the construction office indicated that there were 114 days until the station 
was to be completed. While Irina entered the office for her meeting, Oleg told me to 
stay in the car; he did not think it would be wise for me to go with her. The site was 
surrounded by a distant perimeter fence to prevent terrorists, he said, and he was 
cautious about me taking photographs, telling me the company had its own police. 
Though it is hard to imagine terrorists choosing to attack a pumping station in the 
middle of Siberia with little but trees and swamp around for hundreds of kilometres, 
the protection of the site highlights its importance relative to anything else nearby. 
Indeed, for the nearest rural communities it could at best provide only temporary 
work for informal labourers, but more likely technical specialists would be contracted 
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until their work was completed. To my eye only Sibtekhnika and other distant 
suppliers of minor components could be the transient beneficiaries of Promstroi’s 
construction as it moved through the territory. Thus Promstroi is an entirely different 
type of commercial organisation to anything else in the oblast’. 
 
Oleg attempted to describe this difference in the car. ‘Of course,’ he said, ‘Russia 
cannot continue to depend on oil and gas because there are only 50 years left’. 
However, as I stated in Section 1, Oleg argues that for now state-affiliated companies 
offer the most attractive form of employment, particularly for young people: ‘They 
are attracted to the brand, steady salary and the social status given to oil and gas 
workers.’ By chance the following day I received a photo from a Siberian friend 
whom I had helped with his English language in advance of an interview for an 
internship with Schlumberger, an oil and gas services firm. In the photo he was 
proudly wearing the company’s uniform, having secured the position that would 
enable him to develop a career in Russia’s most important industry. Vladimir 
Shlapentokh and Anna Arutunyan claim that one third of Russian youth and 48 per 
cent of students wanted to become state employees in the late 2000s. They identified 
similar factors for this popularity as Oleg: ‘social guarantees, privileges, the stability 
of the position, salary, and the opportunity to receive bribes and make deals’, as well 
as ‘the connections’ (Shlapentokh and Arutunyan 2013: 29). In a study of the 
aspirations of young Siberians, Vitaly Kashpur also gathered similar responses 
(Kashpur 2009), and Putin himself has stated as much (see Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation 2015: online).  My encounters in the field 
appear to show that this remains the case today. Plainly, these organisations wield 
incomparable political, economic and social influence in the country, yet it is 
characteristic of Oleg’s approach to business that while he bemoaned Promstroi’s 
regional importance, he was happy to profit from it wherever possible. 
 
In Chapter 1 I argued that political influence in Russia is closely associated with 
personal wealth. Shlapentokh and Arutunyan argue that state-affiliated companies 
such as Promstroi are emblematic of this relationship. According to them, access to 
these enterprises has, since the 1990s, become a privilege handed out to politically 
loyal appointees who reciprocate with lots of money (Shlapentokh and Arutunyan 
2013: 23). As a result they argue that a feudal society has emerged with liberal and 
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authoritarian elements. The liberal element includes being able to start a business 
(albeit with ‘impediments that are reminiscent of the Middle Ages’), accumulate 
money, and move freely (Shlapentokh and Arutunyan 2013: 7); while 
authoritarianism is found in the process of privatisation that legalised ‘big property’ 
or former state assets which allowed the former nomenklatura to operate those 
enterprises for themselves (Shlapentokh and Arutunyan 2013: 22). This argument is 
persuasive for my purposes because it helps to delineate between the different 
organisations encountered by Oleg in the course of his entrepreneurship. The 
transaction between Promstroi and Sibtekhnika was between two organisations 
working in market conditions akin, respectively, to these authoritarian and liberal 
feudal conditions. Still, I do not take the feudalism concept too far: Fomin has rightly 
cautioned that feudalism is ‘not everywhere’ in Russia, due to its large urban 
population, strategic importance in the world and scientific achievements (Fomin 
2010: 140). Indeed, I propose that Promstroi is more representative of Russia’s 
‘dominant coalition’ within the country’s LAO, with access to rents agreed politically 
among the country’s elite, while Sibtekhnika, as I have already argued, participates in 
a ‘minor coalition’ whose access to resources is agreed commercially among local 
competitors. To all intents and purposes, the logic of both coalitions is the same: to 
maintain access to resources and limit competition for them. Oleg therefore replicates 
the coalition model to secure the place of Sibtekhnika in the market. Consequently, 
the transaction between the two organisations proceeds on an equal footing: 
Promstroi requires the goods that Sibtekhnika can supply locally. Moreover, Oleg had 
a strong chance of becoming Promstroi’s supplier because of Sibtekhnika’s dominant 
position over regional supplies in their market. It is undoubtedly true that Promstroi’s 
operations provide little benefit to the rural communities of Priyatnaya oblast’ and far 
more to the members of the dominant coalition. However, the point is that Oleg 
managed to create the conditions that enabled him to join Promstroi’s supply chain. 
In this respect it is a mistake to judge Oleg’s analysis of the political economy merely 
by his distaste for the dominance of companies such as Promstroi; in fact it is the 
strength of his analysis that led him to create a minor coalition that allows him to 
survive and thrive in the difficult real economy under conditions of limited access. 
This finding, I note, could not have been identified in a study of Oleg’s attitudes; an 
interview would only have revealed, as with most other studies of entrepreneurship, 
that he resented the state rather than revealing what he does about it.  
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3.4.3 Business with regional elites 
 
I now elaborate further on the relationship between Sibtekhnika and the dominant 
coalition using my final example of Oleg’s work in the interior of the region. One day 
Irina was contacted by Valentina, a businesswoman who enquired if Sibtekhnika 
could refurbish several grocery stores she owned with her husband Volodya in 
Tsentralnyi, the capital of Tsentalnyi raion in the centre of the oblast’. Valentina had 
not met Oleg or Irina, but they were known to one another by reputation due to the 
strength of their respective positions in the region. It was agreed that we would visit 
Tsentralnyi and examine the stores to make more concrete plans. Tsentralnyi raion is 
marginally smaller than the Netherlands but has a population of only 12,000, of which 
the vast majority live in Tsentralnyi itself.10 The journey from Priyatnyi by car would 
take at least 12 hours, mostly by dirt roads. However, to compensate for the arduous 
journey, Valentina incentivised our visit by promising to introduce Irina to the local 
officials responsible for the procurement of educational equipment and staff at the 
local kindergarten, which raised the prospect of further business opportunities. 
Moreover, she had also recently built the most comfortable hotel in the raion to cater 
for the regular flow of businessmen from Moscow (Moskvichi) visiting the regional 
Gazprom office, and invited us to stay in it during our visit.  Thus Valentina seemed 
very keen that Sibtekhnika should visit, offering introductions to local officials over 
whom she apparently held considerable influence in addition to her own commercial 
requirements. 
 
Before our arrival Oleg and Dmitrii explained how Valentina and Volodya had 
acquired this influence. Oleg said that Valentina is the business partner of the wife of 
the leader (Glava) of Tsentralnyi raion, while Volodya is descended from Old 
Believers (Starovery), who wield great authority in the taiga. In the 19th and early 20th 
century the Old Believers were involved in the development of Russian capitalism 
                                                
10 In reality, Oleg joked, it is ten times larger than the Netherlands, because it is impenetrable 
except by dirt road or by riverboat. 
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and philanthropy11, and during the Soviet period sought positions of control within the 
state departments (organi) that controlled taiga resources, including logging and 
fishing. Anyone wanting to work in the taiga today still needs their assistance and a 
guide (provodnik), he said, which endows them with continuing influence.12 They 
survived in the taiga because of their toughness, he claimed, and told me to inspect 
Volodya’s physique, which was a testament to good breeding and a cultural appetite 
for work. Using English, he described them as ‘success-orientated’, ‘self-reliant’ and 
said they have a ‘protestant ethic in an orthodox society’. He also contrasted this with 
the majority of Russians, who ‘take as they receive’ and have an attitude of 
passivity.13 Indeed Dmitrii was keen to emphasise their success, describing them as 
among the wealthiest people in the entire oblast’, with interests in forest products, 
milk and property. Their children live in Italy, he said, which is their first stop before 
London.  
  
Oleg said that as Soviet social classes were reinvented and social positions solidified 
in the post-Soviet years, Russian society was divided into private interest groups. In 
order to overcome difficulties in business, entrepreneurs had to work between these 
groups. Creating bridges between them required connections or money, and Valentina 
and her partners were able to unite on the basis of their collective enterprise, political 
connections and social influence, which enabled them to reap overwhelming wealth 
through their dominance of the raion’s economy. Characteristically, Oleg sought to 
relate this to academic concepts, and cited Olsen’s work on group theory. According 
                                                
11 The renowned hardiness of the Old Believers is often described through story of the Lykov 
family. See for example Dash 2013: online; Vice Magazine 2013: online. See also Roschin on 
the role of the Old Believers in ‘opening-up Siberia’ (1995). 
12 There is little evidence behind Oleg’s claim that the Old Believers accessed positions of 
power in the Soviet bureaucracy since, as Humphrey argues, the majority were hostile to the 
Soviet government (2014: S218) and industrialisation (Dunn and Dunn 1964: 478), although 
they were praised as sober workers and did develop personal strategies for interacting with 
officialdom (see Paert, 2004: 202-205). In any case the extent to which Volodya could be 
considered a practicing Old Believer is negligible today. At best he has assumed the cultural 
traits without the religion. Although he was certainly a hard worker in my observations, he 
was not obviously pious and was a committed Putin supporter and vodka drinker. Oleg said 
he would quickly sober up in the presence of elders, though I did not have the chance to find 
out. 
13 Oleg’s opinion on Russian passivity is not unique. The supposed inertia and apathy in the 
Russian character is sometimes referred to as Oblomovism, after the character in Goncharov’s 
novel (Goncharov 1915; Kets de Vries 2001: 609). 
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to Olsen, the formation of certain small groups allows members to provide themselves 
‘with collective goods without relying on coercion or any positive inducements apart 
from the collective good itself’ (1971: 33). The entrepreneurial union of the two 
wives, combined with the respective political (United Russia) and social (Old 
Believer) influence of the husbands, presented a straightforward opportunity for all to 
benefit financially without significant costs or risks.   
 
In this account, Oleg considers the good fortune of Valentina and Volodya from the 
same perspective that he considers his own entrepreneurial history, which is to 
emphasise his own agency and social capital as the cause of his success. In 
Valentina’s and Volodya’s case, however, the circumstances were entirely different, 
because they were the beneficiaries of political affiliation. As Shlapentokh has said, 
when the leaders of Russia’s regions were appointed by the president in 2004-05 they 
were sanctioned to rule ‘their regions like fiefs in the same authoritarian way as Putin 
ran the whole country’ (2007: 130-131). Thus, while there is no doubt that 
Valentina’s group was enterprising and well connected, it also stood to benefit 
enormously from this change, which sanctioned them to exercise power personally 
over their territory for economic gain. In other words, while I reject Shlapentokh’s 
use of the feudal concept in preference for the concept of LAO, I accept his 
underlying point: Valentina and Volodya are regional members of Russia’s ‘dominant 
coalition’, holding local power and wielding it for personal economic gain. 
 
Valentina’s importance in Tsentralnyi was clear upon arrival as the features of 
Russia’s LAO became clear in miniature. Tsentralnyi is a large village mainly 
constructed from wood and prefabricated materials. Most residences have vegetable 
patches, outhouses, and a street side water supply. Valentina’s hotel, overlooking the 
river, and the Gazprom building, stood out because they were built of masonry. 
Valentina greeted us in a 4x4 and took us to her hotel, which seemed enormous 
beside the neighbouring buildings, then to her five grocery stores. She was, Oleg 
noted, ‘very active’ (aktivnaya), which in Russian connotes energy but also pushiness 
and enterprising spirit. She swept us into her stores and quickly drew our attention to 
dated shelving and refrigeration units that needed replacing. Her staff, the shop 
assistants, glanced at one another with ‘here come the big shots’ expressions, which 
cannot have escaped my companions. Still, Valentina was courteous with them, 
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addressed them by name and asked them to describe any troubles they had with the 
equipment and layout of the shop floor. In other words, her command of her staff was 
akin to Irina’s own in Priyatnyi.  
 
As she moved between the equipment the daily life of the store continued: a drunk 
man loitered at the counter before approaching a couple of men from out of town who 
had stopped by for provisions. The drunk had the red face, dull eyes and 
obliviousness of an alcoholic, but could not buy anything to drink so began making a 
nuisance of himself. He asked the outsiders to buy him a drink and forcefully rubbed 
his forehead against the shoulder of the older man, partly to keep his balance, partly 
to demand his attention. Initially the men laughed at him, but he became more 
vigorous and aggressive. The elder slapped him hard on the face. Perhaps the others 
had not seen, because they continued their inspection regardless, with Irina taking 
photos of the shop floor. Oleg noticed I was watching but said nothing. He was keen 
that I got into the social swing of things and was observing me observing, offering 
occasional commentary and opinion along the way. Outside the drunk put his foot on 
the bumper of the men’s car but was threatened with the elder’s fist and they drove 
off. He staggered over the road to another wretched bystander holding a bottle of 
vodka and related his story. Thus although we were among the poor and drunken 
Russian peasantry of the Siberian interior we were also disconnected from any 
meaningful interaction with them. Indeed, as the wealthier men drove away, they left 
the sad poverty of the village, not with pity but relief. In this way the disconnection 
between Valentina’s membership of the dominant coalition – concerned with the 
modernisation of her shop floor – and the misery of many locals, was revealed. I 
followed Irina and Oleg as they trailed Valentina out of the store, continuing the 
discussion, and we drove to the next. Although I felt ill at ease with my temporary 
position among the privileged, I was also relieved to be in the car away from the 
swarms of mosquitoes, four-winged dragonflies and three-inch hornets with luminous 
green eyes that thickened the air, and made street life immensely uncomfortable. 
These experiences caused me to consider what it takes to be enterprising in the taiga, 
and I pondered Volodya’s Old Believer resolve and toughness with new admiration: it 
is not only good fortune that allowed them to join the dominant coalition but hard 
work and an eye for pouncing on the chances that came their way. 
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After looking at the stores, Valentina turned her attention to showing us a good time 
with an evening of corporate entertainment. Volodya took us on his speedboat 
upstream to where he had constructed a short boardwalk between the rivers and a 
tributary, and several log cabins with hot baths, where we were treated to a large meal 
and vodka. Volodya had built the site to offer entertainment and relaxation for 
Russian tourists and Moscvichi. Indeed this wealthy demographic emerged as 
prominent in Valentina’s strategy for the development of her business. It emerged that 
she deplored the incapacity of the locals to contribute much to the development of the 
local economy, saying that there is no hope for young people, who ‘do not work and 
do not want to! They are happy to receive 50,000 roubles per month and that’s it!’. 
On this basis, I reflect, she knew that the redevelopment of her stores would not 
increase her profits substantially because the market in Tsentralnyi was not growing, 
nor was the purchasing power of its residents. Consequently, her focus for business 
growth was her new hotel and riverside cabins, based on the spending power of 
wealthy outsiders. As such, the renovation of her shops may be seen more as a gesture 
to the locals, giving the impression of modernisation, rather than because it was 
essential or promised further development. This reflects the government’s own 
rhetorical commitment to improving business conditions without much tangible 
change. 
 
Reflecting on our time with Valentina and Volodya a few days later, Oleg said that 
although they do not have a monopoly on local trade, they do monopolise power. ‘In 
Russia there are two social worlds’, he explained, ‘a poor majority and a very rich 
minority, which never meet one another.’ He called this the ‘Haitian model’ 
(Gaityanskii model’) in which power is hoarded both regionally and centrally. His 
analogy is useful to the extent that it acknowledges the marginalisation of the 
Tsentralnyi population from political and economic influence, but the ‘Haitian’ aspect 
is only figurative, likening Russia to a developing country, prone to dependence on 
resource exports, political elitism, violence and the marginalisation of the people. As I 
have indicated above, however, I find a more accurate description for them as 
regional members of the country’s ‘dominant coalition’ in Russia’s LAO. This is a 
concept to which I will specifically return in Chapter 6. Nevertheless Oleg is right in 
the sense that Russia’s social and economic inequality is integral to the country’s 
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institutional structure and that this is politically legitimate. As I now describe, 
Valentina does not hide her political influence or connections. 
 
Following our inspection of her stores, Valentina introduced us to her political 
contacts at the House of Soviets (Dom sovietov), where the local parliament 
(rayonnaya Duma) and local administration are located. She walked through the 
building as if it was her own, knocking on doors and entering offices, compelling 
officials to meet us. We were introduced to a young bureaucrat coordinating raion 
kindergarten provision, who listened as Irina gave a polite and polished sales pitch, 
supported by brochures, highlighting her legal training and 13 years with Sibtekhnika. 
She described her team, their expertise and the services they could offer. The 
bureaucrat hardly said a word, but accepted Irina’s card and said she would be in 
touch if needed. She did not demand an introduction from me, since I was welcome 
simply by association with Valentina. She only raised an eyebrow when Irina 
introduced me as a student and former lobbyist. Everyone politely agreed that 
lobbying was a fine idea but were sure such an industry could not exist in Russia. 
Although we did not talk about politics, it is ironic that using her political clout to 
lobby decision makers was exactly what Valentina was doing for Sibtekhnika at that 
moment.  
 
As word of our presence in the Duma spread we were joined by a woman responsible 
for the development of business in the raion. Irina said that she chairs an interest 
group of businesses working with the Priyatnyi city government and invited her to 
speak at a future meeting. The woman replied that, on the contrary, Irina should bring 
her colleagues to Tsentralnyi for the meeting, which attracted ironic smiles all round; 
bringing these businesses here would be impossible and futile. All the same, this 
conversation underlined that some bureaucrats do try to promote business 
development in Russia in spite of the difficulties. However, just as I indicated in 
Chapter 1, this policy does not really work in practice. In Tsentralnyi it is Valentina’s 
entrepreneurship that is pre-eminent; the only reason Sibtekhnika was present here 
was because Valentina temporarily required it. Indeed, the difference between those 
inside and outside the ‘dominant coalition’ was exposed in our next meeting with the 
manager of a local kindergarten, to whom Irina handed brochures and spoke about 
Sibtekhnika’s product range. The director flicked admiringly through the materials, 
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but said her budget of 7 million roubles (approximately 140,000 pounds in summer 
2014) was all she had to pay wages, maintain the site and buy equipment, so she 
could not afford anything more at present. It was clear to me that the main investment 
in the village would be Valentina’s new shop floors. 
 
Despite the disparity between the resources available to the kindergarten and those 
available to Valentina, the kindergarten director deplored the Tsentralnyi parents as 
much as Valentina had bemoaned the local workforce. ‘Some fathers, she said, are 
‘cunning, and never around, and many mothers are alcoholics’. She introduced us to 
two toddlers who live in the kindergarten because their parents cannot be relied on. 
Valentina nodded and shrugged with a resigned expression, showing she hears such 
stories all the time. In this way it was clear that Tsentralnyi’s citizens have little hope 
for its further development within the wider economy, and only Valentina and 
Volodya had reason to expect better prospects. This realism reflected Oleg’s 
acknowledgement that he must deal with his own affairs rather than expect the 
government to bring about changes. 
 
The influence of Valentina and Volodya in Tsentralnyi reveals the role of Russia’s 
‘dominant coalition’ in the political economy as it actually exists in the regions. Their 
status derives from the convergence of the power of the state (vlast’), which in 
Russian connotes the right and capacity to rule) embodied by their partner the mayor, 
the local personal or de facto power (avtoritet’) of Volodya, the descendent of Old 
Believers, and the business acumen of their wives. Moreover, their economic success 
is not derived from the small stores we visited in Tsentralnyi, even though they face 
slim competition in the groceries market. Rather, the vast majority is derived from 
their ability to exercise authority over the natural resources of a large territory, just as 
Promstroi control the transportation of oil and gas across the oblast’. Therefore as 
with Russia’s strategic industries, their membership of the dominant coalition is, de 
facto, a political right to derive financial benefit from the territory under their control. 
This is the way power and wealth is distributed between ministries, strategic 
industries and regional territories across the country from the president down.  
 
Sibtekhnika, however, also provided Valentina and Volodya with services they could 
not obtain locally. These goods, I argue, are essential because Valentina and Volodya 
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are morally obliged to maintain a degree of local service provision for the community 
and, over time, some sense of development or modernisation. Another plausible 
explanation for the grocery store expenditure is that is would enable them to show 
less profit within their wider business, leaving them liable for less tax, although we 
did not discuss this matter specifically. As Inozemtsev has argued, in contemporary 
Russia ‘politics is just another kind of business. Political problems are solved as if 
they are commercial ones, and commercial ones as if they are political’ (2011: 
online). Thus despite their regional dominance, Valentina and Volodya were in a 
sense dependent upon access to the open market, which is to say they depend on 
occasional trade with companies like Sibtekhnika. Sibtekhnika also welcomed the 
business: Oleg and Irina gained a substantial and competition-free sale, corporate 
entertainment, luxurious accommodation and new political contacts from the 
invitation. To this extent there was mutual benefit in the deal, however Sibtekhnika 
did not depend on it. The dependence, in fact, was all on the side of Valentina and 
Volodya. Therefore even though Valentina was politically stronger as a member of 
the country’s ‘dominant coalition’, in fact she was in a relatively weak position in this 
transaction. 
 
3.4.4 Summary of Oleg’s entrepreneurship outside the city 
 
In this Section I situated Oleg’s entrepreneurship in the context of the regional 
political economy by examining his interactions with other types of commercial 
organisation, which showed how business conditions in the interior differ from those 
in Priyatnyi. Since Oleg is able to survive and profit in the city (described in Sections 
1 and 2), he has little need to extend his business into the interior, however two 
motivations push him to do so. First, small regional enterprises require goods and 
services and Oleg and Irina do what they can to supply them, even if the profit is not 
always high. This type of trade provides a regular stream of business, a reputation for 
reliability and customer service, and serves a community need. Second and in 
contrast, business with state-affiliated enterprises in the interior or with regional elites 
can be very profitable. Most significantly, I showed that the terms of trade between 
Oleg and these elites can be in his favour and not theirs, which is an unexpected but 
significant finding given what is known about the difficulties facing entrepreneurs. 
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Despite their political power, these elites require occasional goods and services from 
the private sector, a need that benefits Sibtekhnika because of the dominant stake 
Oleg has established as a regional supplier. Sibtekhnika was invited to help Valentina 
and Volodya and won a significant contract without competition, profiting 
handsomely, increasing its social capital and adding to its share of the regional market 
without any significant effort. I therefore find Oleg a highly effective entrepreneur in 
spite of the impediments he faces. He does not depend on trade in the interior but 
knows it is profitable if he can get it, and he is in the rare position of knowing that 
elites there may require entrepreneurs more than vice versa. Thus Oleg operates more 
from a position of strength in his regional market than weakness. To achieve this 
position I argue that he has worked according to the same logic of the dominant 
coalition, which ensures continued access to economic resources and limits outsiders’ 
access to supply in his market. This gives him improved terms of trade vis-à-vis the 
ostensibly more powerful state-affiliated elites of the interior.  
 
3.5 Oleg’s social entrepreneurship 
 
In the first sections of this case study I emphasised a dichotomy between Oleg’s 
disdain for political economic conditions on the one hand, and his pragmatic approach 
to working within them on the other. However, Oleg’s pragmatism does not mean that 
he accepts the political economic status quo (that he describes as ‘imperialism’) in 
which private business is vulnerable. On the contrary, in this section I describe his 
quiet efforts to challenge it through a philanthropic initiative he has established called 
the Cooperative. The Cooperative is a community centre ostensibly devoted to 
providing low cost social educational activities, but Oleg also intends for it to enable 
individuals to think and learn independently, as a way to counter the narrative of the 
state. I begin by discussing what the Cooperative is and the factors in its 
development, which I observed during my fieldwork, before considering its 
implications for interpreting Oleg’s entrepreneurship as a whole. 
 
3.5.1 Oleg’s objectives for the Cooperative 
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The Cooperative is a community centre funded by Oleg in a refurbished building 
adjacent to the Sibtekhnika showroom. It resembles a village hall with two large 
rooms, a kitchen and an office, and was officially established to provide a co-working 
area for young entrepreneurs, a community space for events, a series of educational 
and lifestyle courses and a sports court for ball games. However, as I now describe, 
the Cooperative is actually a determined response by Oleg to his disdain for the 
political economic status quo. Specifically, Oleg explained that his ambition for the 
Cooperative is that it instigates the development of local civil society, by nurturing 
independent thought and learning, which he believes is absent in Russia. Indeed this 
assertion is not without foundation; Schrader has argued that civil society is missing 
in Russia because it requires solidarity between people who do not personally know 
one another and a ‘personal commitment across network boundaries’, which are 
absent. (This fits with Oleg’s assertion that bonded social capital defines the way 
Russians cooperate with one another.) Bringing this about, Schrader argues, requires 
not the implementation of market institutions but ‘longer socialisation’ (2004: 407). 
Thus Oleg wants to instigate a sense of solidarity and development in the community. 
This finding offers another reminder that ethnography with contextual holism can 
draw specific attention to the difference between attitudes and behaviours of 
individuals in a situation of formal and informal hybridity (institutional asymmetry). 
In this case, the Cooperative is Oleg’s attempt to bridge that asymmetry with his own 
resources. 
 
Oleg does not of course market the Cooperative on the basis of developing civil 
society. Rather he has both public and private narratives for it. The public purpose is 
to provide educational and personal development opportunities to youngsters which 
are otherwise unavailable or out of reach, in order to broaden their horizons. The 
private purpose for providing these services is to set up a small bulwark against what 
he perceives to be the uninspiring and politicised education provided by the state and 
creeping political lethargy among the young. Moreover, Oleg sees the Cooperative as 
a potential site for the identification and development of talent for business, 
particularly Sibtekhnika. He therefore established the Cooperative to be both a 
genuinely useful and politically acceptable community centre, but at the same time 
provide an alternative to Russian political narratives, establish some roots for civil 
society and advance his own interests.  
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While the Cooperative was under development I observed as Oleg and the 
Sibtekhnika team drew on their contacts to establish a cadre of teachers who would 
offer lessons and activities, and as they engaged with local officials to secure their 
endorsement. In the course of this process Oleg revealed his specific ambitions for the 
centre. His plan was not merely to provide extra-curricular activities, but to enable 
locals, and youngsters particularly, to think creatively and for themselves by giving 
them access to innovative people and teachers in the city from a variety of fields.  In 
his view this was important not for its own sake but because of his dissatisfaction 
with the Russian system of education, and particularly its inadequacy for providing 
the right type of skills and motivations for business. ‘Schools and universities,’ he 
said, ‘just provide badges. Diplomas are meaningless. It is impossible to differentiate 
between candidates from a business perspective.’ In this sense the Cooperative was 
more than a philanthropic gift to the community; it was an attempt to compensate for 
and subvert a state system he considered inadequate and unfair, and was a means to 
identify and nurture those with the potential to become freethinking entrepreneurs. 
‘The Russian market,’ he said, ‘cannot reliably supply the people my business 
requires. Russians have to make their own communities. I am forced to make my own 
way’. In this statement, Oleg resolves to create the means for his own survival and 
development in business due to the inadequacy of the state. At the same time the 
Cooperative may be viewed as Oleg’s response to his perception that the youth are 
turning towards the state and away from other possibilities, particularly personal 
responsibility for their own destinies, and private enterprise. Therefore the purpose of 
the Cooperative is to provide an alternative in a country where these are few. 
Needless to say, Oleg kept these objectives ‘private’ in order to keep them from local 
bureaucrats who might consider the Cooperative a provocation or even 
confrontational.  
 
3.5.2 Seeking official approval for the Cooperative 
 
On the other hand, drawing on the public objectives, Oleg did seek to win local 
government approval for the Cooperative, since he wanted them to support his 
initiative. In his meetings with local officials he drew, characteristically, on a 
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sociological concept to impress them: gentrification. ‘The word sounds good,’ he 
said. ‘It is new to Russia and will be attractive to local officials’. Using this concept 
he sold the benefits of the Cooperative in terms of local development. He argued that 
improving the prospects of the young could spur other advances, such as attracting 
property developers, new inhabitants and businesses. Gentrification, he explained, is 
based on education and, according to him, ‘Education is the same thing as 
entrepreneurship in post-industrial society because entrepreneurs must exploit 
knowledge’. Therefore, he concluded, ‘Gentrification is a commercial technology’ 
that can bring about economic development once it is initiated. In this way Oleg’s 
public justification for the Cooperative was that it serves to gentrify the area.  
 
I do not overplay the distinction between Oleg’s public and private justifications for 
the Cooperative. He genuinely believed in the importance of gentrification and felt 
the Cooperative could assist with it, just as improving the educational opportunities 
for youngsters was unlikely to be very controversial, even to state officials. However, 
the dichotomy is important because it underlines the relevance of political correctness 
in the development of private enterprise and education in modern Russia. Oleg was 
angered by what he believes is the deliberate politicisation of education by the state. 
In his view, Russian education falls not only technically short but is also 
propagandistic. For example, he frequently discussed the Cooperative in 
contradistinction to a regional state-run summer camp, the Integrator, run by the local 
Department for Youth Policy, Physical Culture and Sport, as part of its ‘Integration’ 
programme for young people in the region. Integrator is held over two weeks for 
specially selected young people aged between 14 and 30, and offers lectures from 
popular figures, some flown in from Moscow, and numerous development activities. 
Monika, who assisted Oleg with the development of the Cooperative, also attended 
the Integrator and enjoyed it greatly: ‘It gives young people opportunities to 
reconsider and think critically about their futures,’ she said, ‘and involves experts 
from different spheres’. She introduced me to two friends, who also attended and had 
since been ‘reconsidering their own futures’ though had not decided on anything 
specific. Schwenk has noted these factors in her research into state-run summer 
camps in Omsk oblast’ (also in Western Siberia), where young people are attracted by 
inspirational figures and attendance is considered a ‘life opportunity’ for a lucky few. 
According to her, attendees do not perceive the camps as political events, however 
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lectures and events emphasise economic patriotism, in which work should be done 
above all for Russia, and one should not leave the country permanently, but return to 
build their own success at home (Schwenk 2015). Oleg was damning, describing the 
Integrator as ‘the new komsomol’, with the purpose of ‘creating new cadres, recruits 
to the state’, and confided that he was not sure what to do about Monika, who had 
been corrupted. Attendees are ‘attracted by power’, he complained. ‘The big 
opposition figures in Moscow, Kasparov and so on, don't have any support. Young 
people don't see anything wrong in Russia.’  
 
In practice, Oleg concealed his subversive intentions from bureaucrats by simply not 
mentioning them. Moreover, winning the support of officialdom was not difficult. He 
made contact with the Department for Social Initiatives (DSI)14 within the Priyatnyi 
administration and sought its endorsement. Their representative, Yulia, responded 
positively, since privately funded social initiatives are uncommon, and said that the 
DSI even had resources it could offer the centre, such as 6000 roubles a month to pay 
a local coach to help organise sports events and training. Such support came at a cost, 
however. As Oleg put it, the administration does not normally give money away 
unless it is to somebody they know. Therefore his cultivation of Yulia was essential, 
and she visited the Cooperative several times for tea and biscuits. In time Oleg 
reported that he had paid Yulia to facilitate DSI’s support. Thus, formal support for 
the Cooperative was gained through otkat, revealing again the personalisation of the 
state.  
 
Oleg sought direct political approval too, because with this he could claim real 
legitimacy for the centre even as he sought to undermine the political system. He 
approached three local representatives from the Priyatnaya oblast’ Duma (all United 
Russia) and invited them to attend the Cooperative’s inaugural party. To his dismay, 
none of them did. One made the unexpected excuse that he had cut his finger off in a 
DIY accident, but the others simply did not show up. Here, the political significance 
of the Cooperative is revealed to be small. Although it represents a generous, 
                                                
14 This department is responsible for organising the infrastructure for ‘physical culture’ in 
residential areas, the municipal sports fields and sports instruction in the community, for 
working with disabled people, of ‘healthy groups’ for the elderly and the development of 
urban and regional sports events. 
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innovative and unusual investment in the community, public recognition was granted 
by bureaucrats, not politicians, with bureaucratic support granted for a fee.  This 
might not seem a bad thing given Oleg’s aims, but the absence of political interest in 
the initiative is also indicative of the contempt Oleg sees in the attitude of the 
country’s rulers towards private initiatives and civil society. 
 
Oleg’s frustration with the lack of political interest is also related to the fact that 
working in partnership with the bureaucratic organs is arduous and offers little 
benefit. The problem, as he sees it, is that bureaucracy oversees public events and 
festivals. ‘The government has a monopoly over legitimate public actions,’ he 
complained. ‘It would be unthinkable,’ he said, ‘to hold the inaugural party without 
them.’ Moreover, in Oleg’s mind the representatives of these organs are ‘simple 
people’, pencil pushers who ‘run the state’. To illustrate his point Oleg recalled a 
recent volleyball tournament he had organised to encourage locals to start using the 
Cooperative court. Disappointingly only three teams came: a group of seasonal 
workers from Tajikistan, the second from Sibtekhnika and the other a team of retired 
colleagues from the city administration. The retirees immediately assumed control, 
Oleg says. They made all the players write their names and dates of birth on a 
clipboard they had brought along, for reasons unknown, and dismissed latecomers. 
They also officiated the games pedantically and everybody had to stand around 
afterwards while they handed out pathetic plastic medals and commented on 
individual performances. Even though the court is Oleg’s property and he had 
initiated the event, ‘It is in their nature to control,’ he said. ‘Putin gives these people 
the laws they want. They are the implementers. They are simple people, but you 
cannot act in public without their approval.’ In this sense, Oleg’s hope for brief public 
recognition by local politicians is more obvious. With the involvement of only 
bureaucrats, the Cooperative is, in his view, more prone to unnecessary interference. 
 
While Oleg’s wish for political recognition was frustrated, readying the Cooperative 
to begin its work was a greater priority. Oleg sought the support of acquaintances he 
believed could offer the right sort of teaching, offering them cognac, tea and 
chocolate in order to entice them to his cause. He outlined his vision that students 
would receive one-to-one tuition in the Oxbridge style. Over time, he secured the 
services of several tutors, including an artist, a photographer, an actor, a professor of 
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psychology, an art therapist, an English teacher, an expert in speaking and writing 
clearly, a yoga instructor, an expert on women’s health and the municipal sports 
coach promised by the DSI. An inaugural party was held offering them the chance to 
showcase their wares and leaflets were posted locally to attract potential clients. The 
event attracted a large crowd. Local interest in the Cooperative was growing as I left 
the field. 
 
How should the Cooperative be interpreted in the context of Oleg’s entrepreneurship? 
In one respect the Cooperative is a business project for finding the right type of staff: 
given Oleg’s disdain for state education it provides a mechanism for attracting and 
vetting potential employees. This makes sense in light of what I have written about 
Oleg’s approach to business, which is to create the conditions for success himself 
rather than getting by with the minimal support available. In another respect the 
Cooperative is a philanthropic initiative, born out of Oleg’s wish to improve local 
social conditions with his own resources. In a final respect one might consider Oleg 
as a ‘social entrepreneur’, which is someone who, to paraphrase Martin and Osberg, 
targets an ‘unfortunate but stable equilibrium that causes the neglect, marginalization, 
or suffering of a segment of humanity’ and brings their resources to bear in order to 
bring about ‘permanent benefit’ for that group or society as a whole’ (2007: 39). 
However, I do not find this fully persuasive because Oleg does not believe he will 
bring about such a change, even if the majority of society is marginalised from the 
entitlements granted to the Russian elite. Rather, I prefer to consider the Cooperative 
as a way for Oleg to challenge and resist the political economic status quo that has 
made entrepreneurship a marginal and dangerous occupation, and which has a 
determinant effect on his everyday behaviour (in spite of his relative success). In 
other words, the Cooperative offers him cover for undermining the authority of the 
state in a normative way.  Overall the Cooperative is a project of choice, funded using 
Oleg’s own resources. He did not have to go to the trouble of furnishing a new 
building, seeking new staff, negotiating, bribing and ingratiating himself with state 
representatives but did so, not for business reasons, but to raise a challenge and offer 
something different in the community. The Cooperative was a mechanism for 
channelling his rejection of the status quo, and stood in stark contrast to his business, 
which operated, to the contrary, according to the logic of Russia’s limited access 
order. 
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3.6 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I set out the factors that have enabled Oleg to become a successful 
businessman in spite of the difficulties facing entrepreneurs. He is antagonistic 
towards the political economic status quo, but he developed a pragmatic approach to 
his entrepreneurship. In his assessment, social capital and self-reliance are essential 
factors to his survival and success. However, Oleg’s longevity in business and strong 
market position are also due to his recognition that a degree of control over one’s 
competition is critical to survival in the contemporary political economy. To this end, 
Oleg participates in what I described, drawing on LAO theory, as a minor coalition, in 
which he shares domination of supply of goods (office, retail and commercial 
equipment) in his local market: he does not seek to outdo his local competitors per se, 
but to collaborate with them to uphold their mutual security and deter outsiders. To be 
clear, the minor coalition works in direct contrast to the open economy he himself 
privately advocates: this protection racket (for it is such) does not bring about the 
development of competition he wants (and the government claims to want too) but is 
a direct reflection of the dominant coalition of the country’s elite, which is 
cooperating to limit access to profitable resources. In other words both the 
government and Oleg publicly seek a ‘modernised’ business sector and privately act 
differently to maximise personal gains. Therefore the basis of Oleg’s entrepreneurial 
success is replicating the political economic system to which he is politically and 
morally opposed, and which makes entrepreneurship challenging. 
 
Oleg also has a pragmatic approach to business relations. He is prepared to pay 
backhanders to state representatives for them to do their own job, negotiate with 
indebted mafiya bosses, pay off aggressors who threaten his staff and build 
relationships with state-affiliated elites. These activities appear to be the necessary, 
common sense actions for a businessman who wants to protect his interests and 
quietly proceed in the real economy of contemporary Russia. Upholding this 
pragmatism, Oleg and his directors maintain a focus on organisational order and 
customer service that is itself a reaction to the perception that things tend to go wrong 
and fate can strike the careless. They work to reduce the potential for problems to 
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arise by emphasising competence and control within Sibtekhnika and in their public 
persona. This competence is a result of their long experience, pragmatism in deal 
making, self-assertion and confidence, in employing and drawing on allies, in legal 
understanding (or understanding what can and cannot be done in practice), and in 
focusing on detail. These factors do not mean that Sibtekhnika is not prone to 
interference, but that minimising of the possibility of interference underpins their 
everyday entrepreneurship.  
 
In considering Sibtekhnika’s business outside Priyatnyi, I showed that the profitable 
market has geographical limits, but that opportunities can also occasionally arise to 
supply the region’s dominant elites very profitably without competition. These 
opportunities do not arise by chance, but as a consequence of the scale and reputation 
of Sibtekhnika, established in the city. The most interesting feature of these 
transactions, nonetheless, is they reveal that Sibtekhnika is able to act independently 
and without necessity or coercion with notionally more powerful elites, whereas, 
perhaps counter-intuitively, it was the elites who required the supplies that are only 
available on the open market from a few suppliers such as Sibtekhnika. Thus 
Valentina and Volodya went to considerable lengths to attract Oleg and Irina to 
Tsentralnyi.  
 
In the final section I showed that although Oleg’s business activities do not reveal his 
distaste for and will to resist the status quo, his effort developing the Cooperative 
show that this is in reality one of his personal priorities. Oleg’s public hopes for the 
Cooperative are philanthropic: he wants to improve the educational opportunities 
available to local youngsters and with this objective he has won the support of the 
local authorities. Privately, however, he also wants to create a community of free 
thinkers with independence from the state and personal ambition, responsibility and 
suitability for work in private enterprise, potentially within Sibtekhnika. Oleg does not 
seek substantial change, of course: he knows it is not within his gift. Yet with the 
Cooperative he can set his own agenda and quietly promote his own worldview. 
 
What then is the answer to the question I posed at the outset of this chapter – how has 
Oleg been so successful? His objective, which he has instilled in Irina and Dmitrii, is 
to realise that success as an entrepreneur means to function with autonomy from the 
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state, which requires hard work and vigilance. Through constant effort he has 
maximised his chances of survival by developing the capacity to work and profit 
without interference and live with a high degree of autonomy. This clearly reveals the 
continuing relevance of Yurchak’s concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, as 
described in Chapter 2, 15 years after he conceived it. However, Oleg has not 
succumbed to accepting the inevitability of the status quo even if he is too weak to 
change it. Rather, he advances his own vision by investing in the Cooperative, which 
offers alternative sources of information and inspiration (of his choice) in the 
community. With this he resists the state in a way that is not possible in business. 
Oleg’s entrepreneurial work for autonomy and resistance are themes I return to in 
Chapter 6 when I draw the case studies together. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANNA 
 
4.1 Structure of the chapter 
 
In this chapter I present my second case study, based on observation within the 
Centre for Small Business Growth (CSBG), a business established by Anna in 2001 in 
the city I call Oblomov. Anna established CSBG to assist small businesses with their 
development and for several years she employed two members of staff and achieved 
some commercial success. However, over the past four years Anna has endured a 
significant business crisis partly of her own making and partly a consequence of the 
malicious actions of former clients and local prosecution service officials. As a result 
she now runs CSBG on her own, moving between the formal and shadow 
economies.15 I argue that Anna’s crisis experience provides an example par 
excellence of the difficulties facing entrepreneurs that I outlined in Chapter 1. I 
therefore set out the events that led to the crisis, and the factors that enable her to 
survive as an entrepreneur today.  
 
I begin the case study by outlining Anna’s attitude to business and the history of her 
company. She started CSBG with the goal of assisting the development of business in 
the Western image; an objective she then believed was mirrored by Russian 
government policy. I describe how she came to form this view and its implications for 
her entrepreneurship. During her first year in business she secured the support of a 
Western sponsor which ensured that CSBG grew in the early 2000s as the Russian 
economy recovered. However, when this support was withdrawn she was left 
insufficient funds to continue with her core business services. This led her into a 
poorly judged business deal she could not honour that made her indebted to former 
clients, sparking a crisis she could not control and leaving a business with little 
prospect of recovery or future development. In spite of this, Anna has remained 
                                                
15 The shadow economy is defined by Radaev as “the set of economic activities that are not 
displayed in official reporting and/or formal contracting due to deliberate concealment or non 
coverage in official statistics” (2002: 193). 
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committed to the Western vision of entrepreneurship and maintains a façade that her 
business is representative of it. 
 
In the following section I describe Anna’s current situation as an entrepreneur 
enduring a significant crisis. The crisis presents her with two particular challenges. 
First, she faces persecution from a group of her former clients who seek to intimidate 
and harass her until she repays her debt, which she is unable to do. Second, these 
clients have also secured the support of prosecution service officials who have 
launched a legal case against her that, they say, will end with her inevitable 
imprisonment, but about which she has very little information. I outline the 
characteristics of this persecution and prosecution, consider how it has affected her 
entrepreneurship, and the personal and financial toll they have taken. 
 
In the remaining sections I describe how Anna has responded to the crisis by 
examining her entrepreneurship in practice. I explain how she ‘gets by’ in these 
conditions and what this reveals about the ‘actually existing’ conditions of 
entrepreneurship in Russia. I begin by showing how she dedicates significant time to 
dealing with and responding to her persecutors and prosecutors and how this requires 
a high degree of entrepreneurialism in itself. I find that Anna’s appeal, in which she 
declares her innocence, is based on invoking the arguments for which she established 
CSBG in the first place, namely that the government needs to continue to support the 
development of business and protect entrepreneurs. In other words, she invokes her 
longstanding support for the improvement of business conditions as the basis of her 
claim that she has not done anything wrong. Indeed, even though her crisis reveals the 
fallacy of the government’s rhetorical support for business, her self-defence 
effectively invokes the government’s own formal policy in a way that has tangibly 
stabilised her situation. In sum, I show that her accusers have built a case against her 
by simulating the legality of their case, and she has defended herself by simulating 
her own compliance with the government. I therefore find that her entrepreneurship is 
defined in part by an ongoing argument about the degree to which her activities are 
deemed to be legitimate. 
 
Next, I focus on Anna’s specific commercial activities. These have changed 
significantly since the crisis began. Her objective is now to generate enough money to 
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‘get by’, support her teenage daughter, and generate enough cash to pay off her debts. 
In order to achieve this she has retained CSBG as a formal business shell but in 
practice works mainly in the shadow economy, partly because her reputation is 
decimated so business is weak, but also to keep cash flow off the books. To this end 
she has registered two further companies through which she can divert resources if 
needed. To generate money, she holds periodical executive training seminars, which 
allows her to keep up appearances, but her main business is now informal and 
includes translation services for cash, assistance with visa applications to Western 
countries, as well as participation in two multi-level marketing (MLM) companies, 
and other opportunistic activities. I show that through these activities Anna is able to 
scrape by and must therefore be considered a successful entrepreneur in the context of 
her situation. 
 
Finally I account for the difference between Anna’s attitude to business, based on 
support for Western business norms, with her entrepreneurial behaviour, which is 
determined by her crisis and a consequence of Russia’s institutional asymmetry. 
CSBG failed as a legitimate business of a Western type, meaning that Anna has not 
lived up to her ambition to assist in the transformation of business conditions, or even 
become a competent ‘Western’ businesswoman herself. However, in the context of 
crisis she became a far more effective entrepreneur, by being forced to deal with the 
political economic circumstances as she finds them, rather than as she would like 
them to be. I draw on the concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, to show how 
Anna’s entrepreneurship improved during the crisis as she recognised how to do 
business in ways that allowed her to survive and remain independent. Moreover, the 
crisis has provided her with a new opportunity to show that business conditions can 
and should improve for entrepreneurs, which was her original purpose for becoming 
an entrepreneur. In this way I argue that Anna’s entrepreneurship retains its original 
purpose in spite of her changing circumstances. Consequently, her entrepreneurship 
remains a vehicle not primarily for commerce but for upholding her independence 
and resisting the status quo. 
 
4.2 Anna’s attitude to entrepreneurship 
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Following the completion of a doctorate in Europe, which focused on the problems 
facing businesses in Russia, Anna worked as a research fellow for a western non-
governmental organisation (NGO) promoting democratic and economic transition in 
the former Soviet Union (FSU). There she wrote a report detailing how business 
could be supported in Russia. As her contract ended, she drew on her 
recommendations to ask for support from her employer to start a company supporting 
businesses in Oblomov, her hometown, and was granted sponsorship for a year to 
establish CSBG. During that year she looked for ways to make the business 
sustainable and won further assistance from the U.S. State Department to establish a 
programme enabling Russian entrepreneurs to participate in internships with 
companies in Europe and America where they would learn to improve their business 
skills. Thanks to that assistance, these internships were offered for a fraction of their 
real cost and became very popular. Anna’s clients spent three weeks with businesses 
operating in their sector in America or Europe, then brought Western business 
acumen home, enabling them to develop their own companies, which over time 
would become models of free market capitalism. 
 
4.2.1 Anna’s belief in transition 
 
Anna is a true believer in the need for Russia to become a free market economy in the 
Western model. As she argued: 
 
‘It is often said that business is for the Americans or English and not in our mentality. 
Sometimes people love to justify their lack of success on the basis of a lack of 
business mentality. For me, sending clients abroad is the best example. Or, Western 
companies come here, employ our people and quickly set high standards. Therefore, 
it is a question of management. In America people have come from every country and 
they succeed. They are integrated, work at it and believe in business. This will be 
achieved here when the management standards we need are adopted to get people 
working.’ 
 
Thus Anna’s commitment to importing Western business practices is unambiguous, 
determined not only by the values of her sponsor and patron but also her experience 
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studying Russian business in Europe. She looked upon Russian businesses as 
inherently poor in comparison. When an American opened a coffee shop in the city, 
for example, she described a ‘spirit of celebration’ and the ‘good attitude’ there, 
compared to the dismal ‘Russian mentality’ she encountered in DomKoffi, a café 
opened by a Russian nearby. Her self-appointed role was ‘to break the Russian 
stereotype’ that there can only be businesses of a Russian, American or British type, 
but that Russian entrepreneurs can and should be like those in the West. She claimed 
that her work was at the forefront of bringing this change about in Oblomov, because 
when clients joined her programmes they immediately saw the benefits of a Western 
approach. ‘For them it was such a surprise, a new ideology. Earlier there had been a 
boss in control but now the leader had to work in a cooperative spirit’.  One client, so 
inspired, decided to introduce ATMs to Oblomov. At first he thought it would be 
impossible in Russia because people would steal them, or they would be destroyed, 
she said, but she persuaded him to try. As a result, she claimed, ‘We did not even 
have cheque books, because we went straight to Visa cards’.  
 
In Anna’s view her programmes also gave clients the chance to see how western 
society works too, by staying with a Western family. To her mind Western families 
relate to one another more effectively and value one another more than Russian 
families. The western family model, she believes, has provided the basis for many 
successful businesses and a thriving economy. As she put it, ‘It is one thing to arrive 
and have a look but another to speak with people, with leaders, see how differently 
they operate in the company, how they talk to people, how their system values 
business.’ Clearly Anna’s enthusiasm for the West contrasts with her rather 
pessimistic view of Russia. To her, the more her clients learnt from Westerners, the 
better for themselves, their families, the economy and the country as a whole.  
 
During the early years, Anna also established a seminar, workshop and roundtable 
event programme in the city in which consultants, business trainers and, as she put it, 
‘those who had already achieved something’ in different fields of business gave talks 
to her clients. According to Anna these speakers passed on ‘an ideology, the high 
standards and phrases that you have to introduce directly to salesmen’. In this way 
Anna meant the training to be transformative, not only of business practice but of the 
attitudes local entrepreneurs had towards their work. However, for her the most 
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important aspect of her training was to offer advice on how her clients should 
improve their relations with the local authorities. To achieve this she invited members 
of the local government to attend. ‘Everything is connected with corruption’ she said. 
Since the authorities did not know how the relationship should work, she said, 
businesses must tell them. ‘If businesses do not demand and encourage better 
relations with the authorities, nothing will change because they will continue to act as 
before.’ The responsibility was on businesses to define a new working relationship 
with officialdom, she argued. ‘We had many roundtables, she said, where people 
spoke about how it works in America, for example, how their Chambers of 
Commerce work to help businesses as much as possible, and when people realised 
that this is the best way, it became simpler to achieve it here.’ Anna therefore 
conceived of her roundtables as forging contact between entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats, and portrayed the Western model as an ideal, achievable example for 
Russia. 
 
The final aspect of CSBG’s early work began when Anna found out that the local 
administration had established initiatives to tackle corruption, which enhanced her 
conviction that political-economic change was underway. She gathered information 
about these initiatives under the banner of a ‘anti-corruption programme’ and offered 
it to her clients for a small fee to cover her administrative costs. Considering the early 
work of CSBG together, the influence of the idea of ‘transition’ (see Chapter 2), in 
which Russia moves inexorably from a planned economy to a Western-type free 
market, is unmistakable. Anna established CSBG as an exemplar of transition 
thinking in her city; she literally sold the transition. In this respect her business has a 
clear ideological underpinning, one that rejected the status quo in Russia and aspired 
to Western norms. Her feeling was that Russian political economic conditions and 
social attitudes would have to change, and as her anti-corruption programme appeared 
to show, the state was already orientating itself to this end. Anna therefore positioned 
herself as an advocate of this change, based on her expertise (having interviewed 
many of the first generation of businesspeople in Oblomov) and experience (having 
worked for an NGO in the vanguard of transition advocacy).  
 
4.2.2 Early success, then crisis 
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During the course of Putin’s first presidency, CSBG achieved some commercial 
success. Anna acquired a modern apartment in the centre of the city and a foreign car. 
She took on two employees and acquired an office with an adjacent conference room 
for her seminars. Moreover her professional network also grew extensively as several 
of her internship alumni built successful businesses. She was also well known among 
local officials as an entrepreneur working hard for the city. Today her office displays 
the values for which she toiled: posters of both the Russian and American presidents, 
flags, photos from clients and associates, and letters of gratitude, including one from a 
former U.S. ambassador, adorn the wall. However, after this initial success CSBG was 
threatened by a variety of factors. The sponsorship that was the basis of her 
commercial success could not last indefinitely and business became far more 
challenging when it was withdrawn. As Anna put it, ‘we had partners in the west, we 
worked together, but the programme became more expensive and the number of 
clients fell immediately’. Although Anna did not say so, the withdrawal of assistance 
was undoubtedly related to the dawning realisation among Western donors that 
Russian transition was not happening as expected. In truth, transition had not been 
happening for several years: CSBG was established four years after Yeltsin 
effectively formalised a new kleptocracy in the loans for shares deal (Barnes 2006: 
104; Green, 2009: 202-204; Lovell 2006: 96-99; Nellis 2002: 48; Verdery 1996: 211-
212) and serious doubts had already been raised about the relevance of the concept of 
‘transition’ (Pine and Bridger 1998: 2-7). By 2003, there was little doubt at all that 
transition was conspicuously absent (Carothers 2002: 13).  
 
It is reasonable to ask why Anna, a student of Russian business, did not see this 
coming. However, within Oblomov’s business scene the continuing difficulties facing 
entrepreneurs made her more convinced of the need for change, rather than less 
convinced that change was happening. While academics may have started to find the 
concept irrelevant, she viewed it as incomplete. This is why I describe her as a 
transition believer. For her, transition was an ambition and her main business chance, 
even if in reality it was a receding prospect she did not comprehend or refused to 
acknowledge. I argue that Anna’s experience underlines what Charlie Walker has 
described as the ‘transition to nowhere’. In his study of working-class Russian youth, 
traditional routes to work are available yet unviable as a result of the collapse of the 
 97 
 
state-led economic system (2009: 531-2). Building on this, I contend that the 
aspirations of Russia’s emergent middle class appear to be equally limited, if not by 
economic collapse then by the failure of the state to enable the emergence of the 
market economy it promised. Thus Walker’s conclusion that ‘institutional inertia and 
economic decline have rendered ‘old’ transitions simultaneously available and yet 
unviable’ (Walker 2009: 544) is equally valid in Anna’s case: her identity has been 
‘disembedded’ by the fact that she must function between ‘old and new modernities’ 
(Walker 2009: 544). 
 
For Anna, the state’s advancement of entrepreneurship in its rhetoric about economic 
development and ‘modernisation’ (The Economist, 2009: online; Hill, 2010: online; 
Medvedev, 2009: online; Merry, 2011: online; Ruptly TV 2015: online), offered her 
hope and served to legitimate her convictions about the need for transition. The fact 
of the matter was, however, that the number of Anna’s clients fell as their interest in 
Western perspectives declined. Businessmen found that the situation they 
encountered in the Russian market bore little resemblance to the Western experiences 
Anna shared in her seminars. The increasingly widespread accessibility of the internet 
also meant that often the materials Anna marketed could also be found online. In one 
seminar I attended, participants laughed as one circulated his smartphone revealing 
that the lessons Anna was translating from a DVD were available free in Russian on 
the Internet. At the same time, securing a visa to the West remained a difficult and 
unpredictable process, while the cost of foreign travel in the West stayed high for 
ordinary businesspeople. These problems presented a significant challenge for Anna 
to continue to meet the goals for which she had established CSBG. 
 
Despite these challenges, Anna decided to persevere with the internship programme, 
so looked for ways to reduce the cost in order to attract new clients and enter what she 
described as ‘the mass market’. She judged that this was possible if she used travel 
websites to find cheap flights and accommodation. These costs had not been a priority 
when she had financial support, so her idea was to try to reduce them in order to make 
the programmes accessible to a wider client base. However, this turned out to be 
risky. Anna had to spend much time identifying savings online, which proved 
exhausting. Moreover, by reducing her costs she also reduced her margins, so her 
profits were smaller and unpredictable. It soon became clear that the programmes 
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were unprofitable compared to the effort expended making them affordable for her 
clients. Furthermore, Anna continued to market the packages as a premium product 
which, to her dismay, meant that clients valued their travel experience at least as 
much as the training, so contacted her at all hours with various demands, even when 
they were in the hands of Western hosts or establishments. This model was 
unsustainable: CSBG could not deliver, administer or profit from the high quality 
travel packages it was selling and the business was becoming heavily indebted with 
the runaway costs. Anna found herself spending new clients’ money to pay for 
services for existing clients. Desperate, she finally called a halt to the provision of 
travel services in order to concentrate on running the training aspects of the 
programme. However, this decision meant she owed several hundred thousand 
roubles to clients who had bought packages only for them to be unfulfilled, and she 
was unable to compensate them. Anna admitted that she had made a mistake but, 
instead of filing for bankruptcy, she declared herself innocent of wrongdoing based 
on a conviction that she had the right to repay the debt on her own terms. This, she 
claimed, is how business should work, even though, as I show below, the law is prone 
to interpretation. Thereafter she informed her clients that she could not repay them in 
the hope and with the assumption that she could make personal repayment 
arrangements with them. Instead, they took matters into their own hands and 
instigated the crisis that continues to engulf her over three years later, and which I 
outline next in Section 2. 
 
4.2.3 Summary of Anna’s attitude to entrepreneurship 
 
In this section I have described Anna’s attitude to entrepreneurship as bound to the 
idea of transition that was influential in academic and policy circles during the Yeltsin 
period when she studied in Europe. This view was reinforced when she then 
continued her research within a prominent NGO. In hindsight it seems inevitable that 
her own transition into Russian business would draw on that ideological framework, 
and her success at securing funding to develop CSBG from significant foreign sources 
is indicative of the importance and relevance of those ideas at the time. Despite the 
fact that the ‘Westernisation’ of Russian business seems flawed today, it continues to 
carry influence. As Oleg’s case study also revealed, the improvement of business 
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conditions is a rational aspiration for Russian entrepreneurs. Since business 
conditions in Russia did not improve substantially through the first Putin decade (see 
Chapter 1), it seemed appropriate to Anna that she could continue offering these 
services even after her sponsor withdrew its support and her market diminished. 
Nevertheless it is also clear that Anna did not develop the business qualities she 
advocated and was unable to maintain a profitable business. Her argument that she 
did not defraud her clients illegally is a spurious one, but as I show in the following 
sections, the argument could not be effectively countered, which indicates that her 
intuition and understanding of how business can survive under such conditions (as a 
consequence of institutional asymmetry) is not quite as bad as it seems.  
 
4.3 Anna’s entrepreneurship in crisis 
 
When Anna informed her clients that she could not repay them immediately, several 
of them formed an ad hoc group and signed a document in which they accused her of 
stealing their money. Then, using personal connections to gain the support of 
influential police staff, an investigation was launched against her that is now with city 
prosecutors. Although Anna secured an agreement with some clients through the 
court to repay their debts according to a repayment schedule, this was insufficient for 
others who, working together or alone, preferred to pressurise her personally in 
pursuit of their money. As a result, Anna now faces a crisis with legal and informal 
dimensions: she endures threats and intimidation to herself, her family, her property 
and business, and remains under prolonged investigation without much knowledge of 
the actual case against her or its likely outcome. Both have taken a significant 
personal and financial toll, but the most intolerable aspect of the crisis is the ongoing 
uncertainty it has created. According to her, some prosecutors connected with her 
accusers assume she is guilty, while others take it that she is innocent until proven 
guilty. This is a fair assessment, regardless of whether she is guilty or not. She has 
been threatened with inevitable jail by some, while others have assured her that the 
case would be resolved in a matter of days, only for it to roll on, now into its fourth 
year. Indeed, despite what ostensibly appears to be a simple case of business debt, the 
specific charges against Anna still remain unknown. Given that she has already 
admitted her debts and secured a court-approved agreement for gradual repayment 
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with some clients, the prolonged nature of the case is likely to stem from the 
connections between Anna’s accusers and prosecution staff. Anna is now confronted 
with the fact that the transition she sought did not happen, and as will now become 
clear, her advocacy of Western ideas may have even aggravated those now plotting 
against her. During my months with her, Anna spent a great deal of time speculating 
about who is against her, who is for her, and how to persuade the most sympathetic 
people of her innocence. In this section I begin with a description of the persecution 
Anna faces before turning to the prosecution. 
 
4.3.1 Persecution 
 
Anna has faced several forms of persecution since her accusers began their campaign 
against her. Their main tactic is to intimidate her, which began as soon as she 
informed them that she could not repay them. Within a few days, two armed men 
entered her office and said she needed to pay or her family would be hurt, which 
indicates that they had followed her to identify that she had a father and daughter at 
home. She pleaded that she could not pay immediately. Later, a man entered the 
office and demanded Anna gave him her internal and international passports, which 
would prevent her from fleeing. Her clients apparently believed that with her 
connections in America and Europe, or the fact that she is Jewish and could leave for 
Israel, she could take flight, even though she had admitted her debt and was willing to 
strike a deal to repay it over time. Anna told me that her external passport had 
expired, but she chose to give it up anyway to avoid violence: she quickly decided 
that she would not be able to prevent these people from acting as they wished, so 
would have to conform to their demands wherever possible without actually being 
able to give them the money. 
 
Sometimes intimidation failed. One evening a man arrived at her office drunk and 
claimed to be a sniper. He said he was flying to the Netherlands the following day on 
business, implying that he was on some kind of secret mission. Knowing he was 
trying to intimidate her, Anna bravely replied ‘Yes, you look like James Bond.’ The 
man changed tack and claimed he was representing one of Anna’s clients. Anna said 
she would call her and arrange gradual repayments, to which he said ‘No, that’s too 
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easy, why don’t we talk? I can help you.’ Having failed to intimidate her, he 
attempted to appeal to what he apparently believed were her intellectual pretensions. 
He said that he was sleeping with the client and knew that she was ‘simple and 
working class’. He told Anna that she should hand him the money so that he could 
pass it on to her, and if she did he would let her keep some for herself. Anna replied 
that she could resolve the dispute herself, and when the man had reluctantly left, 
called the client directly to offer gradual repayment. The client said that she was 
waiting for the money to be returned all at once, and would not accept Anna’s offer. 
Several days later, the ‘sniper’ returned and said ‘you did not accept my suggestion so 
what can I have from this office?’. He pointed to a plant in the corner, ‘Maybe this 
tree?’ Anna responded: ‘The other day you were trying to offer me money and now 
you want my tree?’ He left again empty-handed. In these tragicomic episodes it is 
again clear that, contrary to Anna’s hopes, the formalisation of the business sphere 
has not taken place; several of her former clients are resorting to individual tactics 
based on brute force rather than negotiation or recourse to the law. 
 
Another mode of intimidation used by Anna’s accusers is anonymous phone calls. On 
one occasion she received a call from a man who claimed he was from a neighbouring 
oblast’. He said that he wanted to go to New York for business training and asked her 
where he should send the fee. Anna responded by asking if he wanted to know more 
about the training packages, to which he replied, ‘Just tell me where I can send the 
money.’ Anna wondered why he would not want to know more about what he was 
buying, so asked him again, and got the same response. After a time she put the 
telephone down. In relating this episode to me, Anna said the caller was trying to 
entrap her. This type of intimidation did not stop at the office, however. One evening 
Anna left her flat without warning, leaving me with her father, Boris. A few minutes 
later Boris answered the door and admitted a huge, strong-looking man with a woman 
and children. He proceeded to show them eagerly around the flat as if it were for sale. 
The man scowled as he moved between rooms. After they had left, Anna returned 
and, in some distress, called a friend, while Boris busied himself in the kitchen. Anna 
had not told me about the visit so I assumed that she had decided to sell the apartment 
in order to repay her debt. However, when Anna recovered she told me it was not her 
choice but forced upon her by an accuser, who threatened that he was going to take 
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her flat away; she had been intimidated into the viewing even though she did not 
intend to sell it.  
 
These intimidation tactics are also accompanied by attempts to humiliate Anna 
publicly and cast aspersions on her character. On local TV news and on internet 
forums her accusers cast doubt on her credibility as an entrepreneur and business 
history, and portrayed themselves as her victims. They claim that she is manipulative 
and calculating with dubious international connections, and that she lied to her clients 
about ‘partnerships’ she had never had with reputable airlines, in order to entice them 
into deals she could not honour. Remarkably, the group also sought to turn her 
reputation for supporting business against her, by claiming that her numerous 
initiatives over the years showed that she tried to develop a large pyramid scheme to 
defraud ordinary people, and that her seminars introduced Scientology influences into 
the city.16 Considered together, Anna faces persecution ranging from physical 
intimidation to slurs on her reputation, with a significant impact on her wellbeing and 
business. These attacks have been calculated, constant and unpredictable. The 
accusations against her have also been invented, vindictive, defamatory and, though it 
is difficult to comment on every incident, probably illegal. 
 
Anna is vulnerable in a way that Oleg is not, due to his emphasis on self-protection. 
Yet two factors undoubtedly make her predicament worse still: she is a woman and a 
Jew. Female entrepreneurs are not unusual of course; many women are engaged in 
SMEs as opposed to larger companies, and the majority work in the service sector 
like Anna (Salmenniemi, Karhunen and Kosonen, 2011: 83).  However, her 
ideological drive to be an entrepreneur appears quite unusual: in a study of 27 
Russian female entrepreneurs, Salmenniemi, Karhunen and Kosonen found that only 
two of their sample aspired to entrepreneurship, and the remainder were driven to it 
out of necessity. On the other hand a majority encountered gender-based 
discrimination, ranging from the common sentiment that women belong at home 
(where Anna had to be anyway as a single mother) to sceptical attitudes towards 
female entrepreneurs (Salmenniemi, Karhunen and Kosonen, 2011: 87). However, 
Anna is not only a failing female entrepreneur with a family to support, which leave 
                                                
16 I have withheld these online sources to uphold Anna’s anonymity. 
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her vulnerable enough to intimidation and bullying. As becomes clear throughout this 
chapter, Anna’s particular attitude to business – her invocation of the Western model, 
her rejection of Russianness in business, her determination to show Russians how to 
be entrepreneurial (even when she fails) – is deployed by her accusers against her. In 
her attempt to be a progressive path breaker, she has isolated herself further from her 
contemporaries. Her case does nothing to improve the view that Russian women have 
had a particularly hard time in business, nothwithstanding her commercial errors. 
 
To Anna’s isolation must also be added the fact that she is almost certainly the victim 
of thinly-veiled anti-Semitism. Like most of Siberia’s Jews, her family is non-
practising and assimilated, but their religious-ethnic identity is not unknown. She also 
has a daughter and a mother in Israel, and this is likely to be the reason that her 
passport was stolen. When I specifically asked her if anti-Semitism was behind the 
attacks against her, she denied it and pointed out that there are many successful 
Russian Jews, including the former regional governor. Nevertheless, a number of 
‘successes’ does not discount the existence of anti-Semitism in wider society. Indeed 
numerous Russian oligarchs of Anna’s generation have Jewish parentage (for 
example Hoffman 2002: 359; Harding 2007: online; Weaver 2012: online), a fact that 
has not resulted in overt pubic resentment against Jews (Rutland 2005: online). Yet 
Anna’s denial prompts me to justify my argument. Anti-Semitism is alive and well in 
contemporary Russia, since Jews are still widely considered to be outsiders working 
against the interests of the country and its people, which Howard and Gibson describe 
as a result of dogmatism and xenophobia (2007: 195).17 During the early 2000s, anti-
Semitic feelings were ‘running high’, but Putin expressed considerable and 
unprecedented support for Jews (Shlapentokh and Arutunyan 2013: 57), while 
retaining a ‘niche for anti-Semitism’ in Kremlin propaganda so that ‘the Jewish card 
                                                
17 This has a strong historical lineage. In the Tsarist period there was little distinction between 
‘folk’ and official anti-Semitism (Korey, 1972: 111), and in the early twentieth century 
official limits were set on ‘Jewish’ capital in private organisations (Carstensen and Guroff 
1983: 351). During the Soviet period chauvinism and totalitarianism combined to legitimate 
popular anti-Semitism because Jews’ international history, worldwide religion and links with 
the outside world made them inherently suspicious and potentially subversive (Korey 1972: 
123), even though they were formally recognised as a nationality with the right to self-
determination and cultural freedom (Decter 1963: 420). Shlapentokh and Arutunyan argue, in 
fact, that hatred of Jews and Zionism ‘cemented the ideology of the party and state 
apparatchiks’ (2013: 57).  
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could be played if the danger to Putin’s elites from Russian nationalists increased’, in 
order to deprive them of the ability to use anti-Semitism (Shlapentokh and Arutunyan 
2013: 57-59). Meanwhile, in Russian society anti-Semitism remains ingrained. 
Increasing state control of the media has not prevented the publication of slurs 
associating Jews with opposition to the state (Cantorovich 2014: 17), while the 
resurgent Orthodox church seeks to ‘other’ Jews. The church refers to Jews like the 
Russians – a people as well as a religious group – which makes them ‘a rival chosen 
people’ (Kornblatt 1999: 416). Accordingly, while Russia formally accepts and 
supports Jews, open anti-Semitism exists in various public institutions. This reflects 
the situation for entrepreneurs, who are formally supported yet in reality frequently 
exploited. I therefore argue that as a Jew and an entrepreneur, the persecution Anna 
endures has undeniably racist undertones. In the face of all this, there have been no 
legal implications or repercussions for her persecutors, or any protections given to 
Anna. She faces their aggression alone. As she put it, ‘Well, my situation simply 
shows that in our country the presumption of the guilt of business is dominant.’  
 
What ultimately lies behind the attacks on Anna if it is obvious that she cannot repay 
her accusers? In a tangible sense, Anna promised her clients an opportunity to 
improve themselves, to make themselves more successful in the post-Soviet market. 
As such, when her business collapsed she not only failed to achieve her own 
aspirations but also let her clients down too. Thus, in selling the transition but not 
delivering it Anna demonstrated to her clients that the promise of the market was too 
good to be true. Like her, they had wanted to believe they could change their lives 
with business training in the West but it proved impossible and they lost their money 
in the process. This gave them the opportunity to revert to old ‘truths’ about rampant 
Western capitalism, Jews and entrepreneurship. Thus the market emerges as less than 
hegemonic in the way that the planned economy was, but, rather, as something that 
might have been but is no longer possible (or possible for everyone) under current 
LAO conditions. This is the case even when individuals such as Anna, or her clients, 
have done all the right preparation with training or study. Thus Anna and her clients 
are unable to attain the market they have been promised. This is the ‘transition to 
nowhere’ described by Walker (see above), and is visible in the contemporary 
aspirant middle class: the promise of progress is restricted for entrepreneurs too.  
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4.3.2 Prosecution 
 
I now turn to Anna’s prosecution, which has been created by a plot between her 
accusers and their allies within the state prosecution service. I will not provide an 
appraisal of the specific legality of Anna’s position since ‘legality’ is relative under 
conditions of institutional asymmetry: the fact is that although Anna has been the 
subject of a legal investigation since her former clients accused her of taking their 
money, the specific grounds for the investigation have remained unclear. Instead I 
describe her situation as I observed it as regards the investigation. Anna told me that 
when the police first responded to the allegations of her accusers and seized the 
computers from her office, they did so in order to search for evidence of fraud. 
Investigators also accessed CSBG’s bank account to determine from and to whom 
money had travelled. In my assessment these actions appear to be a legitimate course 
of action for investigators under the circumstances and proportionate to the alleged 
crime. However, whatever data was recovered through these actions, when I left the 
field officials had yet to return Anna’s computers and it is not altogether clear what 
they have been doing on the investigation since, with the exception of periodical and 
unpredictable demands for further paperwork. In other words, Anna appears to remain 
under investigation without knowing its legal basis and therefore has no idea of her 
prospects. In this respect she endures the crisis as much a victim of the law as a 
subject to it, and indeed this applies whether she has broken the law or not. The 
prosecutors are unable or unwilling to present clearly the legal case against her.  
 
Moreover, some prosecution officials have engaged in intimidation tactics resembling 
those used by her accusers, which indicates that they have little intention of building a 
robust legal case against her anyway. For example, Anna has been called to the 
prosecution service offices to be told that Russia’s prisons are empty and need filling, 
and that the only way to reduce her sentence was to immediately admit her guilt. In 
other words, Anna was asked to plead guilty to a crime for which she had not been 
charged. If she refused, the official warned her, the process of building a case against 
her would take longer, but her imprisonment was certain. Remarkably Anna did not 
blame the state for this situation, but said it only proved her belief that influential 
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individuals within the prosecution service were in cahoots with her accusers and out 
to ruin her. 
 
The compelling case that the investigation was being manipulated to implicate her did 
not make Anna’s defence any simpler. Rather, building a case for her defence proved 
to be extremely difficult. By the time I left the field she had employed (and 
dismissed) four separate lawyers to help her understand her legal situation, but each 
had offered conflicting advice and the investigation was no further towards a 
resolution. The first recommended that Anna develop a specific ‘strategy’ and ‘play a 
game of chess’ with prosecutors in order to proceed carefully through the crisis. Anna 
quickly rejected this. ‘I did not want my life to be a strategy’, she said, ‘but only 
wanted to tell the truth’. The second lawyer proved to be ineffective too. When we 
met her, for example, Anna asked her to visit the prosecutor’s office to draw their 
attention to a recent presidential declaration stating that if a business debt is being 
repaid the process of repayment should not be interfered with.18 However, the lawyer 
was inexplicably hesitant and said she was about to travel to Moscow for a month so 
refused to help. Instead, she recommended another lawyer whose daughter worked in 
the prosecutor’s office, which might provide a better way of influencing the process. 
It did not, and two further lawyers have not advanced the case any further. Overall 
their contribution has been educated guesswork at best, rather than effective legal 
assistance. 
 
Thus Anna has encountered the legal process as ineffectual from the perspective of 
both prosecution and defence. Just as the prosecution service cannot build or has 
avoided building a decisive case against Anna, so have her lawyers proven more 
concerned with strategising and offering connections rather than developing a proper 
defence case or counseling. Within this perplexing and apparently interminable legal 
                                                
18 An amnesty for businessmen convicted of economic crimes was widely discussed in 2013 
(see Buckley and Weaver 2013: online). Boris Titov, Russia’s business ombudsman, was 
described by Bershidski as pushing for the amnesty of 13,000 entrepreneurs, many of whom 
were in jail ‘because their competitors or former partners pay off someone in law 
enforcement to get them out of the picture’ (Bershidski 2013: online). Anna appears to be one 
of those 13,000. However, a declaration on the implementation of the amnesty by President 
Putin in 2013 had not had any effect on Anna’s situation at the time of writing two years 
later. 
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process Anna’s uncertain prosecution continues. This is clear empirical evidence, if it 
were needed, of the institutional asymmetry in Russian society. In this situation, 
individuals simulate formal processes for personal rather than legal gains. That is, 
prosecution officials appear to be simulating a prosecution for their acquaintances 
and, presumably, some eventual material reward. This is a point I return to below. As 
it happens, the major consequence for Anna is that she remains isolated from support 
or advice, alone to respond to the persecution and prosecution. Outlining the ways in 
which she does so is the purpose of the next sections. 
 
Before continuing I wish to consider what it means to say that Anna is in a ‘crisis’, 
even if it appears self-explanatory. I use this term because it has come to define the 
essential characteristics of her everyday life, and the situation that determines her 
everyday activities. At the time of writing she has experienced the persecution and 
prosecution I have described for over four years, so her nerves are frayed and she is 
often exhausted. Her mood fluctuates between elation, when she manages to resist 
pressure or receives some encouraging news, and depression, when she is threatened 
or has to respond quickly to placate a former client. She is at the mercy of her doubts, 
because she does not have a real sense of whether she is making progress. Her days 
cannot be planned because she is constantly responding to various demands. Her 
family life is strained, with Boris, her septuagenarian father, her only practical help. 
Her remaining employee has resigned because she was scared and gave up hope. Her 
home is under threat because her income is not sufficient to pay her bills. Walker has 
argued that the Russian working class has disproportionately borne the brunt of 
Russia’s economic adjustment on their bodies and minds and ‘are forced back to the 
same strategies of the early post-Soviet period’ (2015: 34). I suggest that Anna’s 
experience shows the entrepreneurial class to be similarly vulnerable, particularly 
women, as I argue further below. While there is no denying that she made a mistake 
and lost the money of numerous clients, her situation now can be fairly likened to that 
of Joseph K, the respectable banker accused of an unknown crime in Kafka’s fictional 
The Trial (reprinted 1998). I draw on Shevchenko’s definition of a crisis, drawing on 
her ethnography of post-socialist Moscow in the late 1990s:  
 
‘A crisis may be perceived as a routine and unchanging condition. In such 
circumstances, the crisis evolves from a singular and alien happening into the very 
 108 
 
stuff of everyday life, the immediate context of decisions and actions, and, after a 
certain point, the only reality with which individuals have the social and cultural 
tools to deal. Crisis may become the default expectation that organises people’s 
priorities and desires, as well as the benchmark against which they measure their 
successes or failures’ (Shevchenko 2009: 2).  
 
Today, 16 years after Shevchenko’s fieldwork, this definition of crisis appears to sum 
up Anna’s everyday experience. Anna has come to consider, for example, that the 
conditions of her crisis are at their worst during the full moon, when, she says, ‘the 
wolves howl and emotions dominate’. In this way the crisis has become the defining 
feature of her life and, as I show in Section 3, the key determinant of her everyday 
activities. 
 
4.3.3 Summary of Anna’s entrepreneurship in crisis 
 
In this section I have described the specific conditions of Anna’s crisis. There is no 
doubt that she is responsible for her debts, nevertheless the reaction by her clients and 
their allies in the prosecution service could not have been predicted. Anna admitted 
that she had made a mistake but, believing she had a legitimate claim to repay the 
debt on her own terms, prompted an aggressive reaction from her clients, who took 
the case into their own hands. At the same time the legal process, such as it is, has 
been manipulated by officials themselves. Anna, it seems, is not even guilty until 
proven innocent because the prosecution service is not interested in whether she is 
innocent. Overall the circumstances of Anna’s crisis exemplify the conditions of 
institutional asymmetry that I described in Chapter 1. Specifically, in an environment 
in which formal rules are uncertain or prone to manipulation, those in charge of their 
enforcement manipulate them to their own advantage. This was the case when Anna 
refused to proceed down a repayment path that suited her former clients, and it was 
again the case in the way they responded according to informal rules. At the time of 
writing both sides continue to try to overcome the other between the formal and 
informal spheres. Meanwhile, Anna has managed to strike informal deals for 
periodical repayment with several former clients, paid for by her new business 
ventures, which shows that others are prepared to work with, rather than against, her 
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to reduce the debt. As I now explain, by working between the formal and shadow 
economies, she has managed to restart her entrepreneurial career, even as she deals 
with the ongoing travails of the crisis. 
 
4.4 Entrepreneurship in responding to crisis 
 
In this section I outline how Anna has responded to the crisis I have described. I 
specifically focus on the activities she undertakes to counter the case against her, as 
opposed to the activities she undertakes to make a living, which follow in Section 4. I 
first discuss the time and effort she devotes to interpreting and making sense of her 
situation by seeking advice and counsel from various sources, and then discuss how 
she seeks to improve it. With her persecutors, Anna’s activity is mainly reactive 
because she does not want to aggravate them. With her prosecutors, in contrast, she is 
far more proactive and devotes great effort to trying to persuade them of her 
innocence. Only by achieving this does she hope to resolve the crisis. In addition, 
Anna has also decided that she should seek to win the support of the presidential 
administration itself, which she believes will be able to examine her case objectively, 
see that she is right and intervene to stop those against her. In this section I examine 
these efforts in turn. 
 
4.4.1 Making sense of the crisis: seeking advice and counsel 
 
Given the uncertainties of her situation and progress, Anna devotes much time to 
seeking advice in order to cope. She often attempts to draw on advice from old 
contacts, but the damage to her reputation caused by her debt and the negative 
publicity advanced by her persecutors has limited her social capital. However, some 
contacts have remained notionally loyal. For example, she places great stock on the 
information she receives from a friend, a retired policeman. His advice does not come 
free, however, and in return she gives him English lessons. One piece of information 
he offered was that one of Anna’s prosecutors, a woman, is ‘essentially a good 
person’ so she must be under pressure to advance the case from her superiors. 
Although this hearsay is vague and possibly false, Anna valued it because it gave her 
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confidence and specific direction for her appeals, which I discuss below. However, 
more often her contacts let her down. When, for example, she asked the retired 
policeman if he would go to the prosecutor’s office and vouch for her character, he 
became unavailable. Indeed, few of Anna’s advisors have been prepared to support 
her in person, apparently because they fear association with a potentially guilty 
businesswoman. When, for example, she asked some loyal clients to go to the 
prosecutor’s office as a group, some made excuses, some went quiet for days, and 
others agreed but then backtracked. Anna believes that men are particularly weak in 
this regard. In contrast, she told me, one loyal female friend went alone and 
voluntarily to the prosecutor’s office as a character witness. She told them they were 
wasting their time, that Anna was not a criminal, and that she felt sorry for them 
chasing her because it was all so insignificant. Anna also seeks advice from fellow 
entrepreneurs who have endured similar crises, on the basis that their insights might 
offer the best course of action. However, since each case ends differently, it is 
difficult to know which to emulate: some went to prison, others gave up their assets in 
order to avoid violence, and still others did not give up but worked relentlessly until 
they were somehow vindicated.  
 
To make up for the lack of quality information from her personal acquaintances, 
Anna tries to gather as much as possible from different sources, and draws particular 
motivation and guidance from the American life coaching audio courses she uses in 
her seminars. These courses emphasise personal and psychological transformation in 
a step-by-step process that encourages listeners to take control of their destiny and 
become mentally and financially successful. Anna plays these late at night and first 
thing in the morning. Unsurprisingly, when her daily circumstances appear to match 
the messages in her courses, this reinforces her chosen course of action. Salmenniemi 
and Vorona have described this in readers of Russian self-help literature as ‘a pick 
and mix method’, where certain points are selected when they are experienced as 
useful (2014: 51). According to their research, some Russian women have embraced 
positive thinking on the basis that if they change themselves the world around them 
will change too: ‘such an individual-centred conception of social change has a certain 
appeal since it resonates with the widespread sense of powerlessness and inability to 
influence the structural conditions of everyday existence in Russian society’ 
(Salmenniemi and Vorona 2014: 54-55).  Salmenniemi has also found that popular 
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Russian self-help literature has done ‘important ideological work by making sense of 
and legitimising social inequalities with a psychological repertoire. With its emphasis 
on self-reliance and autonomy, this repertoire resonates with the acute sense of 
political disenfranchisement that exists amongst the Russian population today’ (2013: 
23). Salmenniemi argues that ‘this psychologisation of social inequalities is not 
particularly Russian, but can be seen as part of neoliberal rationality’ (2013: 12). In 
this vein, Anna’s image of society as one in which inequality exists but in which 
anyone can achieve the American Dream if they take the right steps, is reified by her 
American courses. The cyclical power of these courses lies in the fact that if one does 
not achieve their results, it is still in their power to gain control over their situations. 
 
Although American life coaches offer a rational path to success, Anna also seeks 
emotional and psychological support and reassurance, so she periodically turns to a 
palm reader (extrasens). Unlike the coaching tapes, Anna can ask questions of her 
extrasens and seek some guidance. As I have shown, there are very few other people 
listening to her elsewhere. The extrasens, a former waitress, predicts Anna’s future 
using tarot cards for 1000 roubles a session. She told me that she had enough demand 
to start a business seeing clients daily every half an hour between four and seven 
o’clock, which suggests that Anna is far from alone in wondering about her security 
and prospects. Before the palm reading began the extrasens comforted Anna by 
saying that she had once had cancer but had survived because she had to look after 
her daughter, a story that Anna, whose daughter was same age, found inspiring. 
Indeed, Anna took the insights she received from her as seriously as those from other 
sources. Galina Lindquist has also noted the importance of magic in her anthropology 
of post-socialist Russia:  
 
‘Magic has an obvious connection with the structures of power. Magic 
practices thrive where power is brutal and overwhelming, where the rational 
channels of agency are insufficient or of limited value, and where the uncertainty of 
life calls for methods of existential reassurance and control that rational and 
technical means cannot offer’ (Lindquist 2006: 2).  
 
Moreover as Borenstein noted, it is ‘not at all uncommon’ in post-Soviet Russia for 
an intellectual woman to give credence to the powers of her extrasensory consultant 
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(Borenstein, 1999b: 439-440). Anna’s visit certainly had a cathartic effect: when the 
extrasens asked how she was, Anna began to cry. She took Anna’s hands, shuffled 
her cards clumsily and allowed Anna to collect herself. She laid out the cards and 
turned several over consecutively before telling Anna that although things were 
difficult she would get through it. She said that Anna was currently working with a 
man and a woman and should continue to do so. Afterwards Anna identified these 
people as two contacts who had been involved in a recent seminar, and with whom 
she hoped to start working. Later, it turned out that they were in fact rivals plotting to 
take Anna’s remaining clients for their own seminar programme. Even though the 
extrasens had appeared to be wrong in that prediction, however, Anna blamed herself, 
and speculated that she had identified the wrong contacts. Indeed, in a later session 
the extrasens told her that a previously supportive man would turn against her. In any 
case, Anna always emerged from these sessions with a feeling of relief: the advice 
was delivered in a way that acknowledged Anna’s problems, and told her that after a 
few twists and turns, things would turn out all right.  
 
Anna’s lone vulnerability led her to put great emphasis on all the advice she received. 
The relief she experienced during the moments when others considered her problems 
was palpable, and for a short time afterwards her mood vastly improved. Moreover, 
even if the information she received was not useful, it did have personal value to her: 
her retired police contact had knowledge of the prosecution system that she did not; 
those who had endured crises showed her it could be done; the life coaches made it 
seem as though she had power over her destiny; and the extrasens gave her 
perspective about the journey. Magic in Russia, Lindquist argues, is one of the 
‘cultural tools to change people’s subjectivity in ways that make their lives livable. It 
is about hope, the existential and affective counterpart of agency that replaces it 
where channels for agency are blocked, and presence in the world becomes 
precarious’ (2006: 4). In Anna’s case, each of her sources serves a similar function. 
 
4.4.2 Anna’s response to her persecutors 
 
Anna’s response to her persecutors is mainly appeasing, meaning that she attempts to 
placate them when they try to intimidate her. Her overriding objective is not to buckle 
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under pressure. It is vital to her that she does not yield, she said, because this would 
be interpreted as an admission of guilt and strengthen their will. However, since she 
cannot repay her debt, she must hope that they do not take rash measures or resort to 
violence. To do this she tends to submit to their demands, no matter how 
uncomfortable or problematic, or attempt to negotiate a slower repayment plan. As I 
will describe in the next section, several accusers have already agreed such plans with 
her, and relations between them and Anna are no longer antagonistic. However, 
others still aim to intimidate her at random as part of their campaigns against her.  
 
Anna’s determination to respond to the whims of her persecutors is extremely time 
consuming and often prevents her from getting on with more productive tasks. 
Nevertheless she has little choice if she is not to anger them further. Her decision to 
let one of her accusers look around her house as if it were for sale is a case in point. 
She did not resist this in the hope that it would prevent a more aggressive episode. 
There are plenty of other examples. For example, late one night Anna received a call 
then suddenly asked me to accompany her to a chemist to buy some medicine. En 
route she added that a member of the accuser-group had called to demand 500 roubles 
immediately (approximately £10 in early 2014) and that we were going to give it to 
him near the chemist. Anna was extremely nervous as we waited on the freezing 
street for a few minutes before a young woman turned up with a tough looking man. 
He was not expecting me to be there, so shook my hand for longer and more firmly 
than necessary, while smiling menacingly and asking about my business in Russia. 
However, my foreignness seemed to stifle him and since he was not really looking for 
conversation we instead stood beside the women awkwardly, he with an aggressive 
stance, me with a frown. Meanwhile, Anna gave the woman the cash then wrote out a 
receipt, which they both signed. Anna, with her debt marginally reduced, thanked me 
for my help as we walked home.19 She had to run numerous such errands at short 
notice for little gain all the time. 
 
A few days later, Anna was called to meet another member of the group, a successful 
investment banker, in his office at one of the country’s largest banks. When we 
arrived he asked about her progress repaying the debt. She said that she was working 
                                                
19 I discuss my specific fieldwork role in more detail in the Appendix. 
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on it and described the informal repayments she had agreed with some clients. She 
also mentioned that some clients were accepting cosmetics in lieu of cash or 
discounted participation in her business training seminars (described in Section 4). 
The banker replied that cosmetics could not help him, and it went without saying that 
he did not need her seminars. Instead, he took a notepad and started to write a list of 
administrative tasks she would do for him, then requested the translation from English 
of two articles on banking, and gave her until the next day to send them over. At over 
20 pages each this was a tall order. Finally, he then told her be ready in case he 
thought of anything else. It was not clear whether this work counted as repayment or 
a punishment while he waited for his cash, and Anna did not seek clarification. She 
was obviously fearful. Afterwards she said Boris would complete the translations 
using Google Translate, and in any case he liked doing it. She would remain available 
in case he wanted anything else. By responding to her persecutors in this way Anna 
hopes to placate them while she gets on with her defence. 
 
4.4.3 Anna’s response to her prosecutors 
 
Anna is far more proactive in her response to her prosecution. She makes regular 
visits to the prosecutors’ office to make representations and petitions on the grounds 
that she is innocent of wrongdoing and has the government’s own support for 
business on her side. By drawing on the government’s rhetorical support for the 
improvement of business conditions, and highlighting her own victimisation as an 
entrepreneur, she aims to show that her way of doing business is aligned with the 
state’s policy, and that the persecution and prosecution she faces is unfounded, 
typifying the need for reform. Moreover, by making this argument regularly she aims 
to demonstrate that she will not give up. This approach has proven reasonably 
successful to the extent that Anna has maintained an ongoing argument with the 
prosecution service, rather than admitting defeat. This has been a tangible factor in 
her survival and continuing freedom and, I argue, may be understood as 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, aimed more at independence than commercial 
objectives.  
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Despite Anna’s ability to maintain occasional communications with the prosecution 
service, her everyday experience has not improved as a result: she must consistently 
argue her case until the investigation against her is dropped. As a result, she is often 
unsure how to proceed. During my observations, an idea would often cross her mind, 
making her suddenly concerned that it offered a new or better way to promote her 
innocence, or that the prosecutors might have overlooked some important aspect of 
her case. She also frequently sought to inform them of a recent presidential 
declaration about the development of business or a new law that they might not be 
aware of. On these occasions her angst would increase and she became fixated on the 
possibility that this new information might bring her troubles to a close, coupled with 
the great nervousness that accompanied confronting officials. Anna usually asked me 
to accompany her on these visits for moral support, and though I decided not to 
refuse, they did cause some anxiety because I was wary of highlighting my 
connection with her affairs and raising suspicion against her, especially given the 
‘foreign agents’ law, which was passed just prior to my fieldwork and which, as I 
highlighted in Chapter 2, effectively legalised hostility to foreigners’ interest, real or 
perceived, in Russian politics (see Machalek no date: online).  
 
Besides, the specific utility of Anna’s representations was also unclear. They served 
to underline her awareness of the law and determination to fight, but it is also likely 
that they aggravated the prosecutors already set against her. Nevertheless, it is certain 
that they did have some effect. On one occasion we visited when Anna was more 
confident. A member of the accusing group had withdrawn their support and Anna 
had also identified mistakes in the group’s statement against her. She turned up 
unannounced to speak to an official she believed was torn between his conscience and 
the demands of his corrupted superiors. She told him about the mistakes and revealed 
the name of the woman no longer against her. The official was visibly ill at ease and 
said that he had also been trying to get hold of some of Anna’s accusers to verify their 
statements but had not succeeded. On the way back to the office Anna was ecstatic, 
sure that she was on the right track. Later she decided to visit him again to give him 
documentation that she believed would advance her case. She cornered him in his 
office and explained about her ongoing effort to repay the money through legal and 
personal arrangements, which demonstrated her innocence and good intentions. The 
official could not disagree. Afterwards Anna was again delighted at his agreement, 
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which she saw as a positive sign of the way the case was moving. She was sure that 
by convincing this particular official he would fight for her cause. Whether this was 
the case or not, Anna’s brave personal campaign also reveals her isolation and its 
impact on her wellbeing. Without legal guidance or reliable legal processes, her own 
interpretation of her case forms the basis of her approach, which makes it highly 
fraught and uncertain. 
 
Anna’s campaigning was not only focused on proving her innocence, but speculative 
attempts at winning her prosecutors over. For example, when she heard that the 
government planned to offer an amnesty to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the 
Russian Constitution (Prezident Rossii 2013: online), she visited the prosecutors 
again to make her case. She became sure that this offered her a chance to secure her 
freedom, even though she did not wish to imply that she required an amnesty. Of 
course, as before, this amnesty did not bring about any material change in her 
situation. Rather, it shows how Anna’s campaign of defence attempts to balance the 
idea that she is innocent with any opportunity to extricate herself from the crisis. 
However, this lobbying did have some effect, if only by causing consternation among 
her prosecutors. As Peter Pomerantsev has written about the unfounded prosecution 
of the entrepreneur Yana Yakovleva, her eventual release would not have been 
possible without her ‘dissident impulse’ or will ‘to fight back in the first place… To 
make something happen in Russia, you have to be both valiant protester and 
Machiavellian, playing one clan off against the other’ (Pomerantsev 2015: 117).  
 
The final dimension of Anna’s response to her prosecutors is her attempt to secure the 
support of senior political elites for her cause. Although this effort may seem absurdly 
optimistic, she gives this campaign a great deal of time and attention. She is 
convinced of the essential virtue of these elites and believes that if they hear about her 
case they will be clear about her innocence. Her work in this regard is both 
speculative and coordinated. The speculative aspect involves taking any opportunity, 
however remote, to secure the support of powerful leaders. For example, when she 
heard that the former deputy prime minister and current head of Rosnanotech, 
Anatoly Chubais, was visiting the city, she called an influential local businessman to 
ask if he would make representations to him on her behalf. She told me that since 
Chubais had led Russia’s privatisation drive (Freeland 2000: 48-68; Hoffman 2002: 
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99), he would understand her situation best of all. While I was astonished that she 
thought her acquaintance would do anything of the sort, Anna became visibly 
enthused by the prospect. When he told her to fight her own corner, she promptly 
slumped again.  
 
Anna’s most coordinated appeal is to President Putin himself. She told me that she 
once met him through her work and was convinced that he is coordinating a strong 
anti-corruption drive20. She therefore places great faith in him as a fair arbiter and 
fellow transition believer. Her appeals to him are also made on the basis that she is 
being unfairly persecuted and that an intervention from Moscow could resolve the 
crisis. In order to reach him she spent several days preparing a letter in which she 
drew attention to her problems, asked for his help to resolve them, and offered her 
services with his anti-corruption activities in the region. She even mentioned that she 
had been approached by both the Russian and American security services in the 
course of her travels to acquire information about the other but had turned them 
down. Anna told me this information would demonstrate her honesty and good 
intentions for business and Russia. Anna’s lawyer took the letter to Moscow when she 
visited, and made an appointment at the Kremlin. Anna also sent a copy to the 
president’s regional office. The very act of sending the letter lifted her spirits, and she 
received a reply after a few weeks asking for more information. This put Anna in a 
fine mood for days: she could wield the letter in front of the local prosecutors to show 
them that she was in contact with representatives of the president himself. In order to 
be sure that the additional documents reached Moscow she dispatched Boris himself 
to deliver them. He called on his arrival to say he had taken a ticket in the 
administrative offices and was waiting his turn to make their case. 
 
                                                
20 Tackling corruption was a major theme in Putin’s first state of the nation speech on his 
return to the presidency in 2012 (Gutterman and Busvine, 2012: online). This translated into a 
major policy initiative overseen by an anti-corruption directorate in the Presidential 
Administration (Monaghan, 2014: online). Krastev and Inozemtsev (2013: online) have, 
however, criticised the sincerity of the initiative on the grounds that it will ‘sink the regime’. 
Even so, statements about improving conditions and reducing dangers for entrepreneurs 
continue (for example Tass, 2014b: online) and Anna is able to invoke them in her self-
defence. 
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Appeals to Moscow have a long historical lineage in Russia, but the Putin 
administration has worked to formalise the petitioning process itself. According to 
Arutunyan the government has established a network of United Russia reception 
offices around the country, which allows Putin to be seen as a ‘hands-on man of the 
people’ and where his representatives are ‘authorised to telephone local officials 
responsible for red tape, and, by dropping the name of the prime minister [now 
president], pulling strings on behalf of the citizen’ (Arutunyan 2014: 45). This link 
between the masses and presidential power has an ordering effect: the president 
reifies his power and authority while implicitly acknowledging the inadequacy of the 
bureaucracy below him to serve the people, and at the same time gives the people 
hope that he is on their side. The ubiquity of these appeals is most obvious during 
Putin’s annual addresses in which he devotes hours to answering appeals from 
ordinary citizens. The journalist Shaun Walker has described these periods as the 
‘“Vladimir Vladimirovich please solve this local issue caused by the outrageous 
behaviour of local officials” segment’ (Walker, 2013: online). In this light, Boris’s 
wait to deliver Anna’s precious documents seems logical and appropriate. As 
Arutunyan shows with the petition of her own informant, Sergei, ‘The question of 
spending hours, days, or weeks first petitioning local authorities, then regional 
authorities, and then taking a day’s journey all the way to Moscow… made more 
sense than mobilising a few dozen people in his community to come up with £20,000 
so that all their homes could have gas’ (Arutunyan, 2014: 47). When I left the field 
Anna was still waiting for the president to address her case, but the appeal itself 
improved her mood and the correspondence gave her physical documents that made 
her prosecutors and persecutors pause.  
 
4.4.4 Summary of Anna’s response to the crisis 
 
In this section, I have described Anna’s various activities as she has sought to respond 
to the persecution and prosecution against her. In the absence of an effective legal 
defence, which is the direct consequence of Russia’s institutional asymmetry, she has 
largely had to interpret her position within the crisis herself. Although she has tried to 
secure the support from within her circle of acquaintances, this support was relatively 
weak, with one or two exceptions. She has also sought advice from various sources in 
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the know but this has been relatively unproductive. I therefore argue that social 
capital is not necessarily the default or most effective resource for entrepreneurs in 
the absence of formal institutions. In Anna’s case, when she fell into trouble with the 
state and fell victim to a powerful group of aggressors, her acquaintances tended to be 
conspicuous by their lack of support. Accordingly self-help has been essential. In this 
light the self-help tapes and support from the extrasens have been invaluable in 
Anna’s search for moral support and motivation to keep up with her cause. 
 
In her response to her persecutors Anna has sought to placate them wherever possible. 
This is particularly time-consuming but she has endured because, even though she 
lost their money, she has been able to maintain that she has right on her side. 
Moreover, those clients know that by their taking the law into their own hands they 
are in the wrong too. In response to the prosecution, Anna also proceeds on the basis 
that she has right on her side and makes personal, frequent representations to 
prosecution service officials on that basis. This has also had some effect: prosecutors 
have been unable to make a sound case against her because they are also partially in 
the wrong and she has been able to show that she is at least partially right. She has 
also strengthened her position by drawing on presidential declarations that offer some 
hope for her legitimacy, and securing material documentation from the presidential 
administration that she can use to deter local officialdom. Thus in response to both 
persecutors and prosecutors Anna has been able to invoke and associate herself with 
the government’s rhetorical support for the development of business conditions in 
order to make a case for her defence, even though it was her mistake that instigated 
the crisis. In doing so she has also aligned herself effectively with the president and 
portrayed her accusers as illegitimate. The irony is that Anna’s belief in the transition 
appeared rather naive just prior to the crisis, but her ability to show the government’s 
support for the development of business conditions evidently contributed to her 
survival during the crisis, even though everybody knows the government does very 
little to support entrepreneurs at all. 
 
Two observations stand out considering Anna’s response to her persecutors and 
prosecutors. First, in some respects Anna’s entrepreneurship is significantly affected 
by the crisis. She has to devote significant time to dealing with the challenges of her 
persecution and prosecution which, as I discuss in Section 4, has severely diminished 
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her ability to continue doing business as before. Second and in contrast, Anna has 
been able to use the cause for which she established CSBG – the development of 
business – as an argument in her defence. That is, by pointing to her years of work 
advancing business interests in the city, she has developed a response that plays on 
the illegitimacy of her accusers and their allies in the prosecution service. In this way 
Anna is able to deflect attention from her own wrongdoing onto that of her 
adversaries. Moreover, Anna is able to invoke the government’s formal support for 
business in her defence, which reinforces the original purpose of CSBG. 
Consequently, Anna is able to show that she has been right all along; the crisis just 
goes to show that Russian entrepreneurs face significant difficulties. To put it another 
way, just as the prosecution service simulates the legality of its case against her, so 
Anna simulates the legitimacy of her business to her prosecutors. In response to 
Russia’s institutional asymmetry, Anna has found arguments with which she can 
survive. In this sense CSBG may be a failed business in the formal sense but in the 
practical sense it enables Anna to resist her accusers. Without it, Anna would be very 
vulnerable, but her years of work to advance business gives her self-defence through 
CSBG a legitimate framework and cause to make her arguments against the 
authorities. By twisting the logic of business failure to her advantage, I suggest Anna 
must be judged as an effective, if not successful, entrepreneur under the 
circumstances. 
 
4.5 Doing business during the crisis 
 
In this section I discuss how Anna makes money in the context of her crisis. As I have 
stated, the core business of CSBG – the foreign training programme, the seminars and 
the business advice – was not possible once the crisis began. To make enough money 
to ‘get by’ and repay her debts Anna had to restructure the company and begin 
alternative activities. She continues to portray CSBG publicly as a viable and 
legitimate business (even though as the beneficiary of foreign support it has never 
successfully operated under hard budget constraints), but in reality the company 
became a formal shell for a variety of activities undertaken between the formal and 
informal spheres. As a result, Anna’s white-collar pretensions, intellectual 
background and international connections now count for very little; she faces the fact 
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that her best days in business are behind her. As I conclude below, however, judging 
Anna’s entrepreneurship according to her commercial success is not an effective or 
fair measure in the Russian context. I argue instead that the transformation of her 
business is better considered as a way of maintaining her independence from those 
against her, which, like Oleg’s entrepreneurship, is better conceptualised by drawing 
on ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’. 
 
4.5.1 Business between the formal and informal spheres 
 
Today CSBG is a formal business shell within which Anna pursues a variety of 
activities in the shadow economy. This means that she does not attempt to meet the 
legal obligations of a fully compliant business (such as they meaningfully exist). 
When the crisis began, Anna formed a new company called Travelling Businessman 
and made Boris its director. Through this she channels most of the cash derived from 
activities she undertakes under the CSBG brand. This is necessary, Anna said, 
because when CSBG makes any money, she is obliged by law to put it towards 
servicing her debt, which leaves her very little to live with. It ‘disappears’, she 
complains. Thus Travelling Businessman allows her to control her outgoings. 
However, Anna also thinks Boris is unreliable; he is older and quickly distracted, as 
well as moody when he feels underused or underappreciated. According to Anna, he 
associates business with problems, having had several commercial (ad)ventures of his 
own in the 1990s, so there is a chance he will neglect his commitments to Travelling 
Businessman. To hedge against this Anna has registered a third business, Top 
Executive, through which she can move money if the need arises. Although this tri-
business arrangement is complicated, its advantage is to keep cash available to ensure 
she can meet her basic needs. It also reveals clearly that the Western business 
practices she most wished to promote are absent from her own business. As I argued 
in Chapter 1, it is now extremely difficult for entrepreneurs to be fully compliant with 
the law, so breaking the law becomes both inevitable and necessary. More to the 
point, CSBG is no longer an effective commercial entity in the formal sense, but a 
business operating mostly informally and through which she can defend her interests 
and resist her accusers. As a client from one of Anna’s seminars told me, ‘do not look 
at business structures but at the people. Do not look at Russia’s business statistics, 
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because they are untrue.’ In this light it is a mistake to judge CSBG according to 
recognisable business measures. Her ‘business’ is really what she personally makes of 
it, as I now elaborate. 
 
What are the specific business activities Anna now undertakes? Although demand for 
her business training seminars has diminished and she no longer hosts elite trainers or 
coaches in person, Anna still has one product related to her original work: namely 
small seminars in which she plays American self-help and business competence audio 
courses to small groups, translating from English to Russian in real time. These are 
the same courses I described in Section 3 that she uses herself for motivation. The 
courses serve two important purposes. First, they allow her to keep up appearances, 
projecting the image that she is still the same legitimate businesswoman she has 
always been, with the same type of product. This is particularly important in her 
defence campaign (as described in Section 3). Second, the courses can be sold to new 
clients for cash or she can offer them to her accusers as a substitute for cash 
repayment of her debt. In other words, the seminars can be given to clients as in kind 
debt repayment. This has proven to be quite successful; during the courses I attended 
Anna was indebted to a majority of the participants. 
 
Indeed, Anna now generates most of her cash by drawing on her knowledge of 
English and ‘the West’: her second main source of cash is providing occasional 
translation and language support services. As I described in Section 3, this helped her 
meet the banker’s demand for the translation of an article. She also offers a service 
helping clients complete visa applications for western countries. This is a reasonably 
popular service because many applications are denied, so her long experience sending 
clients to the West means she has a high success rate, which draws a steady stream of 
clients hoping she can improve their chances. Thus Anna’s main product is ironically 
herself: she still draws on her knowledge of the West to survive, even though it is her 
cosmopolitanism that her accusers use against her. This is emblematic of 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’; a recognition of knowing what is possible in the 
market drawing on one’s own resources. However, despite Anna’s ability to generate 
some cash in these ways, she does not make enough to reduce her debt quickly. As a 
result, she tries to avoid using cash to repay her debts. Wherever possible, she tries to 
pay business costs in kind, and earn income in cash. As I have indicated, the price for 
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her products is therefore negotiable and she frequently offers discounts or freebies in 
exchange for debt relief or as payment for favours received. To be clear, this means 
that Anna continues to work with some of her accusers, though these individuals tend 
to be more pragmatic than those seeking to intimidate her.  
 
The informality of Anna’s pricing belies her stringent book-keeping. She tracks how 
much she owes to each client carefully, giving receipts even when debt is repaid in 
kind. These in kind payments also include alcohol, which she keeps stashed in her 
office to offer whenever there is a chance, but most take the form of products she 
acquires as a sales agent for two MLM (multilevel marketing) companies. Indeed 
MLM has formed the significant proportion of Anna’s business activities during the 
crisis. The first MLM company is an east European cosmetics business which I call 
Opale21; the second is an American company selling health enhancement 
consumables such as vitamin supplements or applications designed to remove 
discomfort or aid healing, which I call Vitality. Anna displays Opale products in her 
seminars and offers them to women in exchange for debt relief. Though fewer men 
accept the offer, some do and give them away as presents. Anna also tries to use 
Opale and Vitality instead of cash for business purchases, such as when she hires a 
venue for her seminars. 
 
As with all MLM, Anna’s role as a sales agent is to promote and sell their products to 
clients, and develop her own business by finding new sales representatives to sell 
‘under’ her, thereby increasing the marketing and selling capacity of the business and 
deriving a proportion of their profits too. In Anna’s particular case, she can ‘afford’ to 
give Opale products away in kind because she is indebted to the man who recruited 
her. Thus working for Opale is a blessing and a curse. On the one hand she is able to 
pay down debts using Opale products, which improves her situation with the group as 
a whole; on the other hand the value of her debt to her boss increases, because she 
still owes him the value of the products she has given away (in addition to her 
original debt). In this sense Anna is tied to him. He benefits by knowing that she is 
                                                
21 Despite its East European origins, Opale’s branding is French. I observed that this had a 
real effect on its popularity: when clients learned that it was ‘French’ they were far more 
inclined towards it. 
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working in his interests by increasing the dissemination of his products and that she 
will in time repay her debt to him. However, relations between them are cordial, and 
Anna is not dissatisfied with MLM, because she benefits from the flexibility it gives 
her. 
 
Although Anna is content to work in MLM during her crisis, she does not consider it 
to be proper business, and disassociates herself from it even as she benefits from it. 
She creates this distance because, as I have indicated, her accusers are known to one 
another through their work for an MLM company. Anna told me that MLM attracts 
‘simple people’ and regrets her decision to take her internships onto the ‘mass 
market’ (see Section 1) because it meant dealing with such people: 
 
‘Earlier our clients were only business owners, with whom we had a good 
relationship, while here is another category of people. Multilevel marketing has a 
different ideology, a different psychology. These people think only in the short term. 
They think, “If I don’t receive the money today, I am going to press you and you will 
give me everything.” And they have their own system too: these people do not work 
alone but do whatever their leader tells them. In my case there are several of these 
leaders in different MLMs, and they each have 15 or 20 people that wrote to the 
authorities.’ 
 
Thus in Anna’s view, the type of people accusing her favour a hierarchical leadership 
structure in which subordinates unconditionally support their superiors. This is not 
unlike the system I encountered in Sibtekhnika, Oleg’s business (see Chapter 3). 
Moreover, Anna believes these people consider ordinary business to be inherently 
suspicious, requiring vigilance and control by the state. Clearly, what Anna means is 
that these people retain a socialist attitude to business. For her such people are 
unsuited to, and disinclined to start or work in, Western-style businesses of the sort 
she admires, preferring instead the defined structure and fixed role that MLM 
ostensibly offers. Anna therefore believes MLM is acceptable to her accusers because 
of the way they think and seeks to distance herself from MLM even though it is 
enabling her to survive the crisis: it does not fit well with the narrative she seeks to 
sell or use in her defence. 
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Anna is right that her accusers hold a different view of what legitimate business is: 
just as she considered MLM as a deficient form of business, so they implied that she 
is a pyramid schemer. Both parties seek to portray the other as illegitimate 
entrepreneurs. As such it is ironic that Anna and her accusers both work for MLM 
companies now, even if she does it out of necessity and they do it willingly. I 
therefore argue that Russia’s institutional asymmetry leaves the meaning of legitimate 
business undefined. In consequence I observe that entrepreneurs must justify their 
business activities publicly in order to project their legitimacy. This is exactly what 
Oleg and Irina sought to achieve by asserting and portraying control in their everyday 
entrepreneurship (see Chapter 3). 
 
4.5.2 Multilevel marketing as a legitimate business 
 
It is revealing that both Anna and her accusers perceive MLM to be an effective 
business model, albeit for different reasons. This is ironic because pyramid schemes, 
direct marketing companies and MLMs are deeply suspicious to ethnographers of the 
developing world. Detlev Krige, for example, perceives in them the pervasiveness of 
the market and the exploitation of vulnerable new actors, propelled by a policy 
discourse that reinforces economic empowerment, entrepreneurship and celebrates 
risk taking and individual self-help (Krige 2012: 87). Similarly, David Stoll asserts 
that MLM is merely ‘the legal version’ of a pyramid scheme (Stoll 2013: 278). In his 
view MLM companies represent a method through which individuals in the 
developing world believe they can “escape” their limited material reality and ‘unlock 
the key to more desirable, higher-status commodities’ (Stoll: 2013: 280). However, 
Anna’s conflict with her accusers over what counts as legitimate post-socialist 
business leads me to refute this argument as too simplistic. After all, Anna’s accusers 
make a clear distinction between the pyramid scheme as illegitimate and MLM as 
legitimate. Anna herself considers MLM to be a weak form of business, attracting the 
‘wrong’ type of people, but nevertheless derives considerable material benefit from it 
in the context of her crisis. 
 
This argument might appear to be about pyramids and MLMs, but it is really about 
what legitimate business is in Russia. To be more specific, the meaning of legitimate 
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business continues to change in Russia. Pyramid schemes are known to be criminal 
and illegitimate forms of enterprise today, but they were ubiquitous in the early 1990s 
and had a significant impact on changing perceptions of capitalism. In her study of 
the giant Caritas pyramid in Romania, for example, Katherine Verdery argues that 
the scheme represented a challenge to the socialist ideas that only productive work 
could produce money legitimately, and that money from ‘commerce and speculation 
was polluting, unacceptable and tainted with capitalism’ (Verdery 1995: 642). In this 
way for a time Caritas represented a legitimate understanding of what capitalism was. 
That is not to say that investors fully understood what Caritas was, rather that the 
scheme offered the chance for great capital accumulation without the need for 
political connections and required ‘only the nerve to risk one’s money’ (Verdery 
1995: 642-643). In the case of MMM, Russia’s most infamous pyramid, the 
possibilities of capitalism were embodied in the scheme’s advertising campaign, 
which drew on the soap opera genre and blurred the boundaries of socialist values and 
capitalist values such that ‘investors’ (dangerous capitalists) were re-constituted as 
‘partners’ (productive socialists) (Borenstein 1999a: 50). As Patico has written, in this 
type of reconfiguration, ‘investment is spun away from the Soviet-era meanings of 
“speculation” and is cast as active and cooperative’ (Patico 2009: 216-217). Of 
course, when they collapsed these schemes reinforced the very stereotypes about 
capitalist business that they had temporarily challenged, and, as the accusations 
against Anna show, pyramid scheming came to signify the worst kind of business, an 
allegation one could use to delegitimise business enemies.  
 
My point is that the way in which pyramids were popular when they emerged but then 
perceived as dangerous when they collapsed, reveals how attitudes to business remain 
in flux in contemporary Russia: the present popularity of the MLM model is clearly 
not considered illegitimate in the way that pyramids are. As Hass has written, 
Russia’s post-Soviet experience of business has been characterised by learning as a 
result of Soviet legacies that resisted the haphazard arrival of market practices. 
According to him, the law, the media and Western consultants all had an impact on 
their emergence, and actors:  
 
‘ … both inadvertently and consciously transposed them onto Soviet-era 
principles of production, sales, and values. The end result was a troubled process of 
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interpreting environmental signals and reacting to them – against the backdrop of 
privatisation, organisational restructuring, and political instability – that bred 
practices of sales and valuation neither entirely Soviet nor Western’ (Haas 2005: 39).  
 
Thus Anna’s move into MLM shows that a given type of business may be rationalised 
in different ways: she has been able to legitimate the necessity and practicality of 
MLM in the context of her current circumstances, even though she would prefer to be 
running CSBG as before. Haas demonstrates that the tacit knowledge and practice of 
business did not necessarily accompany the rhetoric of business (Haas 2005: 39), and 
that culture interferes with the adaptation of new laws and policies (Haas 2005: 40). 
Anna’s entrepreneurship is a case in point: her rhetoric of business is not an 
indication of her actual business practices. Nor, as I have repeated, is the state’s 
rhetoric of support for business an indication of its actual support. Consequently I 
argue that in contemporary Russia there are multiple interpretations of legitimate 
business. 
 
Accordingly I find that MLM offers a useful way of working in Russia’s 
contemporary market that cannot be considered illegitimate or necessarily harmful. 
Besides, MLM is not illegal and MLM brands are ubiquitous in Siberia. Indeed, their 
current popularity may stem, as Anna suggested, from their ability to appear 
satisfactory in terms of both socialist values and market principles. MLMs offer sales 
agents a pre-determined, recognisable role, the possibility of self and material 
improvement, a tangible product to sell and a role in which the agent can work within 
their personal network. In these respects MLM gives members the means with which 
to trade, without the complication, vulnerability or financial burden of starting their 
own business, in a socially comprehensible way. Among many Russians of Anna’s 
generation, those without the experience and market ideology she absorbed in the 
West, and for whom the appearance of the market was rapid and shocking, MLM 
offers meaning, status and an aid to survival in the contemporary market. 
Consequently I concur with Patico who argued that the post-socialist market must not 
be considered in terms of ‘a local world of social embeddedness and moral 
obligation’ that seeks ‘to resist seemingly exterior, supercultural, individualistic 
markets’ (2009: 207), but ‘as a set of questions and moments of interpretation – 
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junctures when people consider the multiple implications and valences of the specific 
practices in which they might engage’ (Patico 2009: 208).  
 
Patico’s own informant, a regional manager for Tupperware, a well-known MLM, 
had re-categorised her own commercial role over time, adopting ‘a different kind of 
moral stance – one of approval and pride rather than shame or hesitation’ (Patico 
2009: 214). MLM wields a similar kind of moral legitimacy that means it cannot be 
conflated with pyramids in the contemporary Russian context. Thus while I do not 
condone Anna’s persecutors (who work for MLMs), it is a fact that while she faces a 
crisis partly of her making and partly of theirs, working within MLM offers her both a 
practical lifeline to endure the crisis while reducing her debts, and a business activity 
that offers security because it is morally acceptable to those accusers.  
 
Overall, Anna’s crisis has made it necessary to take her business out of the formal 
sphere and partially into the informal sphere. In order to meet her objective of 
surviving in business formally, which means proving the legitimacy of CSBG and her 
innocence from wrongdoing, Anna must work in part in the shadow economy, where 
she can hide money, conduct business without money, and generate enough to survive 
and pay her debts. In the formal sphere Anna continues to undertake some limited 
activities that resemble her pre-crisis business, namely occasional business training 
seminars. However, since these are decreasingly popular they mainly serve as a 
public relations exercise, upholding and promoting her image as a legitimate 
entrepreneur whose vision for business matches that of the government. The seminars 
generate little cash but are offered for in kind debt relief to her persecutors. Instead, 
Anna’s main for-cash activities draw on her knowledge of English, although these are 
also quite insubstantial. This income is channelled as necessary through one of three 
companies in order to obscure its whereabouts and keep enough free to ‘get by’. 
Wherever possible, therefore, Anna works through two MLM companies to reduce 
her debt through sales or in kind. MLM is not informal work per se but Anna uses it 
in an informal way: it provides her with the possibility of earning some cash income 
and a sales network of her own, but also offers her material resources that she can 
offer in kind in exchange for debt reduction (wherever possible). Most importantly, 
even though Anna dislikes MLM, it offers a type of business that is acceptable to her 
accusers, which mitigates against their aggression.  
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4.6 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I have described Anna’s experience in business, which began 
successfully and then entered a period of crisis that is still ongoing. I began with a 
description of how she developed CSBG, showing that her early success profited from 
her ability to secure support from foreign benefactors. However, this support 
eventually became her downfall, because it deterred her from creating a business that 
could survive under hard budget constraints. This meant that Anna failed to live up to 
the western business model she advocated. Nevertheless, I do not consider Anna’s 
failure to be indicative of her ability as an ‘entrepreneur’ as such, rather a failure to 
appreciate that the market was not changing in the way she expected. Sadly her 
experience only mirrors that of Bridger et al’s informant Irina Razumnova, who 
established the Guildia Small Business Development Centre in Moscow in 1991. 
Razumnova found developing a self-sufficient business ‘a constant headache’ and she 
was required to accept foreign funding from Avon Cosmetics in order to provide her 
training courses (Bridger et al 1996: 126). Later, as rents rose and Avon reduced its 
sponsorship, Guildia could no longer support its trainees’ businesses (Bridger et al 
1996: 144). In an uncanny precursor to Anna’s experience, Guildia found that ‘as 
their overheads increased, they were obliged to charge more for their course and 
materials, yet, at a time of falling living standards, fewer people could afford the fees’ 
(Bridger et al 1996: 144). At the time ‘a widespread sense of hopelessness about 
business’, emerged, leading Bridger et al to ask ‘why bother going on a business start-
up course if starting a business in the formal sense was virtually impossible” (Bridger 
et al 1996: 145). Razumnova’s experience occurred 20 years before Anna 
experienced exactly the same thing. 
  
However, since I have already explained that business conditions are difficult, the 
events that followed the withdrawal of Anna’s funding are of more importance. 
Critically, as I described next, since Anna lost her clients’ money she has faced 
persecution, including physical and psychological intimidation, slurs on her character, 
public humiliation and racism, and a prosecution process that has failed to deliver a 
charge but leaves her under investigation and the threat of prison. Clearly, Anna is 
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distinctly vulnerable to factors largely outside her control, and she is undoubtedly 
trapped by her circumstances. She is unable to gather any tangible support, make 
sufficient money, or even be sure of her position in the eyes of the law. Moreover, she 
spends a great deal of time responding to the whims of her accusers in order to 
placate them. However, despite this enormous pressure Anna has been unwilling to 
yield. Instead, she has responded with a time-consuming and exhausting but effective 
defence, in which she portrays herself as a victim, invoking the government’s formal 
support for the development of business on her side. As such the crisis is now 
characterised by legal uncertainty despite both sides having committed wrongdoing 
along the way. I therefore find that the crisis has taken the form of an argument in 
which both sides try to portray their case as more righteous than the other. At the time 
of writing Anna’s ability to secure the attention of the presidential administration, and 
her ability to cut informal repayment deals with some of her accusers, appeared to 
have stabilised her situation, but not improve it substantially. Nevertheless I argue 
that Anna’s response to this crisis, which is based on her ability to make a normative 
case for her legitimacy that prevents those against her from getting their way, must be 
seen as effective entrepreneurship. That is, since Anna has been forced to react to the 
challenges of the business sphere as they are, rather than as she wishes them to be, 
she has behaved very effectively. 
 
The other element of Anna’s entrepreneurship during the crisis is the transformation 
of her business to ensure that she can survive and repay her debts. Her priority is to 
maintain as much control over her finances as possible, which she achieves by 
channelling cash between her three company shells, and which allows her to free the 
money she needs while placating the demands of the authorities. To be clear, this 
allows Anna to minimise her formal outgoings, and obscures her accounts from the 
authorities. At the same time Anna aims to maintain some of CSBG’s traditional 
services where possible, such as the seminar programme, in order to portray the 
continuing legitimacy of the business and her ongoing commitment to advancing 
business interests, which in turn helps her in her representations to the authorities. 
The seminars and a variety of other services such as translation and visa support also 
generate a small but regular cash flow, and may be used in kind for debt-repayment. 
Finally, Anna has become involved in two MLM schemes that generate some cash 
sales but also offer tangible products that may be offered in kind for debt repayment 
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too. In contrast to those ethnographers who see in MLM the pervasiveness and worst 
of the market in developing countries, I counter that it offers Anna tangible material 
goods that she can trade for a value she determines and a type of business that is 
understandable and acceptable to her accusers. In this respect it offers a sensible and 
flexible response to her needs. 
 
What can be said about the way Anna has responded to her crisis overall? Clearly her 
entrepreneurship has never been determined by profit alone. She is of course in 
favour of making a profit but her vision as an entrepreneur both before and since the 
crisis began has remained primarily to assist the development of western business 
practices in Russia. I therefore find that Anna’s entrepreneurship is, like Oleg’s 
(Chapter 3) most usefully considered in normative rather than commercial terms. 
Having said that, when Anna’s funding was withdrawn her business was 
unsustainable, so she undoubtedly failed to achieve the entrepreneurial standards she 
advocated. Moreover, in attempting to rebuild her business she defrauded her clients, 
showing her capability as a model entrepreneur to be negligible. Nevertheless, when 
the crisis struck, her entrepreneurial approach underwent significant adaptation. She 
recognised that in order to defend herself in the face of acute pressure, which was 
based on destroying her personally and in business, she must continue to make the 
case for the development of business. This decision, I argue, can be effectively 
understood by drawing again on the concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, 
which considers entrepreneurship as an activity undertaken to achieve some 
independence and a degree of civilised reality in spite of the state. In other words, 
Anna deployed a normative argument for her independence as an entrepreneur in 
order to survive. She recognised that she could use the government’s own rhetoric, 
which she had long supported, as the basis for her defence. She knew what could be 
acted upon entrepreneurially in order to secure her survival and independence: even 
though the government does little to support entrepreneurs in reality, she could still 
draw on its formal support as the basis for her defence. This served to stabilise her 
situation by turning the crisis from a vindictive campaign against her into a legitimate 
argument in which she had some claim to innocence. In this way her ‘entrepreneurial 
governmentality’ improved. I therefore contend that Anna became a far more 
competent entrepreneur during the period of her crisis than she had been before. 
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Most of all, during the crisis Anna focused on resisting the state which, I have found, 
is an integral element in contemporary entrepreneurialism. 
 
The second key aspect of Anna’s ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ was to move her 
business in part from the formal sphere into the shadow economy. This enabled her to 
secure the resources necessary to survive and negotiate informal deals for the 
reduction of her debt. Here, Anna ceased working as an entrepreneur who profited 
from foreign sponsorship (which had given her accusers an excuse to punish her when 
she lost their money), to become an entrepreneur working in the real economy as it 
actually exists. In doing so she again became a more effective entrepreneur than she 
had been prior to the crisis. By conducting her business between what Yurchak calls 
the personalised (ie informal) and officialised (ie formal) public spheres (and mainly 
in the former) Anna became a more effective entrepreneur. I therefore conclude that 
Anna’s entrepreneurship has become significantly more effective since her crisis 
began. More importantly, this effectiveness has not been at the cost of her original 
objectives: she still seeks to bring about political economic change in favour of 
business, so resistance represents a critical and necessary part of her entrepreneurship. 
If she can save CSBG by deploying the argument that business conditions must 
improve (which is the government’s formal position too), the result would be a 
continuation of that work. Therefore I suggest, with Yurchak, that Anna’s 
entrepreneurship may be seen not as an attempt simply to survive the crisis, but as an 
attempt to secure a personal form of independence, an ambition for a ‘civilised 
reality’ of her own. More than that, Anna’s entrepreneurship became a means to resist 
the state. Securing the future of her business by resisting her persecutors and 
prosecutors is why she is in business. Like Oleg, therefore, by seeking independence 
Anna also resists the state and seeks to change the status quo. I return to this point in 
Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5: ALEKSANDR AND YURII 
 
5.1 Structure of the chapter 
 
In this chapter I present my third case study, which is based on participant 
observation within Promploshchad, a business established by Aleksandr in the city I 
call Normalnyi. Promploshchad is an industrial site on the edge of the city with 
several units that Aleksandr lets to small enterprises, and he runs the company with 
his son Yuriii. Although the company is successful and the men have plans for its 
development, it is not Aleksandr’s first business: in the late 1990s he founded 
Khoroshiidom, a construction company that became one of the region’s most 
successful firms, however in 2007 success turned to crisis when he was accused of 
large-scale fraud and tax evasion then prosecuted in a case that eventually led to his 
imprisonment. Although he was later acquitted, the officials managed to acquire 
control of his company’s assets in the process. This crisis, in which Aleksandr fell 
victim to corporate raiding (reiderstvo) was, like Anna’s, representative of the many 
difficulties facing businesses that I have outlined, and has left its mark on him and his 
family. He is now deeply suspicious of the role of the state and its representatives in 
the political economy, while Yurii has seen several entrepreneurial projects of his 
own fail and, having witnessed his father’s experience, holds the state responsible for 
their travails. In this chapter I describe how Aleksandr’s crisis and Yurii’s frustrations 
have shaped their entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviour. They have both concluded 
that the state and its representatives are at best obstacles to business but more often a 
menace, yet they have chosen to continue as entrepreneurs; I seek to set out why. I 
outline the factors that led to the fall of Khoroshiidom, and the way in which this has 
affected how they run their businesses today. 
 
I begin the case study with a description of the collapse of Khoroshiidom, focusing 
specifically on the how local bureaucrats abused their position as government partners 
in a joint construction scheme to acquire illicitly the company’s assets for themselves. 
These schemes are infamous in Russia for their susceptibility to fraud and this 
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instance is a case in point: the ruse worked so that even when Aleksandr belatedly 
proved his innocence, the bureaucrats survived and kept their ill-gotten property. Like 
Anna, Aleksandr was widely blamed by many of his former clients who lost their 
money and property in that scheme, so in the course of the investigation he became 
both a villain to his clients and a victim of the state. He experienced irreparable 
damage to his reputation, lost many friendships as people deserted him and suffered a 
huge loss of wealth. As I conclude, this case in itself reinforces many of the negative 
factors associated with post-Soviet Russian business that I discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
In the next section I explain how Aleksandr has responded to the crisis, which was the 
defining event of his entrepreneurial life. His post-crisis view of the political 
economy, in which he once prospered, is of disappointment, and deep suspicion of the 
state and its representatives who, he considers, rule in their own limited interests, and 
whose potential for arbitrary interference in the business sphere is dangerous to 
entrepreneurs and harmful to the development of the country. At the same time, 
Aleksandr has not fully decided how to proceed and is relatively uncertain of his 
long-term path. Rather, since founding Promploshchad he has kept his options open, 
oscillating between staying and developing the company, or deciding to leave the 
country altogether. Even though he is energetic and has enthusiasm and talent for 
business, he has settled for now with overseeing Promploshchad quietly, keeping his 
head low and prioritising the needs of his family, while he contemplates his next step 
with little hope that conditions for business will improve. 
 
In the following section, I focus on everyday business in Promploshchad, with 
Aleksandr as director and Yurii managing operations, showing how their post-crisis 
attitudes affect their entrepreneurship in practice. It emerges that the theoretical 
simplicity of their business model, based on rental income from their tenants, and 
their intention to keep a low profile, is more complicated in practice, since they have 
unfinished affairs from the crisis to deal with and a distaste for obeying officialdom. 
As I show, their wariness of the state leads them to avoid it until it is absolutely 
necessary, which makes apparently simple tasks complex. Moreover, their tenants are 
also keen to avoid ties that encumber their freedom of action, which makes 
management more convoluted than it might otherwise be. In describing these 
behavioural tendencies I draw on Yuriii’s notion of a Russian business ‘mentality’ 
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(mentalitet) to explain how, in their resistance to officialdom and determination to 
protect and advance their immediate interests, they are compelled to maximise their 
independence before seeking a profit, even if the cost of doing so is high. This leads 
me to invoke the concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ to explain my 
informants’ entrepreneurship. Their drive for independence from external constraint, 
and resistance to those who might endanger them, entangles them within a network of 
favours and obligations with their contacts, making everyday business highly tactical. 
Thus, Aleksandr’s and Yuriii’s perception of the malign potential of officials to 
interfere in their affairs has a determinant effect upon their entrepreneurship, 
regardless of the relative simplicity and profitability of the business itself.  
 
In the final section of the case study I explore the drive for independence in more 
detail with respect to Yuriii’s own business, the Spine Centre. Although his company 
has great promise, its development is constrained by bureaucracy, which reinforces 
Yurii’s negative view of officialdom and encourages him to avoid and undermine it. 
In my description of his unsuccessful ventures and current frustrations, which are 
reinforced by his intimate knowledge of Aleksandr’s crisis, Yurii’s dissatisfaction 
with business conditions and determination to succeed in spite of officialdom is made 
clear. Nevertheless, his rebelliousness is also tempered by awareness of the 
consequences of illegality and his conviction, influenced by his admiration of the 
West, that a business should be managed formally (inside the law). Therefore, the 
development of his business follows a path both within and outside the law. This 
path, or that taken by Aleksandr, is not pre-ordained, however: in this section I also 
draw on the attitudes of several of Yurii’s peers, who share his view of the political 
economy as risky, arbitrary and overbearing, but whose approaches to 
entrepreneurship differ significantly from one another, varying from cautiously 
seeking the status quo to violent aspiration to join the elite. In this observation I find 
that entrepreneurs are alone in choosing their approach to business; their own 
perception is their guide. Nevertheless I find that their specific aim to continue in 
business and to avoid predatory outsiders is shared: their ambition is for continuity of 
independence over increased profit and to resist impediments in their way. 
 
In conclusion I find that Aleksandr and Yurii are determined and capable 
entrepreneurs whose businesses have great potential. At the same time, their 
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respective experiences, of the potential of the state to intervene and disrupt business, 
persuades them to proceed with caution. Like Anna, Aleksandr’s entrepreneurial 
approach changed significantly when he was confronted with a crisis and faced the 
fact that officials could not be relied upon to act in his interests. Ever since, his 
entrepreneurship has focused on maximising his independence from officialdom 
rather than rebuilding a large business. In his isolation from state support, Aleksandr 
has had to develop his own approach to business in which his independence is 
paramount and in which the state must be resisted rather than trusted. In this context 
caution and self-interest become priorities for action. Aleksandr and Yurii proceed 
using their wits from day to day, resolved to continue, hoping for the best and aiming 
to avoid trouble. I conclude that, as in Oleg’s case, Aleksandr’s and Yurii’s 
entrepreneurship is experienced as a continual effort to maintain control irrespective 
of material success, with the state an opponent to be hoodwinked and avoided. Unlike 
Oleg, however, Aleksandr is cautious about working with others, assuming that they 
will try to undermine him in their own interests if they can. 
 
5.2 The collapse of Aleksandr’s business 
 
In this section I analyse the events leading to the collapse of Khoroshiidom, which 
provides an empirical illustration of the challenges facing even successful businesses 
in Russia. This also provides an understanding of how the specific context of the 
crisis, which was instigated by state employees, influences his entrepreneurial 
attitudes and behaviours today. Aleksandr’s entrepreneurial career began in the early 
1990s when he left his Soviet-era employment in a heavy industrial plant and became 
a shuttle trader (a common job at the time, see Humphrey 2002: 73-77), buying fruit 
and vegetables in one place then selling them for profit in another. At the end of that 
decade he founded Khoroshiidom, a construction company specialising in new 
residential blocks, which became one of the most significant companies of its type in 
the region. At that time, many construction companies had grown by relying on cheap 
loans from co-investors within the industry (Puzanov 2009: 36). Bank loans, in 
contrast, were hard to come by, because the contractors had limited security to offer 
in return since they often rented land for construction rather than owning it outright. 
Furthermore, the construction industry was ‘very non-transparent’, which meant 
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lending was too risky (Puzanov 2009: 36). By the middle of the 2000s, therefore, 
Khoroshiidom’s expansion had stalled and, Aleksandr said, he was unable to secure 
additional credit from local banks. In order to continue working he chose to become 
involved in a series of ‘equity construction schemes’22, in which the capital for new 
buildings is raised by selling the apartments in advance of construction. Such schemes 
are common in Russia, regulated by law23 and, in Normalnyi, overseen by a 
Municipal Unitary Enterprise (Munitzipal’noe Unitarnoe Predpriyatie, or MUP) 
called Gorodstroi.24 Aleksandr’s relations with Gorodstroi did not lead to further 
growth of the business however, but may be seen as the beginning of its destruction.  
 
5.2.1 A case of reiderstvo  
 
The role of Gorodstroi is to coordinate the implementation of all municipal 
construction orders in Normalnyi, confirming the design of new projects, organising 
the approval required for construction, issuing permits and title deeds, managing 
construction in its technical and financial aspects, and commissioning the completed 
buildings. When Gorodstroi sought building contractors for several new projects on 
plots it owned, Aleksandr successfully applied to become a partner. According to 
their agreement, Khoroshiidom would be entitled to a percentage of the value of 
completed apartments, while Gorodstroi recouped its investment and increased the 
value of the land. Notionally, Gorodstroi also committed to investing at a ‘certain 
stage’ in the development of the buildings, so both parties would have a stake in their 
completion. In theory all partners stand to benefit from such schemes: the client-
                                                
22 Aleksandr’s story made the local and regional press as it proceeded over many months 
through the courts. In addition to the account he related to me, I draw on some of those 
reports here but do not cite them to uphold his anonymity, which is particularly important to 
him today because his reputation in the city is still tarnished and shared equity schemes 
remain controversial.  
23 Federal Law 214-FZ, 2004, ‘On Participation in the Cost-Sharing Construction of Multi-
Family Buildings and Other Real Estate Units, and on Amending Individual Legislative Acts 
of the Russian Federation’ (see Rossiiskaya Gazeta 2004: online). 
24 To be clear, Gorodstroi is not the real name of the MUP I describe here. MUPs are 
commercial organisations owned by the state, with economic autonomy but an obligation to 
pass their profits back to the state. MUPs are not permitted to sell or dispose of their property 
without the permission of their municipal authority (see Martinez-Vazquez 2006: 21-21; 
Maggs et al 1997: 51; Matantsev 1998: 443; Oda: 2007: 78-79). As I explain below, 
Gorodstroi broke this law for the personal advantage of its staff. 
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investor is promised a good deal on a new apartment because they invested in the cost 
of construction, the building contractor makes a reasonable profit, and the 
municipality meets its obligations for new housing. 
 
However, the agreement was not in practice what it was in theory, and turned out as 
follows: Khoroshiidom became responsible for fund-raising and construction while 
Gorodstroi retained ownership of the land and acted as a customer for the work. 
Thus, although Gorodstroi held the legal and exclusive right to raise money from 
citizen-investors, it offloaded that function to Khoroshiidom. This meant that 
Aleksandr was charged with raising the capital required for the construction himself, 
which he achieved with citizen-investments and his own funds, but he did not gain 
any right to the land or, therefore, the apartments he was building. Indeed, 
Aleksandr’s only stake in the properties was a meaningless ‘priority right to future 
partnership agreements’. Therefore he effectively entered into the agreement trusting 
that Gorodstroi would grant him a stake in the completed apartments in order to break 
even and make a profit. This proved to be naive.  
 
These risks were not initially clear, although several issues emerged suggesting that 
Gorodstroi was not a trustworthy partner. Before building began, Khoroshiidom was 
required to pay over 3 per cent of the investment cost to Gorodstroi just for the 
building designs, and gather the necessary legal documentation and permits itself 
even though such administration fell within Gorodstroi’s remit. Over time it became 
clear that Khoroshiidom had to address all problems associated with the entire 
process, while remaining dependent upon the goodwill of Gorodstroi. As costs built 
up, moreover, Aleksandr could not transfer them onto clients, because he did not have 
the right to do so without the approval of Gorodstroi. A major problem then arose 
when one of the first apartment blocks was found to have numerous faults. According 
to Aleksandr, it had been built following Gorodstroi plans, so he asked a specialist 
from a Moscow institute for a second opinion, who told him that the soil was 
inappropriate for construction and that the plans were based on guesswork. For six 
months construction work was halted. 
 
Despite these early hiccups, when the first building was completed the two partners 
concluded a satisfactory agreement on the sale of the apartments that led Aleksandr 
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into a new deal in 2007 to construct several more buildings. Some time after work on 
those sites had begun, however, Aleksandr discovered that Gorodstroi had already 
used these plots as collateral for a loan worth millions of roubles from Sberbank (a 
state-controlled bank, see Radziwill and Vaziakova, 2015: 13-14). This meant 
Sberbank held a controlling stake in the sites and the new agreement between 
Khoroshiidom and Gorodstroi was worthless. This caused the unravelling of the 
shared equity scheme. At this point, Aleksandr had already used much of the finance 
he had gathered from individuals but had no way of either completing the project or 
offering refunds to them. The construction became severely delayed as Aleksandr 
tried in vain to reach an arrangement with Gorodstroi. According to him, Gorodstroi 
told him simply to gather the money himself and complete the project. He realised he 
was being deceived, but also that the deceiver was a state department: he was 
helpless.  
 
At the same time, customers began to demand the apartments they had been 
promised. Aleksandr tried to delay by explaining that they should wait a little longer 
until he could finish them. As with Anna’s case, however, while a few were patient 
the majority believed they had been cheated and demanded their money back. They 
wrote letters to the police and prosecutor’s office, and then the Prosecutor General, 
accusing Aleksandr of fraud. Aleksandr was invited to an interview at the economic 
crimes department and subsequently arrested. Following the arrest, construction was 
frozen and his property, materials and paperwork were confiscated. He was charged 
with cheating 158 people with invalid contracts in an equity construction scheme, 
causing damage of well over 200 million roubles25, as well as tax evasion worth tens 
of millions of roubles. Police asked others involved in the scheme to come forward 
and bankruptcy proceedings were introduced. Aleksandr was sent to prison where he 
faced up to ten years.  
 
                                                
25 Aleksandr was charged with violation of the law on joint construction, in addition to 
Article 159 of the Criminal Code (fraud committed on a large scale with the infliction of 
considerable damage by an individual using his official position) and Article 201 (abuse by a 
person performing administrative functions in commercial or other organisations resulting in 
grave consequences). 
 140 
 
In jail Aleksandr’s situation deteriorated further. The organisation of regional 
constructors excluded Khoroshiidom on the false basis that membership dues had not 
been paid. This was a sign that former allies were deserting him. Aleksandr also heard 
that Gorodstroi had begun to transfer some of the unfinished projects to other 
contractors. From prison he protested and sought to initiate arbitration proceedings, 
claiming that Gorodstroi had not fulfilled its obligations, and to reclaim the 
transferred properties and recover hundred of millions of roubles. After two months in 
prison, a friend from St Petersburg posted bail of one million roubles and he was 
released pending the completion of the investigation. 
 
From the perspective of the individual investors, Aleksandr was a fraudster. He had 
presented himself as a builder offering affordable apartments but the apartments had 
not appeared, while investors’ money vanished. This view should be considered in 
light of the fact that joint construction schemes in Russia have a bad reputation; so-
called ‘grey schemes’ have arisen because the law on joint construction is prone to 
manipulation. Cost sharing makes investors vulnerable when the question of 
ownership arises (Puzanov 2009: 50): promissory notes are not equivalent to contracts 
of sale, thus some investors find their apartment is smaller than was promised, and 
others find the contractor simply disappears and leaves the building incomplete. 
Hence in the investors’ mind, Aleksandr was responsible for reneging on their 
agreement, even if he had not run away. Gorodstroi’s argument was also strong. It 
simply accused Aleksandr of neglecting his responsibility to pay for the construction 
as agreed and neglecting his obligations as investor-constructor. At the same time, 
Gorodstroi downplayed its own role, arguing that it had not known where the finance 
had come from and that keeping track of both finance and construction was 
‘impossible’. This was remarkably brazen: its delegation of the financial aspects of 
the scheme to Khoroshiidom broke the law, while managing the scheme itself was its 
raison d’être.  
 
Despite the plausibility of these arguments, it was in fact Aleksandr who had been 
framed. All the risk of the scheme had been placed on him by Gorodstroi, which had 
taken advantage of its monopoly control over joint construction schemes. It made 
Aleksandr take on the role of gathering investments knowing that he was not allowed 
to do so. It then pulled out of the agreement when several properties were close to 
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completion, knowing that Aleksandr would be prosecuted, leaving them with the full 
ownership of the buildings. This alone does not explain why an MUP would be 
motivated by profit. However, in the months prior to Aleksandr’s arrest, the city 
administration had indicated their intention to privatise Gorodstroi, such that its 
functions remained but it became a regular company. Therefore, if Gorodstroi’s 
directors timed the privatisation and the downfall of Aleksandr to coincide, making it 
look as though Khoroshiidom had defrauded investors, they stood to become 
enormously wealthy. Over the course of the next two and a half years this argument 
formed the basis of Aleksandr’s defence and his eventual acquittal: he, and in turn his 
investors, had been misled by Gorodstroi in a fait accompli.  
 
5.2.2 Rough justice  
 
Aleksandr’s acquittal would take two and a half years to achieve, a period that was 
extraordinarily stressful because he was fighting investors who did not believe him, 
government bureaucrats who wanted to destroy him, and powerful financial interests 
that were hostile to the preservation of his business. During the trial he instructed his 
lawyer to hide documentation supporting his case in a remote location such that it 
could not be destroyed or obtained by the state or associates of Gorodstroi. These 
documents eventually provided the evidence that allowed him to win the case, but not 
without cost. By the time he was acquitted, he had lost Khoroshiidom, which was 
dissolved in bankruptcy proceedings brought against his will. Gorodstroi’s 
involvement of Sberbank in the scheme meant that the bank voted for the liquidation 
of Khoroshiidom when bankruptcy procedures were brought. As such there were 
three parties to the agreement rather than the initial two. Unsurprisingly, Sberbank 
employees involved in the ploy profited personally. Indeed, the Sberbank managers 
involved in the case were personally associated with Gorodstroi officials: the sister of 
one these managers acquired two flats very cheaply. Several others were bought and 
sold quickly for huge profits. It also emerged a major beneficiary of the scheme was 
in charge of the Economics Department in Gorodstroi, proving that the entire ploy 
was initiated by senior figures inside the organisation. Gorodstroi itself inflated the 
cost of construction so that it could justify the increased profit margin from the sale of 
some apartments. One building, Aleksandr eventually proved, cost just over 400 
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million roubles to build, but Gorodstroi calculated construction at nearly 500 million 
roubles and sold some remaining apartments for 15,000 roubles extra each. Thus 
Aleksandr was unable to prevent the remaining construction from being passed to 
rival contractors, and the company’s assets, including cranes, offices and a car park, 
offloaded for almost nothing.  
 
While Aleksandr was eventually cleared of wrongdoing, Gorodstroi survived. Indeed, 
it could hardly fail given its official status. According to Aleksandr, when the director 
of Gorodstroi was confronted with evidence of the inflation of the figures and asked 
to account for the difference, she replied it was a ‘commercial secret’ and received no 
further scrutiny on the issue. To put it plainly, Gorodstroi, a state agency with 
oversight of the construction of new apartments to the city, had systematically 
defrauded its citizens to the benefit of its own directors and their allies. Moreover, it 
appears that the investigators were incentivised not to look into the matter, so that 
even though Aleksandr was eventually freed, the damage was already done. On the 
other hand, although Aleksandr was able to make a case for his innocence, his right to 
the buildings was never strong. Indeed, even when acquitted, many citizen-investors 
rejected the decision, arguing that they had not received their entitlements. They 
claimed that Aleksandr had been successful in his trial because he had been able to 
pay for a ‘Moscow lawyer’. In protest they organised a picket, but, as the media 
reported, officials did not visit them on the picket lines. Like Anna, they also wrote to 
the president and prime minister, as well as the prosecutor general, but this appeared 
to have little impact. However, their case was eventually acknowledged. By 2013, a 
full six years after the scheme was initiated, all investors were in a new apartment. A 
letter on the group’s website thanks the local administration for their intervention in 
the case. It appears that funding was found to complete the remaining apartments 
from social funds meant for citizens in decrepit housing and young families. In this 
way the investors were eventually, gratefully, ‘rescued’ by the state that had 
defrauded them, even as they continued to blame Aleksandr. 
 
Nevertheless, while Aleksandr was framed in this case it is highly doubtful that his 
business affairs had always been transparent. Driving through the city with Yurii, for 
example, he pointed out an apartment that Aleksandr had given to a local official, 
who had then sold it for $200,000 dollars. Perhaps this was the case, perhaps it was 
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not, but such claims indicate that Aleksandr had long operated between politics and 
business, which was a requirement (or reality) of the construction industry in the city. 
Aleksandr and his family prefer to see such favours as indicative of his good nature, 
or befitting a man who had accrued such wealth. He was always generous, they say. 
He gave money to charity, sponsored youth sports teams and helped family and 
friends. He had started as a shuttle trader then built a successful business from 
nothing. Indeed, Aleksandr told me that his reputation for giving to social causes 
meant he was protected while in prison. However, as Evgeniya his wife sadly 
explained, his generosity did not help him during the crisis as many former friends 
and associates turned on him, or forgot about him. 
 
5.2.3 Summary of the collapse of Aleksandr’s business 
 
In this section I have shown how Aleksandr’s construction business was stripped of 
its assets and destroyed for the benefit of local officials whose formal role was to 
support the construction of residential accommodation in Normalnyi. This case of 
reiderstvo also destroyed Aleksandr’s professional reputation and many of his 
friendships, and reiterates the difficulties of doing business under conditions of 
institutional asymmetry. It also reifies several post-Soviet stereotypes about the 
powerful using their influence and legal loopholes to generate huge personal profits, 
and reveals the way in which bureaucrats use their formal position to their advantage 
in the market. Likewise, the case reinforces clichés about dubious entrepreneurs and 
the vulnerability of ordinary citizens in the face of wily businessmen operating 
unlawfully. Each stereotype has an undeniable element of truth here, but it was 
actually these stereotypes that made the ruse workable: as an entrepreneur Aleksandr 
was the most obvious and credible fall guy, just as Anna’s business made her a 
credible fraudster in the perception of her clients. Ironically, the widespread notion of 
business as inherently dubious emerges as something that can be profited from, 
exploiting memories formed in the 1990s: the Gorodstroi officials appealed to the 
residual social categorisation of business as corrupt and exploitative while they 
expropriated the company’s assets themselves. Indeed it is indicative of Gorodstroi’s 
success at discrediting Aleksandr that even though he has been exonerated, many 
investors still hold him responsible for the failure of the scheme. In part they are 
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justified; they were cheated and Aleksandr was able to gather bail money and employ 
an effective lawyer. At the same time those officials who made remarkable money 
from the scheme kept their liberty. Overall the case exemplifies the way in which the 
state has been partly privatised by officials that I described in Chapter 2 with 
reference to Yurchak. The behaviour of the Gorodstroi officials was entrepreneurial, 
taking personal advantage of institutional asymmetry or, in Yurchak’s terms, the 
division of the state into official and personalised spheres. To be clear, they used their 
formal position for personal gain in the market. In the next section I describe how 
Aleksandr’s attitudes to business and the state have been shaped by this experience. 
 
5.3 Aleksandr’s post-crisis attitudes towards business and the state 
 
Aleksandr’s crisis had a profound impact on his life and outlook. As well as 
destroying his business, he was also ostracised from the construction industry and lost 
many friends. On his release from prison he was shaken by the experience but 
philosophical. Describing his mood to a regional newspaper he said: 
 
‘I have a period now when it is possible to evaluate my life and those people 
with whom I live. Many things in our lives are superficial. And when it’s not 
superficial, thank God. To be happy one does not need more, but a goal is needed. If 
it is possible to have more, then good. We live to improve, or something like that. As 
for my business, we wait and see.’  
 
As it turned out, Aleksandr did start another business, but the crisis remained the 
major reference point in his life, a critical influence on his perceptions and decisions. 
Today he holds the view that the current political economic situation in the country is 
unacceptable to too many people and cannot last. It is inevitable, he told me, that:  
 
‘Society will reject the current system. It is only a question of time. Maybe 
tomorrow, maybe in ten years, but it’s certain. People have to survive with so little, as 
you’ve seen, and the country is so dependent upon oil and gas which cannot last 
forever.’   
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However, as he said, at present society must deal with conditions as they are, which is 
that the decisions of the country’s elite are made in their own interests rather than 
those of the country as a whole. As I now show, this perception has had a profound 
impact on the way Aleksandr considers the situation in the country, but after much 
consideration he has not deviated from his desire to continue as an entrepreneur. 
 
5.3.1 Aleksandr’s post-crisis view of the political economy 
 
In the period since his release from prison Aleksandr has formed a specific view of 
the way the political economy functions. Above all, he said, state power is used 
arbitrarily in the interests of those wielding it, rather than the country as a whole. He 
often offered his opinion or a rumour about how the country’s elite made their 
decisions in a way that is completely irrelevant to the daily lives of the rest of the 
population. For example, like many commentators, he considered the release of 
Mikhail Khordokovsky as a gesture to the international community in advance of the 
Sochi Winter Olympics (see also Ioffe 2015: online; Lokshina 2013: online; Meyer et 
al 2013: online), rather than a goodwill pardon. However, he had heard that heavy 
rainfall prior to the opening ceremony had flooded the Olympic stadium, which then 
froze and threatened the venue’s readiness. According to him, only a German firm 
owned the technology capable of removing such ice in time for the start of the games, 
and the German government used the release of Khordokovsky as the condition of 
their support. That is why, Aleksandr told me, Khordokovsky left Russia on a 
German plane bound for Germany. He said that if politicians could manipulate the 
judiciary so brazenly for the most successful Russian businessman, it was no surprise 
that an ordinary entrepreneur such as him could be thrown into prison so easily. 
 
Whether or not such stories were true, Aleksandr was not alone in indulging in this 
type of conjecture. For example, in Normalnyi three businesspeople told me 
independently that a senior Sberbank executive threatened Novosibirsk’s regional 
administration that he would relocate the Novosibirsk office (one of the tallest and 
newest buildings in the city) if a neon advertising board on the street outside was not 
removed. Although nobody could say why the sign was so annoying, by relating the 
story they portrayed Russia’s elite not only as petty but preoccupied with exercising 
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power and expending huge resources on personal whims rather than the interests of 
their organisations or communities. Aleksandr had developed a sideline in such 
stories. When we drove to the remote Altai krai to meet one of his business 
acquaintances, for example, he described the story of the newly constructed Siberian 
Coin casino. The casino was built after the government decided to restrict gambling 
to only four mega-sites on the periphery of the country (later increased to include 
Sochi following the Winter Olympics and Crimea following its annexation; see Tass 
2014a: online). The Siberian Coin was the most inaccessible of the four casinos but, 
Aleksandr said, it was justified by the regional government as a project to advance 
regional development (for example Bloomberg Business 2011: online; Siberian Times 
Reporter 2014: online). He said that the site was deemed so important that it was 
granted a new gas pipeline from Biysk, over 130 kilometers to the north. This 
pipeline, he complained, revealed the warped priorities of the federal government. 
Even Gorno-Altaisk, he said, capital of the neighbouring Altai Republic, had only 
received a gas supply of its own as late as 2008 (see also Gazprom 2008: online). He 
found the whole story infuriating.  
 
In a sense, Aleksandr’s distaste for projects such as the Siberian Coin was justified. 
The casino resembled Soviet projects for the ‘development’ of remote Siberia with 
single industry settlements. However, whereas then such projects were justified in the 
interests of the proletariat, today they are for an elite minority. The government ban 
effectively disallowed the population at large from gambling on vague moral grounds, 
just to build new casinos where only wealthy Russians can access them.26 Indeed, the 
Altai Regional Administration’s own promotional material openly distinguishes 
between regular ‘visitors’ and ‘VIP guests’: the former will be housed in buildings 
‘along the middle course of the river’ while the latter would stay ‘deep into the 
territory… hidden in the wild nature environment’ (Altai Region Administration 
                                                
26 The justification for the ban on gambling was vague. It was suggested in one article that 
many gambling halls are owned and operated by Georgians, thus the idea for a ban arose soon 
after the 2008 war with Georgia (see Antonov and Bomko 2009: online). Nevertheless the 
ban was justified in moral terms, as Vasiliev and Bernhard put it in their study: ‘the anti-
gaming rhetoric we discovered revolved around classic themes such as deviant status of 
gambling and its alleged ties with organised crime, addiction and the protection of youth and 
other vulnerable social groups, the enforcement of class boundaries that protect the poor from 
gambling’s temptation while allowing the rich to play if they are willing to pay and travel, 
and the protection of a morally sound Russian national identity’ (2011: 81). 
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2008: 19). Even so, Aleksandr also exaggerated; the Siberian Coin would not be the 
only recipient of gas from this pipeline, because it was to be located next to a 
‘Tourist-Recreational Special Economic Zone’ (SEZ) called Sky-Blue Katun. This 
resort, one of several new federally planned resorts, provides year-round holiday 
facilities, and while it is not affordable or accessible to all Russians, it does not cater 
to the elite alone (Investment Portal of Altai Region no date, online; Altai Region 
Official Site no date: online; Fedotkin no date: online). Aleksandr was therefore right 
that the government had created a gambling initiative that would only benefit the 
country’s elite and require a costly new pipeline, but the pipe would also supply an 
adjacent resort meant for a larger demographic. 
 
5.3.2 A decision to start again 
 
Although Aleksandr’s exasperation and cynicism at political economic conditions is 
revealed in these examples, he claimed that he had not fully decided how he should 
respond to them. Unlike Oleg, he did not have a clear approach for developing his 
business and limiting the interference of outsiders. However, the question of ‘what to 
do’ next was constantly on his mind, even today, several years after his release. He 
told me that he has three options available. The first was to focus on developing 
Promploshchad, his current business. The company is sited on a reasonably large plot 
of land (known as the baza) containing several industrial units let to small 
manufacturing and engineering enterprises. The business already provides an income 
sufficient to live without any financial problems but could, he calculated, be 
developed to provide a better income of up to one million roubles a month (which in 
late 2014 was about £20,000). He would invest in improving the baza’s existing 
facilities, buy additional land and build new units. The baza is well located on the 
city’s outskirts for light industrial businesses, and a new village is planned further 
along a road that passes the gate, so he could also build a shop to sell groceries to 
passing residents on the site, and perhaps a cafeteria.  
 
Aleksandr’s second idea is to build a medical and rehabilitation centre for wealthy 
Russians seeking post-hospital recuperation and therapeutic treatments. During my 
first visit to Normalnyi he had already constructed a property for this purpose and 
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partnered with a doctor who would manage the business for him on completion. 
However by my second trip the economic situation had deteriorated significantly and 
Aleksandr said that the market for this type of business had diminished, so he had 
almost decided to sell the building and concentrate on the baza instead. In any case he 
had put both the baza and the medical centre building on the market to test the water 
and consider his options further. Even so, by the time I finished my fieldwork 
Aleksandr was no further with his decision-making. 
 
If Aleksandr were to sell these properties, he would take up his third option, which is 
to leave the country altogether. He had decided that the Dominican Republic would 
be his most likely destination because, he told me, it is easy to move there and offered 
a good lifestyle without complications. The plight of the rouble in late 2014 pushed 
this option to the forefront of his mind: ‘Maybe in a few months the Russian border 
will be closed’, he speculated, as Russia’s relations with Europe deteriorated, and 
suggested that the move could be now or never. However, while Aleksandr had 
seriously planned how to emigrate, Evgeniya was less enthusiastic because she had no 
friends abroad. Indeed, Aleksandr was also doubtful: ‘I don’t want to leave, this is my 
country’, he shrugged. Thus even though he decried the fate of his country, he had not 
yet convinced himself to leave.  
 
Aleksandr’s decision comes down to whether he is prepared to continue as an 
entrepreneur in Normalnyi, given his enthusiasm and knowhow for business on the 
one hand, and his disdain for business conditions on the other. Unlike Oleg, however, 
who continued as an entrepreneur in spite of his distaste for political economic 
conditions in the country because he wanted to make some change to local social 
conditions, Aleksandr is less interested in social development or charity than he was 
prior to the crisis. His experiences have made him more stoical than ambitious: his 
primary focus is supporting his family and keeping his head down. During the day he 
travels repeatedly between work and home on constant errands and is dedicated to 
ensuring his family’s wellbeing. On these trips his philanthropic nature became clear, 
and his remarkable business success despite his humble background. Some of his 
family was displaced during the Soviet period and we drove considerable distances to 
assist his relatives in remote locations. One stepsister, for example, lived hours from 
Normalnyi in the countryside in a prefabricated bungalow in a dilapidated village, so 
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Aleksandr was overseeing the renovation of her property, ensuring that she would not 
have to cross the garden to an outhouse any longer. Likewise, when we visited the 
interior, he took potatoes and other staples to other relatives and hard-up friends. 
Thus, although in the back of his mind Aleksandr contemplates escaping, in practice 
he knows he can ‘get by’ locally and has the capacity to support others: he is still 
relatively successful today in spite of his previous problems and knows that he may 
not be able to replicate this success elsewhere. John Round has also encountered 
similar justifications for staying in Russia’s remote far north among would-be 
migrants, who cite practical and cultural reasons for wanting to stay, compared to the 
risk of the unknown if they leave (2005: 718-723). Overall, Aleksandr has the 
knowledge that he has survived before and devotes his time and energy to getting on 
with everyday business and family life, and avoids actually dealing with larger 
questions about the future. 
 
By not significantly changing his life, Aleksandr’s reaction to the crisis is, ultimately, 
to continue as before as an entrepreneur. Nevertheless this time he seeks to avoid 
engagement with the state as much as possible, and keep control of his business 
within his family. This suits Yurii’s needs because, as I explain in Section 4, his own 
entrepreneurial projects had stalled. Aleksandr put Yurii in charge of day-to-day 
operations, which gave him a regular salary and responsibility for putting plans for 
the development of the business into effect. In practice Aleksandr continued to 
instruct Yurii from a distance but he was less often present on site. This arrangement 
was obviously hard for Aleksandr, who was used to having control, but it was also 
hard for Yurii, who wanted to develop his own interests at the same time. 
Nevertheless, it also served both their needs; Aleksandr could dedicate more time to 
supporting his family, and Yurii could focus on making a living.  
 
5.3.3 Summary of Aleksandr’s post-crisis attitudes to business and the 
state 
 
In this section I described how Aleksandr’s crisis convinced him that the state not 
only undermines business but that the country’s elite and bureaucrats are primarily 
interested in themselves rather than serving the country as a whole. This perception 
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led him to the conclusion that he could either stay in Normalnyi and live with this 
reality, accepting that he is powerless to change it, or to leave the country altogether. 
However, counter to his own expectations, he has not yet decided to leave, which has 
meant staying put to continue with his new business. In fact, Aleksandr really prefers 
not to contemplate the future in detail but to concentrate on the immediate needs of 
his family in the knowledge that if he is careful he can ‘get by’ quite well. By 
focusing on everyday matters, he suppresses his disappointment with the structure of 
the political economy. His priorities, therefore, are to ensure that his new business can 
support his family, and avoid engaging with officialdom and the state as far as 
possible. This plan, as I now show, is not as straightforward in practice as it sounds.  
 
5.4 Everyday business in Promploshchad: simple in principle, 
complicated in practice 
 
Promploshchad has a simple business model based on rental income from tenants 
who demand little except a dry unit, water supply, waste disposal and electricity. 
Therefore the business is uncomplicated in principle and this suits Aleksandr’s desire 
for a simple, trouble-free life: the main tasks are to ensure the units have tenants, 
maintain the facilities and initiate their plans for expanding the baza. Nevertheless, 
these jobs require constant attention because the site is large, much of it in disrepair 
and prone to problems, particularly in winter. Indeed, Aleksandr’s and Yuri’s success 
depends on their ability to stay on top of a seemingly endless list of administrative 
and practical chores and the onerous burden of dealing with officialdom over 
questions of utilities and land. It emerges that resolving these apparently simple issues 
is far from simple in practice, and requires great flexibility and knowhow. It is in their 
approach to overcoming these tasks, determined also by their experiences, that their 
entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviours, as well as their view of business conditions, 
can be explained. 
 
5.4.1 Self-interest, influence and independence on the baza 
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On my first visit to the baza the temperature was a few degrees below zero but felt far 
colder thanks to a strong wind. The baza is located beside one of the city’s gigantic 
hot water plants, but in my state of coldness I did not notice the irony until later. In 
any case, the hot water supply had stopped working because a valve had gone 
missing, then somehow turned up a day later. It seemed that the job of reattaching the 
valve gave work to Kirill, a handyman, and although nothing was said, it appeared 
that he had removed it in the first place. In fact, it became clear that the smooth 
operation of the baza relies on several men like Kirill. As we emerged from the boiler 
room, for example, Yurii shouted to Vyacheslav, a tenant who had promised to fix the 
baza’s electric entry gate that was wobbling in the wind. As Vyacheslav strolled up 
with bare hands, bare wind-bitten face and a thin worker’s cap, I could not believe he 
was alive. Although I was entering my second Siberian winter, I had never felt colder. 
Vyacheslav confirmed he would get on with the gate soon. Yurii told me that 
Vyacheslav, who has a tractor repair business, was not currently paying his rent 
because he had just bought a house and could not afford it, so he had agreed to fix the 
gate in kind. Yurii laughed when I said Vyacheslav must be cold. ‘Normally he wears 
only slippers’ he replied, ‘even in winter!’ As I wondered why he didn’t wear boots, 
Yurii told me the monthly rent for the Vyacheslav’s unit is 8000 roubles a month. 
This threw me in to deeper confusion: on the one hand, his rent is very low and he can 
only afford slippers, so his business must be struggling. On the other hand, he had just 
bought a house, so could not be short of money. Perhaps he was rich, perhaps not, but 
he had managed to make an arrangement so that he did not have to pay rent. When we 
saw Vyacheslav a few days later in his slippers, Yurii reminded me: ‘I told you, he is 
a monster!’. I had thought his light footwear was a sign of financial difficulty, but he 
was in fact just oblivious to the cold, and he had fixed the fence. In this scene, the 
baza was revealed to me less as a simple business with predictable rental income, as I 
had assumed, and more as the site of entwined personal dependencies that require 
strong relations, constant vigilance, management and bargaining. 
 
A few days later Yurii and I met two young men interested in hiring a unit for storing 
the distilled water and chemicals they manufactured at another site. Yurii fielded their 
questions about costs and water supply and they seemed satisfied. He explained that I 
was interested in what it is like to do business in Siberia, which made them laugh: 
‘Have you heard of the police?’ one asked. We tried to enter the available unit but it 
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was locked so had to return to the office where the guard was watching television 
beside his camp bed. He could not find the key and Yurii lost his patience. ‘Why must 
I do this myself?’ he shouted, but the old man only mumbled and sank into the corner. 
Yurii grumbled to himself and we looked in on another of the units instead, which 
was being refurbished for a meat and fish smoking business to move in. A couple of 
workers reclined as they fiddled to get a signal on a radio and made no effort to return 
to work when we entered. Sergei, the contractor overseeing the renovation, reported 
that he needed some materials, so we drove into the city to purchase them. This day 
and others continued in this fashion as Yurii responded to the needs of the moment 
and attempted to keep people doing the work he paid them for.  
 
Besides this continuous rallying, the plan to expand the baza proved to be a major 
headache too. This became clear when Yurii informed me he had received notice 
from their electricity supplier that they needed to settle a large debt or their supply 
would be cut. Over the following days, this proved to be rather more complicated 
than simply paying the bill. It emerged that Aleksandr and Yurii had delayed paying a 
Land Tax bill and the tax authority had responded by blocking their bank account.27 
Now that the electricity supply to the baza was also threatened, access to their money 
had become even more essential than usual and Yurii had to scramble. In order to pay 
the bill, Aleksandr called on one of his tenants to borrow the necessary cash. Actually 
paying the bill also proved to be just as frustrating, since when we visited the 
electricity company they would only take payments between three and four o’clock 
and only individuals rather than businesses could pay there. Yurii became 
increasingly anxious. A manager advised him to visit a bank in the city centre where 
he could make a transfer, but on arrival we discovered that this incurred a 3 per cent 
surcharge, which frustrated Yurii even more. In the end the bill was paid very 
reluctantly in the nick of time. 
 
It is in Yurii’s nature to portray events rather more dramatically than they could be, 
nevertheless in that moment the need for electricity was urgent. I asked Yurii why he 
had put off paying the electricity bills in the first place. It appeared extraordinary that 
                                                
27 Russian authorities are entitled to block company accounts if tax returns are not returned on 
time (see for example Schneider Group, no date: 19). 
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a company with a healthy cash flow could allow this to happen. ‘It’s a mentality’, he 
replied, as if they could not help themselves from trying to get away with it. 
However, over a drink on a later occasion, Yurii tried to clarify how exchange works 
in Russia and his meaning became clearer. With one hand he gave me his glass, 
representing a product, and with the other took my hypothetical money. This is a 
conventional exchange as you understand it, he told me. However, in Russia, he said, 
the two are not simultaneous if you can help it. ‘The rule is to keep your money’, he 
said. Starting again, he gestured to give me the glass while taking the money but did 
not let the glass go. The point is that unless you absolutely have to part with your 
money, there’s no reason to give it away. Thus Aleksandr and Yurii had applied this 
rule with the tax authorities. That they had incurred a fine for doing so was 
unfortunate but beside the point; they had tried to keep as much money as they could. 
 
Nevertheless, Yurii’s difficulties did not end when they finally paid the bill. When 
their bank account was reopened they discovered 160,000 roubles missing and could 
not identify where it had gone. During the day Yurii spoke about it with Konstantin, 
their lawyer, and realised he appeared nervous. Konstantin had been Aleksandr’s 
lawyer when Khoroshiidom was dissolved. Before liquation an external administrator 
had been appointed to oversee the insolvency process, but according to Aleksandr he 
was appointed in a town hundreds of miles away, never visited Khoroshiidom, 
examined its documents, or did anything in the interests of the business. Aleksandr 
argued in court that the administrator had breached his obligations to serve the 
interests of the business. Konstantin’s role was to represent this claim in court. 
Nevertheless Aleksandr theorised that Konstantin had been bribed by the 
administrator not to do so in exchange for a proportion of his fee, which also came 
from the business. This, if it were the case, would be ‘classic otkat’, said Yurii. 
Again, the logic of this theory was initially unclear to me. Why would Konstantin, 
who had stood so loyally by Aleksandr during his crisis, now betray him and risk his 
job for the sake of about £1000? Yurii replied that Aleksandr would not fire 
Konstantin, but they would have ‘a long talk’. Indeed Konstantin was a good friend 
and we had all been on a hunting trip a few weeks earlier. In this episode it became 
plain that the ‘mentality’ Yurii had described has to be taken seriously. Konstantin 
did apparently not want to damage his relations with Aleksandr and Yurii, and his 
intervention did not make any difference to the outcome of the insolvency process 
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(which proceeded to liquidation), but he saw an opportunity to take a cut even though 
he knew it meant disobeying Aleksandr and being found out. 
 
The way in which Konstantin stole from Aleksandr, or the way Kirill coopted him, or 
the way Vycaheslav got away without paying rent, or indeed in the way Aleksandr 
sought to withhold payments from the electricity company, all appear as a sort of 
fatalistic individualism, in that everyone is seeking to advance their own interests no 
matter what the cost. However, I assert that it is better to consider their behaviour in 
terms of seeking independence and resisting pressure, working between the formal 
and informal spheres. For example, in Konstantin’s case, his official work was to 
represent Aleksandr, but he also sought to take advantage of this situation by creating 
a scheme in which he could profit from the bankruptcy of his own employer. Thus 
Konstantin’s status as a lawyer did not prevent him from attempting to steal from his 
employer, but endowed him with the knowledge of how to take personal profit from 
his position. To put this another way, Konstantin had the knowledge to know how to 
steal within his role, and how much he could steal without losing his job. This logic 
also applies to Kirill: everybody knew he stole the valve but he still got away with it 
because he knew he could steal it with plausible denial, and then win the work to 
repair it. The same logic applies to Vyacheslav: he had recently bought a house but 
managed to claim financial difficulty and avoid paying rent in cash, but in kind 
instead. And when an external administrator was appointed by the court to oversee 
the insolvency of Khoroshiidom, he saw an opportunity not to do the job but still get 
paid. Aleksandr’s effort to avoid paying the electricity board was not because he was 
against paying in principle, but because he thought he might be able to get away with 
it. This, I argue, underpins what Yurii means by the ‘mentality’ of business, and it 
made life more complicated for Aleksandr than he wanted. 
 
It appears remarkable that an ostensibly successful business could become embroiled 
in so many informal and seemingly unnecessary complications in addressing 
apparently simple tasks such as collecting rent, paying fines, following the law and so 
on, but this is to underestimate the ‘mentality’ of business Yurii emphasised. Clearly, 
Aleksandr and Yurii view officialdom in its legal and bureaucratic forms as a menace 
to be avoided and resisted as much as possible. This stems not only from their crisis 
experience, in which senior figures within the state structures were revealed to be 
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corrupted, but also because of the way everyday legal processes and diktat are 
vulnerable to informal intervention due to institutional asymmetry.  
 
5.4.2 Resisting officials and the state 
 
To state what is now obvious, formal processes (such as legal requirements) may be 
circumvented, and it is in entrepreneurs’ material interests to circumvent them, 
especially given their continuing vulnerability to the officials who wield formal 
power. Thus Yurii and Aleksandr routinely resist meeting their formal obligations or 
even obeying the law until it is completely unavoidable, they wait as long as possible 
to consider their options and they seek to circumvent obstacles when they can. I find 
that everyday relations between entrepreneurs and officials develop such that both 
know the other is deviating from their formal duties and they must yield as little as 
possible. This resistance, however, can inconvenience them further, such as when 
Aleksandr’s bank account was blocked for delaying payment of his bill. Nevertheless, 
as I have found, resistance in my informants’ entrepreneurship is as integral to, and as 
critical, as their drive for independence. This cat and mouse between entrepreneurs 
and officials adds stress and frustration to everyday business tasks, and reinforces the 
idea that the state is the enemy. However, if state representatives are repeatedly 
revealed to be corrupted and corruptible, as they were in Aleksandr’s experience, it is 
inevitable that businesses will avoid parting with their money until it is inescapable. 
 
The counterpoint is that if formal procedures are vulnerable to intervention, there is a 
temptation to take advantage. Moreover, entrepreneurs feel justified doing so because 
of the arbitrary injustice they are exposed to in general. This appears to explain 
Konstantin’s behaviour; to accept the bribe rather than do the ‘right thing’ by his 
employer appeared justified because a legal process that accepted (or could not 
prevent) criminal behaviour from its own administrators was already corrupted. 
Likewise, Aleksandr’s experience of a corrupted judiciary justified not paying his 
debt in the first place. Therefore it appears incumbent upon entrepreneurs to 
circumvent and resist the state whenever they are able. That neither Aleksandr nor 
Konstantin got away with it does not mean their logic was wrong. Indeed, the key 
point is that formal processes do not turn out as they ought because others have 
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already personally intervened in their own interests. Thus when the commercial court 
imposed an external administrator on Khoroshiidom it could not have accounted for 
the administrator’s improvisational behaviour, nor could Aleksandr have predicted 
Konstantin’s own interference, which was a reaction to that of the administrator. This 
unpredictability, or informalisation of formal processes, invokes a sense that one 
should prepare for the worst possible outcome, and that chances have to be taken 
when they are presented. At the same time, the impetus to circumvent formality takes 
instrumental rather than personal terms, thus, Konstantin took his chance in spite of 
his friendship with Aleksandr: the mantra ‘it’s nothing personal, just business’ seems 
apt.  
 
Finally, although self-interest determines these informal behaviours, this does not 
negate the importance or value of social capital. In their moment of need, for 
example, Aleksandr and Yurii found the financial resources necessary by borrowing 
from their own tenants on the baza. Of course, it was in the tenants’ interests to help 
Aleksandr prevent an electricity cut. However, Aleksandr and Yurii are also willing 
to help their tenants, as Vyacheslav’s no-rent arrangement shows. In this sense there 
is a certain solidarity, evinced at least on the baza, among entrepreneurs seeking to 
‘get by’ and circumvent the demands of the state. Considering these points together, I 
find that the ‘mentality’ Yurii described is less an innate Russian state of mind than a 
determination not to be a victim of predation by others or the state, and to maximise 
personal advantage and independence relative to them. An important conclusion here 
is that even as Aleksandr operates a successful, cash-rich business, he and Yurii still 
work in near battle-mode, in which basic operational requirements such as electricity, 
cash-flow and even the legal right to exist have to be fought over. In other words even 
in this successful and growing company, everyday business activities may veer 
perilously close to crisis or even catastrophe, requiring informal solutions that rely on 
improvisation and personal connections.  
 
5.4.3 Summary of everyday business in Promploshchad 
 
In this section I have shown how Aleksandr’s perception of the state as dangerous has 
affected his entrepreneurship. Based on Aleksandr’s experience of crisis, he and Yurii 
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consider government bureaucracy to be an unpredictable and untrustworthy menace 
that they avoid until there is no other option. However, their avoidance and resistance 
strategies can make their situation worse and apparently simple tasks complicated. At 
the same time, everyday relations on the baza require close attention too, because they 
depend on characters such as Kirill, Vyacheslav and Konstantin. Although these men 
depend on the baza they also constantly look for opportunities to increase their 
influence over Aleksandr and Yurii, maximise their own interests, and save or make 
money. This has created strong mutual dependencies irrespective of Aleksandr’s and 
Yurii’s formal seniority. Similarly, Konstantin took advantage of an opportunity for 
otkat because such a chance may not have been available tomorrow. Thus while these 
entrepreneurs are partially dependent upon one another, they also improvise in a way 
that overrides loyalty for personal gain in spite of the risks to relationships or 
increasing their own workload. As a result of a general sense that things can go 
wrong, I observed a tendency towards maximising immediate gains even at the cost 
of losses tomorrow. In order to explain these behaviours Yurii offered the idea of a 
Russian ‘mentality’, but I have conceptualised this in terms of a determination to 
uphold their freedom of action and resist the state or other aggressive outsiders. I 
discuss this point further in Chapter 6. 
 
5.5 Yurii’s entrepreneurship: a struggle for independence 
 
In this section I seek to determine more specifically what it means to say that these 
entrepreneurs resist and seek independence from the state by examining Yurii’s 
entrepreneurship in more detail, and the approaches some of his contemporaries have 
taken to developing and managing their businesses. I find that independence does not 
mean the same thing for everybody. On the contrary, entrepreneurs must decide their 
own approach and ambitions based on their experiences and perceptions of their 
position regarding the state and other market actors. 
 
5.5.1 Yurii’s struggle to start a business 
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Yurii is in his late twenties but has long sought to establish himself as an independent 
and successful entrepreneur. He has started a number of enterprises, beginning at 
university when he made money organising dances for students. After that, he 
struggled for several years. He worked first as a cheesemonger, which involved late 
nights packing cheese, transporting it to Western Siberia’s larger cities and 
negotiating with grocers to sell it. Although he said he was successful at this, his boss 
stayed in Normalnyi, did not give him enough cheese to make decent money, and paid 
him poorly. He was also using his own car to drive fellow workers and the cheese, 
and drove it into the ground. After a while, Yurii decided to move on and put it down 
to experience. In any case, Aleksandr needed support as he dealt with his crisis, so 
they agreed to work together during that period. Later he tried his hand at 
construction, then became a warehouse manager, with a view to learning the trades, 
but he did not take to these jobs either. Thus while Aleksandr’s pessimistic view of 
political economic conditions results chiefly from his crisis, Yurii’s pessimism stems 
both from his intimate knowledge of Aleksandr’s case and his initial, unsuccessful 
attempts at independent entrepreneurship. In fact, while Aleksandr’s pessimism is 
tempered by his acquittal and financial security, Yurii has to contend with the daily 
struggles on the baza and the challenges of developing his own projects. As a result 
he is even more frustrated by political economic conditions than his father is. 
 
However, when I conducted my fieldwork Yurii had started a new company that 
showed greater promise, and he was working hard to make it succeed. The idea for 
this business came from a conversation with Nikolai, his girlfriend’s father. Nikolai, 
an osteopath, had long wanted to establish a medical business but had already lost one 
when his partner defrauded him, and was tentative about trying again. However, he 
had been contacted by his brother in Germany, Sergey, who had become aware of a 
handheld imaging device manufactured and commonly used in Europe that could 
greatly enhance osteopathic diagnoses in Russia.  Together they decided to try to win 
the right to train doctors and distribute the device in the FSU. Initially Yurii secured a 
verbal agreement from the manufacturer and sought to register the device in Russia. 
This process, however, is still ongoing after two years. The authorities did not accept 
the medical data provided by the manufacturer and said that it must be re-certified in 
Russia. The cost for this began at 100,000 roubles but was later tripled when a new 
director was appointed to the institute responsible for certification. The huge size of 
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these fees, Yurii explained, meant that they had to secure the support of a third party 
investor, who provided the cash but took a 25 per cent stake in the business. A 
catalogue of further costs and delays followed. 
 
However, the men were determined to succeed: Yurii said that the device had a cost 
price of 150,000 roubles and a sale price nearly five times higher, so the potential was 
enormous. To keep things going, he translated the 300-page instruction document into 
Russian himself, while Nikolai called on another brother, a public relations executive 
in Moscow, to help draw attention to the product there. The problem, Yurii explained, 
was not that nobody wanted the product, but that bureaucracy prevented them from 
selling it. While they waited for better news about certification, they decided to 
establish a small osteopathy clinic in Normalnyi, where Nikolai could work privately 
and Yurii could try to develop the business in Kazakhstan, where they have not 
encountered such bureaucratic impediments. Their clinic, the Spine Centre, is housed 
in three rooms within a dilapidated former industrial site that has been cursorily 
renovated. They have installed baths, a single-seat sauna and treatment tables, and sell 
alternative medicines, particularly the blood from Maral deer antlers, famed in Russia 
for their supposed medicinal, healing and aphrodisiac properties (Siberian Times 
Reporter 2015: online; Sputnik 2012: online), as well as other ‘natural’ extracts and 
remedies. Most importantly, they have acquired a computer with software that allows 
them to make diagnoses with the imaging device, which Nikolai will use to determine 
appropriate treatments. Although Yurii told me that Nikolai will only ‘demonstrate’ 
the device to other doctors in the Spine Centre, it was plain that they also planned to 
use it for treatment in parallel to their wait for certification. In this way, Nikolai can 
focus on developing their reputation in the local medical community, while Yurii can 
focus on administration and business development when he is not committed to the 
baza. Likewise, Sergei in Germany can be called upon to negotiate with the 
manufacturer in Europe when needed. When I asked Yurii if he thought the 
certification process would end with approval, he expressed confidence not on 
scientific grounds, even though the level of scrutiny is lower than that in the West, but 
because the institute was receiving a lot of money for the work. 
 
At this point I argue that Yurii’s entrepreneurship, which takes place in both the Spine 
Centre and Promploshchad, represents a form of portfolio employment. Portfolio 
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employment in the post-socialist context conventionally refers to individuals taking 
on formal and informal work in order to survive (for example Morris 2012b: 219). 
This distinguishes it from portfolio employment in advanced economies where it 
connotes working for multiple clients as a way of achieving greater independence (for 
example The Economist 2009b: online). That said, in Yurii’s case, it is his choice to 
develop the Spine Centre, since he makes enough money to survive working for 
Promploshchad, his father’s company. Furthermore, both businesses are legitimate to 
the extent that they exist formally and the men aim to develop them as such. 
Therefore I find that Yurii’s case raises the importance of considering portfolio 
employment in normative as well as practical terms in contemporary Russia: he 
chooses to have a second business not out of necessity but because, like all my 
informants, it offers the sort of life he wants to create irrespective of the challenges. 
This is also the case with Oleg’s Cooperative, but not with Anna, whose informal 
businesses are essential rather than optional. Yurii’s entrepreneurship reveals that the 
distinction between formal and informal work is not necessarily between two types of 
business; rather, it seems that all Russian business must operate between the two 
spheres. Williams and Round have found, based on research in Ukraine, that formal 
and informal work are ‘inextricably intertwined and mutually constitutive’ (2009: 94). 
I accept this, and emphasise that Yurii’s informal work takes place within his formal 
business, rather than separately from it, as a consequence of the unpredictable 
conditions he encounters in the market. I also concur with Williams and Onoshchenko 
who, based on a study in Ukraine, found that ‘the majority of those in the formal 
economy rely heavily on the informal economy to secure their livelihood’ (2015: 29). 
Indeed, it is not the case that Yuri is struggling to survive but it is still essential for 
him to work informally. This, I have shown, is the consequence of institutional 
asymmetry. 
 
Given that Yurii does not actually need to have his own business, however, it is useful 
to consider what drives him towards it. In addition to his father’s influence and 
success in business, he often described his ‘hope for globalisation’ and, like Anna, 
that Western business practices would take root in Russia, despite his experiences to 
the contrary. Hence his ambitions reflect emergent post-socialist masculinities, 
associated with neoliberalism, which, according to Walker, are based on ideas of self-
governance, individualisation and entrepreneurship as opposed to working class 
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occupations that were valorised in the Soviet period (Walker 2016: e-book). In this 
sense Yurii’s aspirations as a young middle class man are not unusual. However, as I 
found in Anna’s case, they are restricted by their non-availability, namely the 
problems that have arisen inhibiting the development of his businesses. Hence 
portfolio entrepreneurship is a logical response: if one is ambitious then problems 
have to be endured and overcome alone in the hope of eventual success. 
 
5.5.2 Yurii’s perception of business conditions 
 
Although Yurii is obliged to work informally to secure the future of the Spine Centre, 
he expressed anger at having to do so. Like his father, his frustration with political 
economic conditions stems from his experience of government bureaucracy as a 
burden on entrepreneurs. In turn, he idealises business conditions in Europe and the 
United States. He was delighted, for example, that the manufacturer of the medical 
device would spend 90 Euros to send him documentation to assist with the 
certification process. ‘It showed that they believe I am a serious businessman’, he 
said. Conversely, he was furious that he faced only doubt and bureaucracy about the 
value of the device at home. Like Aleksandr, Yurii had given much thought to this 
situation, and offered constant explanations and examples of the way the political 
economy works. Thirty per cent of the population depends on the state for their 
pensions, he claimed, and perhaps 60 per cent for their salaries.28 With such a large 
proportion of the population dependent on the state, support for our leader stays high, 
he reasoned. (As I noted in Chapter 3, Oleg drew the same conclusion). Even so, he 
said, many people find life here hard and are trying to escape. When I accompanied 
him all the way to Novosibirsk to visit the EU visa centre with paperwork for an 
application, so that he could travel for a meeting with the device manufacturer, he 
laughed at the scene: ‘Lots of nervous Russians behaving well!’, he said sardonically 
in the waiting room, implying that everybody wants to leave the country if they can. 
                                                
28 Yurii was broadly correct regarding pensioners, but overestimated the number of state 
employees. Around a third of the Russian population is currently pensioners (Piper 2015: 
online), and their number is forecast to grow: by 2020 there will be 100 workers for every 
100 pensioners (Economist 2012a: online). However, overall state employment has declined 
since 2000, to approximately 30 per cent in 2010 (although state employment in the oil and 
banking industries has increased) (Smolinski 2013: online). 
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‘My girlfriend tried to get a holiday visa for the USA last year but was denied it. So 
many Russian women leave and do not come back.’ He spoke of the large Russian 
populations in London and Thailand too, and suggested many Russians would be 
there if they could. I asked how he reconciled widespread support for the status quo if 
so many wanted to leave the country, to which he said: ‘Russians are angry with their 
past but keep doing the same things, repeating themselves. Russia always relives its 
own history. Nothing is new today.’ 
 
Yurii’s sense of reliving the past is useful for understanding his attitude further. He 
perceives that his actions are constrained by overwhelming officialdom and 
bureaucracy, which are historically constant in Russia. Everyday travails tended to 
reinforce his view that the state and its representatives are obstacles to his ambitions. 
For example, when we returned to our parking space outside a shopping centre, we 
found that the traffic police had been lurking nearby to give tickets to unwitting 
parkers and they handed Yurii a 1,000-rouble fine. While we waited in the cold as an 
officer completed the paperwork in his car, his colleague was nearby rounding up 
other victims, rather than advising them not to park, and they formed a shivering 
queue behind us. Yurii described the scene as ‘absolutely typical’, and evidence that 
the state works against its own people. When on another occasion we drove to have 
winter tyres fitted to his car, he returned home to find that his windscreen sprays had 
been removed from the bonnet and were presumably now on the car of his mechanic. 
He swore repeatedly. When we drove past the city of Akademgorodok I mentioned 
how interesting it was to build a science town, but he said nothing had changed. He 
argued that Russia builds many large projects that are unnecessary, and began to list 
them. ‘Skolkovo, for what? There’s no need to copy! Rosnano was supposed to be for 
technology,’ he said, ‘But do you know what Chubais said about why so much money 
has been given to Rosnano? To give people jobs! You know what we call Rosnano? 
Rosbanano! And what about the new road to Kazan? I don’t want my taxes to go 
there!’ He continued in this fashion, shouting at the injustice of it all. He gave such 
views frequently and with gusto, confident that the basic corruption of the state is 
beyond dispute, based on his own reading and conversations with respected people. 
For example, he introduced me to a professor he had met at a lecture at the local state 
university. The professor told me Siberia is an economic colony and that Russia lives 
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in ‘a golden age of bureaucracy.’ Yurii could not agree more. ‘It’s simply 
Gazpromland!’, he declared.  
 
When these frustrations occasionally got the better of him, Yurii declared the 
situation in the country intolerable. Once, after we were pulled over by the traffic 
police and asked for our documentation, he lost his sense of proportion and told me 
there would be a revolution within six months: ‘The traffic laws are deliberately 
unclear so that the police can extort the people!’ he cried. ‘They can always find 
something wrong with your car!’ Although this sounds melodramatic it is worth 
noting that our ongoing awareness of the confusing conflict in Ukraine also added to 
Yurii’s feeling that anything seemed possible at that time (in late 2014). During less 
stressful moments, however, he argued that it would be elites who would change the 
country, rather than the people. ‘Power is segmented under federal control. Regional 
government does not have control over the police or the army. The federal 
government holds power because it controls taxes and resources.’ According to this 
rationale, the police remained dependent upon and loyal to the state. Moreover, Yurii 
told me, ‘I am not a political person’, and saw no role for himself in political events. 
Thus despite his clarity of thought on political economic conditions, Yurii himself 
relived the past, and hoped for the best from Moscow, even as he bemoaned his 
personal circumstances. In this circular logic Yurii believed (and showed me) that 
political economic conditions are intolerable, while arguing that it was not his role but 
that of distant elites to change them. He suggested that reliving the past was the only 
credible option open to him. His hope for change, such as it was, came from his 
feeling that the next elite could only be better. 
 
5.5.3 Yurii’s contemporaries’ reactions to business conditions in 
Normalnyi 
 
At this point it is useful to position Yurii’s frustration in light of the views of other 
entrepreneurs. As I have already written, his entrepreneurial activities are informed by 
the ‘mentality’ he described: that officialdom must be avoided until it is completely 
necessary, and because of the arbitrary potential of the state he must protect his 
interests and take opportunities whenever they are available. Nevertheless, his 
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decision-making is also informed by his belief that business should be done properly; 
he does not want to have to break the law but has to according to the structure of the 
system. However, although Yurii and Aleksandr are deeply cynical about Russia’s 
political economy, their reaction to these conditions is not inevitable. Several of 
Yurii’s acquaintances have responded quite differently. Nikolai, his business partner, 
was also frustrated by the difficulty of developing their business but was calmed by 
historical continuity rather than enraged by it: ‘Yurii does not see that the situation is 
normal. In Russia if an official says something, it must happen.’ Indeed, as I now set 
out, although Yurii’s contemporaries tend to share his view that conditions for 
business could be better, their reaction to this perception in their everyday business 
varies widely from caution to adventurism. 
 
Igor, a mechanic in his late twenties, has a small garage in an industrial sector of the 
city. He offered me a few words in English and explained that he had studied in 
Brighton for a few weeks as a teenager. Since then, however, it appeared that his 
ambitions had been dampened.  ‘In order to succeed in business,’ he said, ‘you need 
to have contacts in strategic sections’, meaning local government and which, he 
implied, he did not have. This did not mean he did not retain an interest in the affairs 
of the country, however, and to my surprise he recommended a book by Simon 
Kordonskii of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, to help me understand 
more. Under such conditions, I asked, what were his hopes for his business. ‘Well, to 
continue’, he replied simply. In this way Igor imagined a modest future role for 
himself, based on an assessment of his place in the order of things and an acceptance 
of his fate. He did not aspire for more because he did not think it was realistic, even 
though his intellectual references and practical skills revealed him to be a very 
capable man. Expressing my esteem about Igor to Yurii afterwards he scolded me: 
‘Russians have enormous potential, but the problem is the government: for them there 
is no need for more than oil and gas.’ Thus Yurii’s view that the government stood 
deliberately in the way of entrepreneurs was reinforced by Igor’s response. As I have 
already indicated, however, the argument that businesses lack potential is not always 
borne out: Yurii’s medical business and Promploshchad are promising. Thus, if Igor 
occupies one position, in which the political economy is understood to be oppressive 
and this prevents self-improvement, Yurii occupies another in which the political 
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economy is oppressive but business development is possible with concerted effort and 
initiative (even though this has proven more hope than reality at present).  
 
Viktor, a second acquaintance of Yurii’s, is another case in point. Now in his late 
twenties, he started his entrepreneurial career working with criminals who took 
homeless men from the streets, cleaned them up, gave them some papers and a back 
story, then sent them into banks to apply for a loan, which they then stole. After a 
time, he felt uncomfortable doing this but was inspired to start a credit brokering 
business of his own when his wife was denied a loan. He could not understand why 
her application had been unsuccessful, so visited a credit broker to find out how it 
worked. He decided that a business assisting people with their credit applications 
could be very successful. At that time, he said, only three brokers worked in 
Normalnyi but the sector quickly expanded to 20, then contracted again as 
competition drove the majority out of business. His business model is simple, he 
explained: he built relationships with several local banks, which provided him with an 
understanding of the sort of terms under which they would agree to provide credit. He 
then brought them a steady stream of well-prepared applicants from his clients. The 
most important aspect of the role, he underlined, is a high level of service. He speaks 
honestly to clients about their financial circumstances, advises them about which 
bank will be most receptive, and assists them in preparing applications. Then he 
approaches the bank on behalf of the applicant, so that they deal with him personally. 
If the bank agrees, then the client visits the bank and signs the agreement. In this 
respect, he is personally involved in the whole application process; both client and 
bank rely on his integrity. In return for this work, clients pay him between 5 and 15 
per cent of the loan value. Regarding his ambitions, Viktor said that in an ideal 
situation the banks would pay him to bring them new clients, and that he would work 
only with ‘quality clients’, though he conceded this was unlikely at present.  
 
Thus today Viktor has a business that can operate, in principle, without veering into 
the shadow economy. However, like Promploshchad, he works between the formal 
and informal spheres in practice. For example, he offers bank managers cash in order 
to secure their agreement on loan applications. As he said: ‘Of course, otkat exists 
today, but in five years it will be much less. Standards will improve with 
competition.’ With this conviction, Viktor gave the impression that business 
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conditions will improve in time, even though he had already said competition in the 
market has decreased significantly. What grounds did he have for such optimism? In 
fact, as I sat with them, it appeared that their optimism was illusory and, most likely, 
for their own benefit as young men facing a future in difficult business conditions. 
They are, in fact pessimistic about the future. Their primary concern was the 
economic crisis. ‘There are fewer good clients now,’ said Viktor. ‘Anyway, nobody 
takes responsibility in Russia. A man can take out a loan, but forget about the 
responsibility to pay it back.’ Moving away from the difficulties facing business 
temporarily, he turned to bemoan the rising cost and falling standard of living. ‘For 
example, today it is necessary to pay for medical insurance because public doctors are 
awful and drunk.’ At this point Yurii took the chance to grumble too: ‘Actually 
people leave hospital worse than before. After hospital an acquaintance of mine 
became ill and now cannot work.’ They proceeded through a quick-fire list of other 
annoyances. ‘The cost of car insurance is too high as well, so people risk it with only 
basic insurance or go without’, said Viktor. ‘And the school system is the same’, he 
said. ‘Private tutors can make a lot of money, and normal teachers with their own 
students after school too.’ Yurii nodded vigorously: ‘School is just about repetition. 
The government wants to produce idiots!’ As I stated above, Yurii’s views about the 
country closely resembles Oleg’s (Chapter 3). 
 
After continuing through several similar points, Viktor brought the subject back to a 
general absence of responsibility. ‘Although the economy is bad’, he said, ‘the credit 
market is risk-free. When you have received the credit, just change your name and 
they will never find you. Or simply say your conditions have changed and you cannot 
pay the money back.’ Would this land me in prison, I asked, but he shook his head 
and laughed. Here Viktor admitted that all is not lost. In fact, his business fares better 
when government effectiveness is weaker. Although he believes political economic 
conditions and social morality have been corrupted, in the credit business there are 
still opportunities because it is poorly regulated and systems are prone to 
circumvention: he can make money from his clients whether they abide by their 
contracts or not. Viktor was being slightly disingenuous when he bemoaned political 
economic conditions and said that society lacks responsibility; he is successful 
because he has identified a market in which he can take advantage of these 
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conditions. He is an effective entrepreneur under conditions of institutional 
asymmetry. 
 
Yurii’s position is similar: his father’s crisis and his own difficulties have convinced 
him that the state should be blamed for political economic problems. If the 
government managed the economy well, the situation would not be getting worse, he 
said. For example, ‘I borrowed $500 three months ago from a friend. Then the value 
was 20,000 roubles; now it’s 23,000. This is not the sanctions, but a terrible 
economy.’29 This rationale leads him to the conclusion that ‘entrepreneurs do not 
know what will happen tomorrow: we might have work, we might not,’ which in turn 
justifies the ‘mentality’ that governs his entrepreneurial behaviour: the government is 
better to be avoided than obeyed and entrepreneurs must take their chances. This 
logic is clearly reactive, with the government a menace whose actions drive 
entrepreneurs to avoid and circumvent regulation, which in turn drives cynicism and 
motivates self-interest. Nevertheless, like Viktor, Yurii’s business interests have 
developed because of his appreciation that it is only through circumventing formal 
obstacles, such as the certification of his medical device, that his business can be 
developed.  
 
Thus far I have argued that if Igor was tentative about interaction with the 
government and cautious in his approach to the future, emphasising only the survival 
of his business, Viktor and Yurii were even more frustrated with the state, but more 
determined to undermine it as a result. Pavel, another of Yurii’s acquaintances, takes 
this determination a step further still. Also in his late twenties, he has already gained a 
senior position within a large regional construction company similar to 
Khoroshiidom. When we met, he spent much time on the telephone dictating orders to 
staff working late into a freezing night on a construction site. Indeed, he projected 
aggression and showed us videos on his smartphone of his bare-knuckle boxing 
training and organised gang fights in the city. He related a story of punishing a 
wealthy local man who had refused to pay a debt, dragging him from his car and 
                                                
29 Perhaps this is indeed the case. In a discussion between Connolly et al it was argued that 
Western sanctions have had a limited impact (Connolly et al 2015: 2). 
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beating him up in full view of the police. This story reveals the complicity of the local 
authorities in his violence. 
 
Pavel, however, was intelligent and articulate too. The most financially successful of 
Yurii’s peers, he talked not in terms of frustration but optimism at political economic 
conditions. He described his entrepreneurial approach: ‘First it is necessary to 
understand the local situation and local people’, he told me. ‘The majority want to 
work from nine until five o’clock then go home and drink beer. They think that’s all 
there is. They drink at the weekend, and expect the same for their children. And then 
there is another type, those people that want their otkat’, he said with a grin. ‘But it is 
not just business that is corrupt’, he said, ‘When a contract for a new building is 
offered in competition, the requirements are written in such a way that only one 
company can win. The officer in charge of the competition receives some 
“chocolate.” It is called the carousel.’ he smiled, indicating that the officer would 
offer all likely bidders a chance to ‘win’ the contract with a bribe. In Pavel’s vision of 
a successful businessman, therefore, hard work goes hand in hand with violence and 
both are necessary. At the same time, productive work (in this case construction) goes 
hand in hand with fraud (otkat). To Pavel, this is simply the way things are. The smart 
entrepreneur, in his view, recognises the political economy as imperfect and chooses 
to exploit it. Thus exploitation appears as the key requirement for business success in 
the opinion of the most commercially successful of this group of entrepreneurs who 
reached adulthood just before, or during, the Putin presidency. This view, I recall, 
partly resembles that of Dmitrii, Oleg’s son (Chapter 3): he was not outwardly 
aggressive and focused on everyday sales rather than corruption, but he did emphasise 
that a Russian business should be prepared to take any steps to protect its interests. 
Pavel and Dmitrii are young, bright, assertive and ambitious, and believe that success 
means dealing with circumstances as they find them, taking what they can, as 
opposed to Yurii and Viktor, who are discontented with the present but hope for a 
better future and seek to circumvent obstacles with only their wits. 
 
It is interesting that in justifying the beating of the wealthy businessman, Pavel spoke 
approvingly of Sergey Shoigu, the Russian Defence Minister, and claimed he had also 
beaten subordinates when he had to. This anecdote is revealing, since Shoigu, like 
Putin, had a reputation as a youngster for brawling, but also started out in the Siberian 
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construction business (The Economist 2015: online; Nechepurenko 2015: online). 
That Pavel should look to Shoigu, the longest serving member of the Russian 
government, as a role model, is revealing not only with respect to his background, 
although Pavel was born as something of an outsider, to a Russian mother and Jewish 
father in Kazakhstan, just as Shoigu was born in remote Tuva to a Tuvan father and 
Russian mother. Rather, in profiles the Defence Minister is widely described as an 
unlikely success, loyal, competent and politically neutral (for example The Economist 
2015; Nechepurenko 2015: online). Indeed Pavel sees a potential future in politics. I 
asked him which party interested him. He replied that ‘in Russian we have clans, not 
parties’, and suggested that he would align himself in time. This determination to be 
involved in politics but do so apolitically, to do what is required competently and 
loyally, in apparent emulation of the public image of Shoigu, is striking as an 
example of simulation of elite behaviour at the quotidian level. In his rise in business 
these behaviours appear to have held him in good stead thus far. 
 
I have argued that Yurii and three of his entrepreneur-acquaintances of the same 
generation share a reasonably unambiguous perception that the political economic 
conditions of the country present difficulties for business. However, the manner in 
which the men’s attitudes determine their behaviour varies widely. Igor is cautious, 
Viktor and Yurii are pragmatic and Pavel is cavalier. Noticeably, it is Pavel who has 
achieved the most economic success to date. Even so, the circumvention of the state 
was a necessary activity for each entrepreneur. Thus, for example, otkat appears 
simultaneously as a necessity and symbol of dysfunction in the ‘actually existing’ 
economy: it is a reaction to a political economy in which the future seems uncertain 
and the government dangerous. On the other hand, it acts as an incentive for action, a 
reward for the most energetic, brave and violent. Both these positions conform with 
Yurii’s concept of ‘mentality’: survival and success both require acting primarily in 
one’s own immediate interests rather than, necessarily, according to law or the 
interests of wider society. This does not preclude the formation of social relations, 
which are clearly integral to economic activity. It does appear to explain, however, 
why the mutual interests of groups coalesce around short-term interests and 
convenience, rather than long term strategies. Indeed, as Pavel emphasised, the 
structure of the political economy is determined by ‘clans’, or elite alliances: this is 
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reflected at the level of agency in the way entrepreneurs rely on, and act in the 
interests of, their limited social network. I return to this point in Chapter 6. 
 
Overall these entrepreneurs share a conviction that the political economy remains 
problematic and that opportunities for business are closed to those unconnected to 
officialdom. There was no consensus on whether the future offered greater 
opportunities, however. Igor and Pavel, who were respectively the least and most 
tolerant of risk, did not expect much improvement. Yurii and Viktor however, who 
are seeking to build legitimate businesses, believed that the improvement of 
conditions would come in time and that this improvement was indeed inevitable. 
Today, however, their priority is to work to protect and advance their interests; this is 
the impetus to resist the influence of outsiders on one’s business that I described in 
Section 3. The question of what these interests are, nevertheless, differed for each 
man: whereas Igor was cautious and sought to maintain the status quo out of a sense 
of place far from the elite, Pavel had a swashbuckling determination to emulate the 
‘clans’ that hold greater influence, and had decided that there is a profit to be made in 
both business and corruption. Viktor had identified a market in which he had 
outgrown many competitors and stood to profit from the continued growth of a 
legitimate business, but he also stood to benefit from the fact that the credit market is 
prone to circumvention and has established local relationships with the banks to take 
advantage while he can. In this situation, his plan is simply to remain flexible and 
pragmatic as necessary. Overall each entrepreneur considers business conditions 
perilous, but each has had to develop a personal assessment of the extent to which 
action is constrained based upon their observations and experiences. In sum, their 
business ambitions were not uniform, but aimed rather at a personal version of 
independence.  
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I explained how Aleksandr’s experience of crisis affected his 
entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviours. Aleksandr’s case shows that even the most 
successful independent businesses in Russia face predation, not just those like 
Anna’s. Before the crisis he was prepared to take risks with the development of his 
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business; played perhaps too fast and loose in Russia’s booming construction 
industry; gave generously to city charities; but eventually entwined his company’s 
fate with a state agency that betrayed him. Having endured the loss of his business 
and imprisonment, he is now content to concentrate on the day-to-day oversight of 
Promploshchad, his new business, and reluctant to overstretch himself, choosing a 
path of self-reliance, drawing on family and local contacts for assistance when 
required. However, although Aleksandr contemplates leaving the country, he has 
decided to return to entrepreneurship in spite of his experiences. I argue that this 
decision is not primarily motivated to recover the type of wealth he had prior to his 
crisis, or even to make a profit, but because it represents the only means with which 
he can exercise most control over his affairs and live independently, extricating 
himself from the predatory state and its officials. He also knows that Promploshchad 
offers a sufficient business with reasonable potential, if he can maintain it. 
 
The requirement to maintain Promploshchad is therefore what primarily motivates 
Aleksandr, just as the survival of the Spine Centre through the certification process is 
what motivates Yurii, whose view of business conditions is influenced by his father’s 
experience and his difficulties getting his own business started. Indeed, the same 
motivation is the daily priority for Viktor and Igor with respect to their businesses 
too. Thus I argue that all these entrepreneurs view the arbitrary potential of the state 
and its bureaucrats with foreboding and do what they can to resist it in order to 
maintain their independence. This is at least as important as the growth of their 
businesses. Ironically, this means that they must take an interest in political power, 
even though they are all disparaging about the political system and are devoted to 
separating themselves from it. That is, they must develop a sense of their own 
prospects by constantly interpreting political economic conditions around them and 
do what they can to stay out of trouble. Thus, their observations and experiences of 
officialdom inform their activities far more than compliance with formal institutions. 
This does not mean that they necessarily break the law, but that the law is not a good 
guide to how they make decisions any more than the existence of law is a reliable 
guide to its enforcement. In other words, under conditions of institutional asymmetry 
these entrepreneurs’ priorities reflect those of Oleg (Chapter 3) and Anna (Chapter 4) 
with respect to their ongoing effort to gain and maintain their independence from the 
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state through entrepreneurship. This reinforces Yurchak’s concept of 
entrepreneurialism as a striving for ‘civilised reality’. 
 
What does Aleksandr specifically do to achieve his own civilised reality? He is 
devoted to minimising his interaction with officialdom and minding his own business. 
Yet he must balance this ambition with the need to interact occasionally with officials 
in order to simply keep his business going and address administrative requirements. 
As I showed, his reluctance to do so, because of the injustices he suffered, until they 
become unavoidable, complicates his affairs when they could be simpler. In this 
respect I identified a tension between his desire for independence and the 
accompanying need to resist the state. Moreover, other individuals are acting 
according to their own interests on the baza, which can mean that they impede one 
another rather than working cooperatively. Kirill, for example, sought to make 
himself indispensible by damaging baza equipment that only he could repair, while 
Konstantin developed a ruse in which he could steal from Aleksandr, even though 
they work for the same company and are friends. Moreover, by trying to avoid paying 
a bill, Aleksandr ended up in a situation in which he had to borrow money from one 
of his own tenants. The result of this type of cat and mouse behaviour, which have 
secondary consequences and bind these men to one another in a variety of informal 
ties, may yet be to antagonise officials, which explains why Aleksandr and Yurii are 
constantly scrambling to solve such problems. In other words, the drive for 
independence does not make personal relations less important, but gives them a more 
instrumental form. I do not imply that personal relations are devalued, or that Russian 
entrepreneurs are amoral. Rather, there is a move towards self-interest in a situation in 
which the economy is struggling, officialdom is overbearing and unpredictable, and 
the future is difficult to foresee. Overall, Aleksandr and Yurii simply focus on 
immediate issues rather than more strategic plans, even though they have realistic and 
promising ambitions for the development of the baza and Spine Centre respectively. 
Consequently their business activities are defined by their unpredictability, even 
though their actual business is straightforward in principle.  
 
It is striking that it was Yurii rather than Aleksandr who had conceptualised his 
entrepreneurial approach in terms of a Russian ‘mentality’ (which I interpreted as an 
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effort to maximise one’s freedom of action and assert control over one’s affairs). It 
took a crisis for Aleksandr to distance himself from authority, whereas Yurii and his 
contemporaries took the necessity to do so for granted. This could reflect a greater 
sense of the risks facing businesses among younger entrepreneurs today than 
Aleksandr had prior to his crisis, having started in the 1990s. However, the younger 
entrepreneurs also reacted to this risk differently. Most of them associated the 
stability and longevity of their business – meaning independence – with distance 
from, and avoidance of, the state. However Pavel, and Aleksandr prior to his crisis, 
were prepared to associate themselves with officialdom in order to gain influence, 
even if they lost some independence. Pavel acknowledged corruption in the political 
economy but also embraced it; he is willing to do whatever it takes to join the 
political economic elite, and it is revealing that, thus far, he was the most successful 
businessman. Unlike the other entrepreneurs, Pavel did not accept that corruption was 
bad, rather inevitable, so he reasoned that he might as well work within the system. 
Yurii and his other contemporaries rejected this, aiming for their own civilised reality. 
It is telling that Pavel was not, like them, a true entrepreneur since he had not started 
his own business, but was an employee of an influential company. Thus I argue that 
the drive for independence is (as I also found in Chapters 3 and 4), an essential 
element in contemporary Russian entrepreneurship. For Pavel, safe within a large 
company, the structure of the political economy could be enriching if he worked 
within the system. His view is that only by doing business for high stakes can the 
most important political and economic rewards be gained. This is out of kilter with 
the ambitions of the other entrepreneurs. They find the structure abhorrent and abused 
by elites, but also see themselves as powerless to intervene. As such, their 
entrepreneurship is focused on creating separation between themselves and the state 
while they try to go about their business. 
 
In this chapter I have described Aleksandr and Yurii as ambitious but newly cautious 
entrepreneurs. They are experienced and capable but determined not to be victimised 
again. Unlike Oleg (Chapter 3), who has a degree of local control in his market and 
some certainty, or Anna (Chapter 4), who faces an uncertain future, Aleksandr and 
Yurii have to ‘get by’ relying on their wits and experience. In some ways, however, 
the crisis has been liberating for Aleksandr: he is no longer bound to forces he cannot 
control, and has the freedom to decide how to concentrate his efforts with the 
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knowledge and experience that crisis can be endured. Similarly, the frustration of 
daily business has not broken Yurii’s determination. They both recognise the 
proximity of unpredictable state power to business, and hold it in disdain, but have 
resolved to continue.  They feign optimism about an improvement in business 
conditions, and independently described that improvement as inevitable, but they 
have not the will to fight it like Anna (Aleksandr already fought for his survival) or 
capability to influence it in the way Oleg is attempting (he does not want to draw 
attention to himself again, while his past charity was unappreciated). Their path for 
now is to maintain and enhance their businesses in order to uphold their independence 
without attracting much attention. 
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CHAPTER 6: RECONCEPTUALISING 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
 
6.1 Structure of the chapter 
 
In Chapter 1 I offered a straightforward justification for this research. I argued that 
although it is well known that business conditions in Russia remain tough because of 
‘institutional asymmetry’, there has not been enough empirical research based on 
observation of actual business practice to show what businesses are practically doing 
to ‘get by’ under these conditions. In Chapter 2 I claimed that ethnography offered a 
unique methodology for studying business by revealing what my informants are 
actually saying and doing over an extended period.  Moreover, ethnography has not 
been applied to the study of entrepreneurship in the contemporary Russian business 
context even though it played an important role in research this subject in the first 
post-communist years. I drew particular direction from ‘contextual holism’, a new 
approach for studying post-communism ethnographically, to justify this methodology 
and provide an analytical guide for the research. This study is the first to adopt this 
approach in the ethnography of contemporary Russia. Contextual holism is the study 
of post-communism as a ‘situation’ and requires attention on the ‘embedded 
individual’ between agency and structure, historical legacies, the connection between 
perception and reality (or social constructions) and the importance of both formal and 
informal spheres of activity. In the case study chapters (3-5) I drew on this method to 
determine the way my entrepreneur-informants perceived and behaved in conditions 
of institutional asymmetry. My fieldwork was undertaken in three comparable but, as 
I have shown, very different small businesses. My objective in this chapter is 
therefore to answer my research question: what can be said about how my informants 
do business in conditions of institutional asymmetry? 
 
Considering the diversity of my informants’ experiences, however, it is necessary to 
consider them in light of theories about how the political economy functions. How 
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can the observations I made in the course of fieldwork be theorised? Given that I cited 
numerous sources in Chapter 1 claiming that business conditions are hard, which 
theory can account for Oleg’s apparently unusual entrepreneurial success? Which 
theory can account for why, in spite of all her problems, Anna did not give up as an 
entrepreneur? Which theory provides an explanation of why, after losing his 
successful business and going to prison, Aleksandr returned to start another 
company? In this chapter I first show that predominant theories dedicated to Russian 
political economy cannot wholly answer such questions because they do not 
sufficiently represent the role and influence of private businesses. These theories 
consider the critical feature of the political economy to be what I describe as its 
‘hybridity’, in which the state dominates the weak, vulnerable private sector. 
Undoubtedly, the central idea in hybrid theories is important: it is undeniable that my 
informants’ primary motivation is to respond to the difficulties they associate with the 
state. At the same time, these theories place too much emphasis on the influence of 
the state over business, and not enough on entrepreneurs’ agency as I observed it. 
Indeed, the most obvious conclusion emerging from the case studies is that although 
entrepreneurship is clearly difficult, entrepreneurs’ can survive and some, like Oleg, 
thrive. This has not been sufficiently explained in predominant theories. Therefore, 
my task in this chapter moves from considering how my informants ‘get by’, to how 
these findings can contribute to improving theoretical conceptualisation of the 
relationship between business and the state. 
 
I begin by describing how predominant theories of the Russian political economy 
concentrate chiefly on the power and functions of the state. This, I emphasise, is not a 
surprise, since they are chiefly concerned with macro trends. However, this does 
leave the role and influence of entrepreneurs most absert in their analyses. This 
observation reinforces my original point that too little research has been undertaken to 
determine what entrepreneurs are actually doing in such difficult conditions, which 
has allowed theory to develop without a thorough empirical basis, or one that 
considers macro and micro trends effectively. Consequently, these authoritative 
theories imply that business is difficult, the private sector is subordinate and 
entrepreneurs are vulnerable. This conclusion is reinforced by specific empirical 
studies of business based upon macro-economic, policy and political analyses which, 
I stated in Chapter 1, means that extant empirical and theoretical research reinforce 
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one another, leaving minimal academic impetus or incentive for new observational 
studies of business. I therefore find that there is a theoretical and empirical shortfall in 
the study of entrepreneurship that has resulted in a misunderstanding of its role and 
function regarding the state. In response I will argue that although the state has an 
undeniably dominant role in the political economy, there is a need to improve 
theoretical accounts of the role of entrepreneurs and the private sector. Clearly, if 
current theories emphasise the observation that business is difficult then they 
overlook many of the observations I have described in the case study chapters, and 
specifically the fact that the institutional environment did not wholly inhibit my 
informants’ capacity to act in their own interests. My informants are not (only) 
submissive to the state but exhibit an indomitable drive for independence from 
constraint, considerable freedom to act even when under pressure, the capabilities to 
change and influence their material and relational circumstances and to resist 
potential and actual interference, albeit to varying degrees. I therefore find that the 
case studies offer an important opportunity to enhance the way in which business-
state relations in Russia are considered theoretically.  
 
In order to make use of the case study materials, an alternative theoretical 
concueptualisation is required which can accommodate the clear relative power of 
Russian state officials and effectively portray the independence, influence and 
resistance that my informants demonstrated. In the following section, I draw on North 
et al’s LAO theory, which, as I wrote in Chapter 2, can explain the arbitrary power of 
Russia’s ‘dominant coalition’ based on the need to limit violence among competing 
interests. This theory is also persuasive because it was not conceived for the Russian 
case alone, which means that I can treat Russia not as an exception but as subject to 
the same constraints as other developing countries, despite the pathologies particular 
to the Russian case that I have described. Most importantly, LAO theory states that 
the specific role of the private sector is determined by studying institutional 
constraints in the context of limited access. This means that I can apply my case study 
material (which is based on the study of entrepreneurship under conditions of 
institutional asymmetry) to determine the specific relationship between entrepreneurs 
and the state within this theoretical framework. 
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Finally, I make the case that a sufficient theory of hybridity, which can explain the 
agency of my informants’ relations with the state irrespective of their situations, 
would draw on Yurchak’s argument that the Russian state itself takes a hybrid form, 
divided into officialised-public and personalised-public forms. By understanding that 
the state functions between these spheres, entrepreneurs’ agency, their 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, can be explained. However, I also move beyond 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, which does not address the specific reasons why 
my informants choose to resist the state rather than merely avoid it. I find that 
entrepreneurs do seek ‘civilised reality’, as Yurchak argued, but they also seek to 
undermine the state and improve their material circumstances in their own ways. I 
therefore draw on LAO theory to explain the structure of the political economy and 
priorities of Russia’s ruling elite, and combine it with both Yurchak’s concept of 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, and my own evidence of entrepreneurial 
resistance, to describe entrepreneurs’ role and function under LAO conditions. This 
offers, first, a theoretically grounded explanation of how my informants survive and 
thrive in difficult conditions and second, a reconceptualisation of Russia’s political 
economy that accounts for their agency and enhances empirical and theoretical 
understanding of business-state relations. I conclude that it is the personalisation of 
the state, rather than the dominance of the state, which plays the most important role 
in determining entrepreneurial activities. 
 
Overall I draw on my three case studies to set out a distinctive contribution to 
theoretical knowledge. I endorse the case that the Russian political economy 
functions according to the logic of limited access. This means that the country’s 
dominant coalition works to maximise their interests and minimise the potential for 
violence and, ultimately, that the economic modernisation promised by the 
government is more a rhetorical device than substantive policy. As a result 
entrepreneurs work, like elites, between the formal and informal spheres, and are 
subject to ‘suspended punishment’. However successful entrepreneurs recognise that 
business is less about developing a formal business than seeking, like the elites, to 
protect their access to resources and interests. Moreover, I also argue that 
entrepreneurs’ agency is considerably greater than predominant theories maintain, 
which represents a new empirical and theoretical intervention in studies of Russian 
business and demonstrates the validity of an ethnographic approach to political 
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economic research. I argue that my informants became entrepreneurs in spite of the 
risks precisely not to be dependent upon the state, and to undermine the constraints 
upon them. Just as Russia’s elites seek to minimise the capacity of their peers for 
violence, so entrepreneurs seek to extricate themselves from a situation in which they 
are also vulnerable. Ultimately, I make the inference that as a group entrepreneurs 
may represent a latent bloc of opposition to the political economic status quo. They 
are the group most conscious of the problems of the political economy and have the 
capacity (agency) to resist the predatory state. Their willingness to create a united 
bloc, to challenge the state, however, is weakened by the individualism that is at the 
heart of their actions. The sad irony is that although every entrepreneur knows that 
most of their acquaintances feel antagonistic about the status quo, they quietly resist it 
individually rather than work together to challenge it. 
 
6.2 The absence of entrepreneurship in predominant political 
economic theories 
 
The purpose of this section is to show that predominant theories about the Russian 
political economy do not give sufficient attention to the role and influence of 
entrepreneurs as I observed them in Chapters 3-5. This provides the justification for 
looking beyond predominant theories about Russia specifically to the more 
accommodating, parsimonious LAO theory. To be clear, this section is not a straw 
man: I do not critique the effectiveness of predominant theories because they focus 
mainly on macro-economic factors. Rather, I seek to show that the specificity of the 
relationship between business and the state has not been wholly articulated 
theoretically. As a result, the specific dynamics of the interaction between 
entrepreneurs, the state and its officials is not fully realised. To the extent that 
predominant theories pay attention to this interaction, a distinction is typically made 
between a dominant state and a weaker, vulnerable private sector subject to hard 
budget constraints. As Connolly has stated, the relationship between the two sectors is 
considered ‘generally one-way’ (2009: 186), meaning that the private sector is 
subordinate to the state. I begin by outlining several of these theories, which I 
describe as ‘hybrid’ theories because of the emphasis they place on the distinction 
between the strong state and weak private sector. As will become clear, the 
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prevalence of these theories reveals how much credibility the idea of hybridity is 
afforded in current thinking about Russia. Indeed, the centrality of hybridity in these 
theories is typically revealed in their very names. Having described these theories, 
however, it is clear that this type hybridity ineffectively accounts for the influence 
and actions of my informants in their relations with state officials as revealed in the 
case studies. This leads me to argue that a better theoretical conceptualisation of the 
relationship between the state and private sector is required. 
 
6.2.1 A dominant state and vulnerable private sector: predominant 
theories of hybridity 
 
Gaddy and Ickes’ rent management system (RMS) is the pre-eminent articulation of 
hybridity, based on their argument that ‘any examination of the Russian economy 
ought to take oil and gas as its starting point’ (2010: 284). In this system, oil and gas 
rents are distributed between state-affiliated corporation owners, oligarchs, senior 
officials and important regional governors. The most important regions, cities and 
enterprises receive the most rent, which ensures social stability, while the need to pay 
rents and raise a profit ensures the oligarchs keep their rent-generating enterprises 
efficient and remain politically loyal (Gaddy and Ickes 2015: 19). Gaddy and Ickes’ 
assertion that the Russian economy is ‘addicted’ to rents, thereby inhibiting the 
development of business, or more generally ‘modernisation’, has been a theme in 
their long-term work on the Russian economy (2002; 2005; 2013) and is widely 
accepted in the literature. Susanne Oxenstierna, for example, makes a direct link 
between rent addiction, the non-development of the private sector and institutions 
(2013: 36-38). Although Connolly has clarified that the RMS is meant principally to 
illustrate ‘the key factors that shape economic development’ (2015: 11), and it is 
undisputed that resource industries are primarily responsible for Russia’s economic 
growth under Putin, this has not limited the conclusions Gaddy and Ickes draw from 
their analyses: in their most recent iteration they conclude that the RMS is now 
inherent to Russia’s political economic condition, irrespective of who holds power 
(2015: 26). From the perspective of business-state relations, I consider this assertion 
too bold: first, it is not possible to test a claim about the future and, more importantly, 
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this claim relegates Russia’s entrepreneurial sector to indefinite conceptual and 
empirical irrelevance, which my case materials refute. 
 
In a study of Russia’s prospects for modernisation, Jan Winiecki concludes that 
Russia is over-dependent on mineral resource revenues (2012: 309) and the economic 
sphere is characterised by a strong state and a vulnerable private sector. Businesses, 
he argues, understand they are ‘private until further orders from the government’, and 
SMEs ‘suffer from racketeering by mafia, the bureaucracy or (often) by both working 
in tandem’ (Winiecki 2012: 313). He concludes that ‘serious institutional and policy 
changes… seem to be beyond reach for political reasons’ (Winiecki 2012: 314). This, 
he argues, will frustrate Russia’s further development. Thus Winiecki considers that 
business has a structurally subordinate role to the state in Russia’s political economy. 
Again, I do not find anything problematic in this argument, and indeed agree with it 
in principle, but as a study that considers business-state relations, it does not account 
for the agency I have observed among private sector actors. 
 
Robinson has also argued that the state is the only actor strong enough to deliver 
change and meet the demands of post-Soviet Russian society, and described the 
political economy in terms of ‘state capitalism’ (2013a: 5-6). In earlier work, 
Robinson used this term tentatively, suggesting that there was an emerging trend 
toward ‘the state asserting its right to be the arbiter of how property is distributed and 
to do this in opposition to outside interests if it chooses’ (2009: 443). He drew 
particular attention to the influence of the state over large commercial organisations 
(mainly former Soviet enterprises) and foreign companies rather than ordinary 
entrepreneurs. In a later book he used the term again, and conceived of state 
capitalism as a ‘loose category’ due to uncertainty about whether it is ‘something that 
exists as a form of political economy in Russia or whether it is a project, something to 
be created to address developmental goals’ (2013a: 5). State capitalism, he argued, ‘is 
frequently described as having latent properties as much as actual ones that can be 
analysed. This enables the analyst to impute characteristics to it without their fully 
being there’ (Robinson 2013a: 5). Although Robinson feels able to use the term ‘state 
capitalism’ tentatively, I contend that such a model, in which the state is considered to 
be both actual and latent, is empirically problematic: if only the state (in both action 
and inaction) is a determinant variable then the private sector is deemed to hold no 
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influence. Hence this theory does not allow for the influence my informants wield 
relative to the state either. 
 
Bremmer has used the term ‘state capitalism’ more confidently. He argues that this is 
not a Russian or post-Soviet phenomenon but a general trend across the developing 
world (Bremmer 2009: 40). This claim is also endorsed by The Economist (2012c: 
online), which devoted a special edition to the worldwide emergence of state 
capitalism (2012b: online). According to Bremmer, under state capitalism ‘the state 
functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain’ 
(Bremmer 2009: 41). Governments are not content to regulate the market but seek to 
use it ‘to bolster their own domestic political positions’ principally through national 
oil corporations, state-owned enterprises, privately owned national champions and 
sovereign wealth funds (Bremmer 2009: 42). He makes the case that in Russia ‘any 
large business must have favourable relations with the state in order to succeed’ 
(Bremmer 2009: 43) while close personal ties between the Kremlin and the bosses of 
these companies mean that politicians and bureaucrats are more closely bound to 
economic decision-making than at any time since the Cold War (Bremmer 2009: 44).  
Conversely the ‘free-market tide’ that began with the fall of the Soviet Union has 
receded (Bremmer 2009: 40-41). As The Economist states, state-backed companies 
account for over 60 per cent of the value of the Russian stock market (The Economist 
2012c: online). 
 
Although theories of state capitalism focus on macro-trends, there is no doubt that 
they are persuasive. Andrei Illarionov argued in 2006 that the Russian state had 
become ‘corporatised’ (2006: online), such that state-owned companies privatise their 
profits and nationalise their losses, driven by a corporate ideology in which 
privileges, subsidies, credits, powers and authority are offered to those who are 
‘nashi’ or ‘ours’ (Illarionov 2006: online). Simeon Djankov argues that state 
capitalism replaced crony capitalism in 2003 when Khodorkovsky was arrested and 
the state nationalised his shares in Yukos, which ‘soured investor sentiment on the 
security of private property’ (Åslund in Djankov 2015: 3). Thereafter oligarchs were 
‘replaced at the heart of the economy by state-sector bureaugarchs’ (The Economist 
2012d: online). Since then the state has dominated the economy. In 2015, 55 per cent 
of the economy was in state hands and nearly 30 per cent of the workforce, a higher 
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proportion than in 1996 (Djankov 2015: 3). Nevertheless, despite the general 
effectiveness of this argument, I maintain that this concept demotes private business, 
and particularly entrepreneurship, to weakness and irrelevance: by definition, if big 
business is dependent upon the state, small business must be more dependent still. 
 
Another influential model of hybridity is patrimonialism. According to Robinson, 
scholars differ over whether Russia is a ‘patrimonial capitalist’ state, or a 
‘neopatrimonial’ state (Robinson 2011: 437). The former, which he endorses, occurs 
when traditionally patrimonial forms of political and economic organisation (in which 
power over the economy is personalised) are forced to undertake market reforms, 
instigated by external lenders or agencies (Robinson 2011: 436). In Russia this has 
created a situation in which Putin must balance the tension between formal and 
informal institutions and the imposition of market rationality imposed by global price 
structures and trade flows. He must therefore govern by combining the logics of each 
of these demands, playing one off against the other as required (Robinson 2011: 437). 
Under these conditions, ‘modernisation’ or economic transition is hard to achieve 
because it would require a ‘political break’ that destroyed the elites’ hold over the 
economy, and a ‘economic break’ that introduced new actors that were ‘powerful 
enough to supplant the elite and rewrite the political rules’ (Robinson 2011: 438). To 
date these breaks have not occurred. Indeed, Robinson has extended his analysis to 
argue that patrimonial capitalism is a post-Soviet tendency, categorising the political 
economies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine as well as Russia using this term 
(2013b). In these countries, elite groups are economically favoured and their public 
legitimacy is based on elite agreement. The public accepts this as their ‘economic 
order’, such that ‘legitimacy flows from other power-holders, not from the governed’. 
Hence even if economic reform were mooted it would suffer from ‘collective action 
problems’ (Robinson 2013b: 140). Clearly the stability of patrimonial capitalism is 
derived, as with the RMS, from the ability of elites to secure income as loans or 
energy rents from foreign sources. Therefore, Robinson argues that only when this 
income starts to decline will political crises arise (2013b: 144). As a result, in this 
conceptualisation the private sector is considered to be marginalised and would 
require elite intervention to develop. I do not contend these conclusions, but my 
materials indicate that entrepreneurs can develop their businesses without elite 
intervention. I also find that, to the contrary, sometimes elites need the private sector 
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in order to develop too. Again I find that a more nuanced conceptualisation is 
required. 
 
Neopatrimonialism, in contrast, is determined not by external forces but the tension 
between Russia’s traditional patrimonialism and its rational-legal institutions 
(Robinson 2011: 437). As Vladimir Gel’man has argued, drawing on North’s work on 
institutions, the traditional patrimonial (informal) institutions trump the formal 
institutions of state. He states that specifically ‘neo-patrimonial political institutions’ 
have been built to ‘serve the interests of ruling groups in Russia and other post-Soviet 
states and consolidate their political and economic dominance’ as opposed to formal 
institutions that would allow for a programme of western-type modernisation (2016: 
457). Oleksandr Fisun has made this argument particularly eloquently, arguing that 
‘in the neopatrimonial system, the ruling groups regard society as their own private 
domain, and the fulfilment of public functions as a legitimate means to their own 
personal enrichment’ (Fisun 2012: 90). As with patrimonial capitalism, therefore, 
neopatrimonialism depicts the private sector as too weak to influence the structures 
that determine Russia’s political and economic fate. As Fisun puts it, in a 
neopatrimonial system ‘the individual national leader controls the political and 
economic life of the country, and the personal cliental relationships with the leader 
play a crucial role in amassing personal wealth, or in the rise and decline of members 
of the political elite’ (Fisun 2012: 91). Nonetheless, this emphasis on the elite does 
not sufficiently allow for the material influence and resistance of private interests that 
my case studies revealed, so it has only partial explanatory value when considering 
the actual capacity and activities of businesses. 
 
In Sutela’s theory of a ‘dual economy’, another theory of hybridity, he perceives 
duality in three areas. First, because Russia is so large that economic competition in 
remote areas is impossible on account of prohibitive transport costs, while other areas 
are integrated into international markets. Second, the Russian financial system is 
divided because households and SMEs rely on domestic financial institutions while 
the largest businesses operate internationally. Third, Russia’s law on ‘strategic 
sectors’ exhibits dualism since these businesses are ‘either owned or at least 
controlled to a degree deemed necessary by the state… Those deemed of less 
importance are left to markets and private entrepreneurship’ (2013: 64). Sutela, like 
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Robinson, argues that the specific extent of dualism in the economy is unclear 
because the state cannot be clearly defined; one’s affairs may not interest the Kremlin 
but they could interest a regional official (Sutela 2013: 64), for example. This implies 
that that the state’s power is arbitrarily applied and the role of officials in private 
enterprises varies significantly (Sutela 2013: 64-65). At the same time, the 
overwhelming strength of the state maintains the continual weakness and dependence 
of the private sector. Whether the state is dominant all of the time or not, its relative 
strength over the subordinate private sector is the key feature of this theory which, 
like the other theories I have included in this section, means it does not give sufficient 
attention to the specific characteristics of the relationship between state and private 
sector. 
 
Phillip Hanson has also conceived of a Russian ‘dual economy’ (2007: 869), but 
applies the term in a different way. He argues that dualism exists in the sense that the 
state, particularly the presidential administration (as opposed to policy makers), has 
taken a direct interest in some sectors of the economy, particularly but not exclusively 
oil and gas (Hanson 2007: 877-879) since the Yukos saga began in 2003 (Hanson 
2007: 875-876). In some sectors this intervention has done significant harm while in 
others entrepreneurs have adapted ‘in the belief that there is a viable framework of 
informal rules that they understand’ (Hanson 2007: 887). Richard Sakwa has taken on 
Hanson’s concept and argues that under this system market forces ‘operate freely in 
the private sector, whereas in the state-controlled sector (but not-necessarily state-
owned) strategic development-oriented part of the economy, more dirigiste rules… 
apply’ (2013: 88). For Sakwa a dual state has been created in which patrimonial and 
legal-rational systems of domination exist in parallel and ‘operate at the same time, 
reproducing dualism at all levels and allowing actors to operate elements of either but 
undermining the inherent internal logic of both’ (Sakwa 2013: 69). The work of 
Hanson and Sakwa is, again, persuasive and closely relates to the argument I made in 
Chapter 1 in which institutional asymmetry creates risks for the private sector, forcing 
entrepreneurs to adapt their behaviour. Moreover, in Sakwa’s analysis of two cases of 
reiderstvo against private companies, one was successful and the other was not, 
leading him to conclude, carefully, that Russia does not have a ‘prerogative state’, but 
one ‘trapped in the gray area between an administrative and a genuine constitutional 
state’ (Sakwa 2013: 70). In his theory, therefore, Sakwa argues, unusually, that 
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businesses can sometimes resist the state, which is reinforced by my findings. 
However, Sakwa, like Hanson, focuses upon the relationship between the state and 
big business; his work does not consider the role of ordinary entrepreneurs, so no 
insight is given to how small businesses can resist the state from their position of 
weakness. Indeed as I have stated already, the absence of attention upon ordinary 
entrepreneurs is characteristic of all theories of how the Russian political economy is 
structured. 
 
The final theory of hybridity I highlight is the idea that the Russian political economy 
is neo-feudal or, as Inozemtsev describes it, a ‘power vertical in which power is 
converted into money, and vice versa’ (2011: online). Within this system power can 
be bought, which means that the country is governed feudally at every level, overseen 
by President Putin himself and controlled dutifully by his friends and colleagues: ‘All 
big national business is associated with the federal authorities or controlled by them; 
local entrepreneurs still try to bargain with regional bureaucracy’ (Inozemtsev 2011: 
online). The hybridity in this theory is distinguished by the separation between those 
individuals with access to the ‘vertical’, and those without, who are forced to fend for 
themselves within their respective locales. Inozemtsev argues that this system, like 
the RMS, will endure, because it would be ‘totally illogical’ for the political class to 
change it, and because joining the system is so attractive to the rest who, like 
participants in a Ponzi scheme, believe being involved offers more chance of 
advancement than remaining outside (2011: online). Similarly, Shlapentokh and 
Arutunyan also describe Russian society as ‘feudal’, arguing that bureaucrats are able 
to turn their offices into fiefdoms, which becomes a source of enrichment not only for 
the individual but also for networks of his or her relatives and friends’ (2013: 29). 
Like each of these theories, the idea of Russia as a feudal country is persuasive. 
Uniquely, the theory of feudalism foresees the possibility that individuals excluded 
from the vertical of power can become included in the system if they pay. 
Nonetheless the possibility that private sector actors may have their own agenda, may 
reject the system itself or indeed wield their own influence independent of the state is 
not considered. 
 
Overall, in spite of some differences in their depiction of Russia’s political regime, 
these predominant theories share the view that the political economy takes a hybrid 
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form in which the state has a dominant, leading role in the economy and the private 
sector is weak and vulnerable (with the exception of Sakwa, who argues that some big 
businesses have been able to resist the state, although he gives no attention to the type 
of small businesses I studied). I concur that the overwhelming size and importance of 
Russia’s state-controlled industries to the political elite and economic fate of the 
country is indisputable, and, as I will argue, the influence of informal political power 
over formal institutions is integral to the way in which the country is ruled. Indeed, in 
Chapter 1 I drew on numerous studies showing that many of the problems facing 
small businesses stem from the overwhelming power and arbitrarily destructive role 
of state officials acting in their own interests, and this is also clear in the case studies 
of Anna and Aleksandr. At the same time, the case studies also show that the 
relationship between the state and small business is not entirely determined by the 
vulnerability of the latter to the former. As a result, a more nuanced account of 
business-state relations is required. 
 
6.2.2 Summary 
 
In this section I described several predominant theories about the political economy 
of Russia. My purpose was to show that due to their level of analyses, focused on 
macro-economic factors, they all reach a similar conclusion regarding business-state 
relations, despite nuances between them: specifically, the relative power of state 
officials to act arbitrarily over the weaker private sector actors. This, I emphasise, is 
undoubtedly correct and reflects my findings too. Nevertheless, greater insight into 
the actual capacity of entrepreneurship, the specific activities of entrepreneurs, and 
business-state relations (particularly with SMEs), is required and possible. My case 
study material indicates that although the private sector is clearly comparatively 
weak, entrepreneurs are not content to suffer this weakness, seek freedom from the 
state, and may undertake activities to resist it.  I now make the case that LAO theory 
can accommodate both the relative strength of the state, emphasized by current 
predominant theories, and the entrepreneurial agency I observed in the course of my 
fieldwork. 
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6.3 Russia as a limited access order 
 
In this short section I follow North et al (2013a: 332) and Connolly (2009) to claim 
that Russia’s political economy is better described as a limited access order (LAO). I 
begin by clarifying what an LAO is, building on the introduction in Chapter 2. LAOs 
are one of three ‘orders’ within a typology developed by North et al to understand the 
way political, economic and social forces in developing countries interact (North et al 
2013b: 1).30 An LAO:  
 
‘ … creates limits on access to valuable political and economic functions as a 
way to generate rents. Rents are created both by limits on access to resources and 
functions – like worship, trade, education and warfare – and by limiting access to 
forms of social organisation that larger society will support. Powerful individuals 
possess privileges and rents, and since violence threatens or reduces those rents, the 
risk of losing rents can make it in the interests of powerful individuals and groups to 
cooperate with the coalition in power rather than to fight. Privileged individuals have 
privileged access to social tools enabling them, and only them, to form powerful 
organisations. In limited access orders the political system manipulates the economy 
to create rents as a means of solving the problem of violence’ (North et al 2007: 3). 
 
To put this most simply, LAOs are governed by a ‘dominant coalition’ that 
manipulates the country’s economic interests to create rents so that the most powerful 
members of society are persuaded to refrain from violence (North et al 2007: 3-5). 
According to Connolly, who first applied LAO theory to the Russian case, the 
contemporary Russian state wields less control over the economy than its Soviet 
predecessor but remains in control of the main sources of revenue, which enable it to 
‘suppress any potential sources of economic and political power’ (2009: 200). 
Moreover, these economic sectors are accessible only by insiders through patronage 
networks, so the involvement of outsiders remains limited (Connolly 2009: 200). In 
                                                
30 LAOs may be seen in contrast to open access orders (OAO), which, like Western societies, 
‘use competition and institutions to make it in the interests of political officials to observe 
constitutional rules, including constitutional control over all organizations with the potential 
for major violence’ (North et al 2007: 4).  
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this way the primary objective of Russia’s dominant coalition is explained by its 
motivation to minimise a constant threat from internal or external challengers. It 
follows that economic performance depends upon how these threats are handled 
(Diaz-Cayeros 2013: 236). Ordinarily the solution is not efficient in terms of the 
organisation of economic activity, but such arrangements are required to ensure some 
economic accumulation. North et al point out that removing rents would not result in 
a competitive market economy but ‘a society in violence and disorder’ (2013b: 7). 
This makes LAOs stable to the extent that they can minimise violence, but ‘second 
best in terms of productivity and growth’ (Diaz-Cayeros 2013: 236). It is therefore 
important to recognise that LAO theory does not work within the framework of 
modernisation. Accordingly, as North et al themselves state, ‘dualism’ is a typical 
economic feature in an LAO: 
 
‘Many LAOs today have dualistic economies, with a domestic economy 
governed by domestic rules and institutions and international enclaves run by a 
separate set of rules and institutions, modelled on and enforced by foreign OAOs … 
Participation in the enclave of the global economy, with access to international 
capital and secure property rights, gives third world elites opportunities to prosper 
without having to alter their domestic LAO institutions that produce security and 
sustain their rents’ (2007: 39-40). 
 
These features, I argue, explain the motivation of the Russian elite (dominant 
coalition) to maintain political and economic power and, consequently, the ongoing 
weakness and vulnerability of the private sector. I therefore claim that LAO theory 
can accommodate the central element in the predominant hybrid theories I have 
described, namely the unassailable power of the state and dominant elite in relation to 
the private sector. In any case LAO theory was not developed for the Russian case 
alone, so it is a more elegant conceptualisation. 
 
If LAO theory effectively explains the central role of Russia’s dominant coalition, 
how does it accommodate the role and influence of the private sector as I have 
described it in the case studies? As I have said, North et al acknowledge that private 
enterprise is often difficult in LAOs but do not assume that the private sector is a 
dependent variable in the political economy. Rather, LAOs exist along a spectrum 
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‘differentiated by the structure of their organisations’ (North et al 2013b: 10-11) 
which means that each LAO must be examined to determine the specific 
‘mechanisms and institutions’ by which they sustain private organisations and what 
motivates members of the dominant coalition to respect them (2007: 44). In other 
words North et al demand that the specific characteristics of the relationship between 
the dominant coalition and the private sector is investigated. As North argued in his 
earlier Nobel prize winning work (see Chapter 1), a society’s ‘institutional matrix’ 
determines the rules of the game for organisations, so tracing the way firms respond 
to the opportunities and limitations these present offers a method for situating 
businesses within Russia’s ‘oligarchic model of wealth creation and industry 
domination’ (Aidis 2015: 78-79). Since studying the institutional constraints on 
businesses formed the basis of my empirical approach, my case study material can 
form the basis of this investigation. To be clear, these case studies can serve to 
illustrate what the specific features of the relationship between the state and small 
business in Russia’s LAO are. This will build on Connolly’s work, in which he made 
the initial case for conceiving of Russia as an LAO based on analysis of macro-
economic factors. 
 
Before proceeding, I note that Yakovlev (2015) did try to examine the Russian private 
sector using the LAO framework in a study assessing the prospects for an improved 
business climate in the country. He postulated that Russia’s dominant coalition could 
become more stable and bring about long-term growth following the 2008-09 crisis if 
it took steps to integrate new (medium-sized) business interests into the dominant 
coalition. He argued that the government had a genuine will to achieve this by 
enhancing the status of business associations, but this was not welcomed by the 
siloviki (in his view the leading group in the dominant coalition), who stood to lose 
rent and power, and whose position was also strengthened as a result of their clamp 
down on the mass protests of 2011 (Yakovlev 2015: 62 and 74). He therefore 
concluded that the involvement of medium-sized business could strengthen the 
stability of the dominant coalition but this has not happened yet (Yakovlev 2015: 74). 
I counter that this conclusion is satisfactory in principle, but his methodological 
approach leads him to assume that businesses within Russia’s already-existing LAO 
are of one mind, would be willing to be coopted into state-affiliated business 
organisations, and to join the dominant coalition. Like the majority of studies of 
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Russian business, and indeed predominant theories of ‘hybridity’, his assumptions are 
based on the idea that the private sector is dependent on the dominant coalition 
without reference to empirical data. As I have claimed, a methodology based on 
policy analysis cannot provide an accurate understanding of what businesses are 
doing in Russia. It is also unclear which businesses he is describing, because 
‘business’ is analysed as a single entity. Also, like all the theorists cited in this 
chapter, he does not focus on small businesses or entrepreneurs. Hence the conditions 
on which it/they might join a dominant coalition is unknown.  
 
In this brief section I argued that LAO theory can provide a sufficient framework for 
recognising both the relative strength of the Russian state over the rest of the 
economy while accommodating the influence of the private sector as demonstrated by 
my informants. LAO theory is appropriate because it recognises the importance of 
understanding how institutions work at the level of agency, following North’s 
pioneering work on institutions that I highlighted in Chapter 1. However, this work 
has not yet been undertaken. I therefore now set out to determine for the first time 
with observational data what the specific role and influence of small business is in 
Russia within the framework of LAO theory. This offers a theoretical framework that 
acknowledges the hybridity of Russia’s political economy and the role of its private 
sector actors. 
 
6.4 The role of entrepreneurs in Russia’s limited access order 
 
I now develop a conceptualisation of my informants’ agency by re-examining their 
entrepreneurship under LAO conditions. This enables me to achieve two objectives. 
First, by explaining how my informants survive and thrive in spite of their 
vulnerability I answer my original research question. Second, by developing a 
theoretical framework for their agency I can account for the role entrepreneurs play in 
the context of limited access and the specific reasons why they are permitted to 
survive. I conclude that the private sector is not simply vulnerable but, rather, that it is 
an essential resource for all individuals in the ruling elite, state bureaucracy and 
business sector working entrepreneurially.  
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6.4.1 Rethinking hybridity 
 
I begin with the observation that in each case study ‘the state’ was manifest in a 
personalised rather than bureaucratic form. In Oleg’s case ‘the state’ was represented 
by the bureaucrat he bribed in order to secure support for the Cooperative project, and 
Valentina and Volodya, regional members of the dominant coalition who sought 
Sibtekhnika’s services. None of these officials were antagonistic to Oleg but together 
they developed ways of working that served mutual interests. In Anna’s case ‘the 
state’ took the form of prosecution service officials who had mounted a legal case 
against her. Although Anna had undoubtedly made formal mistakes and was indebted 
to her former clients, individuals in the prosecution service had not given her detailed 
information about the case even after many months of harassment. Some of these 
individuals were working, at least in part, on behalf of her former clients for their own 
personal gain. As a consequence, she devoted considerable time to influencing them, 
but had little understanding of her progress. On the other hand, she did not take her 
concerns to others within that local bureaucracy, but sought to convince the president 
personally of her claim to innocence. In Aleksandr’s case the ‘state’ was represented 
by bureaucrats within the state-controlled MUP Gorodstroi who stripped the assets 
from his business and conspired to imprison him. Thus in all three cases the Russian 
‘state’ was never experienced as a formal or faceless bureaucracy. On the contrary, 
dealing with ‘the state’ meant dealing with the unpredictable and personal objectives 
of officials. Therefore just as social capital is important between businesspeople, 
personal relations are crucial in encounters between officials and entrepreneurs. To 
this extent the vulnerability of the private sector must be contextualised rather than 
generalised; it is not the case that all businesses are dependent upon the state. On the 
contrary, relations between even the dominant coalition and entrepreneurs may be 
cordial. As Oleg’s case revealed, even though Sibtekhnika was weaker relative to the 
enormous formal power of Valentina and Volodya, he was in a stronger position in 
the context of their encounter because they needed resources and support unavailable 
locally. Valentina and Volodya became, through political affiliation, among the 
wealthiest people in the entire oblast’. They are representatives of the dominant 
coalition at the regional level, personally exercising power over their territory for 
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economic gain,31 yet their relationship with Oleg, who bore no threat to their regional 
coalition, was cordial. 
 
I find that Yurchak offers the best explanation for why personal rather than formal 
relations between the state and entrepreneurs are so significant: he argues that the 
state is partially privatised by its own officials (2002: 312). Thus business has 
developed according to this ‘hybridity’ in which personal relations take precedence 
over formalities. The hybridity of the state means that entrepreneurs with registered 
companies, such as my informants, are not the only actors behaving entrepreneurially. 
In my case studies regional elites, officials and criminals all do so, which means that 
the boundary between the state and private sector breaks down in the ‘actually 
existing’ economy. These people moved between the officialised-public and 
personalised-public spheres entrepreneurially to their own advantage in their relations 
with my informants. Overall, it is clear that the idea of hybridity between the state and 
private sector is less in evidence than the conceptualisation Yurchak offers of the state 
itself in hybrid form. This demonstrates that the role of the state in the business 
sphere is not formal, but personal.  
 
I now reflect on my informants’ experiences to show how they dealt with the 
personalised state and argue that they learnt to do so in various ways and at various 
stages. Oleg grasped the need to deal with the personalised state very early, whereas 
Anna and Aleksandr learnt to do so as a consequence of their crises. In order to 
account for their agency in their respective situations, I draw on the concept of 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’. To reiterate, this reconstitutes they way 
entrepreneurship is understood: not conventionally as a vocation but with a 
Foucauldian emphasis on the ‘rationalities and practices’ (see Kerr 1999: 174), or the 
attitudes and behaviours of entrepreneurs themselves. This, indeed, offers an 
explanation of how all actors behave entrepreneurially. As I now show, 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ offers a way of accounting not only for what 
entrepreneurs are doing, but why and how they do it in spite of their structurally 
vulnerable situation; it offers an explanation of agency that is not determined by 
                                                
31 Inozemtsev has noted that the Russian elite is increasingly composed of dominant families 
or clans in his aforementioned description of Russia’s ‘neo-feudalism’ (2011).  
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vulnerability, as predominant hybrid theories assume. Indeed, I go beyond 
entrepreneurial governmentality to argue that entrepreneurship is not characterised by 
vulnerability alone but by a drive for independence and, where possible, resistance 
too. 
 
6.4.2 ‘Entrepreneurial governmentality’ and resistance in the case of Oleg 
 
Oleg told me that he specifically developed his entrepreneurial approach around the 
need to ‘get by’ in the absence of state support by drawing on his social capital. Such 
was his ability to achieve this that he built a profitable business that has avoided 
external interference for over two decades. Three specific capabilities explain this 
success. First, he knew his local competitors and worked with them to achieve shared 
control over supplying their market by developing a minor coalition. This, I argued, 
clearly functions according to the logic of limited access in that it reduces the 
potential for violence and interference over members’ profit source. Although it 
differs from the logic of the dominant coalition which is focused on securing shared 
control over rent sources, the point is that in a situation in which Oleg and his 
competitors are all vulnerable, they have joined forces to remove one aspect of that 
vulnerability, which is each other. Second, Oleg has a distinctly pragmatic approach 
to business relations. He recognises that the business sphere is not occupied 
exclusively by entrepreneurs but includes officials, the mafiya and so on, so he works 
to develop cordial relations with them all. Third, Oleg and his team are dedicated to 
asserting and displaying control within the business and in their external relations as a 
way of promoting the seriousness and credibility of the business. This serves as a 
deterrent to potential aggressors and shows that Sibtekhnika staff are willing and able 
to get their work done effectively, know what they are doing and can resist potential 
interference. The aim is to show that they are no pushovers. Oleg and his team aim to 
show everyday that they mean business, in both senses of the term. 
 
Through these behaviours Oleg’s ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ is revealed. His 
attitudes and behaviours are motivated by the recognition that he does not work in a 
free market but one in which he is vulnerable, so he must be willing to create better 
conditions to do business under those circumstances. It is not enough to say that as an 
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entrepreneur he survives by using his social capital in the context of institutional 
asymmetry (as the studies I highlighted in Chapter 1 tend to argue). An argument 
based on social capital alone would describe Oleg as particularly well connected but 
would also have to assume he was lucky to have avoided trouble. By using the 
framework of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ instead, his success is associated 
with his particular attitude to what is possible under conditions of ‘suspended 
punishment’ and how in particular he deployed his social capital. The basis of his 
relative success, I therefore argue, is his appreciation of how to behave in a situation 
in which the state operates in a personalised form. In other words ‘entrepreneurial 
governmentality’ is a particular form of agency; it takes luck and vague ‘personal 
networks’ away from the centre of the analysis and provides a framework for 
acknowledging Oleg as a skilful entrepreneur in the context of his circumstances. As 
Yurchak states, this concept considers entrepreneurship as the capacity to ‘think and 
practice’ in ‘relation to different aspects of the world – people, relations, institutions, 
the state, laws – in terms of symbolic commodities, risks, capital, profits, costs, needs, 
demands, and so on’ (Yurchak 2002: 279).  
 
The major example of Oleg’s ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ is his work in remote 
Tsentralnyi with Valentina and Volodya. As members of Russia’s dominant coalition 
they have used their authority in the officialised-public sphere to maximise their 
commercial interests in the personalised-public sphere and in doing so became among 
the wealthiest people in the oblast’. Yet when Valentina and Volodya wanted to buy 
resources unavailable locally they sought to establish strong personal relations with 
Oleg and his team, who could provide them. Thus relations between ‘the state’ 
(represented by Valentina and Volodya) and ‘the private sector’ (represented by Oleg 
and his team) were not based on the vulnerability of the latter upon the former but 
cordiality and mutual interest. Valentina and Volodya secured their retail equipment 
while Oleg gained important regional contacts, an opportunity to pitch for further 
sales to Tsentralnyi’s state budget holders and a large contract to refurbish their shops 
free from competition. Thus agency in the form of entrepreneurial governmentality 
constitutes the basis for business-state relations in Oleg’s case, rather than a vague 
notion of a hybrid power structure. 
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Furthermore, it is striking that the Sibtekhnika team’s first priority is not the growth of 
the business per se. Rather, as I wrote above, the directors’ daily effort is focused on 
creating the conditions and nurturing the relationships required for making business 
possible. This point is underlined further when considering the time and investment 
Oleg devotes to the development of the Cooperative as opposed to Sibtekhnika. The 
purpose of the Cooperative is to change local attitudes and create independent 
thinkers, which is an attempt to promote social change, meaning that Oleg is 
motivated by normative as much as commercial imperatives. I therefore argue that 
Sibtekhnika is as much a means for generating the resources required for a better, 
independent life as it is for profit. Oleg is primarily dedicated to achieving the local 
conditions required to do business, and channels resources into creating the 
conditions required to effect local change rather than doing business per se.  
 
This observation underlines the importance of studying the perceptions and role of 
entrepreneurs using ethnographic methods: an attitudinal study of Oleg’s 
entrepreneurship would have captured his principled opposition to a political 
economy in which he is structurally vulnerable, but it would not have been able to 
determine that he seeks not merely to ‘get by’ but to create the conditions to do 
business and live in spite of that structural vulnerability. Thus it is only by observing 
Oleg’s actual activities that a fuller appreciation of his attitudes are revealed: although 
he is opposed to the status quo he realises that he cannot do anything about it and 
instead prioritises activities to create his own ‘civilised reality’ (see Yurchak 2002: 
313). This finding also goes some way to explaining why small business 
entrepreneurs tend to remain unattached to state-affiliated business organisations (see 
Chapter 1): they see little value in lobbying and prefer to focus on their own 
circumstances without drawing attention to their activities. Hence, ‘entrepreneurial 
governmentality’ offers a framework that can explain Oleg’s success at both avoiding 
predation and building a successful business, and showing that independence is at 
least as important to him as his commercial interests. It also provides an explanation 
of Oleg’s agency that does not rely on social capital or mere luck, which is the 
recourse of most attitudinal studies of Russian business (see Chapter 1) and the 
assumption in predominant theories of hybridity. Indeed, if an example were needed 
of knowing how to act entrepreneurially in the context of a political economy in 
which the state takes a hybrid form, Oleg’s approach would be it. His case also 
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demonstrates that the ‘state’, such as it is, is not inherently antipathetic to the private 
sector, but that officials engage with and exploit it according to their own 
entrepreneurial governmentalities, just as Oleg is prepared to engage with state 
representatives or resist them. This is the logic of limited access: coalitions form 
according to the threats and opportunities they face at any moment.  
 
However, although entrepreneurial governmentality provides an explanation of 
Oleg’s agency and drive for ‘civilized reality’, a more distinctive aspect of my 
findings is that his business is also a means to resist the state. By seeking change the 
Cooperative represents a personal, if surreptitious, challenge to the state and the logic 
of limited access. It shows that Oleg resists the vulnerability that is a feature of life 
outside the dominant coalition. Indeed Oleg does not only seek independence but is 
dedicated through his daily activities within Sibtekhnika to resisting predation, and in 
the Cooperative to denying the state a monopoly on education and ideas. Clearly, it 
appears impossible to act entrepreneurially in a business sphere in which the state 
takes a personalised form without working between the officialised-public (formal) 
and personalised public (informal) spheres, which necessitates working against the 
interests of the state. Abu-Lughod has argued that when ethnographers encounter 
‘resistance’ in their informants’ activities they should ask what it indicates ‘about the 
forms of power that they are up against’ (Abu-Lughod 1990: 47). In response, I find 
that the Russian political economy is less determined by structure than it is by the 
agency of individuals and groups operating according to the logic of limited access. 
Entrepreneurs do not have access to the rents that are distributed among the dominant 
coalition so they must seek to maximise their own interests. At the same time 
entrepreneurs are not content to accept vulnerability; as I show below with respect to 
the other case studies, the difficulties endured by Anna and Aleksandr did not lead 
them to give up entrepreneurship, but made them more determined not to. 
 
6.4.3 ‘Entrepreneurial governmentality’ and resistance in the case of Anna 
 
Anna’s entrepreneurship was inspired by her studies in Europe, which gave her an 
academic understanding of the problems facing entrepreneurs in Russia, and then 
motivated her to establish CSBG. This understanding, which was determined by her 
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perception that the Russian economy was in transition, was misplaced. More to the 
point, she did not prove to be an effective businessperson by any measure, not least 
the Western standard she aspired to, and her malpractice precipitated the crisis she 
continues to endure. Nevertheless, if I put aside the fact that she clearly defrauded her 
clients (my purpose is not to act as an apologist for Anna’s mistakes or ignore the 
losses of her clients) and concentrate on her particular attitudes and behaviours in the 
context of her crisis, it is clear that her descent into crisis led to a significant change 
in her entrepreneurial approach. Most obviously, in financial desperation she began to 
work almost entirely in the shadow economy to hide her income, within two MLM 
companies. This was not purely pragmatic, however, but constituted a shift in her 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’. By participating in MLM she appeased one 
member of the group to which she was indebted by working for him. MLM also gave 
her access to material resources that enabled her to reduce her debt in kind with other 
members of that group. In a similar way, her piecemeal work for the banker enabled 
her to re-establish personable relations with him and reduce more of her liabilities 
rather than face his aggression and influence among her accusers and the prosecution 
service. When examined from the perspective of limited access, these actions clearly 
reduced the potential for violence that she has faced during the crisis, if not remove it 
altogether. In significant respects, therefore, Anna’s crisis forced her to be a more 
effective entrepreneur than she had been before: she became focused on dealing with 
circumstances as they were rather than as she wished them to be. 
 
The way in which Anna dealt with countering the legal and accusatory case made 
against her, moreover, exemplifies ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’. She coopted the 
state’s rhetorical support for business as a material resource in her self-defence, which 
I argue is as significant to her survival in business as her retreat into the shadow 
economy. Anna’s representations to the prosecution service were focused on 
particular officials she judged most likely to support her case; they were 
communicated in ways that underlined the undeniably significant role she had 
personally played in supporting the development of business in the city; and they 
focused on legal ambiguities that could be interpreted in her favour or political 
statements that might let her off the hook. Moreover by continuing her seminar 
programme (at discounted rates or free to her accusers) she maintained her public 
profile as an advocate for business reform. In this sense her business was ideally 
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placed for a fight against her accusers: it is rather awkward to launch a case against a 
company that argues for business reform. As such, Anna used herself as an exemplar 
of the problems in business she had long fought against. Of course, she would have 
rather made money from these seminars but in the context of her crisis she was well 
placed. Most impressively, when her appeal to the presidential administration 
received a reply, it had a significant effect by fortifying in her a sense of 
righteousness and acting as a deterrent against rash interventions by her accusers and 
prosecution service officials. In all these respects the personal rather than procedural 
aspects of her defence were the most effective. By devoting such effort to defending 
herself, furthermore, Anna demonstrated the seriousness of her appeal and refusal to 
merely to accept defeat, which conventional hybrid theories assume would be 
inevitable in the face of a dominant state. Notwithstanding the problems Anna created 
for herself, therefore, in the context of her crisis her ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ 
was significantly better than it had been before. 
 
Like Oleg, I find that much of Anna’s entrepreneurial effort was not to make a profit 
but to create the conditions in which she could continue in business and live an 
independent life, or create her own ‘civilised reality’. Indeed, this was her original 
purpose in business: she founded CSBG to promote the western business norms in 
Russia, which is as normative an objective as it is commercial. Unlike Oleg, 
therefore, who has kept his normative agenda to himself, Anna publicly stood for the 
change she wanted to see, which was brave but naive and provided ammunition for 
her accusers during the crisis. However, it was not this objective that caused her 
problems because, after all, the government publicly shares these objectives. Rather, 
her trouble stemmed from her simple inability to make the business work in 
commercial terms. Indeed most entrepreneurs (like Oleg) have grasped that small 
businesses are vulnerable and that the government is not supporting them, so 
attendance dwindled at Anna’s seminars and demand for her other services fell 
(although her seminars did survive into the crisis and advanced her normative 
objectives). However, if Anna’s formal business reveals the weakness of her 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ before the crisis, her ability to survive the crisis 
reveals how much she has improved as an entrepreneur. What had previously been a 
naive belief in the support of the state for the development of business suddenly 
became useful (even if she no longer believed it!). Her argument that the state had 
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said it supported business and therefore must support hers (even though she had 
proved to be a poor businesswoman), and her faith in the essential benevolence of the 
president (even though her business is of no concern to him) may yet, ironically, 
provide the means for her to exit the crisis and retain her freedom. 
 
Overall, it is true that Anna made commercial mistakes and should be reprimanded 
for the damage and losses she caused. It is also true that her frantic effort to invoke 
the state’s support for business now is a cover for those mistakes. However, when 
viewed from the perspective of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ it is wrong to judge 
this behaviour according to the same standard one might in a market economy. On the 
contrary, she started a business to support the development of business at a time when 
being an entrepreneur in Russia is dangerous. Although her company became 
embroiled in a crisis, her decision to become an entrepreneur was not simply ‘to do 
business’ but to improve the political economic status quo. As such, her 
entrepreneurship has always been about resistance: changing the material conditions 
for business. Therefore her response to that crisis was not simply to salvage the 
vestiges of her floundering business and achieve her freedom but a continuation and 
justification of her life’s work to improve business conditions in spite of the 
difficulty. That she has not run away from her mistakes and sought to earn the money 
to repay her accusers is testimony to her integrity. In sum, Anna’s entrepreneurship 
resembles Oleg’s to the extent that it is dedicated to achieving an independent life in 
spite of the difficulty, and resisting the vulnerability that comes with that decision. 
Indeed Anna has long rejected the status quo and fought for something she believes 
in. 
 
6.4.4 ‘Entrepreneurial governmentality’ and resistance in the case of 
Aleksandr and Yurii 
 
Aleksandr’s case study began with a classic case of reiderstvo in which officials used 
their formal position for personal gain. Prior to that, Aleksandr made the assumption 
that he was working in partnership with these officials. Later, when he realised, or 
admitted to himself, that they intended to strip the assets from his business, it was too 
late. This event had a significant effect on Aleksandr’s entrepreneurial approach, but 
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what it did not do was deter him or his son Yurii from entrepreneurship. Rather, 
Aleksandr emerged from the crisis (prison) extremely shocked and fatigued by what 
he had endured but he soon started a new business. This was not because he had to: 
he could have worked for someone else, returned to state employment or, indeed, left 
the country. Therefore Aleksandr’s case reveals again that, despite the vulnerability of 
the private sector, vulnerability in itself has not deterred my informants from 
entrepreneurship. Rather, entrepreneurship represents a choice to create the conditions 
to live as one wishes in spite of the difficulties of doing so, and a choice they 
willingly make over any other vocation.  
 
During the crisis Aleksandr concluded that officials cannot be trusted and this has 
been determinant of his post-crisis entrepreneurship. He is now resigned to the fact 
that small businesses have a marginal place in the political economy and must learn to 
help themselves. His son Yurii, who follows Russian and international affairs closely, 
echoes this sentiment and claims the government only cares about oil and gas and that 
business is unimportant to the state. In this way it appears that their post-crisis 
assessment matches predominant theories of hybridity, which claim that businesses 
are inherently vulnerable to arbitrary intervention. This assessment is accurate if the 
loss of Aleksandr’s business and his imprisonment are taken to mean that he is a 
helpless entrepreneur. However, the crisis forms only part of his experience and 
cannot account for his decision to start a new business. Moreover, Aleksandr is hardly 
helpless. The crisis provoked him to adapt his entrepreneurial attitudes and 
behaviours significantly, just as Anna’s did. His relentless energy testifies to his 
commitment to remain in business and determination not to make the same mistakes 
again. Whereas before the crisis Aleksandr had prioritised business development (this 
is what led him into the deal with local officials), since the crisis his main concern is 
to avoid contact with them as much as possible. Although he highlighted the 
development of the baza as his business objective, during my fieldwork he and Yurii 
spent most of their time trying to avoid and resist officialdom or dealing with the 
consequences of doing so. In other words Aleksandr and Yurii might say that they are 
victims of a state that neglects and destroys business but they have stayed in business 
and refuse to yield to their vulnerable situation.  
 
 202 
 
Indeed Aleksandr and Yurii spend many hours trying to deal with minor crises 
associated with avoiding officials, or gaining the upper hand in personal deals instead 
of business development. This reinforces Yurchak’s point, which I have now made 
with respect to each informant, that their objective is to create suitable conditions 
(civilised reality) for their own business. This observation is enhanced further when 
considering life on the baza, where several entrepreneurs work together. Unlike 
Oleg’s situation, in which a minor coalition organises resources and ensures 
cooperation to limit outsiders’ access to the market, on the baza Aleksandr and his 
tenants are entwined in a complicated game of one-upmanship in which each 
entrepreneur seeks to maximise their own interests. Aleksandr’s tenant Kirill 
damaged the hot water system only he knew how to fix in order to get the job of 
fixing it. Likewise Vyacheslav claimed he could not pay rent even though he had just 
bought a house, but offered to fix the fence instead. Similarly when Aleksandr 
realised that he could not pay the electricity bill because his bank account had been 
blocked as punishment for delaying payment, he had to borrow money from another 
of his tenants. The tenant could hardly say no: his business needed an electricity 
supply. Even Konstantin, Aleksandr’s lawyer, conspired to take a personal cut from 
the fees for the judicial process in which he was representing Aleksandr. Thus even in 
this situation, in which each entrepreneur is partly reliant on the others due to their 
shared location on the baza, each still behaves according to the logic of 
‘entrepreneurial governmentality’: their priority is to advance their personal interests 
according to opportunities they perceive in a business sphere in which access is 
limited.  
 
Conversely, although the crisis did not deter Aleksandr and Yurii from 
entrepreneurship, it did provoke in them a determination not to seek change beyond 
their own circumstances. Whereas Oleg and Anna seek to change the character of the 
Russian political economy, Aleksandr and Yurii are resigned to defending their 
marginal position within it and taking their chances. Aleksandr’s overwhelming 
priority is to support his family; he lost many friends during the crisis as they 
distanced themselves from him and he has stopped supporting the local charities to 
which he contributed prior to the crisis. His view is that if the state and society cannot 
support him when he is doing well then he is hardly going to make new effort now; 
the state must be resisted. Yurii argues that political change is inevitable and 
 203 
 
‘revolution’ could be months away, but believes it is up to Russia’s next dominant 
coalition to bring it about, rather than the likes of him. As a result, both men prioritise 
advancing their own position to do business. 
 
6.4.5 A reconceptualisation of entrepreneurship in Russia 
 
Overall it is clear that each of my informants object to business conditions in which 
they must work in ‘suspended punishment’. However, their behaviours indicate that 
they are not deterred by these conditions. Rather when conditions worsened for Anna 
and Aleksandr they did not lose their nerve but were more determined to continue as 
entrepreneurs. Likewise despite Oleg’s success he devotes significant personal 
resources to the Cooperative with the objective of challenging sociopolitical norms. I 
find that Yurchak’s argument, in which entrepreneurship is motivated by a drive for 
an independent life in spite of the state rather than commerce per se, offers a good 
interpretation of these behaviours. I add that in my discussions and interviews with 
other entrepreneurs, such as Yurii’s contemporaries, this perception was reinforced: 
they do not expect conditions to change in their favour but only wish to be able to 
‘keep going’ (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, really grasping why entrepreneurs are 
prepared to endure requires going beyond ‘civilised reality’ to show that business 
allows them to work counter to the interests of the state. 
 
In their marginal but determined position in Russian society, entrepreneurs occupy a 
similar place to Russia’s historical intelligentsia. It has been questioned whether the 
intelligentsia still exists in post-Soviet Russia (Kochetkova 2010: 36), but their basic 
role as a distinct social group with particular resistance to conformity, a drive for 
freedom and independence (Berlin 1978: 133; Kochetkova 2010: 13) from the 
political elite bears comparison with my informants’ outlook. Like the intelligentsia, 
these entrepreneurs view state power as overbearing, bemoaning its malign influence 
in the economy and society, and seek to avoid and resist the regime. Likewise, they 
consider themselves an enlightened, persecuted political minority whose views 
contradict those of most Russians, particularly those working for the state, who are 
content with the status quo. Like the intelligentsia they also see themselves as 
patriots, seeking the best for Russia on behalf of wider, less progressive society. In 
 204 
 
this respect they reserve for themselves a special status as a persecuted but 
conscientious and determined minority, able to diagnose the country’s problems but 
unable to change them although, as I have shown, this does not prevent them from 
attempting to improve local conditions for those around them (Kochetkova 2010: 17). 
Also like the intelligentsia, they are affiliated not by formal associations but shared 
values and outlook; as such they cannot be considered an organised opposition, rather 
a distinct social group. Finally my informants occupy a unique social position in 
contemporary Russia, vulnerable but independent, politically conscious but isolated, 
aware of the country’s potential and with practical knowledge but lacking 
organisation. (Russia’s main business associations, after all, are created or coopted by 
the state.) In these respects it is no surprise that Anna and Aleksandr are former 
academics, although entrepreneurship is not only for the elites: before starting in 
business Aleksandr worked in a factory.  Entrepreneurship appears less a mere 
vocation and more a conscious lifestyle for those seeking independence and resistance 
under conditions of limited access. As Berlin wrote on the intelligentsia, ‘they [were] 
a persecuted minority who drew strength from their very persecution; they were the 
self-conscious bearers of a Western message’ (Berlin 1978: 144).  
 
Nevertheless, if this analogy seems too much, it is still indisputable that my 
informants are opposed to, and determined, when possible, to quietly resist, the LAO 
conditions they encounter; their disenfranchisement. The kind of quiet resistance my 
informants undertake is what James C Scott has called ‘infrapolitics’, a hidden or 
‘subterranean world of political conflict which [has] left scarcely a trace in the public 
record’ (Scott 2012: 113), constituted by small acts undertaken over time which 
cannot change the status quo but form ‘a politics which “dare not speak its name”, a 
diagonal politics, a careful and evasive politics that [avoids] dangerous risks’ (Scott 
2012: 113). As he states, infrapolitics is the ‘prevailing genre of day-to-day politics 
for most of the world’s disenfranchised, for all those living in autocratic settings’ 
(Scott 2012: 113). I find it reasonable to see my informants’ efforts to counter the 
state as infrapolitical.  
 
Although infrapolitics is persuasive because it emphasizes the hidden or underhand 
character of the resistance I interpreted in my informants’ activities. However it is 
also quite a loose political term and a more specific theoretical explanation of their 
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agency is required. What does it actually mean to say that resistance is part of my 
informants’ entrepreneurship? What makes these actions specifically resistant? One 
effective response is to draw a comparison with employment in an OAO. In a stable 
institutional environment, entrepreneurs do not have to be concerned about the 
arbitrary intervention of state officials. To be precise, their businesses and 
organisations can rely upon the rule of law and their commercial success is largely the 
result of their own initiative and effort. In Russia’s LAO, however, entrepreneurs start 
their businesses knowing they could be ruined not only by their own failures but the 
intervention of others. This is the essence of why my informants choose, by necessity, 
varying paths of resistance. Clearly, some of my informants’ resistance is more 
pronounced than others. As I claimed in Chapter 5, for example, among the young 
entrepreneurs I encountered in Normalnyi, each made a personal assessment of the 
extent to which their actions are constrained and had arrived at different conclusions 
about how to act in response. In this way the resistance I encountered was not 
uniform and it changed over time too. For instance, Aleksandr is clearly not the same 
risk taker he was before he lost his construction business, but on the other hand his 
crisis has made him determined not to lose out again, so he constantly resists 
engagement with state organs and officials today.   
 
This explanation does not, however, fully explain why my informants chose the risk-
prone entrepreneurial path. I find a counterfactual useful. Suppose I had a secure job 
in an OAO. Over time I established myself in my place of work and, even though I 
am not satisfied with every aspect of the job, I consider the costs of leaving 
detrimental to my income and career trajectory. In this respect I consider the costs of 
exit to be high. In this situation my priority, therefore, is to minimise career risk and 
carry on, knowing I can cope with the everyday annoyances of my work. Moreover, 
even the prospect of greater independence and potentially higher earnings as an 
entrepreneur does not convince me to deviate from the role I already have. In my 
informants’ cases, nevertheless, this logic does not apply. As entrepreneurs in 
Russia’s LAO, the costs of exit are low while the costs of staying are potentially high: 
as I have shown, they could have closed their businesses and returned to their pre-
business careers in research, in the factory, or even have left the country, but they 
chose to stay in risk-prone employment, even having endured crises. This exposure to 
risk is why resistance activities are integral to my informants’ independent 
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entrepreneurship and I have provided evidence to show this in each case study. My 
informants continue as entrepreneurs not for commercial reasons alone. Anna’s 
objective was not simply commercial survivial but her work had a normative 
dimension that required fighting the local bureaucracy. Although exit was simpler she 
chose to endure her crisis because she believed business conditions needed to change 
in line with policy. Oleg spent a disproportionate amount of time diverting money and 
effort into his non-commercial Cooperative activities despite his commercial success. 
He wanted to provide an alternative to the local education system, quietly challenging 
state provisions and developing civil society. Even though Aleksandr knew the 
danger posed by the local authorities based on the loss of his business and 
imprisonment, he still returned to entrepreneurship. Moreover, he then sought to resist 
engagement with officials at every opportunity because he viewed them as self-
interested rather than supportive, even though it made his life more difficult. In other 
words, all my informants chose to continue at risk rather than taking easier, 
uncontroversial options. There is little job security in Russian small business; it 
requires a level of commitment that endures in spite of crises. Resistance is evinced in 
the fact that even although Anna and Aleksandr nearly lost everything, they persisted 
and took action to stand up for themselves.  
 
This is not to say that resistance is declared or the same in each case. My informants 
did not become entrepreneurs to fight with officials; resistance is not their primary 
aim. As Scott argues with respect to infrapolitics, the resistance is undeclared. 
Nonetheless these entrepreneurs know that if they are to survive in business a certain 
amount of non-commerical activity devoted to undermining or countering offialdom 
in order to secure their position is required. Evidently, in some cases, like those of 
Oleg and Anna, this activity goes further still; towards trying to change the material 
circumstances of the local political economic situation. 
 
LAO theory offers a framework for explaining my informants’ agency as I have 
described it here. Under LAO conditions (institutional asymmetry), they do not have 
the same access to resources as members of the dominant coalition and remain 
vulnerable, so the imperative is to put their interests first. The importance of self-
reliance means that entrepreneurship in the Russian context is quite distinct from the 
‘Western’ definition of entrepreneurship in which profit is the primary objective. It is 
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better defined according to what entrepreneurs do in reaction to their unpredictable 
situations. Thus Oleg has developed well-honed competencies over time to limit the 
potential for violence, survive and profit in his local market, and maintain pragmatic 
engagement with the full range of individuals with entrepreneurial potential (officials, 
mafiya, ruling elites and so on). This approach has proven successful. Conversely 
Anna and Aleksandr’s specific reaction to the hybridity of the state developed when 
they became victims of it. Anna’s reaction has been improvised and based on 
negotiation, while Aleksandr and Yurii have developed an approach based on 
avoidance that tends to have unforeseen consequences. I therefore argue that 
Yurchak’s concept of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ provides a theoretical 
framework that explains this behaviour not in terms of a reaction to vulnerability, as 
predominant theories assume, but in terms of knowing how to act entrepreneurially in 
a political economy in which the state takes a hybrid form.  
 
The hybridity of the state means that personal relations are of considerable 
importance. As I have shown, the relationship between members of the dominant 
coalition, state officials, ordinary entrepreneurs and others are not necessarily 
characterised by antipathy; cordial relations based on mutual interests can be created. 
Entrepreneurs learn to deal with (by which I literally mean make deals with) all the 
characters operating in the private sector. Moreover, since the private sector is the 
arena from which property, wealth and resources are acquired, as my material about 
Valentina and Volodya reveals, I do not accept that the private sector is marginal to 
the interests of the ruling elite; rather it is essential to their interests. In one respect the 
personalisation of the political economy represents a significant problem; it enabled 
officials to develop a case to strip the assets from Aleksandr’s first company, for 
example. To this extent the state is indeed an arbitrary threat to business, as 
predominant political economic theories propose. In another respect, the 
personalisation of the state allows entrepreneurs to develop relations with the 
individuals that can serve their needs and protect their interests, as Oleg’s cordial 
relations with the local official who supported the Cooperative after an informal 
payment illustrates. It is in this latter respect that ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ is 
of unique explanatory service. 
 
 208 
 
Overall I have argued that ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ offers a way of revealing 
the agency of my informants in the context of their vulnerability in a limited access 
order. That is, despite the institutional asymmetry of the political economy, the 
personalisation of the state (as opposed to the dominance of the state advanced in 
predominant hybrid theories) is the chief factor determining their entrepreneurial 
activities. As a theory of action, it allows for their negative attitudes to the political 
economic status quo in which they are marginal figures, but also their determination 
and capability to protect their own interests, which are conceived in terms of a drive 
for independence from the state. Furthermore, I have extended this conceptual 
framework to argue that the drive for independence under these conditions is also a 
form of resistance to the status quo: by choosing entrepreneurship they pick a 
vocation in which undermining the state is inevitable and essential. I therefore find 
that ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, with the addition of the will to resist that I 
have identified, serves to explain how entrepreneurs ‘get by’ under conditions of 
institutional asymmetry, which was my original research question. Moreover, it also 
satisfactorily explains the influence of entrepreneurs under conditions of limited 
access, which was my theoretical challenge in this chapter. Critically, I find that 
entrepreneurs are not only vulnerable, but they serve as a critical resource for all 
actors in the political economy, who work entrepreneurially between formal and 
informal spheres to their own ends. To be specific, entrepreneurship is an essential 
rather than a marginalised feature of Russia’s limited access order, and indeed 
essential to understanding the behaviour of all actors. 
 
6.5 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I claimed that predominant political economic theories cannot account 
for the considerable agency demonstrated by my informants, because they emphasise 
the dominance of the state and the weakness of the private sector. As a result, I made 
a case that North et al’s LAO theory offers a framework that can accommodate the 
relative power of Russia’s dominant ruling elite in the economy. At the same time, 
applying LAO theory requires an account of the specific role of the private sector 
through an examination of its institutions. My case studies, which were based on 
examination of how entrepreneurs ‘get by’ in conditions of institutional asymmetry, 
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provide the empirical material to achieve this. Moreover, while Connolly has 
demonstrated the applicability of LAO theory to the Russia case at the macro-level, 
the specific role of the private sector in Russia’s LAO has not been investigated. This 
chapter represents an attempt to both advance the development of LAO theory and 
critique predominant ideas about the role and function of business in Russia.  
 
I found that in an LAO emphasis is placed on the potential of individuals – whether 
elites or entrepreneurs – to limit violence in order to improve their access to material 
resources. Dominant elites and state representatives are clearly far more powerful 
than entrepreneurs, but they are not necessarily destructive in their activities in the 
private sector, nor does the state set formal limits on the capacity of business. Rather, 
elites and bureaucrats act according to the opportunity to profit personally from 
intervening in the market, or because of a threat to their position.  They may decide to 
use their position personally to acquire the assets of businesses arbitrarily, as Anna’s 
case study demonstrated. However, as Oleg’s case study showed, elites are also 
dependent upon the private sector in order to generate profit and supplement their 
position. They cannot achieve this without building relations with entrepreneurs. In 
both cases the actions are not those of a corrupted regime but one that functions 
according to the logic of limited access.  
 
While Anna experienced considerable stress and constraint on her freedom as state 
representatives intervened in her business, Oleg had wide-ranging contacts and 
freedom to act in the local market; his son Dmitrii proudly declared to me that in 
Siberia they were free from the regulation and laws that constrain business in Europe. 
These differences are not because Anna is at risk and Oleg and Dmitrii are not, but 
because the latter had a better grasp of the extent to which they could act 
entrepreneurially in the context of limited access. Yet if Oleg thrived, over time Anna 
developed the means to survive and neither gave up. They both came to understand 
that elites and state officials work according to informal norms rather than formal 
rules and developed, to different extents, the capacity to act on that basis. This 
agency, I claim, is effectively conceptualised by ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’. 
They came to understand, at various points in their careers, that the state does not 
seek to ‘modernise’ business conditions as it promises, but decided to carry on 
anyway. As with the elites, their activities are primarily devoted to achieving what 
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they can in business while limiting their susceptibility to intervention. Yet why did 
they bother? I find that they carried on not for commercial success but first, as 
Yurchak has argued, to create a ‘civilised reality’ of their own, and second, I advance, 
to resist the status quo. I have shown that my informants take particular steps not only 
to overcome the unpredictability of their situations, but became entrepreneurs 
knowing that it would require an effort to retain their businesses and continue in spite 
of the possibility of arbitrary intervention: Oleg did this through the Cooperative; 
Anna through her fight for the improvement of business conditions; and Aleksandr, 
even if he no longer seeks change directly, returned to entrepreneurship after his 
imprisonment, which signalled a refusal to be deterred. In contrast to predominant 
theories I find that entrepreneurs become entrepreneurs precisely in order not to be 
subordinate. I find the objective of entrepreneurship to be working for political and 
economic independence and change through business. In this way independence and 
resistance are inseparable parts of the job; if you choose the former you accept the 
latter.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
In this research my objective was to find out what entrepreneurship is like under 
conditions of institutional asymmetry. I argued that this could be achieved most 
effectively using a multi-sited ethnography (Chapter 2): although ethnography has not 
been employed to study entrepreneurship during the Putin era, it offers the prospect of 
gathering data on entrepreneurs’ attitudes and behaviours, unlike the majority of 
extant research on the subject, which has focused on the former rather than the latter. 
In this way an ethnographic study offered an unusual and effective research proposal 
and I set out my empirical material in three case studies (Chapters 3-5). Above all I 
have found that my informants chose a career in entrepreneurship despite the 
difficulties they face and that they exercise significant agency in the face of 
overwhelming odds. I argued that this makes entrepreneurship attractive not simply to 
those who seek commercial achievement in the market but those focused on 
upholding their independence, willing and wanting to resist officialdom. I then 
contended that this finding has significant consequences for understanding 
contemporary business-state relations and, accordingly, raises a challenge to 
predominant theories about the structure of the Russian political economy (Chapter 
6). In Section 1 of this concluding chapter I draw four conclusions from this study. In 
Section 2 I consider their implications and outline potential avenues for further 
research. 
 
7.1 Overall conclusions 
 
1. Conditions for Russian entrepreneurs remain difficult despite the 
government’s long running policy to support business development. 
 
In Chapter 1 I showed that entrepreneurs’ perceptions of business conditions in 
contemporary Russia have been well studied and it is widely accepted that 
entrepreneurs face numerous difficulties despite longstanding government initiatives 
to reduce them. My first and most obvious conclusion is that this research underlines 
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the continuance of these difficulties. My informants’ experiences, particularly those 
of Anna and Aleksandr, reveal such difficulties very clearly. Aleksandr’s experience 
shows that even the most successful entrepreneurs are vulnerable to predation by 
aggressors or officials at any time. Anna’s crisis shows that even though she has 
almost nothing worth acquiring, her accusers take advantage of her weakness to 
threaten and intimidate her, and a legal case against her rolls interminably on. She is 
in a particularly weak position as a woman and a Jew, coupled with her high regard 
for the West. Moreover, even though Oleg runs a successful company, his daily 
activities are as focused on pre-empting and overcoming problems as they are on 
developing the business. The concept of ‘suspended punishment’, coined by 
Ledeneva, therefore remains relevant today irrespective of one’s commercial success, 
which shows that the government’s long-term policy of support for business is more 
rhetorical than substantial.  
 
2. Despite the difficulties and vulnerabilities encountered by businesses, 
my informants can act in their own interests. This challenges 
predominant theories about the structure of the political economy.  
 
Each of my informants recognises their vulnerability to officials and other aggressors, 
whether as a result of personal experience (in the cases of Anna and Aleksandr) or 
because of the danger they perceive in the political economy (in the case of Oleg). 
However, they can all act (to lesser or greater extents) to limit this vulnerability and 
advance their interests. Indeed, they devote the majority of their time not to 
commercial imperatives but to limiting violence and creating the conditions in which 
to do business. To conceptualise this I draw on ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’, 
which is a way of knowing and acting in a business environment in which the state 
takes a personalised form. I therefore argue that entrepreneurship must be explained 
not as a conventional vocation in business, but as an understanding of what can be 
achieved in one’s particular circumstances, building relations with others operating in 
the private sector (including other entrepreneurs, criminals and state representatives) 
in order to limit violence and achieve commercial objectives. Their success at getting 
by without formal institutional support, whether surviving a crisis in the case of Anna, 
or thriving in regional business in the case of Oleg, leads me to challenge the 
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assumption in predominant political economic theories that entrepreneurs are 
necessarily subordinate to the state, even if they are relatively weaker. Their agency 
must be accounted for in theory. 
 
3. LAO theory provides a better explanation of how the political 
economy works in practice, accounting for relative strength of the 
state and allowing for the entrepreneurial agency I observed. 
 
I argue for a conceptualisation of the Russian political economy that functions 
according to the logic of an LAO. In this system, dominant elites share privileged 
access to strategic resources and the ability to act arbitrarily in the real economy 
which makes entrepreneurship challenging. However, LAO theory also requires an 
account of the specific dynamics of state-business relations through study of Russia’s 
institutional framework, which enabled me to draw on my empirical observations of 
entrepreneurship under conditions of institutional asymmetry. I conclude that 
relations between elites, state representatives and entrepreneurs are determined by the 
need to limit violence or advance individual interests in the context of a personalised 
official sphere. This means that relations are not necessarily antagonistic. Moreover, 
elites are dependent on the private sector more than entrepreneurs are on the state, so 
relations cannot be defined by a zero-sum game, as hybrid theories presume. I 
consider this finding to be an indictment of the idea of ‘modernisation’, which the 
Russian government promotes in policy and which is commonly taken seriously in 
academic research on the Russian political economy. As North et al argue, ‘thinking 
of developing countries as limited access orders with their own social dynamic rather 
than as flawed or incomplete open-access order societies affords new insights into the 
impediments and paths to development’ (North et al 2013a: 328). Even though 
‘modernisation’ has an important role in Russian history, from an ethnographic 
perspective I argue that the concept contains little meaning in contemporary Russia 
with respect to the improvement of business conditions.  
 
4. Since vulnerability overshadows the private sector, it follows that 
entrepreneurs start businesses not simply for commercial reasons but to 
live autonomously and, to varying degrees, resist the state. 
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On his company website Oleg has written an unusual introductory phrase: 
‘Sibtekhnika reflects the most significant events of the history of perestroika in 
Russia, since the firm was founded in 1991 when the whole country was faced with a 
choice: how to live?’. In my view this unusual phrase serves to reveal the importance 
of distinguishing between conventional ideas about what an entrepreneur is, 
associated with Russian transition or modernisation policies (see Chapter 1), and 
what entrepreneurialism actually is as I have encountered and described. 
Entrepreneurialism, I find, is an attitude and set of practices undertaken in spite of the 
difficulty of business. Thus, even though each of my informants holds the view that 
the structure of the political economy limits their chances in business, they still chose 
to become or remain entrepreneurs. This is the case even when they encountered life-
changing crises (in the case of Anna and Aleksandr). I have concurred with Yurchak 
that Russia’s entrepreneurs are motivated not simply by money but by a life separate 
from the state.  
 
Nevertheless, although autonomy is an important objective to all my informants, I 
find that it does not do full justice to their rejection of, and challenges to, the political 
economic status quo. I go further to argue that entrepreneurs are the group most 
aware of the inequity and problems of the political economy, which is to say the 
power and malign role of the country’s dominant elites over the rest of the country. 
To this extent they are de facto opponents of the political system. My evidence for 
this claim is clear: Anna went in to business to advance Western commercial values 
and came to perceive her crisis as indicative of that requirement. More specifically, 
since her business is indebted and unlikely to enrich her in the future, her decision to 
endure the crisis (instead of filing for bankruptcy, she chose to work her way out of it 
and face up to her mistakes) represents a challenge to the state to honour its policies 
and certainly a personal mission. Aleksandr’s decision to return to business following 
his imprisonment is also defiant. Moreover, his determination not to be undermined 
again reveals his ambition to develop a career on his own terms, even if this 
inconveniences him from time to time. Oleg’s company Sibtekhnika is successful 
because he and his staff have created a business that works with the grain of the local 
political economy: he is devoted to limiting violence and cooperating wherever 
possible with all the characters operating in the local market. On the other hand, the 
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Cooperative, his social entrepreneurial project, is focused on providing services, 
opportunities and an ideology that the state does not. Overall my informants hold the 
view that the political economy functions counter to their interests and they choose to 
quietly resist it when the necessity or opportunity arises. 
 
7.2 Implications and further research 
 
In this section I consider the implications of these conclusions and avenues for further 
research. I believe this study has empirical and theoretical value for scholars in 
several disciplines, most obviously those engaged in questions of Russian and post-
Soviet affairs, but also beyond this ‘Area’ to other regions. Moreover, it may provide 
insights for entrepreneurs seeking to understand the Russian market or for general 
readers interested in contemporary Russian affairs, as well as those intrigued by 
everyday life away from Moscow. What can be said about my conclusions? Of 
course, this study has provided a detailed empirical investigation into ‘actually 
existing’ business conditions but further work is first required if the material I have 
gathered is to be verified. However, my assessment is that Russian business 
conditions will remain as challenging as they are now for at least the duration of the 
Putin presidency. There is no reason to think that Russia’s pro-business agenda will 
improve conditions now when it has been ineffective to this point. Indeed I judge that 
the Russian government’s support for business, an important element within its 
‘modernisation’ policy agenda, is largely inconsequential and serves chiefly as a 
rhetorical device rather than a substantive set of measures. Were this policy effective, 
the positive influence of formal institutions on my informants’ activities would have 
been significant, however I found the opposite to be the case. A major implication of 
this research, therefore, is that Russian policy towards business, and its business 
associations, should be treated with greater scepticism. As a consequence, improving 
business conditions is not a question of articulating the ‘right’ policy, as if the current 
policy is wrong. Rather, the point is to recognise that current policy has not improved 
my informants’ conditions in business because it has not been implemented formally 
by the dominant coalition.  
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The gap between government policy and business reality is why LAO theory is most 
persuasive; it pays attention to institutions. In LAOs rent, limited access and 
privileges are used to limit the potential for violence from dangerous groups (North et 
al 2013a: 330); therefore ‘modernisation’, which eliminates rents, constraints to 
market entry and competition does not reduce that potential (North et al 2013a: 336). 
In the Russian LAO, businesses are allowed to provide goods and services in the 
market but they have also become a resource from which elites and officials may 
derive informal income, leaving them vulnerable to predation. Even though everyone 
knows that the state interferes in business, entrepreneurs work under the threat of 
violence and prefer to keep a low profile rather than organise themselves collectively 
into an effective lobby. Yet despite the weakness of business, the government 
oversees a fine balance: it must allow a reasonable and sufficient level of commerce 
to meet public demand for access to goods and economic development (such as it is) 
while ensuring that the private sector remains weak and benign. The bottom line is 
that businesses are more interested in changing the political and economic situation in 
favour of the market than the government. Therefore future research should focus on 
the stability of this balance: whether entrepreneurs are becoming more focused on 
challenging the state, individually and collectively (which would require some 
capacity for violence), or whether the government is succeeding in keeping business 
interests contained. This research should, I argue, be undertaken ‘bottom up’, 
focusing on entrepreneurs’ attitudes and behaviours vis-à-vis the state, rather than 
‘top down’, which would place too much emphasis on state policy rather than actual 
business-state relations.  
 
In other words, my first suggestion for further research is to call for more 
ethnographic studies of entrepreneurship, in order to generate greater empirical 
understanding of what businesses are doing in light of difficult business conditions in 
Putin’s LAO. The three Siberian cases in this study represent a start, but further in-
depth research is required in other Russian regions. The objective is to understand the 
quality of business-state relations and entrepreneurs’ level of opposition to the status 
quo more generally: although my data appears to validate LAO theory, my arguments 
would be more persuasive if they rested on further cases and, given the diversity of 
my informants’ experiences, there is plainly more to learn. I therefore recommend 
 217 
 
further ethnographic work among Russia’s entrepreneurs and to integrate this material 
into wider knowledge about the Russian political economy. 
 
Although my call for new research is perhaps inevitable, it is not the only way that 
this study can influence thinking about contemporary Russia. Most simply, this 
research provides a reminder of the contribution ethnography can make by identifying 
what informants are both saying and doing. Moreover, by adopting an ethnographic 
approach I determined that entrepreneurship in the Russian market is not only a 
commercial undertaking but has important political connotations and social meanings 
for entrepreneurs. I therefore advance the case for further ethnography in Russian 
studies, particularly on questions of political economy, which I have shown can 
benefit from long-term, detailed observational studies of agency. As Haas argued 
(2005, see Chapter 2), markets are learned rather than pre-existing, so its participants’ 
activities must be observed more frequently than they have been to date. 
 
Similarly, this research provides greater impetus to study the Russian regions rather 
than focusing on European Russia, as is often the case. The justification is simple: my 
conclusions show that policy made in Moscow is not a strong indicator of actual 
political economic activity in practice, so while Moscow is an easy research option, it 
is hardly the most interesting. At the same time, even though Siberia is an 
inhospitable, enormous territory, and its population relatively small, which together 
renders business particularly challenging (see Chapter 3), my informants’ experiences 
in business are not extraordinary given what is known about Russian business in 
general: ‘suspended punishment’ is the defining feature of everyday life in Siberia 
too. Accordingly I contend that although Siberia may be considered exceptional in 
many respects – home to many of the country’s resources and with an outdated and 
much-unreconstructed Soviet infrastructure and economy – the notion that it is a mere 
‘resource colony’ or incapable of market reform is better suited to capturing the 
academic imagination than revealing much about what is actually happening in the 
market. I therefore suggest that further research is completed in Siberia in order to 
draw the region in closer from the analytical cold, treating it as a normal part of the 
Russian political economy. 
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Beyond these methodological points, I hope that substantive aspects of my 
conclusions will also be considered by scholars and analysts focused on tangible 
issues facing contemporary Russia. My conclusions are especially relevant to political 
economists. Having challenged predominant ‘hybrid’ theories about the structure of 
the political economy, they can draw my observations of the business sector, 
specifically the role and influence of entrepreneurs, into their analyses. Ideally, they 
will instigate future observational studies themselves, so that consideration of the 
‘actually existing economy’ is given in their studies of state-business relations. The 
conclusions may also interest political scientists, for whom the autonomy and 
resistance of my informants will be particularly interesting sixteen years into Putin’s 
rule, at a time when it is widely assumed that the large majority of the Russian public 
support the Putin government and that opposition figures are weak and divided. The 
idea that entrepreneurs may represent a significant if hidden bloc of opposition to the 
state offers an intriguing research proposal and, as I proposed in Chapter 6, may be 
considered further in comparison to Russia’s intelligentsia, through the lens of 
‘infrapolitics’, or indeed alongside Russia’s other better-known opposition groups. 
Finally, by revealing entrepreneurs as vulnerable and marginalised but with specific 
group characteristics (which I likened to the intelligentsia), this study will be of 
relevance to sociologists considering the structure of society in the Putin era. Thus my 
findings have multidisciplinary implications and raise the prospect of interesting new 
research on contemporary Russia. 
 
Finally, this research will be of use beyond the Russian ‘Area’. Most clearly, I have 
found my data consistent with LAO theory, which builds on Connolly’s initial 
application of LAO theory to the Russian case (2009, see Chapter 2), but in so doing I 
have added further to the growing body of evidence supporting this institutional 
approach to understanding economic development around the world (North et al 
2013b: 1). Moreover, this research provides an insight into how entrepreneurs ‘get 
by’ in spite of a predatory state, which has comparative value for studies considering 
other countries. My conclusion that entrepreneurship can also represent a form of 
resistance or opposition under these conditions may be of particular interest to 
ethnographers or scholars of business studies conducting fieldwork in other LAOs or 
authoritarian regimes. Indeed the underhand resistance displayed by my informants 
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may also be of interest to scholars of ‘infrapolitics’, the evasive, undeclared politics 
of the disenfranchised (Scott 2012, see Chapter 6).  
 
In all these ways my objective is that this research will provide a useful empirical and 
theoretical basis for further research in Russia and beyond. My final modest hope is 
that this study will be of general interest to readers intrigued by life in contemporary 
Russia. Perhaps the determination and capabilities of Oleg, Anna and Aleksandr serve 
to challenge the unfortunate stereotypes that Russians are either apathetic or 
subordinate in the face of their autocratic officials and leaders. 
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APPENDIX: BEING IN THE FIELD 
 
The purpose of this short Appendix is to offer greater understanding of my specific 
role as an ethnographer observing Oleg, Anna, Aleksandr and Yurii. I describe my 
training for ethnography, including language immersion, my entry into the field and 
establishment of relations with my informants, and my specific role and approach to 
data collection in each field site. In so doing I lay out for scrutiny the practical and 
ethical challenges I encountered and how I dealt with them. 
 
A.1 Research training and entry into the field 
 
Considering my fieldwork in hindsight I have been struck by the similarity between 
my experience and that described by Walker (2011) with respect to my training, entry 
into the field and fieldwork position. Like Walker, I began my training for doctoral 
research with the CREES Masters degree, which focused on multi-disciplinary 
approaches to studying the region (Walker 2011: 216). In this research I engage with 
macro and micro social, political and economic processes, and in this respect the 
thesis is a product of that training, undertaken in the Area Studies tradition. My 
inclination was always to examine my ethnographic material in light of wider 
concerns in Russia rather than work within a single discipline. Besides, my 
informants’ daily concerns were expressed in direct relation to their position within 
the political economic structure, which moved me to consider wider political 
economic issues. This is why there is a clear move from my case studies to theoretical 
questions in Chapter 6, and why I found Kubik’s reinvigoration of Area Studies as a 
study of a ‘situation’ to be persuasive. 
 
Also like Walker, at the outset of this research I spent an extended period in Russia 
completing intensive Russian language training, which enabled me to conduct pilot 
research (2011: 218), and develop my first fieldwork contacts. As in Walker’s case, 
language proficiency brought considerable value to my research, not only in terms of 
my ability to build relations, but as somebody that could demonstrate genuine interest 
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in the region; this in turn meant I carried a reasonable amount of cultural capital 
(Walker 2011: 219-220). At the same time, Russian language and my unfamiliar 
presence as a Westerner infrequently raised some suspicion: on a few occasions it was 
assumed that I had malign intent by gathering information about life in the provinces, 
despite my student status. This was never a real hindrance to my work but served as a 
reminder that cultural capital can also be cultural baggage (see also Walker 2011: 
221). Although ethnographers everywhere can be the subject of suspicion (Sluka 
2007: 218-219), in this case the suspicion mattered because it found support in 
official antipathy to the West, particularly in the context of the crisis in Ukraine, and 
the idea that ‘foreign agents’ are working against Russia. 
 
Even so, more often than not my cultural capital served to ‘open doors’ (Walker 
2011: 219-220) rather than close them. This was the case with each of my informants. 
Anna, a former PhD student with training in the West, and with an inclination to 
western culture and business practices, was receptive to my questions about her 
background in business when we were introduced through my language school, then 
willing to accommodate me as an observer within CSBG later. With Aleksandr and 
Yurii, our rapport grew more through conventional ‘male’ pursuits, including hunting 
and football, as well as mutual interest in each other’s lives in Europe and Russia. We 
also found common ground sharing our new languages, since Yurii was learning 
English and was keen to improve his skills with a native speaker; my knowledge of 
colloquial Russian and business terminology improved thanks to him. This informal 
coincidence of interests naturally led to conversations about our respective work and 
then to their consent to my observation of their businesses. Again, Walker has noted 
the way in which informal communications or ‘cultural exchange’ can help to 
establish trust in this type of cross-cultural research (2011: 224). In the case of Oleg, 
we were introduced by mutual acquaintances in a university: the importance of social 
capital here worked in my favour. As a former academic and long-time entrepreneur 
he was also receptive to my research, immediately expressed an interest in my topic 
and willingness to accommodate me in Sibtekhnika. 
 
A.2 Fieldwork role 
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The relative and surprising simplicity of establishing relations with my informants in 
different regions of Russia belied the challenge of actually observing them everyday. 
Nevertheless Van Maanen has stated that it is incumbent upon ethnographers to 
justify what they did in the field (Van Maanen 1995: 21) and I wish to be clear about 
my role. In Anna’s case my position as observer was determined by the circumstances 
of her crisis. As I have written, her days were frequently spent responding to new 
matters thrown up by her accusers and it was often simply not appropriate, as Nilan 
states, to ask ‘silly questions when there is a crisis going on’ (Nilan 2002: 375). 
Nevertheless, as an observer I was frequently present in her office when aggressors 
visited seeking money or to intimidate her, and I accompanied her to difficult 
meetings with her accusers or prosecutors. Due to the nature of her situation, 
therefore, I faced an obvious challenge: did my presence make her situation worse, or 
endanger either of us? In practice my role demanded what de Laine describes as 
flexibility, inventiveness and preparedness to modify my behaviour to different 
‘context-specific requirements’ (de Laine: 2000: 94). Most of Anna’s accusers were 
not aware of me, since the crisis started before I entered the field, while accusers 
visiting the office typically ignored me altogether. Nevertheless, I was aware that my 
presence raised the risk of her being associated with Westerners, whether I was a 
declared student or not, and suffering further allegations. I raised this with Anna, but 
she said that my presence did not adversely affect her situation, and that she had 
considered this prior to allowing me to ask questions about her business. In this 
respect I was reassured that she understood that I did not wish to make her situation 
any more difficult by being there, and that she would not have allowed it in any case. 
 
On some occasions, the opposite, surprising question presented itself: was my 
presence actually helping Anna? While I was wary of highlighting my involvement in 
Anna’s affairs and often considered absenting myself from certain situations or 
meetings, she was unfailingly positive about my presence, and said that it helped her 
to remain calm. In this respect my observation perhaps had a gendered dimension, 
since my presence may have given her some protective reassurance, particularly 
during periodical scares. After one meeting with an accuser, she told me that they had 
been less aggressive than usual because they felt obliged to be polite in front of a 
foreigner. Although to my eyes the accuser had certainly not been calm, Anna was 
grateful. In these examples it is plain that Anna believed I helped her by virtue of just 
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being there. Consequently it cannot be denied that my presence aided her in her 
resistance and refusal to give up despite my objective to remain neutral. Thus as an 
observer I was not only by her side but, by default, on her side too.  
 
My hoped-for neutrality was compromised on other occasions too. First, on the 
occasion when I accompanied Anna to give money to one of her accusers (see 
Chapter 4), she undoubtedly co-opted me into the meeting by falsely saying we were 
going for medicine when in fact we were going to meet a particularly aggressive 
accuser. Although I had not refused to accompany her to previous meetings, she had 
felt obliged to ensure I would go along, most probably for a personal sense of 
security. All the same, she acknowledged the misjudgment with an apology; it did not 
happen again. I put it down to the stress of her situation and as such decided that the 
experience was still a valid part of my fieldwork. Second, in the course of observing 
Anna’s occasional seminars my presence as a foreigner invariably drew the attention 
of the other attendees, who were as interested in hearing about my business 
experience in the UK as I was in theirs32. This was a key example of my ‘cultural 
capital’ in the field, and one from which Anna derived some benefit too: it created 
good conversation between seminar attendees, who became well acquainted, and 
improved Anna’s credibility as a serious entrepreneur with genuine commitment to 
furthering business interests. On balance my presence as an observer was welcomed 
by Anna not only due to her interest in my research and goodwill, but because she 
also appeared to derive some small benefit from it, and this in turn countered my 
concerns about the risk of worsening her situation by my presence.  
 
Regarding the practical question of how I collected my data, Anna’s crisis did present 
some challenges, even though she sought to be as helpful as possible. Our time was 
spent in the office, on foot, in seminars, in various meetings and locations, so I 
frequently kept my field diary updated in small breaks after events rather than during 
them. This meant I spent much time writing from memory in quiet moments, over 
meals, during car journeys or tapping notes and quotes into my mobile phone on the 
go. Anna was open to me recording on a dictaphone but in practice this was an 
                                                
32 Prior to beginning this PhD I had worked for two American companies in sales and 
consultancy roles respectively. 
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unwieldy and conspicuous device to carry around so I used it only for our longer 
discussions and interviews. Most often, I revised and updated my field notes at home 
in the evenings based on the notes I had taken during the day.  
 
With Oleg, Aleksandr and Yurii the working day was spent between locations too: at 
the office, on construction sites, on the baza and in remote locations such as 
Tsentralnyi, or with Aleksandr’s relations and acquaintances in the countryside. In the 
case of Aleksandr and Yurii, my fieldwork was undertaken during Siberia’s autumn 
and winter, which made note taking on the baza impossible. Consequently I wrote my 
field notes in the margins: on the tram, during short breaks or again, writing prompts 
and quotes into my phone, before updating them properly in the evenings. That said, 
my time with these men was, in both cases, an all-encompassing experience and we 
spent many evenings and weekends together too, having BBQs, banyas, drinking, 
playing or watching sports, hunting, fishing and so on. It is well known that Russian 
businessmen conduct much of their business in these social environments, not least 
because they reinforce social capital and offer the chance for new connections.  In 
these ways I became a companion for their male pursuits through the duration of my 
fieldwork so my access to their affairs was undoubtedly enhanced by my gender.  
 
On the whole I believe that this close proximity to my informants was beneficial to 
the research process in two respects. First, business matters did not cease at the end of 
the working day but were discussed and acted upon all the time, interwoven with my 
informants’ personal lives, so more opportunities were available for discussion and 
observation, and trust between us grew. Second, as a close acquaintance of these men 
I had great access to their contacts and was made to feel welcome by them all. In this 
respect my observations were far more straightforward than the uncertainty 
surrounding Anna’s situation. All the same, the sheer amount of time we spent 
together raises the question of whether there was sufficient distance between us for 
me to remain an impartial observer. Nevertheless, I occasionally excused myself for a 
weekend in order to recover and gather my observations and notes: my own work 
gave me a reason they understood to take stock and maintain distance and 
perspective. 
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A.3 An observer observed? 
 
Although I did not encounter truly significant difficulties with Anna, Oleg, Aleksandr 
or Yurii, I will conclude on the ambiguous question of whether I was followed by 
state representatives, or indeed whether any of my informants were under suspicion or 
acting on the state’s behalf. On several occasions I felt as though I was being 
followed or observed, not least on the day I departed the field for the final time: as I 
left my accommodation two men leant on the bonnet of their car and watched as I got 
into a taxi for the airport. This was quite peculiar because it was five o’clock in the 
morning and nobody else was around. As we set off they roared passed, as if to 
indicate they had been watching all the time and were seeing me off. Just as 
intriguing is that Anna frequently left her apartment door unlocked during the day, 
leaving anybody who had tried the door free to enter. Why would she do this when 
she religiously locked her office door? One day I had left my laptop at her apartment 
without knowing it was left unlocked and returned to find it tampered with and no 
longer working. Anna could not explain it, but nor did she reveal why the door was 
unlocked. Perhaps she had cut a deal with the authorities or somebody else, allowing 
them access to her property as some sort of placatory measure. Of course, perhaps I 
am imagining a connection that does not exist, but I recognise that there are some 
things about my informants’ business that I will not have been able to uncover. The 
complex relationship between them and the state is a fitting point on which to end. 
 
 226 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abu-Lughod, L. (1990) ‘The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of 
Power through Bedouin Women’, American Ethnologist, 17 (1) pp. 41-55. 
 
Adler, P. S. and Kwon, S-W. (2002) ‘Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept’, 
Academy of Management Review, 27 (1) pp. 17-40. 
 
Aidis, R. et al. (2008a) ‘Entrepreneurship in Russia’, UCL SSEES Centre for the 
Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe, Economics Working Paper No. 88 
pp. 1-20. 
 
Aidis, R. et al. (2008b) ‘Institutions and Entrepreneurship Development in Russia: A 
Comparative Perspective’, Journal of Business Venturing, 23 (2008) pp. 656-672.  
 
Aidis, R. (2015) ‘Is Russia an Entrepreneurial Society? A Comparative Perspective’, 
in Oxenstierna, S. (ed.). The Challenges of Russia’s Politicized Economic System, 
London and New York: Routledge, pp. 77-95. 
 
Alburov, G. (2015) ‘Samyi Vezhivyi iz Dvortzov ili Nezakonnoe Obogashchenie na 
primere Sergeya Shoigu’. Available at: http://alburov.ru/2015/10/shoygy/ (Accessed 
20 January 2016). 
 
Altai Region Official Site. (no date) ‘Sky Blue Katun’. Available at: 
http://www.altairegion22.ru/en/tourism/katun/ (Accessed 20 November 2015).  
 
Antonov, M, and Bomko, V. (2009) ‘Russia Bans all Gambling and Shuts Casinos’, 
Oddly Enough, Reuters.com, published 1 July 2009, Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/01/us-gambling-closure-odd-
idUSTRE56045Y20090701#yWSc0PTsDpPqfCSJ.97 (Accessed 27 November 
2015). 
 227 
 
 
Aron, L. (2013a) ‘Structure and Context in US-Russian Relations at the Outset of 
Barack Obama’s Second Term’, American Enterprise Institute, published 11 March, 
Available at: http://www.aei.org/publication/structure-and-context-in-us-russian-
relations-at-the-outset-of-barack-obamas-second-term/ (Accessed 27 February 2016).	  
	  
Aron, L. (2013b) ‘The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas’, American 
Enterprise Institute, published 29 May, Available at: 
http://www.aei.org/publication/the-political-economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/ 
(Accessed 27 February 2016).	  
	  
Arutunyan, A. (2014) The Putin Mystique, Talton Edge, Newbold on Stour: 
Skyscraper Publications. 
 
Baranov, A. et al. (2015) ‘How Not to Measure Russian Regional Institutions’, 
Russian Journal of Economics 1 (2): 154-181. 
 
Barnes, A. (2006) Owning Russia, London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Berlin, I. (1978) Russian Thinkers, London: Penguin Books Ltd. 
 
Bershidski, L. (2013) ‘Putin Frustration Grows as Russia’s Economy Slumps’, 
Bloomberg Business, published 23 May 2013, Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-23/imprisoned-entrepreneurs-and-
russia-s-economic-slump (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
	  
Biznes Solidarnost’. (2015) ‘Pod Pressom’, Available at: 
http://www.kapitalisty.ru/tamog/page/4/ (Accessed 7 September 2015).  
 
Bloomberg Business. (2011) ‘The Russian Vegas… in Siberia’, Bloomberg.com, 
published 3 March, Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_11/b4219073510600.htm 
(Accessed 20 November 2015). 
 228 
 
 
Bonnell, V. E. and Gold, T. B. (2002) ‘Introduction’, in Bonnell, V. E. and Gold, T. 
B. (eds.) The New Entrepreneurs of Europe and Asia Patterns of Business 
Development in Russia, Eastern Europe and China, London: M. E. Sharpe, pp xiii-
xxii. 
 
Borenstein, E. (1999a) ‘Public Offerings: MMM and the Marketing of Melodrama’, 
in Barker, A. M. (ed.) Consuming Russia Popular Culture, Sex, and Society since 
Gorbachev, London: Duke University Press, pp. 49-75. 
	  
Borenstein, E. (1999b) ‘Suspending Disbelief: ‘Cults’ and Postmodernism in Post-
Soviet Russia’, in Barker, A. M. (ed.) Consuming Russia Popular Culture, Sex, and 
Society since Gorbachev, London: Duke University Press, pp. 437-462.	  
 
Bovt, G. (2015) ‘Russia’s Increasingly Absurd Laws Benefit Nobody (op-ed)’, The 
Moscow Times, 28 May, Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russias-increasingly-absurd-laws-
benefit-nobody-op-ed/522566.html (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
	  
Bremmer, I. (2009) ‘State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?’, 
Foreign Affairs, 88 (3): pp. 40-55.	  
 
Bridger, S. et al. (1996) No More Heroines? Russia, Women and the Market, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Buckley, N. and Weaver, C. (2013) ‘Vladimir Putin Unveils $14bn Plan to Revive the 
Russian Economy’, ft.com, 21 June, Available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5670dcf2-da78-11e2-a237-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2bla5pjjq (Accessed 12 August 2013). 
 
Burawoy, M. et al. (2000) ‘Involution and Destitution in Capitalist Russia’, 
Ethnography, 1 (1) pp. 43-65. 
 
 229 
 
Burawoy, M. and Verdery, K. (1999) ‘Introduction’, in Burawoy, M. and Verdery, K. 
(eds.) Uncertain Transition Ethnographies of Change in the Post-Socialist World, 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, pp. 1-17.	  
 
Cantorovitch, I. (2014) ‘Post-Soviet Region’, in Porot, D. and Katz, Z. (eds.) 
Antisemitism Worldwide 2014 General Analysis Draft, Tel Aviv: Moshe Kantor 
Database for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, The Lester and 
Sally Entin Faculty of Humanities, Tel Aviv University, pp. 17-21. 
 
Carothers, T. (2002) ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13 
(1) pp. 5-21. 
 
Carstensen, F. V. and Guroff, G. (1983) ‘Economic Innovation in Imperial Russia and 
the Soviet Union: Observations’, in Guroff, G. and Carstensen, F. V. (eds.) 
Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 347-360. 
	  
Castells, M. and Kiselyova, E. (1998) ‘Russia and the Network Society An Analytical 
Exploration’, Russia at the end of the 20th century conference, Stanford University, 
5-7 November, Available from: 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/Russia20/volumepdf/castells.pdf (Accessed 14 March 
2013).	  
	  
Chadee, D. and Roxas, B. (2013) ‘Institutional Environment, Innovation Capacity and 
Firm Performance in Russia’, Critical Perspectives on International Business, 9 (1/2) 
pp. 19-39.	  
 
Chief Economy and Investment Department of Investment Department of Altai 
Region. (2008) ‘Gambling Zone ‘Siberian Coin’, Presentation, Barnaul, no date, 
Available at: 
http://www.econom22.ru/investment/gos_chast_partnerstvo/sibcoin/SibMoneta2009e
ng.pdf (Accessed 20 November 2015). 
 
 230 
 
Connolly, R. (2009) ‘Economic Structure and Social Order Development in Post-
Socialist Europe’, PhD Thesis. University of Birmingham. Available at: 
http://findit.bham.ac.uk/ (Accessed: 18 June 2015).   
 
Connolly, R. (2013) The Economic Sources of Social Order Development in Post-
Socialist Eastern Europe, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Connolly, R. (2015) ‘Troubled Times Stagnation, Sanctions and the Prospects for 
Economic Reform in Russia’, Research Paper, Chatham House Russia and Eurasia 
Programme, London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs. 
 
Connolly, R. et al (2015) ‘Sanctions on Russia: Economic Effects and Political 
Rationales’, Event Summary, Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, 
London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs.  
 
Daniel, B, J. (2015) ‘What surrounds us now: Cultural Animation and the 
Participatory Cultural Voids in Poland’, in Pleyers, G, and Sava, I, N. (eds) Social 
movements in Central and Eastern Europe A Renewal of Protests and Democracy, 
Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, pp. 54-67. 
 
Dash, M. (2013) ‘For 40 Years, this Russian family was cut off from all Human 
Contact, Unaware of World War II’, smithsonian.com, 28 January, Available at: 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/for-40-years-this-russian-family-was-cut-
off-from-all-human-contact-unaware-of-world-war-ii-7354256/?no-ist (Accessed 7 
October 2015). 
 
Decter, M. (1963) ‘The Status of the Jews in the Soviet Union’, Foreign Affairs, 41 
(2) pp. 420-430. 
 
de Laine, M. (2000) Fieldwork, Participation, Practice Ethics and Dilemmas in 
Qualitative Research, SAGE Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi. 
 
 231 
 
Díaz-Cayeros, A. (2013) ‘Entrenched Insiders: Limited Access Order in Mexico’, in 
North, D, C. (eds.) In the shadow of violence politics, economics and the problems of 
development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 233-260. 
 
Djankov, S. (2015) ‘Russia’s Economy under Putin: from Crony Capitalism to State 
Capitalism’, Policy Brief Number PB15-18, Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics. 
 
Dunn, E, and Dunn, S, P. (1964) ‘Religion as an Instrument of Culture Change: the 
Problem of the Sects in the Soviet Union’, Slavic Review, 23 (3) pp. 459-478. 
	  
Estrin, S. et al. (2007) ‘Institutions and entrepreneurship development in Russia: a 
comparative perspective’, William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 867, 
Available at: 
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/57247/wp867?sequence=1 
(Accessed 19 June 2016).	  
	  
European Investment Bank. (2013) ‘Small and Medium Entrepreneurship in Russia’, 
Available at: http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/econ-study-small-and-
medium-entrepreneurship-in-russia.htm (Accessed 15 March 2016).	  
 
Fedotkin, D. (no date) ‘Creation and Development of Tourist-Recreational Special 
Economic Zones in Russian Federation’, Available at: 
http://www.rotobo.or.jp/events/forum/presentation/2-3-01Fedotkin.pdf (Accessed 24 
November 2015). 
 
Fedotov, V. (2015) ‘Okolo Nolya. Pochemu Kreml’ ne Uluchshit Biznes-Klimat v 
Rossii, slon.ru, 7 September, Available at: https://slon.ru/posts/56059 (Accessed 7 
September 2015).	  
	  
Filipenok, A. and Shtykina, A. (2015) ‘Biznesmen Rasskazal na Forume v Moskve o 
“Perepilivanii ekonomiki”’ RBK.ru, 10 December, Available at: 
 232 
 
http://www.rbc.ru/business/10/12/2015/5668b8429a7947618f7d161d (Accessed 12 
December 2015).	  
	  
Fisun, O. (2012) ‘Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial 
Perspective’, Demokratizatsiya, 20 (2): pp. 87-96.	  
	  
Foa, R, S. and Nemirovskaya, A. (2016) ‘How State Capacity Varies within Frontier 
States: A Multicountry Subnational Analysis’, Governance: An International Journal 
of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 29 (3): 411-432.	  
	  
Fomin, D. A. (2010) ‘O Vremeni, v kotorom my Zhivem’, EKO, Vserossiiskii 
ekonomicheskii zhurnal, 2 (February): pp. 135-153.	  
 
Freeland, C. (2000) Sale of the Century Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to 
Capitalism, Doubleday Canada. 
 
Gaddy, C. G. and Ickes, B. W. (2002) Russia’s Virtual Economy, Washington D. C.: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Gaddy, C. G. and Ickes, B. W. (2005) ‘Resource Rents and the Russian Economy’, 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, 46 (8): pp. 559-583. 
 
Gaddy, C. G. and Ickes, B. W. (2010) ‘Russia after the Global Financial Crisis, 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, 51 (3): pp. 281-311.  
 
Gaddy, C. G. and Ickes, B, W. (2013) Bear Traps on Russia’s Road to 
Modernization, Routledge: London. 
 
Gaddy, C. G. and Ickes, B. W. (2015) ‘Putin’s Rent Management System and the 
Future of Addiction in Russia’, in Oxenstierna, S. (ed.) The Challenges of Russia’s 
Politicized Economic System, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 11-32. 
 
 233 
 
Gans-Morse, J. (2012) ‘Threats to Property Rights in Russia: From Private Coercion 
to State Aggression’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 28 (3): pp. 263-295. 
	  
Gazeta.ru. (2015) ‘Razgovor Korovy s Myacnikom’, gazeta.ru, 10 December, 
Available at: http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2015/12/10_e_7950101.shtml 
(Accessed 12 December 2015).	  
	  
Gazprom. (2008) ‘Gazprom Commissions Barnaul-Biysk-Gorno-Altaisk Gas Pipeline 
with Branch to Belokurikha’, Press Release, 21 November, Available at: 
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2008/november/article64417/ (Accessed 20 
November 2015). 
 
Gel’man, V. (2016) ‘The vicious Circle of Neopatrimonialism in Russia’, Post-Soviet 
Affairs, 32 (5): pp. 455-473. 
 
Gibson, J. L. and Howard, M. M. (2007) ‘Russian anti-Semitism and the 
Scapegoating of Jews’, British Journal of Political Science, 37 (2): pp. 193-223. 
 
Golikova, V. V. (2009) ‘Business Associations: Incentives and Benefits from the 
Viewpoint of Corporate Governance’, in Dolgopyatova, T, Iwasaki, I, and Yakovlev, 
A. A. (eds.) Organization and development of Russian business a firm-level analysis, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 258-283.  
 
Goncharov, I. (translated by Hogarth, C. J.). (1858, reprinted 1915) Oblomov, New 
York: MacMillan. 
 
Gordon, C. (1991) ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’, in Burchell, G, 
Gordon, C, and Miller, P. (eds.) The Foucault Effect, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 1-52. 
 
Goskomstat. (2010) ‘Small and Medium Business in Russia: Statistics’, Available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/publish/prezent/infograf/mal_bisnes_eng.pdf (Accessed 24 
February 2017). 
 234 
 
 
Goskomstat (2015) ‘Number of Small Enterprises (excluding Micro Businesses) by 
Economic Activity’, Available at: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b16_12/Main.htm 
(Accessed 24 February 2017). 
 
Green, O, S. (2009) Entrepreneurship in Russia: Western Ideas in Russian 
Translation, PhD Thesis, Gothenburg Studies in Sociology No. 40, Department of 
Sociology: University of Gothenburg. 
 
Gutterman, S. and Busvine, D. (2012) ‘Putin Pledges to Fight Corruption, Capital 
Flight’, Reuters.com, 12 December, Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-russia-putin-
idUSBRE8BB1CD20121212 (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Haas, J. (2005) ‘Trials and Tribulations of Learning the Market: Culture and 
Economic Practice in Russia’s Market Transition’, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian 
and East European Studies, Number 1706, Centre for Russian and East European 
Studies, University of Pittsburgh. 
 
Haas, J. (2012) Rethinking the Post-Soviet Experience Markets, Moral Economies, 
and Cultural Contradictions of Post-Socialist Russia, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
 
Hanson, P. (2007) ‘The Russian Economic Puzzle: Going Forwards, Backwards or 
Sideways?’, International Affairs, 83 (5): pp. 869-889. 
	  
Hanson, P. (2014) Reiderstvo Asset-grabbing in Russia, Russia and Eurasia 
Programme Paper 2014/03, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs.  
	  
Harding, L. (2007) ‘The Richer they Come…’, theguardian.com, 2 July, Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/02/russia.lukeharding1 (Accessed 21 
May 2015). 
 235 
 
 
Harding, L. (2016) ‘Mega-Rich Homes Tour puts Spotlight on London’s Oligarchs’, 
theguardian.com, 4 February, Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/feb/04/mega-rich-homes-tour-london-oligarchs-russia-alexei-navalny-
putin, (Accessed 4 February 2016).	  
 
Hill, F. and Gaddy, C. (2003) The Siberian Curse How Siberian Communist Planners 
left Russia out in the Cold, Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Hill, F. (2010) ‘Dinner with Putin: Musings on the Politics of Modernization in 
Russia’, Foreign Policy Trip Reports: Brookings Institution, brookings.edu, October 
2014, Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2010/10/russia-putin-
hill (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Hobson, P. (2015) ‘How to Ignore a Corruption Scandal, Kremlin Style’, 
themoscowtimes.com, 10 December, Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/how-to-ignore-a-corruption-scandal-
kremlin-style/552429.html (Accessed 16 March 2016).	  
 
Hoffman, D. E. (2002) The Oligarchs Wealth and Power in the New Russia, Oxford: 
Public Affairs. 
 
Humphrey, C. and Mandel, R. (2002) ‘The Market in Everyday Life: Ethnographies 
of Post-socialism’, in Humphrey, C. and Mandel, R. (eds.) Markets and Moralities 
Ethnographies of Post-socialism, Oxford: Berg, pp. 1-16. 
 
Humphrey, C. (2002) The Unmaking of Soviet Life Everyday Economies after 
Socialism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Humphrey, C. (2014) ‘Schism, Event, and Revolution: the Old Believers of Trans-
Baikalia’, Current Anthropology, 55 (S10): pp. S216-S225. 
 
 236 
 
Illarionov, A. (2006). ‘When the State means Business’, nytimes.com, 25 January, 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/25/opinion/when-the-state-means-
business.html, (Accessed 28 July 2016). 
 
Inozemtsev, V, L. (2011) ‘Neo-Feudalism Explained’, American Interest, 6(4), 
published online 1 March, available from: http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2011/03/01/neo-feudalism-explained/, accessed 30 September 2015.	  
 
Inozemtsev, V. (2013) ‘Colonies vs. Dependencies: an Invitation to a Discourse’, 
Russia in Global Affairs, 2 (2013) Available at: 
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Colonies-vs-Dependencies-An-Invitation-to-a-
Discourse-16046, (Accessed 28 September 2015). 
	  
Inozemtsev, V. (2016) ‘Zashchita Putina kak Uzakonit’ Bogatctvo Chinovnikov’, 
snob.ru, 4 April, Available at: https://snob.ru/selected/entry/106595 (Accessed 4 
April 2016). 
 
Investment Portal of Altai Region. (no date) ‘Molodezhnuyu Gostinitzu, Letnii 
Kinoteatr i EKO-otel’ Postoyat v “Biryuzovoi Katuni”, Mass Media, Available at: 
http://invest.alregn.ru/en/mass-media/detail.php?ID=366 (Accessed 20 November 
2015). 
 
Ioffe, J. (2015) ‘Remote Control Can an Exiled Oligarch Persuade Russia that Putin 
must go?’ newyorker.com, 12 January, Available from: 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/12/remote-control-2, (Accessed 1 
December 2015). 
 
Jong-Sung, Y. (2013) ‘Transition from a Limited Access Order to an Open Access 
Order The Case of South Korea’, in North, D, C. et al (eds.) In the Shadow of 
Violence Politics, Economics and the Problems of Development, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 293-327. 
 
Kafka, F. (reprinted 1998) The Trial, New York: Schocken Books. 
 237 
 
 
Kashpur, V. V. (2009) ‘Predprinimatel’stvo kak Zhiznennaya Perspektiva 
Sovremennoi Molodezhi (na premere Tomskoi Oblasti)’, Vestnik Tomskovo 
Gosudarstvennovo Universiteta, 1 (5): pp. 53-68. 
 
Kerr, D. (1999) ‘Beheading the King and Enthroning the Market: A Critique of 
Foucauldian Governmentality’, Science and Society, 63 (2): pp. 173-202. 
 
Kesby, R. (2012) ‘Why Russia Locks up so many Entrepreneurs’, BBC World 
Service, 5 July, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18706597, 
(Accessed 5 April 2016). 
 
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (2001) ‘The Anarchist Within: Clinical Reflections on 
Russian Character and Leadership Style’, Human Relations, 54 (5): pp. 585-627. 
	  
Khaleeva, J. (2009) ‘Incentives for Implementation of Regulatory Reform: 
A Comparative Survey of Federal and Regional Government Officials in Russia’, 
Technical Report, Centre for Economic and Financial Research, Available at: 
http://www.cefir.org/index.php?l=eng&id=34&yf=2009 (Accessed 14 March 2016). 	  
 
Khotin, L. (2007) ‘A Siberian Curse?’, Problems of Economic Transition, 49 (9): pp. 
35-50. 
 
Kochetkova, I. (2010) The Myth of the Russian Intelligentsia Old Intellectuals in the 
New Russia, London: Routledge. 
 
Kordonskii, S. (2012) ‘Norma Otkata’, Otechestvennye Zapicki Zhurnal dlya 
Medlenhogo Chteniya 2 (47), Available at: http://www.strana-oz.ru/2012/2/norma-
otkata (Accessed 14 October 2015). 
 
Korey, W. (1972) ‘The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An 
Analysis’, Slavic Review, 31 (1): pp. 111-135.  
 
 238 
 
Kornblatt, J. D. (1999) ‘“Christianity, Antisemitism, Nationalism”: Russian 
Orthodoxy in a Reborn Orthodox Russia’, in Barker, A. M. (ed) Consuming Russia 
Popular Culture, Sex, and Society since Gorbachev, London: Duke University Press, 
pp. 414-426. 
 
Krastev, I. and Inozemtsev, V. (2013) ‘Putin’s Self-Destruction Russia’s New Anti-
Corruption Campaign will Sink the Regime’, foreignaffairs.com, 9 June, Available at: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2013-06-09/putins-self-
destruction (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Kreidenko, T. F. and Mironova, M. N. (2012) ‘Modern Small Business in Russia’, 
Regional Research of Russia, 2 (4): pp. 347-352.	  
 
Krige, D. (2012) ‘Fields of Dreams, Fields of Schemes: Ponzi Finance and Multi-
level Marketing in South Africa’, Africa, 82 (Special Issue 01): pp. 69-92. 
	  
Kubik, J. (2013) ‘From Transitology to Contextual Holism: A Theoretical Trajectory 
of Postcommunist Studies’, in Kubik, J. and Linch, A. (eds.) Postcommunism from 
Within Social Justice, Mobilization, and Hegemony, New York and London: New 
York University Press, pp. 27-94.	  
	  
Kubik, J. (2015a) ‘Between Contextualization and Comparison: A Thorny 
Relationship between East European Studies and Disciplinary ‘Mainstreams’, East 
European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 29 (2): pp. 352-365. 	  
	  
Kubik, J. (2015b) What to do with Area Studies and Cross-(Multi)disciplinarity in the 
21st Century, Lecture at the Conference ‘Area Studies in the 21st Century’, 9 
November 2015, Available at: http://www.ceelbas.ac.uk/workshops/area-studies-in-
the-twenty-first-century-podcast (Accessed 5 January 2016).	  
 
Ledeneva, A. (1998) Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal 
Exchange, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
	  
 239 
 
Ledeneva, A. (2009) ‘From Russia with Blat: can Informal Networks help Modernize 
Russia?’, Social Research, 76 (1): pp. 259-288. 	  
 
Ledeneva, A. (2013) ‘Sistema: How Putin’s Russia is Governed’, UCL SSEES 
Research Blog, 11 March, Available at: 
http://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/2013/03/11/sistema-how-putins-russia-is- governed’ 
(Accessed 14 March 2013). 	  
 
Linch, A. (2013) ‘Introduction: Postcommunism in a New Key: Bottom up and Inside 
out’, in Kubik, J, and Linch, A. (eds.) ‘Postcommunism from Within Social Justice, 
Mobilization, and Hegemony, New York and London: New York University Press, 
pp. 1-26. 
 
Lindquist, G. (2006) Conjuring Hope Healing and Magic in Contemporary Russia, 
Oxford: Berghahn Books.	  
	  
Lipman, M. (2014) ‘No Good Economic Options for Putin’, Commentary: European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 10 December, Available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_no_good_economic_options_for_putin377 
(Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Lokshina, T. (2013) ‘Russia’s 2013: The Year in Human Rights’, opendemocracy.net, 
24 December, Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/tanya-
lokshina/russias-2013-year-in-human-rights, Accessed 1 December 2015. 
 
Lovell, S. (2006) Destination in Doubt Russia since 1989, London: Zed Books. 
 
Luzhkov, Y. M. (2005) Parkinson’s Law An Insight into the Irrational Russian 
Character, Middlesex: Middlesex University Press. 
 
Machalek, K. (no date) ‘Factsheet: Russia’s NGO laws’, Freedom House, Available 
at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf (Accessed 1 June 
2015).  
 240 
 
 
Maggs, P. B. et al. (1997) ‘The Civil Code of the Russian Federation: parts 1 and 2’, 
London: M. E. Sharpe. 
 
Martin, R. L. and Osberg, S. (2007) ‘Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for 
Definition’, Stanford Social Innovation Review Spring 2007, Available at: 
http://www.ngobiz.org/picture/File/Social%20Enterpeuneur-
The%20Case%20of%20Definition.pdf (Accessed 14 October 2015).  
 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., et al. (2006) Reforming Regional-Local Finance in Russia, 
Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The 
World Bank. 
 
Matantsev, I. (1999) ‘The Civil Law Status of a Municipal Unitary Enterprise under 
Russian legislation, Review of Central and East European Law, 1998 (5/6): pp. 443-
450. 
	  
McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C. (2002) ‘The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in 
Transition Economies’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (3): pp. 153-170.	  
 
Medvedev, D. (2009) ‘Dmitry Medvedev’s article, Go Russia!’, Office of the 
President of Russia, kremlin.ru, Available at: http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/298 
(Accessed 16 July 2013). 
	  
Merry, W. (2011) ‘The Crisis of Russian Modernisation’, Russia and Beyond: Open 
Democracy, opendemocracy.net, 20 July, Available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/wayne-merry/crisis-of-russian-
modernisation (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Meyer, H. et al. (2013) ‘Putin’s pardon of Tycoon buoys Russia before Sochi Games’, 
Bloomberg.com, 20 December, Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-20/khodorkovsky-free-after-10-
years-in-prison-as-putin-signs-pardon (Accessed 1 December 2015). 
 241 
 
 
Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. (2015) ‘Vladimir 
Putin Named the Key Conditions for the Development of Small and Medium 
Business’, Federal Web Portal for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, Ministry of 
Economic Development of the Russian Federation, 10 April, Available at: 
http://en.smb.gov.ru/sme/news/263.html (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. (2016a) ‘Federal Law 
from July 24, 2007 No. 209-FZ’, Federal Web Portal for Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises, Available at: http://en.smb.gov.ru/support/regulation/209-fz/ (accessed 2 
March 2016).	  
 
Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (2016b) ‘About SME’, 
Federal Web Portal for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, Available at: 
http://en.smb.gov.ru/sme/about/ (Accessed 7 March 2017). 
 
Monaghan, A. (2014) ‘Can Russia ever extract itself from Corruption?’ Valdai 
Discussion Club, valdaiclub.com, 13 February 2014, Available at: 
http://valdaiclub.com/politics/66805.html (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Morris, J. (2012a) ‘Beyond Coping? Alternatives to Consumption within a Social 
Network of Russian Workers’, Ethnography, 14 (1): pp. 85-103. 
	  
Morris, J. (2012b) ‘Unruly Entrepreneurs: Russian Worker Responses to Insecure 
Formal Employment’, Global Labour Journal, 3 (2): pp. 217-236. 	  
 
Morris, J. and Polese, A. (2014) ‘Introduction: Informality – Enduring Practices, 
Entwined Livelihoods’, in Morris, J, and Polese, A. (eds.) The Informal Post-Socialist 
Economy Embedded Practices and Livelihoods, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1-18.	  
 
Narayan, D. (1999) ‘Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty’, Policy 
Research Working Paper 2067, Washington D. C.: The Word Bank. 
	  
 242 
 
Naval’nyi, A. (2015a) ‘”Chaika”. Fil’m fonda bor’by s korruptsiei’’, 1 December, 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXYQbgvzxdM (Accessed 16 
March 2016). 	  
	  
Naval’nyi, A. (2015b). ‘Kto v Zamke Zhivet? FBK Dokazyvaet: Elitnuyu 
Londonskuyu Nedvizhimost’ Vitze-Prem’er Shuvalov Arenduyet sam y sebya’, 23 
July, Available at: https://navalny.com/p/4346/ (Accessed 20 January 2016). 
 
Naval’nyi, A. (2015c). ‘Noven’kii Dom Press-Sekretarya Peskova. Skromno – 4700 
millionov rublei, 17 September, Available at: https://navalny.com/p/4455/ (Accessed 
20 January 2016).	  
	  
Nechepurenko, I. (2015) ‘Shoigu at 60: The Man who Would be Russia’s King?’, 
themoscowtimes.com, 21 May, Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/shoigu-at-60-the-man-who-would-be-
russias-king/522018.html (Accessed 25 December 2015). 
	  
Nellis, J. (2002) ‘External Advisors and Privatization in Transition Economies’, 
Working Paper Number 3, Centre for Global Development Working Papers, Centre 
for Global Development: Washington D.C.	  
	  
Nilan, P. (2002) ‘‘Dangerous fieldwork’ re-examined: the question of researcher 
subject position’, Qualitative Research, 2(3): pp. 363-386.	  
 
North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.	  
	  
North, D. C. (1993, reprinted 1996) 'Epilogue: Economic Performance through Time', 
in Alston, L. J. et al. (eds.) Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 342-355.	  
	  
 243 
 
North, D. C. et al. (2007) ‘Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New 
Approach to the Problems of Development’. Policy Research Working Paper 4359: 
The World Bank, Washington D. C.: The World Bank. 
 
North, D. C. et al. (2009) Violence and Social Orders, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
North, D. C. et al. (2013a) ‘Lessons in the Shadow of Violence, in North, D, C. et al 
(eds.) In the Shadow of Violence Politics, Economics and the Problems of 
Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 328-350. 
 
North, D. C. et al. (2013b) ‘Limited Access Orders: An Introduction to the 
Conceptual Framework’ in North, D, C. et al. (eds.) In the Shadow of Violence 
Politics, Economics and the Problems of Development, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 1-23. 
 
Oda, H. (2007) Russian Commercial Law: Second Edition, Leiden and Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
OECD. (2013) Russia Modernising the Economy, OECD ‘Better Policies’ Series, 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/publications/russia-modernising-the-economy-
9789264207998-en.htm (Accessed 15 March 2016).	  
	  
OECD. (2014) OECD Economic Surveys Russian Federation Overview, Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-russian-federation.htm, Accessed 
15 March 2016).	  
 	  
OECD. (2015) Russian Federation: Key Issues and Policies, OECD Studies on SMEs 
and Entrepreneurship, Paris: OECD Publishing. 	  
	  
Ojaro, A. and Isomäki, H. (2011). ‘Entrepreneurship and Small Business in Russia: a 
Review of Empirical Research’, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, 18 (1), pp. 97-119. 
 244 
 
 
Olsen, M. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Oushakine, S. A. (2009) The Patriotism of Despair Nation, War, and Loss in Russia, 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Oxenstierna, S. and Olsen, P. (2015) ‘The Economic Sanctions against Russia: Impact 
and Prospects of Success’, Report FOI-R--4097—SE, Stockholm, FOI.  
 
Paert, I. K. (2004) ‘Memory and Survival in Stalin’s Russia: Old Believers in the 
Urals during the 1930s-50s’, in Bertaux, D. et al (eds.) Living Through the Soviet 
System, London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 195-213. 
 
Patico, J. (2008) Consumption and Social Change in a Post-Soviet Middle Class, 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
 
Patico, J. (2009) ‘Spinning the Market the Moral Alchemy of Everyday Talk in Post-
Socialist Russia’, Critique of Anthropology, 29 (2): pp. 205-224. 
 
Pine, F. and Bridger, S. (1998) ‘Introduction: Transitions to Post-Socialism and 
Cultures of Survival’, in Pine, F. and Bridger, S. (eds) Surviving Post-Socialism Local 
Strategies and Regional Responses, London: Routledge, pp. 2-15. 
 
Piper, E. (2015) ‘In Russia, Crisis Deepens Slide in Living Standards for Pensioners’, 
reuters.com, 28 January, Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/28/us-
russia-crisis-pensioners-idUSKBN0L10D320150128#kTZ8hL6T8Aoyc7pv.97, 
Accessed 2 December 2015. 
 
Pokrovsky, N, E. and Nikolaeva, U, G. (2014) ‘Blizhnii Sever kak chast’ Bol’shoi 
Kartiny Mira’, in Pokrovsky, N, E. and Nikolaeva, U, G. (eds) Potentsial Blizhnego 
Severa: Economika, Ekologia, Sel’skie Poseleniya’, Moskva: Logos, pp. 450-479. 
 
 245 
 
Pomerantsev, P. (2015) Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, London: Faber 
and Faber Limited. 
 
Prezident Rossii (2013) ‘V Gosdumu vnesen na Rassmotrenie Proekt Postanovleniya 
ob Ob”yavlenii Amnistii v Svyazi c 20-letiem Prinyatiya Konstitutsii Rossii’, 
Sobytiya, kremlin.ru, published 9 December, Available at: 
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19811 (Accessed March 10 2014). 
 
Private Eye. (2016) ‘It’s Boom Time in Putin-on-Thames’, Private Eye, Issue 1411, 
Available at: http://www.private-eye.co.uk/issue-1411/in-the-back (Accessed 18 
February 2016).	  
	  
Promstroi Grup. (2015) ‘O Kompanii’, promstroi-group.ru, Available at: 
http://www.promstroi-group.ru/index.php?id=about) (Accessed 14 October 2015).  
 
Puffer, S. M. and McCarthy, D. J. (2007) ‘Can Russia’s State-Managed, Network-
Capitalism be Competitive? Institutional Pull versus Institutional Push’, Journal of 
World Business, 42 (2007): pp. 1-13. 
 
Puffer, S. M. et al. (2009) ‘Entrepreneurship in Russia and China: the Impact of 
Formal Institutional Voids’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34: pp. 441-467. 
 
Puzanov, A. (2009) 'Development of the Real Estate Rights System  
in Russia in 1989-2009’, Institute of Urban Economics, Available at: 
http://www.urbaneconomics.ru/eng/publications.php?folder_id=19&mat_id=86 
(Accessed 27 November 2015). 
 
Radaev, V. (2002) ‘Entrepreneurial Strategies and the Structure of Transaction Costs 
in Russian Business’, in Bonnell, V. E. and Gold, T. B. (eds.) The New Entrepreneurs 
of Europe and Asia Patterns of Business Development in Russia, Eastern Europe and 
China, London: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 191-213. 
 
 246 
 
Radziwill, A. and Vaziakova, Y. (2015) ‘Improving the Business Climate in Russia’, 
OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1192 (ECO/WKP(2015)10), 
Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(
2015)10&docLanguage=En (Accessed 27 November 2015). 
	  
Razomasova, E. A. (2010) Rify v Farvatere Malogo Biznesa Sfery Uslug, E’KO. 
Vserossiiskii’ E’konomicheskii’ Zhurnal, January 1: pp. 127-134. 	  
	  
Ries, N. (2002) ‘”Honest Bandits” and “Warped People”: Russian Narratives about 
Money, Corruption, and Moral Decay’, in Greenhouse, C. J. et al (eds) Ethnography 
in Unstable Places, Durham and London: Duke University Press, pp. 276-315.	  
 
Ries, N. (2009) ‘Potato Ontology’, Cultural Anthropology 24 (2): pp. 181-212.	  
	  
Robinson, N. (2009) ‘August 1998 and the Development of Russia’s Post-Communist 
Political Economy, Review of International Political Economy, 16 (3): pp. 433-455. 
 
Robinson, N. (2011). ‘Russian Patrimonial Capitalism and the International Financial 
Crisis’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 27 (3-4): pp. 434-455. 
 
Robinson, N. (2013a). ‘Introduction: The Political Problems of Russian Capitalism’ 
in Robinson, N. (ed.) The Political Economy of Russia, Plymouth: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, pp. 1-14.  
 
Robinson, N. (2013b). ‘Economic and Political Hybridity: Patrimonial Capitalism in 
the Post-Soviet Sphere’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 4 (2013): pp. 136-145. 
 
Roschin, M. (1995) ‘Old Belief and Work’, Religion, State and Society, 23 (3): pp. 
263-267. 
 
Rose, R. (1994) ‘Getting by Without Government: Everyday Life in Russia’, 
Daedalus, 123 (3): pp. 41-62. 
 247 
 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta. (2004) ‘Federal’nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatzii ot 30 Dekabrya 
2004 G. N 214-F3’, rg.ru, 31 December, Available at: 
http://www.rg.ru/2004/12/31/dolevoe-stroitelstvo-dok.html (Accessed 2 December 
2015). 
 
Round, J, and Williams, C. (2010) ‘Coping with the Social Costs of “Transition”: 
Everyday Life in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine’, European Urban and Regional 
Studies, 17 (2): pp. 183-196. 
 
Round, J. (2005) ‘Rescaling Russia’s Geography: The Challenges of Depopulating 
the Northern Periphery’, Europe-Asia Studies, 57 (5), pp. 705-727.  
 
Ruptly TV. (2015) ‘Russia: Putin Outlines Goals to Boost Entrepreneurship in 
Russia’, youtube.com, 7 April, Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vr1cW0g0w8I (Accessed 1 June 2015). 
 
Rutland, P. (2005) ‘Anti-Semitism and the Russian Oligarchs’, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, 1 February, Available at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programmes/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=274
72&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=176&no_cache=1#.VWxA0GAxErV (Accessed 21 
May 2015). 
 
Rutland, P. (2015) ‘Petronation? Oil, Gas and National Identity in Russia’, Post-
Soviet Affairs, 31 (1): pp. 66-89. 
 
Sakwa, R. (2014) Putin and the Oligarch: the Khodorkovsky-Yukos affair, London: I. 
B. Tauris and Co. Ltd. 
 
Sakwa, R. (2013) ‘Systematic Stalemate: Reiderstvo and the Dual State’, in Robinson, 
N. (ed) The Political Economy of Russia, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, pp. 69-96. 
 
 248 
 
Salmenniemi, S. (2013) ‘Post-Soviet Khosiain: Class, Self and Morality in Russian 
Self-Help Literature’, Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289456788_Post-
Soviet_Khoziain_Class_self_and_morality_in_Russian_self-help_literature 
(Accessed 25 February 2017). 
 
Salmenniemi, S, Karhunen, P, and Kosonen, R. (2011) ‘Between Business and Byt’: 
Experiences of Women Entrepreneurs in Contemporary Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 
63 (1): pp. 77-98. 
 
Salmenniemi, S. and Vorona, M. (2014) ‘Reading Self-Help Literature in Russia: 
Governmentality, Psychology, and Subjectivity’, The British Journal of Sociology, 65 
(1) pp. 43-62. 
 
Schneider Group. (no date) ‘Accounting and Taxes in Russia’, Available at: 
http://schneider-
group.com/sites/default/files/brochures/SCHNEIDER_GROUP_Accounting_and_tax
es_in_Russia_web.pdf (Accessed 18 November 2015). 
 
Schrader, H. (2004) ‘Social Capital and Social Transformation in Russia’, Journal for 
East European Management Studies, 9 (4): pp. 391-410.  
	  
Schreck, C. (2015) ‘Western Scholars Alarmed by Russian Deportations, Fines’ 
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 31 March, Available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-western-scholars-alarmed-
deportations/26929921.html (Accessed 1 April 2016). 
	  
Schreck, C. and Shakirov, M. (2015). ‘Russian Businessman Lashes out at Kremlin, 
Becomes Cause Celebre’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 11 December, Available 
at: http://www.rferl.mobi/a/russia-businessman-rails-against-official-
extortion/27420874.html (Accessed 12 December 2015).	  
	  
 249 
 
Schwenk, A. (2015) ‘Summer camps in Russia – the Analysis of a Cultural Form in 
an Authoritarian Political Figuration’, Conference Paper, 12th Conference of the 
European Sociological Association 2015, 26 August. 
 
Scott, J. C. (2012) ‘Infrapolitics and Mobilizations: A Response by James C. Scott’, Revue 
Française d’études Américaines 1 (131): pp. 112-117.  
 
Shevchenko, O. (2009) Crisis and the Everyday in Post-Socialist Moscow, 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.	  
	  
Shlapentokh, V, and Arutunyan, A. 2013. Freedom, Repression, and Private Property 
in Russia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shlapentokh, V. (2007) Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society a New Perspective 
on the post-Soviet era, Basingstoke: Basingstoke MacMillan. 
 
Sluka, J, A. (2007) ‘Fieldwork Conflicts, Hazards and Dangers’, in Robben, A, C, G, 
M. and Sluka, J, A. (eds.) Ethnographic Fieldwork: An Anthropological Reader, 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 217-222. 
 
Siberian Times Reporter. (2014) ‘All in! Siberian’s First Casino Opens, Complete 
with Golden Sinks’, siberiantimes.com, 8 November, Available at: 
http://siberiantimes.com/business/casestudy/features/f0007-all-in-siberias-first-
casino-opens-complete-with-gold-sinks/ (Accessed 20 November 2015).  
 
Siberian Times Reporter. (2015) ‘Would you take a Blood Bath to Boost Potency, 
Restore Beauty or Hold Back Aging?’, siberiantimes.com, 25 August, Available at: 
http://siberiantimes.com/other/others/features/f0145-would-you-take-a-blood-bath-to-
boost-potency-restore-beauty-or-hold-back-ageing/ (Accessed 22 November 2015). 
 
Smolinski, L. (2013) ‘Russia: the Dwindling Employees of the Big State’, 
blogs.ft.com, 24 October, Available at: http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
 250 
 
brics/2013/10/24/russia-the-dwindling-employees-of-the-big-state/ (Accessed 2 
December 2015). 
 
Smooha, S. (2008) ‘The Mass Immigrations to Israel: A Comparison of the Failure of 
the Mizrahi immigrants of the 1950s with the Success of the Russian Immigrants of 
the 1990s’, The Journal of Israeli History, 27 (1): pp 1-27. 
 
Spuknik. (2012) ‘Siberian Red Deer Farms in the Altai Mountains’, 
sputniknews.com, 27 June, Available at: 
http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20120627/174271419.html (Accessed 22 November 
2015). 
 
Stoll, D. (2013) ‘Three Ethnographies of Escape via Pyramid Schemes’, 
Anthropological Quarterly, 86 (1): pp 277-285. 
 
Sutela, P. (1999) ‘Russia: the State and Future of the Economy’, Bank of Finland 
Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Available at: 
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/pdf/92876.pdf (Accessed 15 January 2016). 
 
TASS. (2014a) ‘Putin Signs Law Authorizing Gambling Zones in Sochi and Crimea’, 
tass.ru, 23 July, available at: http://tass.ru/en/russia/741958 (Accessed 20 November 
2015). 
 
TASS. (2014b) ‘Putin: Gosudarstvo dolzhno sdelat’ vse, chtoby v Biznec nikto ne lez 
c “Kryshevaniem”’, tass.ru, 7 April, Available at: http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1885639 
(Accessed 21 May 2015). 
 
Taylor, B, D. (2011) State Building in Putin’s Russia, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
The Economist. (2009) ‘Dmitry Medvedev’s Building Project’, economist.com, 
November 26, Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/14973198 (Accessed 1 
June 2015).	  
 251 
 
	  
The Economist. (2012a) ‘An Unaffordable System’, economist.com, 6 October, 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21564257 (Accessed 2 December 
2015).	  
	  
The Economist. (2012b) ‘Special Report State Capitalism’, economist.com, 21 
January, Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21542931 (Accessed 26 July 
2016).  
	  
The Economist. (2012c) ‘The rise of State Capitalism’, economist.com, 21 January, 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21543160 (Accessed 26 July 2016).  
 
The Economist. (2012d) ‘Themes and Variations’, economist.com, 21 January, 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21542924 (Accessed 26 July 2016). 
	  
The Economist. (2014) ‘Planet Plutocrat’, economist.com, 13 March, Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21599041-countries-where-politically-
connected-businessmen-are-most-likely-prosper-planet (Accessed 3 April 2016). 
 
The Economist. (2015) ‘Master of Emergencies’, economist.com, 7 November, 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21677992-trusty-defence-
minister-only-person-serve-every-government-fall (Accessed 25 November 2015). 
 
The Economist. (2016a) ‘Government in Exile’, economist.com, 11 February, 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21692934-new-generation-
migr-s-has-plans-homeland-they-never-wanted-flee-government?frsc=dg%7Ca 
(Accessed 15 March 2016).	  
 
The Economist. (2016b) ‘Night of the Long Scoops’, economist.com, 18 February, 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21693253-smashing-little-
capitalists-russias-capital-night-long-
scoops?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07 (Accessed 15 March 
2016). 
 252 
 
 
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. (2016) ‘The Panama 
Papers Politicians, Criminals and the Rogue Industry that Hides their Cash’, 
panamapapers.icij.org, no date, Available at: https://panamapapers.icij.org (Accessed 
4 April 2016).	  
	  
The Moscow Times. (2014) ‘Just 3% of Small Russian Businesses last more than 3 
years’, themoscowtimes.com, 23 October, Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/509984.html (Accessed 15 March 2016).	  
	  
The Moscow Times. (2015) ‘Putin Frees Small Businesses from Inspections for 3 
Years’, themoscowtimes.com, 14 July, Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/525639.html (Accessed 15 March 2016).	  
	  
Tomlinson, K. (2002) 'Coping as Kin: Responses to Suffering among Displaced 
Meskhetian Turks in Post-Soviet Krasnodar, Russian Federation', PhD Dissertation, 
Department of Anthropology: University College London.	  
	  
Transparency International. (2016) ‘Table of Results: Corruption Perceptions Index 
2015’ Available at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table (Accessed 15 
March 2016).	  
	  
Trudolyubov, M. (2014) ‘Business, Power, and Property Rights in Russia after 
Crimea’, 
Kennan Institute Event, November 17, Available at: 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/business-power-and-property-rights-russia-after-
crimea (Accessed 15 March 2015). 	  
	  
Van Maanen, J. (1995). ‘An End to Innocence: The Ethnography of Ethnography’, in 
Van Maanen, J. (ed.) Representation in Ethnography, London: SAGE Publications 
Ltd. 
	  
 253 
 
Varese, F. (1994) ‘Is Sicily the Future of Russia? Private Protection and the Rise of 
the Russian Mafia’, European Journal of Sociology, 35 (2): pp. 224-258. 
 
Vasiliev, P. V. and Bernhard, B. J. (2011) ‘Prohibitions and Policy in the Global 
Gaming Industry: a Genealogy and Media Content Analysis of Gaming Restrictions 
in Contemporary Russia’, UNLV Gaming Research and Review Journal, 15 (1): pp. 
71-86. 
 
Verdery, K. (1996) ‘Faith, Hope and Caritas in the Land of the Pyramids: Romania, 
1990 to 1994’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 37 (4): pp. 625-669. 
 
Verdery, K. (1996) What was Socialism and What Comes Next? Chichester, West 
Sussex: Princeton University Press. 
 
Vice. (2013) ‘Surviving in the Siberian Wilderness for 70 years (full length)’, Video, 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tt2AYafET68 (Accessed 7 October 
2015). 
 
Volkov, V. (2002) ‘The Selective Use of State Capacity in Russia’s Economy’, 
PONARS Policy Memo No. 273, Available at: 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pm_0273.pdf 
(Accessed 3 March 2017).  
 
Walker, C. (2009) ‘From ‘Inheritance’ to Individualization: Disembedding Working-
Class Youth Transitions in Post-Soviet Russia’, Journal of Youth Studies, 12 (5): pp. 
531-545. 
 
Walker, C. (2011) ‘Positionality and Difference in Cross-Cultural Youth Research: 
Being ‘Other’ in the Former Soviet Union’, in Heath, S, and Walker, C. (eds) 
Innovations in Youth Research, London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 210-228. 
 
Walker, C. 2015. ‘Stability and Precarity in the Lives and Narratives of Working-
Class Men in Putin’s Russia’, Social Alternatives, 34 (4): pp. 28-34. 
 
 254 
 
Walker, C. (2016) ‘In Search of “Stability”: Working-Class Men, Masculinity and 
Wellbeing in Contemporary Russia’, in Karioris, F, G. and Lindisfarne, N. (eds.) 
Masculinities under Neoliberalism, London: Zed Books Ltd, chapter 3 (Kindle 
version). 
 
Walker, S. (2013) ‘We're now in the "Vladimir Vladimirovich Please Solve this Local 
Issue Caused by the Outrageous Behaviour of Local Officials" Segment, Twitter, 19 
December, https://twitter.com/shaunwalker7/status/413626346867134464?lang=en 
(Accessed 19 December 2013). 
 
Weaver, C. (2012) ‘Berezovsky-Abramovich: Why the Fuss?, ft.com, 31 August, 
Available at: http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/31/berezovsky-abramovich-
why-all-the-fuss/ (Accessed 21 May 2015). 
 
Williams, C. C. and Onoshchenko, O. (2015) ‘Evaluating the Validity of the 
Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives Towards the Informal Economy in Ukraine’, in 
Morris, J, and Polese, A. (eds) Informal Economies in Post-Socialist Spaces 
Practices, Institutions and Networks, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 25-50. 
 
Williams, C. C. and Round, J. (2009) ‘Beyond Hierarchical Representations of the 
Formal/Informal Employment Dualism’, European Societies, 11 (1): pp. 77-101. 
 
Williams, C. C. et al. (2013) The Role of Informal Economies in the Post-Socialist 
World The End of Transition?, London: Routledge. 
 
Williams, N. and Vorley, T. (2014) ‘Institutional Asymmetry: How Formal and 
Informal Institutions Affect Entrepreneurship in Bulgaria’, International Small 
Business Journal, 33 (8): pp. 840-861.	  
	  
Winiecki, J. (2012) ‘Russia and China Facing the “Great Wall”: How to Succeed in 
the Second Structural Transition. Post-Communist Economies, 24 (3): pp. 309-325. 
 
 255 
 
Woolcock, M. (2001) ‘The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and 
Economic Outcomes’, info.worldbank.com, Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/9746/woolcock_e.pdf, (Accessed 14 
August 2016). 
 
World Bank. (2016) Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory Quality and 
Efficiency, Washington, DC: World Bank.	  
	  
World Justice Project. (2016) ‘Rule of Law Index’, available from: 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#table, accessed 15 March 2016. 	  
	  
Yakovlev, A. (2014) ‘Russian Modernization: Between the Need for New Players and 
the Fear of Losing Control of Rent Sources’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 5, pp. 10-
20.	  
	  
Yakovlev, A. (2015) ‘State-Business Relations in Russia after 2011 ‘New Deal’ or 
Imitation of Changes?’, in Oxenstierna, S. (ed.) The Challenges of Russia’s 
Politicized Economic System, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 59-76.	  
	  
Yakovleva, Ya. (2012) ‘100 Shagov Putina – Ochen’ Malen’kikh Shagov’, slon.ru, 2 
February, available at: 
https://slon.ru/economics/100_shagov_putina_zhdem_konkretnykh_predlozheniy- 
737001.xhtml (Accessed 7 September 2015).	  
 	  
Yurchak, A. (2002) ‘Entrepreneurial Governmentality in Post-Socialist Russia a 
Cultural Investigation of Business Practices in Russian Business, in Bonnell, V. E. 
and Gold, T. B. (eds.) The New Entrepreneurs of Europe and Asia Patterns of 
Business Development in Russia, Eastern Europe and China, London: M. E. Sharpe, 
pp. 278-324. 
 
Yurchak, A. (2005) Everything was Forever, Until it was No More, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 256 
 
 
Zubarevich, N. (2012) ‘Four Russias: Rethinking the Post-Soviet Map’, 
opendemocracy.net, 29 March, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-
russia/natalia-zubarevich/four-russias-rethinking-post-soviet-map (Accessed 28 
February 2017).  
